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· Abstract 
Many of the recent armed conflicts have taken place in cities of the Developing World. In the 
resulting emergency situations, water supply and sanitation are among the most essential ser-
vices to restore. They form part of the urban services available to. the city dwellers that are 
commonly managed by local water sector institutions. 
This is, in principle, acknowledged by aid agencies but partnerships between them and water 
sector institutions do not always happen because of concerns such as: independence vis-a-vis 
the local government; possible corruption arid inefficiency problems; and political obstacles. 
Moreover, agencies prefer short-term structural rehabilitation to long-term institutional devel-
opment, for which they do not always feel sufficiently qualified and experienced. 
This study tackles the problem by determining how these partnerships influence the perform-
ance of aid operations, in particular in terms of efficiency I effectiveness in the case of emer-
gency response and of sustainability and coverage in the case of rehabilitation. It is based on a 
number of case studies selected in: Kabul (Afghanistan); Jaffna (Sri Lanka); Monrovia (Uberia); 
Bemi (Democratic Republic of Congo); Port-au Prince and Port-de-Paix (Haiti), and Grozny 
(Chechnya in the Russian Federation). 
For emergency operations, findings show that partnerships tend to take place when the type or 
level of technology involved and/or security conditions do not allow the aid agency to work in-
dependently from water utilities. Partnerships do not necessarily influence efficiency I effec-
tiveness in the short term but are beneficial because they prepare for rehabilitation. 
In terms of rehabilitation, findings suggest that current practice maintains a separation between 
large-scale rehabilitation projects and community-based projects focusing on specific 
neighbourhoods. This has a detrimental effect on sustainability and fails to address the needs 
of the most vulnerable populations. The study recommends a more coordinated approach that 
involves a reform of funding patterns, in order to reconcile sustainability and universal service. 
Key words:-Anned Conflicts; Case Study Research; Developing Countries; Humanitarian Aid; 
Local Institutions; Urban areas; Water and Sanitation. 
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Preamble 
The field of research of this PhD was originally proposed· to me in an e-mail. It was described 
as: 'urban emergency water or sanitation'. This e-mail was sent to me while I was worning in 
Kabul, Which is among the best possible environments to seek 'inspiration' for this kind of topic. 
My original idea was to research urban sanitation, an area I knew relatively well since I had 
worned on a large-scale urban sanitation programme in Kabul with the Intemational Red Cross. 
However, by the time I decided I would apply for this PhD and received a positive feed-back to 
my application, I had changed my mind and opted for a somewhat more 'controversial' topic: 
how to worn efficiently with local govemment? At the time, it looked as a genuine and funda-
mental problem and my views in this regard have not changed since. The idea emerged, based 
on my relatively long experience of dealing with local authorities throughout my professional life 
as an aid worner. This aspect of humanitarian inteNentions is crucial- in particular in cities-
and represents a challenge for many organisations. I was several times confronted with it and 
realized how little· aid agencies knew about how best to address this fundamental aspect of 
their worn. I arrived at Loughborough with this idea in mind and never deviated from it. Consult-
ing with some of my former colleagues and supeNisor only reinforced the opinion that this was 
an appropriate topiC. Later, I found out that vel}' little research had been carried out on how aid 
agencies deal with local instiMions in emergencies, in particular in field of water and sanita-
tion. My own interpretation of the reasons behind the apparent lack of academic interest in the 
issue - which I mention in the course of this thesis - is that relief worners do not often pub-
lish their thoughts on this kind of issue and academics tend to be absent from the field in 
emergency situations. 
I had to refine the orientation of my study on two aspects: the type of emergency and the stage 
of the emergency I wanted to look at. The type of emergency has to do with its causes. Basi-
cally, two different circumstances are relevant to water and sanitation assistance: emergencies 
resulting from natural hazards, and those caused by armed conflicts. I initially explored both 
avenues, but following a decisive trip to the University of Yorn, I decided to only keep the latter. 
The main reason was that humanitarian inteNentions in natural disasters and armed conflicts 
are vel}' different in character and exploring both would have compromised the coherence of 
the whole study. My experience of worning in conflict areas with the Intemational Red Cross 
also contributed to this choice. As for the phase of the emergency explored, I somewhat ex-
panded the initial research topiC, since a large part of this study is concemed with rehabilita-
tion, which actually comes after the emergency phase - although it is sometimes more com-
plicated than that. The main reason for focusing more on rehabifitation was that the role of wa-
ter sector institutions during this period appears to be more fundamental than in emergencies. 
vii 
My ambition is that this study, and/or the papers published while it was canied out become not 
only a contribution to knowledge, but also a way of raising awareness on the need for a more 
coherent approach of partnership between aid agencies and local institutions. 
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A. Introduction 
A.lntroduction 
1. Background to the study: the urban environment 
Cities have always caused fascination. Their names are engraved in human history, associated 
with great accomplishments. From the Antiquity to the Modem Era: Babylon, Persepolis, Cuzco, 
Athens, Rome, Timbuktu, Venice, and many others, were centres of political power, economic 
supremacy, knowledge, and culture. After the Industrial Revolution, their predominance over rural 
areas became evident, as wealth generated by Industrial production based in urban centres at-
tracted manpower and constantly drained resources from the countryside. Throughout the 19th 
and 20th centuries, such process took place, first in Britain, France, Germany and the United 
States, and later in the rest of what is known as the 'developed world,l. In the last few decades, 
the 'developing world' gradually went down a similar path, but at a faster pace thanks to what has 
been known since the early 1990s, as globalization2• 
Today, continuous urbanization is a reality in most countries. For many of them, it has had painful 
consequences. The expansion of cities, especially in the developing world, has happened with 
high social and environmental costs. It is sadly ironic that cities, symbols of opulence that lured so 
many migrants from rural areas, harbour so much misery. In the same way, whilst cities have be-
come the engines for economic growth, they have also been the sources of environmental deg-
radation, which eventually also has its economic cost. 
The sheer nature of cities is at the heart ofthese problems. As Metzger (1994:610) puts it: 
'Central position and density, which are the core characteristics of the city, are 
identified as elements that contribute to create or amplify problems linked to the 
urban environment,.3 . 
The consequences may be terrible. and in extreme cases have led to the almost complete de-
struction of some cities. For instance certain effects of the expansion of cities may be the cause 
of so-called natural disasters. Social crises. ranging from civil unrest to war, have even more 
devastating consequences. They are amplified by the urban environment, which tends to erode 
traditional social networks. These crises affect living conditions, including access to the most es-
sential services such as water supply and sanitation. 
1 See section 3.2 page 4. . 
2 'Globalization involves a wider and deeper merging and interdependence of domestic economies into a world-
wide arena of competitive multi-markets and exchanges. It encompasses the flows of goods (trade). capital (fi-
nance and direct). information (transparency and access), labor (including human capital) and culture (institutional 
qattems and dynamics)' (Albala-Bertrand, 2003). 
Translated from French by the author. 
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2. Scope of the study 
This study is concerned by how the response to crises in urban areas of the developing world is 
managed. It concentrates on water and sanitation, which are basic services usually delivered by 
local institutions and examines the interaction between these institutions and aid agencies inter-
vening to help in restoring them. Two types of situations are considered: 
1. Emergency response; and 
2. Rehabilitation programmes. 
Only crises resulting from armed conflicts are considered, although some of the related notions 
also apply to crises resulting from natural hazards. 
3. Definition of core concepts 
The first step of this study consists of defining the core concepts that are used, some of which 
appear in the title. They are mostly linked to notions which have different meanings to different 
people and have sometimes generated debates. The urban environment is complex and adds to 
the complexity of the crises with which it is confronted. Even the very first notion to look at, which 
is the definition of urban areas, is far from universal. Likewise, emergency situations are hard to 
categorize and it is sometimes equally hard to define when they start and when they end. The 
. study of aid agencies, involved in the response to crises, requires reviewing a large array of very 
diverse organisations. This section· proposes a number of definitions whilst detailing aspects of 
this complexity. 
3.1 Urban areas 
There is no generally agreed definition of the concept of an urban area (Macura, 1964; Andrano-
vich and Riposa, 1993). Each country decides upon its own criteria of what is urban and what is 
rural. In general it is based on the size of a given agglomeration. The lower limit of what is con-
sidered as urban ranges from 300 people to 20,000 (Macura, 1964). Other characteristics of the 
urban environment include: a dense population; a concentrated living space; the existenCe of 
specific social networks and a variety of economic activities and social lifestyles (Andranovich 
and Riposa, 1993). 
The definition of a ~ or urban area proposed by Albala-Bertrand (2003:87) is based on these 
criteria. It states: 
\11 city or urban area is a set of infrastructure, other structures and buildings that 
create an environment to serve a population living within a relatively small and 
confined geographic area. The lives and livelihoods of the population are sup-
ported by interrelated systems around which the urban area and society function '. 
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In the developing world, countries such as The Philippines base their definition of urban areas on 
the type of economic activities, others, such as Benin, use population density (Tacoli, 1998), most 
have population thresholds, usually comprised between 1,500 and 5,000 inhabitants (Hardoy and 
Satterthwaite, 1986). Criteria to classify an area as urban or rural are arbitrary, as reflected in the 
definition proposed by Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989): 
:A concentration of people, buildings or economic activities which a govemment 
chooses to call "an urban centre" '. 
In terms of economic activity, it is often considered that agriculture characterizes rural areas 
whereas industry and services would essentially be urban. Tacoli (1998) challenges this concept, 
arguing that it is somewhat blurred by the considerable interaction between sectors traditionally 
believed to be part of each of the two environments. Urban poor tend to engage in agriculture 
whilst a considerable number of rural households find livelihoods in non-agriculture activities. 
The peri-urban interface of urban areas in developing countries is where the majority of these in-
teractions take place. It is an area where agricultural and non-agricultural activities tend to be car-
ried out side by side (Tacoli, 1998). It is also a place where a large number of poor urban dwellers 
tend to live and where many environmental problems tend to be concentrated because of the 
disposal of solid waste and wastewater coming from central districts (Mattingly, 1999). Many new- . 
corners to urban areas first settle in the peri-urban interface. Their constant groWth, especially in 
South-East Asia, adds to the difficulty of defining urban areas. City boundaries become arbitrarY 
in places where urban and rural activities are mixed (Goldstein, 1994; Tacoli, 1998). As a conse-
quence, population figures may vary considerably, depending on where boundaries are placed. 
The variation between countries in the definition of what is urban has an influence on urban sta-
tistics and often make comparisons irrelevant. The United Nations has tried, with limited success, 
to standardize thresholds in order to address this problem (Satterthwaite, 1998; Drakakis-Smith, 
2000). The organisation has decided that: urban centres are: 'settlements of over 20,000 people'; 
cities: 'are over 100,000, "million cities· are over a million, "big cities· are over 5 million in size'; 
and mega-cities are: 'those with populations exceeding 8 million (Beall, 2000:430)'. 
Satterthwaite (1998) points out that a large proportion of urban dwellers live in market towns or 
administrative centres which are not villages but are too small to be considered as cities. The dis-
tinction between city and town is another issue on which finding agreement has proved difficult. 
Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989) consider the term town as 'ambiguous' and define a town as: 
'an urban centre too small or too agriculturally based to be considered a city'. 
Another characteristic of urban areas is the presence of a number of services, among which are 
water and sanitation. This issue will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. For the pur-
pose of this study, urban areas are agglomerations large or important enough to benefit from ur-
ban services delivered by local institutions. This notion is defined in section 3.6. 
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3.2 Developing countries 
The World Bank (2005) defines developing countries as: 
'Low- and middle-income countries in which most people .have a lower standard . 
of living with access to fewer goods and services than do most people in high-
income countries'. 
This classification is based on countries' Gross National Income ' (GNI) per capita, and relies on 
specific thresholds, which appear in Table A.1. 
Table A-1: Countries classification according to GNI per capita 
_11 
Todaro and Smith (2005:792) describe developing countries as: 
'mainly characterized by low levels of living, high rates of population growth, low 
income per capita, and general economic and technological dependence on de-
veloped economies'. . 
Based on 2004 values, the World Bank includes a total of 152 countries - out of 176 - in the 
categories 'Iow-income' and 'middle-income'. The definition of developing countries, on this basis, 
does not fully represent levels of development, given the existing inequalities within countries. 
Besides, conSidering 'Upper Middle-Income' countries as developing leads to including countries 
such as H·ungary, Poland or the Baltic states, which are currently members of the European Un-
ion (EU) and do not fit the criteria - at least on the basis of the description by Todaro and Smith 
(2005). Excluding 'Upper Middle-Income' countries avoids this problem and reduces the list to 
118 countries but leaves out countries such as Botswana, Gabon, Mexico and Venezuela, which 
are commonly considered as 'developing'. Such discrepancies seem hard to avoid if the classifi-
cation has be based on countries' GNI. 
In the rest of the study, 'developing countries' will refer to 'Lower Middle-Income' and 'Lower-
Income', as defined by the World Bank based on 2004 data. Map A-1 illustrates the geographical 
distribution of developing countries, based on GNI per capita values for 2003. 
1 GNI per capita: is gross nafional income divided by midyear population. GNI per capita in U. S. dollars is con-
verted using tile World BalJk Atlas method (The World Bank, 2005b). 
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Map A-1: GNI per Capita, 2003 
Source: The World Bank, 2005 
The Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs further distin-
guishes 'Less Developed Regions' and 'Least Developed Regions'. Their list appears in Box A-1. 
Box A-1: Less developed regions and least developed countries 
Source: Population Division, 2005 
3.3 Emergency situations and rehabilitation 
The noticins of emergency response and rehabilitation are related to the occurrence of a disaster. 
The United Nations defines a disaster as: 
'A serious disruption of the functioning of a society, causing widespread human, 
. material, or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected society . 
to cope using its own resources' (UNISDR, 2004:Annex1). 
An emergency situation is the consequence of a disaster. Relief operations aim at alleviating the 
suffering of those affected by an emergency. 
Disasters are usually classified into natural and man-made. Natural disasters are produced by 
hazards of natural origin such as extreme weather, geophysical phenomena and epidemics, 
whereas human activity is the cause for man-made disasters. Man-made disasters are divided 
5 
A. Introduction 
into teqhnological disasters - such as industrial or transport disasters ......; and c?mplex emergen-
cies. Only the latter will be considered in this study given that technological disasters rarely re-
quire water and sanitation assistance. 
Complex emergencies represent situations of armed conflict and/or civil unrest. The aid agencies 
forum Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) defines this notion as: 
~ humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or con-
siderable breakdown of authority resulting from intemal or extemal conflict and 
which requires an intemational response that goes beyond the mandate or ca-
pacity of any single agency and/ or the ongoing United Nations country program' 
(OCHA,1999). 
The term first appeared in the late 1980s when the end of the EastJWest confrontation resulting 
from the Cold War made armed conflicts more 'complex' (Schafer, 2002:2).The concept of com-
plex emergency is often difficult to grasp 1 because modem armed conflicts tend to last long, fight-
ing altemating with lull periods, which make it hard to tell whether and when a particular country is 
, . 
gone back to 'normal'. For this reason, Goodhand and Hulme (1999) consider complex emergen-
cies as social processes rather than events with a clear beginning and end. Buchanan-Smith and 
Maxwell (1994:9) call permanent emergencies2 long-lasting crises whos~ causes are often rooted 
in the society they affect. They define the notion as: 
'a very large problem of structural poverty and a need for more or less permanent 
welfare: 
Once the emergency is over, rehabilitation can take place. It is described as a way of restoring 
the 'same level of functionality' in habitat, livelihoods and services as before the crisis (Green, 
2000:343). It involves works on the infrastructure, but also on communities and institutions. 
The OECD Disaster Management Committee (1997:10) considers that rehabilitation programmes 
should aim to: 
'initiate reconstruction of infrastructure at the national and local levels and to save 
livelihoods. As beneficiary self-sufficiency is a major objective, programme man-
agement is progressively put under local control. Cost recovery schemes, large-
scale employment generating projects and revolving funds operations can be in-
troduced. In situations of continuing instability, disaster prevention (avoiding a re-
turn to the emergency) and mitigation (reducing the impact of any deterioration in 
the situation) are essential aspects of the rehabilitation effort'. 
According to this organisation, rehabilitation operations are meant to be completed within two 
years and 'overlap with relief operations and objectives' (OECD Development Assistance Com-
mittee, 1997:10). It is however not always clear which activities should be considered as 'relief 
and which should be seen as 'rehabilitation'. Munslow and Brown (1999: 209) note that most 
practitioners base their conception of the sequence of operations in the response to natural dis-
1 As reported by Ryle (1997): 'when joumalists donT know, they call it "chaos"; when aid workers donT know, they 
call it a "complex emergency". 
2 Schafer (2002:2) similarly defines chronic conflicts. 
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asters. They consider a linear progression with a relief phase taking up to six months, usually fol-
lowed by a rehabilitation phase lasting between six months and two years and middle-term re-
construction, which may last for several years. The reality of complex emergencies shows that 
such linearity is rare 1. 
Based on the analysis by Greene (2000: 34 7) the following five elements encompass rehabilita-
tion: 
1. Access to basic services, including water and sanitation; 
2. Empowerment to restore or enhance livelihoods, re-establishing those affected by the 
disaster and implementing projects aimed at reducing poverty (in particular in the case of 
complex emergencies); 
3. Works on the infrastructure to support services and livelihoods; 
4. Resource mobilisation including local govemment and communities in order to ensure 
. long-term sustainability; 
5. Calamity/catastrophe security structure, covering risk reduction by mitigation policy. 
The fifth element, which covers risk reduction and mitigation, is actually only relevant in the case 
of natural disasters. It was suggested that relief may, under certain circumstances, prevent con-
flict or contribute to peace-building2 (Goodhimd and Hulme, 1999; Harmer and Macrae, 2004b), 
nevertheless, there are no established prevention and mitigation policies applying to complex 
emergencies. 
The notions of rehabilitation and reconstruction are linked but their relationship is not clearly de-
fined. Some practitioners see rehabilitation as the first step of reconstruction, which addresses 
. the detrimental effects of armed conflicts on infrastructure and socio-economic framework, both 
aspects being essential to a peaceful society (The World Bank, 1998). Others consider that deal-
ing with infrastructure and deficient socio-economic networks corresponds to reconstruction whilst 
rehabilitation focuses upon the restoration of 'entitlemene of crisis-ridden people and house-
holds'. The term rebuilding is more vague and may refer to projects some consider rehabilitation 
and others reconstruction. In the end, for many authors rehabilitation, reconstruction and rebuild-
ing have similar meanings and represent intemal and external efforts to restore 'normal' political, 
social and economic conditions in a war-affected area (Carbonnier, 1998:11). 
1 This issue is developed in the review of literature. see page 86. 
2 Defined as Yhe promotion of institutional and socioeconomic measures, at the local or national level, to address 
the under/ying causes of conflict' (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999:15). 
3 See definition of 'entitlement' page 34. 
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3.4 Armed conflicts 
Armed conflicts are among the humanitarian crises mentioned in the various definitions proposed 
for a complex emergency'. Goodhand and Hulme (1999:14) define a conflict as: 
~ struggle, between individuals or col/ectivities, over values or claims to status, 
power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are to as-
o sert their values or claims over those of others'. . 
Uppsala University, in Sweden, manages an intemationally recognised 'Conflict Database' (Upp-
sala University, 2006b). 
It has a more technical definition of armed conflict, including explicit quantitative criteria: 
'a contested incompatibility which concems govemment and/or tenitory where 
the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the govem-
ment of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. 
The central parties, or, the primary waning parties, which first stated the incom-
patibility, have to be govemmental parties. The existence of govemmental parties 
on both sides of a conflict is not enough to conclude that we are dealing with in-
terstate conflict, as it can also be an intrastate with foreign involvement: 
Uppsala University (2006) distinguishes three 
levels of intensity in armed conflicts: 
1. Minor; 
2. Intemiediate; 
3. War. 
Definitions of these three levels appear in Box 
A-2. 
Conflicts can be interstate or intrastate. Inter-
state conflicts are also called international 
conflicts. 
Uppsala University (2006). defines an intra-
state conflict as: 
~ conflict between a govemment 
and a non-govemmental party, 
with no interference from other 
countries: 
Box A-2: Levels' of Intensity In armed con-
flicts 
Source: Uppsala University, 2006. 
There may be foreign involvement in an intrastate conflict. which Uppsala University (2006) de-
fines as: 
~ conflict within a country between a govemment and a non-govemmental party; 
where the govemment, the opposition or both sides receive troop support from 
other govemments, that actively participates in the conflict: . 
1 Seepage 6. 
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Intrastate conflicts are also called intemal conflicts or civil wars. 
3.5 Aid agencies 
Developing country govemments often do not have the resources to respond on their own to 
. emergency s"ituations resulting from armed conflicts. In such cases, they may request help from 
the intemational community - govemments and private entities, including the general public. A 
large number of agencies are involved in emergency aid - also called relief - andlor rehabilita-
tionlreconstruction projects. They form what is often called the 'humanitarian system,1 • 
• Emergency aid: 
Wood et al (2001) distinguish five types of agencies commonly involved in relief: 
1. National relief structures or relief structure linked to particular groups - such as warring 
parties in the conflict; 
2. National and local Non-Governmental Organisations2 (NGOs); 
3. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; 
4. United Nations agencies; 
5. Intemational Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). 
The last three categories of agencies represent the international relief system: 
• The Red Cross and Red Crescent movement is the relief system's oldest component. It is . 
divided into the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), created in 1863 and 
active in complex emergencies; the Intemational Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent societies (IFRC), created in 1918 and mostly active in natural disasters areas; 
and 183 National Societies - today, more numerous than United Nations' members; 
• The World Food Programme (WFP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are the four main UN agencies involved in re-
lief (Natsios, 1995). However, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan Ameri-
can Health Organisation also play a prominent role in disaster relief. In 1991 was created 
the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), which later became the Office for Co-
ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Its role is to coordinate humanitarian action; 
• NGOs are, by far, the largest sub-group. They are private entities dealing with all types of 
disasters. Since 1989, they are more active in armed conflict areas, which were tradition-
1 It should be noted that both the terms 'international cornmunity' and 'humanitarian system; although widely 
used, are rejected by many - e.g. Austen (2003) - who rightly argue that people and governments cannot be 
considered as working towards a common goal as the terms would suggest. The same applies to humanitarian 
agencies. .. 
2 Non-Governmental Organisations: 'Non belonging to or associated with a govemment' Oxford English Diction-
aty. 
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ally the field of the ICRC and the UNHCR. Today, the number of NGOs involved in relief1 
is close to 260 but only a few are predominant: namely Care, Catholic Relief Services, 
'Medecins Sans Frontieres' (MSF), Oxfam, Save the Children, and World Vision. 57 per 
cent of them are based in Europe and 33 per cent in the United States (Stoddard, 
2003a). Details on major international NGOs appear in Box A-3. 
Box A-3: Major NGOs 
Source: Stoddard, 2003:2 . 
Military and paramilitary actors as well as commercial contractors - local or intemational -
may also play a role in emergency aid. Donor's govemments may, in rare cases, also deliver 
aid directly (Borlon et ai, 2001). 
The various channels through which aid may reach recipient populations are illustrated in Figure 
A-1. They may be rather complex and Munslow and Brown (1999:216) find the 'chain of com-
mand' far too long. One typical example is the mode of delivering assistance often adopted by 
UN agencies: 
UN Agencies -+ Inlemational NGOs -+ Local NGOs -+ Community-Based Or-
ganisalions%ommunity leaders -+ Recipient community. 
Funding for emergencies may be bilateral, when it comes from a specific govemment, or multi-
lateral, when it comes from a group of governments. The Office of the United States Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is among the most prominent sources of bilateral aid for emer-
gency situations whilst the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) plays the same 
role as far as multi-lateral funds are concerned. 
1 They are sometimes called 'Humanitarian NGOs' by opposition to the development ones. 
2 A non-for-profit organisation. whose members belong to a specific community. 
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The main providers of aid for rebuilding economic and physical infrastructure are: 
• The European Union (EU), and in particular 'EuropeAid',"which, like ECHO, is managed 
by the European Commission but supports development programmes, sometimes in 
post-conflict situations. The European Development Fund (EDF), part of EuropeAid, sup-
ports projects in the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific region; 
• United Nation agencies such as the UNDP; 
• Donor states, for instance: the United States (USAid), Japan (Japan Intemational Coop-
eration Agency), the United Kingdom (Department for International Development), the 
German development fund (BMZ), etc.; 
• NGOs. 
A number of Intemational Financial Institutions (IFls) fund specifically rehabilitation and recon-
struction projects. As for emergencies, they include bilateral financial institutions such as the 
German Development Bank (KfVV) and multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank, etc. A number of private instituUons or foundations may also pro-
vide funds, usually for relatively small-scale projects. 
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Some aid agencies work exclusively in emergency response and rehabilitation - as is the case 
of the leRC and the UNHCR. Others, such as UNDP, Oxfam or Care work in development pro-· 
jects as well. 
3.6 Water sector institutions 
One of the main roles of aid agencies in emergency response and rehabilitation in urban areas is 
to restore access to basic services for the affected population. In 'normal times', it is the respon-
sibility of institutions in charge of delivering urban services. These services include: water and 
sanitation, street cleaning, solid waste management, roads and street lighting. They are regulated 
and are sometimes delivered through private enterprises (Cavill and Sohail, 2003:235). 
Providing services under a set of regulations is what characterizes urban service institutions. This 
aspect is reflected in the definition of an institution proposed by Uphoff (1986:8): 
'complexes of norms and behaviours that persist over time by serving col/ectively 
valued purposes'. 
Water and sanitation are among the most essential urban services. The water sector covers all 
consumptive uses of water including: irrigation, domestic consumption and industrial use. The 
various water resources are: surface water, groundwater and reclaimed or recycled water (Saleth 
and Dinar, 1999:3). 
According to Saleth and Dinar (1999:4-5) water sector institutions have three tasks: 
1. Water Law: water rights, conflict resolution, scope for private sector participation etc.; 
2. Water Policy: criteria for project selection, pricing, private sector participation, user par-
ticipation etc.; 
3. Water Administration·: special organisation, functional capacity, infonnation, research, 
technological capabilities etc. 
In general, govemmental bodies are in charge of enforcing water law and defining water policy in 
accordance to the law. They comprise ministries, municipal authorities and elected assemblies -
in democracies. The actual management of water services is assured by what is commonly 
known as 'water utilities', which may be public, semi-public or private. This study is mostly con-
cerned with water utilities, which run water and sanitation systems in cities and towns. These sys-
tems usually consist of water distribution networks and, in certain cases, of sewerage networks 1. 
4. Structure of the study 
This section has introduced the main concepts essential to understand the subject of this study. It 
is based on definitions found in the literature and, in this regard, is not different from the review of 
1 Sewerage networK are expensive to build and operate. They seNe far less urban dwellers of the developing 
world than water distribution networKs. Nevertheless, wherever they exist, sewerage networKs are run by water 
utilities. 
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the literature that follows. However, the review of the literature explores more broadly the topics 
contained in the definition ofthe study. Its main goals are: 
• To provide sufficient information allowing an in-depth understanding of the background to 
the study; 
• To show the relevance ofthe study; 
• To support the problem statement leading to the research question, which is one aspect 
of the justification for the study; 
• To show the 'gap' in knowledge this study addresses, which is the other aspect of the jus-
. tification for the study. 
The review describes the rising trends in phenomena such as urbanization, wars and urban wars. 
Their importance shows the relevance of the study since it quantifies how often the problem ex-
pressed in the research question may be encountered. 
The justification for the study, problem statement and research question represent the conceptual 
framework introduced in a section which follows the review of the literature. The basis for the re-
search hypothesis, which is also part of the conceptual framework, is based on the findings from 
the review of the literature. 
The methodology chapter details the method that is used to test the research hypotheSiS and in 
this way answer the research question. The case study method, adopted for this study, is intro-
duced and justified because of its relevance to the type of situations explored. Its limitations are 
detailed. At the end of methodology section, the cases to be reviewed are introduced and justifi-
cations for their selection are given. 
The following chapter is the review of the case studies. They are presented for each of the loca-
tions in which cases are selected. They cover seven cities and towns in six countries and four 
continents. Each of the locations is introduced by an account of the historical background to the 
crises that are examined. This part is essential to understand the general context. Other introduc-
tory sections explain, for each location, the situation in terms of access to water and sanitation, 
institutional set-up and impact of the armed conflict. The actual review of 'interventions' by the 
considered aid agencies follows. It is carried out according to a structure defined in the method-
ology section. 
The analysis and conclusion chapters are based on the experiences reported in the case studies. 
Emergency operations and rehabilitation/reconstruction projects are considered separately. The 
, 
study concludes on the possible impact these lessons may have on the way water and sanitation 
assistance is delivered in urban areas affected by armed conflict and the recommendations to be 
drawn from this study. 
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B. Review of the Literature 
1. Structure and sources 
The opening sections of the review look at the study's main research areas which are: 
1. Urban areas; 
2. Water and sanitation; and 
3. Armed conflicts. 
They demonstrate their importance in the case of developing countries. 
• It starts with urban areas, and more precisely with the notion of urbanization. The fact 
that urban populations tend to grow all over the developing world highlights the relevance 
of the urban environment as a research area. The causes and consequences of the 
growth of Third World cities are explored. Its impact on poverty is given special attention 
and the notion of vulnerability, relevant to natural disasters, but which is also used in the 
case of complex emergencies, is introduced; 
• Water and sanitation is the second main research area. This section shows the impor-
tance of water and sanitation for health, but also for well-being and social relations. Wa-
ter is essential to life. Access to water is therefore regarded as a human right. However 
whilst water is a social good it also has a cost and a value that turn it into an economic 
good. These somewhat conflicting concepts are related to another important dimension 
or water and sanitation, which is the political one; 
• The third and last main research area looks at armed conflicts. Their importance in terms 
of trends, causes and consequences are explored for developing countries,emphasizing 
the reasons behind the Third World's particular disposition to be affected by war. 
After exploring the background, the review focuses upon issues at the intersection between the 
three main research areas: 
• Urban water and sanitation is the first focus area. It is concemed with how water and 
sanitation is delivered in the urban areas of developing countries. It looks at the stake-
holders involved, in particular: households, communities, public utilities, and the private 
sector. It describes and comments on the possible arrangements supporting different 
levels of service; Access to water services for the poor is given special attention; 
• Water and sanitation in war-related emergencies explores how water and sanitation as-
sistance is delivered in emergencies in terms of quantity, quality and type of service. 
Health threats related to emergency situations are, analysed. The protection given by in-
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temational treaties to water systems during armed conflicts as well as the importance of 
access to water in the process of peace-building are also briefly reviewed; 
• Anmed conflicts in urban areas analyses the trends in the occurrence of armed conflicts in 
such areas and shows the reasons that make urban areas particularly prone to conflicts. 
The consequences of armed conflicts on communities and institutions are reviewed with 
the help ofthe notion of social capital. 
RestOring water and sanitation services in urban areas affected by armed conflicts represents the 
ultimate focus ofthis study. It is at the intersection between the main research areas. Since such 
restoration involves extemal aid agencies, the following section of the review looks at the mecha-
nismsof humanitarian assistance. Itstarts by defining the fundamental principles on which hu-
manitarian action is based and looks at how they may be influenced by donors' govemments. It 
also looks at the implications of what is often called 'NGO proliferation' on the coordination of in-
terventions, competition over financial resources and, ultimately, on the quality of the assistance 
provided. The emergence of the concept of 'Humanitarian Accountability' and related quality 
standards in disaster response are consequences of this evolution. Another important notion, 
which has simultaneously gathered momentum, is the link between relief and development. It is 
meant to infuse longer-term goals to relief operations. This concept is also reviewed in particular 
in the context of urban infrastructure rehabilitation after armed conflicts. The difficulties faced by 
aid agencies when intervening in the urban environment are explained. Dealing with govem-
ments, institutions and communities are important aspects of the challenge that represents hu-
manitarian action in cities. Institutional development is one of the major tasks expected from aid 
agencies dealing with urban services institutions. It is introduced as a strategy to achieve sus-
tainable results. The section concludes with the issue of time-frame, which looks at the contradic-
tion between the ambition of linking relief and development whilst relief is usually funded over 
short-term periods. 
The final section reviews documents related to water and sanitation interventions in cities affected 
by armed conflicts. It emphasizes the relatively small amount of literature on this specific subject 
and looks at the limited theory that has been developed. It introduces leRe's 'preventative main-
tenance', looks at how aid agencies collaborate with water utilities in and after emergencies and 
analyses a strategiC framework aimed at maximising benefits from the reconstruction of water 
supply networks. 
The structure of the review is illustrated in Figure B-1. It shows how the intersections between the 
main research areas: Urban areas, armed conflicts and water and sanitation define the three as-
pects on which the study focuses: Water and sanitation in urban areas, water and sanitation hu-
manitarian assistance in war-related emergencies and armed conflicts in urban areas. The 
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mechanisms of humanitarian assistance represent a fourth focus which introduces the 'core sub-
ject' which is restoring water and sanitation services in urban areas affected by armed conflict. 
3.3 Armed conflicts In 
Figure B-1: Structure ofthe review 
Some of the main sources for this review are listed below: 
3.2 Water and Sanitation In 
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• . The journal 'Disasters', published by Blackwell Publishing for the Overseas Development 
institute (001); . 
• The joumal 'Environment and Urbanization' published by the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (liED); 
• The magazine 'Humanitarian Exchange' published by ODI; 
• Reports published by Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) and Humanitarian Policy 
Group (HPG), belonging to ODI; 
• Books and reports published by the World Bank and the World Bank's Water and Sanita-
tion Programme; 
• Books and reports published by WE DC at Loughborough University; 
• Books and reports published by OECD; 
• Books and reports published by WHO; 
• Books and reports published by the ICRC; 
• Reports published by United Kingdom's Department For International Development 
(DFID). 
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2. Main research areas 
2.1 Urban Areas 
• The nature of urbanization and its trends 
The world urban population has consistently increased in the last 50 years. United Nations sta-
tistics forecast that, by around 2010, it should be larger than the rural population, as shown in 
Figure B-2. 
Figure B-2: World population growth and urbanization - % urban 
Source:United Nations Population Division, 2005 
This increase in the number of urban dwellers is called urbanization. According to Gibbs 
(1961:13): 
'Urbanization can be defined narrowly to refer to the demographic trend of in-
creasing density or population movements to cities~ 
The definition proposed by Beall (2000:428) emphasizes how urban settlements evolve and 
change status: 
'The proportion of a national population living in urban centres. An increase in the 
level of urbanization can result from rural-urban migration but usually results from 
. rural settlements growing to a size where they are reclassified as urban, or met-
ropolitan areas being extended to inc:orporate areas whic:h were previously c:/as-
sified as rural'. 
Wirth (1970: 56) c:onsiders urbanization not only as an increase in the number of people in a 
specific place, but also as a process affecting people's way of life: 
1he spell of the influenc:es which the city exerts by virtues of the power of its insti-
tutions and personalities operating through the means of c:ommunic:ation and 
transportation '. 
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This shows how urbanization becomes a factor of social change. Beall (2000:428) makes a 
similar statement: 
'The urbanization process refers not only to changes in population size and dis-
tribution but also involves an analysis of the related economic, social and political 
changes'. 
Developed countries were already predominantly urban in the 1950s - 52 per cent of their 
population lived in urban areas in 1950. Urban growth, over the last decades, is largely due to 
developing countries. Figure B-3 shows the evolution of the urban population as a proportion of 
the total population in the less developed regions and the least developed countries - see 
definition in Box A-1, page 5. 
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Figure B-3: Percentage of urban population in the less developed regions 
Source: Population Division, 2005 
It shows that urban population in the less developed regions has increased from 17.9 per cent· 
in 1950 to 43.2 per cent in 2005 - 25.3 points difference. In the least developed countries, the 
progression goes from 7.4 per cent in 1950 to 27.7 per cent in 2005 - 20.3 points difference. 
This graph also shows that, in the less developed regions, urban population should be larger 
than rural population before 2020. 
However, as emphasized in the introduction', these figures should be considered while keeping 
in mind that they depend on the definition given by each country of what is rural and what is ur-
ban. Moreover, sustained urban growth does not necessarily lead to gigantic cities. As stressed 
by Satterthwaite (1998) such growth is largely due to an increasing number of urban dwellers . 
living in towns. The change can nonetheless be considered as significant, albeit that provided 
the definition of 'urban' and 'rural' remains the same during the considered period. 
1 Section A.3. 1 page 2. 
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• Causes of urbanization 
The definition of urbanization proposed by Gibb (1961:13)1 attributes urbanization to two demo-
graphic phenomena: 
1. Natural population growth - 'the demographic trend of increasing density'; and 
2. Migration - 'population movements to cities'. 
However, as pointed out by Beall (2000)2, whilst urbanization may result from rural-urban migra-
tion, it is more often the case that urbanization is due to rural settlements being reclassified as 
urban. Reclassification through changes to boundaries can therefore be considered as a third 
cause of urbanization. 
Regarding natural growth, Drakakis-Smith (2000:76) argues that, whilst urban growth in the de-
veloped world was, at the origins, limited by high mortality rates, this did not happen in develop-
ing countries because the growth of their cities happened later, at a time when progress in ur-
ban infrastructure and services -especially sanitation, medical care, and health - could avoid 
such adverse effects. Moreover, it appears that family planning programmes applied in cities 
are more effective with the middle-income families than with low-income ones. Contraception is 
more likely to be used in order to space births than to limit the overall number of children. The 
reasons behind high fertility rates do not differ between the urban and rural environments: large 
families mean larger income for the household and an insurance of care for elders. This ex-
. plains how natural population growth contributes to urbanization. 
The other factor is rural-urban migration. People in rural areas are believed to be mostly at-
tracted by cities because of better job opportunities. And yet, according to Todaro and Smith 
(2005), unemployment in Third World cities is high because their economies have not been able 
to absorb the influx of job seekers coming from the countryside. In this regard, Drakakis-Smith 
(2000) notes that the lack of job opportunities has not detered candidates from urban migration, 
even in regions such as Africa, where economic prospects are rather poor. For Haeringer 
(1993:90) urbanization in the. developing world, unlike in the developed countries, was not the 
consequence of economic growth but a 'pure demographic phenomenon, or, in other terms. a 
spiral that no circumstance could durably stop,3. Pourtier(2004) proposes an explanation, stat-
ing that rural populations in Africa move to cities simply because they get bored, and aspire to a 
different way of life. Reasons may also be found in the development of the rural economy. In 
most countries, certain regions are 'left behind' in the development process. The consequences 
are rural unemployment and poor access to basic services. Some regions may also have opted 
for a type of large-scale and/or commercial agriculture that requires less manpower (Potter and 
lIoyd-Evans, 1998; Drakakis-Smith, 2000). This last aspect is further developed by Hamza 
1 See hereabove. 
2 See page 17. 
3 Translated from French by the author. 
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and Zetter (1998), who argue that structural adjustments - or macro-economic reforms linked 
to globalization1 - imposed by IFls on many developing countries, increase the proportion of 
export-led agriculture whilst concentrating manufacturing industry in the periphery of cities. This 
would contribute to urbanization. It is a view shared by many researchers, according to Mulligan 
and Crampton (2005). 
Regarding the relative influence of natural growth and migration, it appears that, whilst urban 
growth was, in the past, mostly attributed to migration - in particular in Africa, natural growth 
has since become preponderant (Devas and Rakodi, 1993; Le Bris, 1995; Tacoli, 1998) . 
• Urbanization and poverty 
The impact of urbanization on poverty is probably among the most obvious. It is a widely recog-
nised phenomenon (Devas and Rakodi, 1993; Drakakis-Smith, 2000). Poverty is defined by the 
United Nations as: 
'a human condition characterized by sustained or chronic deprivation of the re-
sources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of 
an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and 
social rights' (UNECOSOC, 2001).· . 
To the question 'why are the poor poor?' Wratten (1995:28) answers through a review of the lit-
erature on the causes of poverty that shows how perceptions evolved from blaming poverty on 
'personal failings of the individuals concemed' to attributing it to 'unfairly structured political and 
economic systems'. In the 19608 Lewis (1967) introduced the notion of 'culture of poverty', ac-
cording to which poor would be part of a 'sub-culture' of specific personal attributes and behav-
iours that would crea~e obstacles to their participation to formal economy and thereby perpetu-
ate their state of marginalisation from one generation to the next. These views were challenged 
by Valentine (1968) who criticized the notion of 'sub-culture', arguing that what Lewis (1967) 
saw as an abnormal behaviour was in fact a reasonable adaptation to a lack of income. Like-
wise, Perlman (1976) did not see any marginalisation of the poor in the process of urban devel-
opment. On the contrary, she valued their contribution to urban economy, albeit through infor-
mal channels. The shift in the interpretation of poverty from the individual to the structure and 
nature· of economic growth took place. from the 1970s. This theory claimed that economic 
growth in the North would happen at the expense of both urban and rural poverty in the South 
(Wratten, 1995:31). In the 1980s, development models imposed by the North through structural 
adjustments2 were widely blamed for intensifying poverty, most notoriously in urban centres 
(Wratten, 1995, Hamza and Zetter, 1998; Drakakis-Smith, 2000). Competitiveness imposed by 
globalization maintained low wages - and sometimes appalling working conditions (Harris, 
1989; Drakakis-Smith, 2000) - while contributing to the reduction of budgets allocated to social 
1 See definition, footnote 2, page v. 
2 See hereabove. 
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policies aimed at mitigating poverty (Hamza and Zetter, 1998). Greater levels of unemployment 
were also consequences of the whole process,since urban population tends to grow faster than 
formal employment (Devas and Rakodi, 1993; Todaro and Smith, 2005). Other factors include 
low wages - and sometimes appalling working conditions (Hanis, 1989; Drakakis-Smith, 2000) 
- partly due to constraints on competitiveness imposed by globalization. Globalization has also 
. forced many developing countries to reduce budgets allocated to social pOlicies aimed at miti-
gating poverty (Hamza and Zetter, 1998; Drakakis-Smith, 2000). 
The preponderance of .the informal sector in low-income neighbourhoods - often located in 
peri-urban areas - is a consequence of the incapacity of formal employers to deal with the in-
crease in manpower due to urbanization (Haeringer, 1993; Potter and Lloyd-Evans, 1998; Dra-
kakis-Smith, 2000). Potter and Lloyd-Evans (1998:172) propose the following definition of in-
formal sector: 
'Unaccountable and unregistered activities which are found in most countries of 
the world~ 
Their typology of informal sector operations in developing countries includes small-scale pro-
duction - urban farming, construction, crafts, food processing etc., distributive trades -
processed food trading, imported items trading etc., and tertiary enterprises - laundry, trans-
port, bottle and waste collecting etc. 
The poor are the most affected by the deterioration of living conditions in urban areas. This in-
cludes issues such as the nuisances linked to heavy road traffic or' social problems such as 
criminality (Hanis, 1992) or the general decline of social cohesion ~hat lead to the suppression 
of mechanisms of solidarity among urban communities living in precarious conditions (Le Bris, 
1995:48). 
As with foi"mal employment, urban services, in particular those requiring infrastructure works . 
such as water supply, have been unable to" cover the needs generated by the high pace of ur~ 
banization (Amos, 1993; Bakker, 2003). The most deprived areas are the informal settlements 
where the majority of poor families live in order to avoid paying land fees or rents (Potter and 
Lloyd-Evans, 1998:138). Informal housing refers to homes that do not comply with local rules 
such as: planning regulations, construction standards and land tiUe (UNCHS-Habitat, 
2003a:104). It is a relatively vague notion since, depending on the interpretation of regulations,. 
the same settlement may be considered as formal or informal (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). Infor-
mal settlements are, in most cases, semi-legal or illegal. The notion of illegality is also subject to 
interpretation but is, according to Durand-Lasserve (2006) 'distinctively more repressive'. Occu-
_ pants of illegal subdivisions are under threat of expulsion. Other than that, there are no major 
differences between the characteristics of 'informal' or 'illegal' settlements. Wegelin-Schuringa 
(1999) distinguished four iYpes of locations for these settlements: 
1. Central city: characterized by high levels of congestion; 
21 
B. Review of the Literature 
2. Within the official boundaries of urban areas; 
3. Outside official boundaries but fully occupied: with irregular or inadequate water services; 
4. Outside official boundaries and in process of urbanization: mostly un-served. 
Gugler (1997) emphasizes the immense differences in living standards between the affluent 'ur-
ban elite' of the centre, which has benefited from most of the public investment and those 'left 
behind' in low-income settlements. Likewise, Durand-Lasserve (2006) sees a 'strong correlation . 
between urban poverty, tenure status, access to services and citizenship'For Collignon and 
Vezina (2000), the very existence of illegal settlements is a tacit admission from the authorities 
of their incapacity to ensure universal infrastructure coverage .. 
• Cities and disasters 
The detrimental effects of urbanization contribute to the exposure of urban dwellers to disasters. 
This is partly due to the impact of urbanization on the environment. Among the most common 
consequences are floods, created by increased surface run-off, and landslides due to acceler-
ated erosion (EM-OAT, 2006). These local causes come in addition to global environment 
changes, which are largely recognized as a cause for frequent storms, blizzards, heat waves 
etc. (Wisner, 1997; Downing et aI., 1999). 
However, these so-called 'natural hazards' are not sufficient to ~xplain the prevalence of urban 
disasters. Uitto (1998:7) pOints out that the incidence of natural disasters in cities has increased 
in recent years and states that: 
'the occurrence of disaster depends on three basic variables: 
(1) hazard (natural phenomena such as earthquakes, typhoons or volcanic erup-
tions); . 
(2) exposure (structures, buildings, humans and other entities at risk); and 
(3) vulnerability (propensity to suffer loss)'. 
He further stresses that, if it is assumed that the long-term frequency of natural phenomena re-
mains the same 1, the increase must be due to the second and third variables i.e. exposure and 
vulnerability. 
The notion of vulnerabilitv is defined by the United Nations as: 
'The conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental fac-
tors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact 
of hazards' (UNISDR, 2004:Annex1). 
A definition, proposed by Wisner (1997), links the notions of vulnerability and recovery: 
'Vulnerability to disaster is the lack of capacity to cope with extreme events and 
to recover speedily'. 
This can be summarized in the following formula, linking risk, hazard and vulnerability: 
Risk (R) = Hazard (H) x Vulnerability (V) (Wisner eial., 2004:49). 
1 This however contradicts the influence of global climate change. 
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It shows that there cannot be a risk without vulnerability. 
In the urban context, this notion refers to situations in which cities develop on hazardous 
grounds. This is a direct cause of urbanization. Cities may have been originally founded in rela-
tively safe sites, but as they grow, part of their population may be forced to settle in hazardous 
places (Satterthwaite, 1998). Mitchell summarizes the situation calling cities 'crucible of hazard' 
(Mitchell, 1999). 
Land situated in safe areas becomes too expensive for low-income families and this is a major 
cause of vulnerability (Thouret and d'Ercole, 1996; Satterthwaite, 1998). They are most at risk 
of suffering from natural disasters, not only because they may live in hazardous areas but also 
because the poor quality of their houses cannot withstand phenomena such as' earthquakes or 
violent storm (Wisner, 1997). This situation partly explains why the vast majority of natural dis-
asters affecting cities occur in developing countries. Between 1975 and 2004, more than 400 of 
their cities were affected1• This figure only considers major disasters that have substantially 
damaged the urban habitat and infrastructure. 
2.2 Water and Sanitation 
Water and sanitation services are essential to health and wellbeing. WHO proposes a definition 
of health linked to these two notions: 
\A state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the ab-
sence of disease or infirmity'. 2 
A person's wellbeing is described by Dasgupta (1993) as a function of 'utility' - the goods and 
services that are useful to her - and of 'freedoms'. Access to water and sanitation is not only 
useful but indispensable. It contributes to freedom in the sense that people enjoying adequate 
access to water and sanitation acquire dignity while being more likely to remain free from dis-
eases. 
This section highlights the main aspects of what makes access !o water and sanitation important 
to human society . 
• Impact of water and sanitation on health 
Perrin (1996) shows the importance of water and sanitation as part of the basic preventative 
measures necessary to build a health-care system. This concems the entire population and 
thus can be imagined as the basis of a 'Health Pyramid', as shown in Figure B-4. 
1 Based on reports from EM-DAT (www.EM·DAT.net). Louvain.Ja- Neuve University, Belgium and Relief Web, 
www.reliefweb.lnf. 
2 Preamble of the constitution of the World Health Organization, 1948. 
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Figure B-4: The Health Pyramid 
on Perrin, 1996:309 
Caimcross and Feachem (1993:4) define a water-related disease as: 
'one which is in some way related to water or to impurities in water. It is neces-
sary to distinguish the infectious water-related diseases from those related to 
some chemical property of the water'. . 
The four types of water-related diseases are listed in Table B.1 according to their transmission 
route. They consist of: waterbome, water-washed, water-based and water-related diseases. The 
walerbome and some of the water-washed diseases are linked to the presence in water of 
pathogens transmitted by human excreta - normally in the faeces. 
Excreta-related diseases can be prevented through hygiene and sanitation as shown in Table 
B.2. WHO (1987:12) defines sanitation as: 
7he means of col/ecting and disposing of excreta and community liquid waste in 
a hygienic· way so as not to endanger the health of individuals and the commu-
nity as a whole'. 
1 The latter refer to, for example, fluoride or arsenic, which cause disease but are not infectious. 
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Table 8-2: Potential for control of excreta-related infections by improvements in sanitation and 
personal hygiene . 
In recent years, the concept has been broadened in order to include environmental conditions 
that affect human health. This is known as 'environmental sanitation' (Harvey et aI., 2002). The 
notion includes: excreta disposal; wastewater management; solid waste management; and - in 
the case of disasters - disposal of dead bodies. 
Statistics by WHO (2004:120-121,126-127) for 2002 show that 3.2 per cent of deaths - almost 
1.8 million per year - and 4.2 per cent of 'disability-adjusted life years (DAL y)'3 - nearly 62 
1 A disease caused by paraSites of the genus Schistosoma, also known as Bilharzia, which has an aquatic snail 
intermediate host, WHO. 
2 Parasitic worm. 
3 One DAL Y can be thought of as one lost year of 'healthy' life. 
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million - are due to diarrhoeal diseases, which are mostly related to unsafe water, poor sanita-
tion and lack of hygiene. These numbers concern WHO member states - data from112 health 
registration systems. As Shown in Figure B-5, Africa has the largest proportion of these deaths, 
with 39 per cent, followed by South-East Asia. This is consistent with the analysis of these data 
by Nath et al (2006), which reveals that 99.8 per cent of deaths due to diarrhoeal diseases oc-
cur in developing countries. They also find out that 90 per cent of them concern children. 
Eastern 
The Americas, 3% 
"'UroDD"~ 1 % 
Figure B-5: Geographical origin of deaths due to dlarrheoal diseases - 2002 
Source: WHO, 2004:120-121 
A number of researchers have tried to determine the relative impact on health of sanitation, wa-
ter quantity, water quality, and hygiene promotion. One of the most complete investigations was 
carried out by Esrey et al (1991). It was based on a total of 144 studies examining the impact of 
improved water and sanitation facilities on excreta-related, waterbome, water-washed and wa-
ter-based diseases. The study showed that increasing water quantity has a greater impact on 
health than improving water quality and that improving sanitation and hygiene are more effec-
tive than improving water supply only. 
A more recent study, carried out by Nath et al (2006), looks at the difference in terms of health 
benefits between improving water quality at source and at household level. It shows that the 
provision of clean water at household level can reduce diarrhoeal disease morbidity by 6 to 50 
per cent even without intervening on hygiene and sanitation. . 
• Water as a human right 
Because water is so essential to life, a number of international agreements consider access to 
water as a human right. The notion of human rights is defined by WHO (2003:7) as: 
'rights protected by intemationally guaranteed standards that ensure the funda-
mental freedoms and dignity of individuals and communities. They include civil, 
cultural, economic, political and social rights'. 
Governments are therefore meant to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. 
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The 'right to adequate water and sanitation services is based on the right to health recognised 
by a number of UN entities among which: WHO in 1946, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948 and the Convention of the Rights of the Child in 1989. In 2000, the UN Commit-
tee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ESCR) adopted a General Comment that inter-
prets the right to health as an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate health-
care but also to those factors that determine good health - which include safe water, adequate 
sanitation, food and housing. In 2002, UN ESCR recognised access to water as an independent 
right (WHO, 2003:8). 
The basic water requirements on which the notion of 'appropriate access' is based are (WHO, 
2003:12-16): 
Sufficient quantity: the 1977 UN Water Conference in Mar del Plata, Argentina, later reiterated 
in the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, defined access to water as a water source 
located within 1 kilometre or within 30 minutes round trip from the home (WHO, 2003:12). Lev-
els of access are: basic, intermediate and optimal, as detailed in Table B.3. 
• Safe for drinking and other purposes; 
• Accessible to everyone; 
• Affordable for everyone. 
An additional criterion, in terms of access, is whether water sources are 'improved' or 'not im-
proved'. This is defined by WHO and UNICEF as follows (WHO and UNICEF, 2000:4): 
• Water sources considered as improved and therefore 'safe for drinking and other pur-
poses' are: household connections, public standpipes, bore holes, protected dug-wells, 
protected springs and rainwater collection; 
• Water sources considered as not improved are: unprotected wells, unprotected springs, 
vendor-provided water, bottled water and tanker truck provision of water. 
Bottled water is not conSidered 'improved' because of concerns over the quantity of supplied 
water, not on the quality. 
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Table B-3: Service level and quantity of water collected 
• Adequate access to sanitation. 
In terms of sanitation, adequate access is defined in relation to the type of systems available. 
WHO and UNICEF also define which systems are considered as improved and which are con-
sidered as not improved (WHO and UNICEF, 2000:4): 
• Sanitation systems considered as 'improved' are: connections to a public sewer, connec-
tion to septic system, pour-flush latrines, simple pit latrines and Ventilated Improved Pit 
(VIP) latrines; 
• Sanitation systems considered as 'non improved' are: service or bucket latrines - where 
excreta are manually removed, public latrines and open latrines: 
As pointed out by Alien et al (2006:30), this does not say anything on the maintenance and the 
cleanliness of these systems. It might be the reason why public latrines, which tend to be dirty in 
the absence of a caretaker, are considered as 'non improved'. 
1 Away from home. 
2 Within the confines of the household. 
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• Water as a public or an economic good 
The Intemational Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) that took place in Dublin, 
in January 1992, mobilized experts from- 80 intemational, intergovemmental and non-
govemmental organizations. They adopted the following four principles guiding the development 
of water sector activities (WMO, 1992): 
. 1. Freshwater is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and 
the environment; 
2. Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, in-
volving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels; 
3. Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water; 
4. Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognised as an 
economic good. 
The last of these principles on the economic value of water states the following: 
'it is vital to recognize first the basic right of all human beings to have access to 
clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to recognize the 
economic value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses 
of the resource. Managing water as an economic good is an important way of 
achieving efficient and equitable use, and of encouraging conseNation and pro-
tection of water resources' (WMO,1992). 
Whilst recognising adequate water and sanitation as a human right, this principle stresses that 
failing to recognise the economic value of water leads to a waste of resources and damage to 
the environment. Considering water as an economic good would therefore be essential to 
achieve 'efficient and equitable use' of water. 
An economic good can be defined as: 
'Any physical object, natural or man-made or seNice rendered, which could 
command a price in a market'. (Bannock et al., 1998) 
By contrast, public goods are: 
'Commodities the consumption of which has to be decided as a whole rather than 
by each individual'. (Bannock et aI., 1998) 
Public goods are (Bannock et aI., 1998): 
• Non-'rivalrous': one person's use does not prevent another person from using it; 
• Non-excludable: if one person consumes it others are also entitled to do so; 
• Non-rejectable: individuals cannot avoid consuming it, even if they want to. 
These characteristics do not fully apply to water - with the exception of the last point. However, 
some argue that whilst water may not be a public good, its economic value is hard to determine 
because of its nature. If access to water is a human right1 because it is essential to life, giving it 
1 See page 26. 
29 
B. Review of the Literature 
a price is contradictory. Moreover, water has also a cultural dimension. It is, for instance, essen-
tial in the practice of many religions (Gleick et aI., 2002; Le Bris, 2002; Bakker, 2003). 
This is at the centre of a debate on equity in water supply. The World Bank is seen as promot-
ing a liberal approach to it. In this respect, Varis and Somly6dy (1997:28) state 'the World Bank 
is in favour of changing water from a social to an economic good', but add 'the social function of 
water should not be faded away' (Varis and Somly6dy, 1997:31). 
For Gleick et al (2002) the two approaches are not mutually excludable and water is not only an 
. econamic good, but also a social good because it benefits wellbeing both for each individual 
and for the society in which it lives. Likewise, Gutierrez et al (2003:10) state: 
We believe that in the context of both service and resource management, water 
is an economic good, a social and environmental good, and a human right. 
These different aspects should not be mutually exclusive, and need to be bal-
anced with priority given to human and environmental requirements, and without 
cost-recovery becoming a barrier to meeting basic human needs'. 
Hafmann (2006) analyses the characteristics of each approach and summarizes them in Table 
j 
B.4 . 
. 8-4: Comparison of water as a human right versus water as a commodity 
Source: Hofmann, 2006:4 
• Sanitation as a public good 
Sanitation can hardly be presented as an economic good, apart maybe when excreta and 
wastewater are reused as fertilizers in agriculture. Both households and municipal institutions 
attach a much lower priority to sanitation than to water supply (Alien et aI., 2006:84) and as a 
result it is - often wrongly - seldom considered as a profitable business. Its universal benefits 
can however confer to sanitation the status of a public good. As stressed by Caimcross (1999), 
installing a latrine benefits not only the family that installed it, but also its neighbours, because 
confining excreta limits the spread of disease. 
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• Access to water and sanitation and politics 
Adequate access to water and sanitation represent a benefit that can be exploited by politicians: 
to access or to conserve power. The recent election of the Hamas party in Palestine was in part 
the result of the poor management of public services, and in particular of water and sanitation 
by the previous administration. In a region where water is a particularly sensitive good because 
of its scarcity1 the political dimension ofthe issue is particularly important(Beaumont, 2006). 
The issue of water supply - along with electricity - had also a strong political importance in 
the December 2005 presidential elections in Liberia2, in which both presidential candidates 
promised during the run-up campaign to re-establish piped water supply and electricity in the 
capital Monrovia within six months after their inauguration (IRIN, 2005). 
Spiller and Savedoff (1999:5-6) analyse the issue supporting their views with cases from Latin 
America. They argue, in the case of the urban envircmment, those three main characteristics of 
water sector: large sunk costs, economies of scale, and massive consumption lead to the po-
tential politicization of pricing and operations. Because of large sunk costs, there are usually 
few suppliers involved in the provision of urban water supply. The perception of water as a 'so-
cial' or 'basic' service, essential to everyone and controlled by a few leads to potential interfer-
ences from politicians. They may intervene in areas such as criteria for marlcet attribution and 
conditions for service delivery. Water tariffs in particular may be a powerful tool of political mobi-
lisation that can be used to impede reforms. In certain circumstances, this may bring significant 
electoral gains. Political obstruction may lead to what these authors call a 'Iow level equilibrium' 
in which water utilities operate inefficiently and service degrades in a downward spiral as illus-
trated in Figure B-6. Spiller and Savedoff (1999) stress that the solution is to escape from this 
downward spiral by creating a regulatory frameworlc involving institutions able to guarantee the 
independence ofthe service from political power. 
1 Water rights are negotiated with Israel. 
2 See page 167. 
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Figure 8-6: Effects of politicization of water supply 
Source: Savedoff and Spilier, 1999:14 
2.3 Armed conflicts 
• Trends in the occurrence and the nature of armed conflicts 
The frequency of armed conflicts has globally increased since the end of the Second World 
War. According to data from Uppsala University (2006), it was under 20 per year between 1945 
and, 1960 compared to 30 now, with a peak above 50 during the years that followed the collapse 
of the Soviet Block, in 1989. 350 armed conflicts have erupted since 1945, of which 300 - 85 
per cent - took place in developing countries. Figure B·7 shows the evolution of the number of 
armed conflicts per year over the last three decades. 
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Out of 187 armed conflicts taking place in the developing countries between 1975 and 2004, 
170 - 90 per cent - were either intemal or intemationalized 2(Uppsala University, 2006b). The 
.proportion of intemal conflicts in the total number of active conflicts per year has grown from 
about 50 per cent after 1945 to more than 95 per cent in the mid-1990s (Uppsala University, 
2006a). This evolution illustrates a change in the nature of warfare. In 1832, von Clausewilz 
(1976) defined war as: 
'An act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will'. 
This definition, according to Kaldor (1999), suggests a struggle for power between rival states. 
Such occurence has become relatively rare in recent years. The above-mentioned statistics 
show that most wars are civil wars, often described with terms such as: 'rebellion', 'insurgency', 
'guerrilla' or 'Iow-intensity conflict'. Looking at the last decades, Ruffin (1999) found that, after a 
period of instability between 1975 and 1980 - with war in Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Sri-
Lanka, Cambodia and the Spanish Sahara - and a relative quieter period in the 19805, con-
flicts have become more volatile. In the absence of arms control, they have produced more de-
struction, evolving into 'extreme wars', they also tended to last longer, in particular in the case 
of intemal conflicts. According to Collier et al (2004:253) 'the average civil war lasts over six 
times longer than the average intemational war'. Their research shows that long-lasting conflicts 
often occur in regions with characteristics such as 'Iow per capita income, high inequality and a 
moderate degree of ethnic division'. Another characteristic of modem conflicts is the generaliza-
tion of violence against civilians. According to Azam and Hoeffler (2002:462), what used to be a 
'side-effecf of war is now often used as a military tactic. 
1 See definition of conflict intensity page 8. 
2 Internal with foreign involvement. 
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• Factors influencing armed conflicts· 
Most of the research studying the causes and the consequences of armed conflict has focused 
upon civil wars, probably because, as mentioned earlier, they have become more frequent. 
Poverty is generally recognised as one of their main consequences (Austin, 1999; Le Billon et 
aI., 2000; Goodhand, 2001 b; Collier et al., 2003). Establishing poverty as a cause of war is 
more difficult (Schafer, 2002:29) and authors have different and sometimes divergent views on 
_.; 
the question. 
ECONOMIC STAGNATION AND ARMED CONFLICTS 
Certain authors consider economic stagnation and decline in income as a cause for armed 
conflict (Auvinen and Nafziger, 1999; Wayne Nafziger and Auvinen, 2002). The fact that 
wars almost exclusively occur in poor countries (Smith, 1994; Le Billon et aI., 2000) would 
support this hypothesis. Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) believe that there is a threshold in 
GNI1 above which conflicts do not take place. Their conclusion is that the increase in the 
number of war-related emergencies observed in the early 1990s may be partly due to a poor 
growth record in the developing world observed during the previous decade CNayne 
Nafziger and Auvinen, 2002:155). Likewise, Smith (1994) pOints out that countries in debt 
are more likely to experience conflicts. Poverty would therefore be both a cause and a con-
sequence of armed conflicts (Good hand, 2001 b:28) as discontent created by inequalities 
leads to political instability and in tum insurrection. It is what Goodhand (2001b:26) calls 'bot-
tom up violence', adding that rebellion is more likely to come from the transiently poor rather 
than from the chronically poor, because the latter are often poorly organised and passive. 
Collier (2003:13) calls civil wars 'development in reverse'. He argues that the economy suf-
fers not only because of ttie damage to vital infrastructure - roads, bridges, telecommunica-
tions, ports etc. - but also because of the fear it inspires. People afraid of violence flee, 
leaving behind their assets or shifting them abroad. In both cases, they become economi-
cally unproductive (Collier et aI., 2003). A less legitimate type of economy such as drug traf-
ficking may take over and contribute to finance the conflict. In recent history, other types of 
trafficking such as diamonds or weapons have also taken place. 
Looking at the consequences at household and individual level, Goodhand (2001) and Le 
Billon (2000) analyse the consequences of armed conflicts on people's entitlements, defined 
as: 
'Their rights and powers of access to essential goods, services and resources' 
(Le Bil/on et al., 2000:12). 
1 See definition in footnote 1, page 4. 
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The different types of entitlements are: 
• Direct entitlements: the items produced and consumed by the household - e.g. subsis-
tence agriculture; 
• Illegal entitlements: items acquired by theft and/or violence; 
• Market entitlements: items eamed through work; 
• Public entitlements: services provided by the public authority - e.g. health services, 
education, water; 
• And civic entitlements: items and services provided by community organisations or relief 
agencies. 
It appears that, in situations of armed conflict, people rely primarily on direct and illegal enti-
tlements .. Market and public entitlements are likely to decline, especially in situations of state 
failure. Compensations by civic entitlements, such as those coming from aid agencies, are 
largely dependent on the security situation. 
, 
INEQUALITY AND ARMED CONFLICTS 
Cramer (2003) believes that economic inequality has a 'huge' influence on the likelihood of 
conflict. Yet, this is only valid if economic aspects of inequality are considered in relation to 
its social, political, cultural and historical links. Stewart (2001 and 2002) further develops the 
notion. She distinguishes 'vertical' and 'horizontal' inequalities. 'Vertical inegualitv' is due to 
differences in ineome. Examples such as Kenya, Thailand and Brazil, which are politically 
relatively stable despite huge differences in the social scale, show that it is not always a 
source of armed conflicts. In contrast, 'horizontal' inequalitv i.e. inequality between groups 
defined according to their region of origin, ethnicity, social class or religion is more often the 
cause for sporadic riots, sometimes tuming into full-scale civil wars 1. 
Collier (2000) has a different point of view. He argues that: 
'the main grievances - inequality, political repression, and ethnic and religious 
divisions - ( ... J provide no explanatory power in predicting rebellion'. 
In his research, based on the analysiS of the economic data of 161 countries at war between 
1960 and 1999, Collier (2000) concludes that the economic characteristics of countries and, 
in particular, the presence of natural resources are paramount in predicting conflict. Ex-
tracted resources are especially 'Iootable' because 'they are easily accessible to govem-
ments and rebels alike' (Le Billon, 2001 :569). Refuting the perception of rebellion as 'self-
saCrifiCing heroes struggling against oppression', Collier (2000) argues that, objectively, re-
bels are mostly motivated by predation - the 'rebellion as crime' approach (Collier, 2000b) 
...:... and, at the same time, feeds from predation to sustain its action. Rebellion serving private 
interests, as described by Collier and Gunning (1995), refers to the emergence of rebel 
1 E.g. Sri Lanka, see page 159. 
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leaders accumulating considerable wealth during their time as rebel leaders and, in some 
cases, their govemments. There are often referred to as 'Warlords' (Box B-1). 
Marchal and Messiant (2002) question the validity of these conclUSions, arguing that the se-
lection of cases on which the whole research is based and the way data is processed seems 
biased. They also deplore that, when building his theory, Collier (2000) 'superbly' ignored the 
works of other academics, such as Kaplan (2000), who sees violence between communities 
as the main cause of conflict affecting societies or Kaldor (1997, 1999 and 2001) who con-
siders current conflicts as the consequences of changes linked to globalization. 
Box B-1: Warlords 
Based on Giustozzi, 2005; Jackson, 2005 and Le Biflon, 2000 
The emergence of conflict in a 'globalized' world is analysed by several authors (Kaldor, 
1999; Le Billon et ai., 2000; Goodhand, 2001b; Stewart, 2001; Marchal and Messiant, 2003). 
They argue that, whilst aiming to integrate economic processes and culture, globalization 
also lead to 'disintegration and differentiation within societies' (Le Billon et al., 2000:3), shat-
tering the traditional values, in particular in the developing world. Looking at economic as-
pects, it appears that trade deregulation has had detrimental effects on particular groups, 
creating inequality, that in tum have fed rebellion. 
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BAD GOVERNANCE AND ARMED CONFLICTS 
Another commonly cited cause of armed conflict is bad govemance'. For Goodhand 
(2001 b:24), govemments have a role in preventing grievance from becoming violent by treat-
ing their people with justice, which they often fail to do. On the contrary, as pointed out by 
Stewart (2002:12) peaceful protests are often repressed and this may lead to violence. Ac-
cording to Murshed (2002:390), this is due to a 'weak social contract,2, often a legacy from 
colonial powers, which tended to 'divide and rule'. In his view: 
'Violent conflict is unlikely to take place if a country has a framework of widely 
agreed roles; both formal and informal, that govern the allocation of resources, 
including point-resources rents and the peaceful settlement of grievance'. 
In war-areas, political structures are often considerably' affected. Nafziger and Auvinen 
(2002) mention state weakness as a parameter influencing the occurrence of crises. They 
refer to situations where 'personalistic' regimes seek personal profit of their position and are 
engaged in predatory activities that Collier (2000) considers the main cause for civil war. In 
extreme cases, the decline may lead to 'state collapse' or 'state failure' (Cliffe and Luckham, 
1999; Cliffe and Luckham, 2000), a situation that existed in several African states, for in-
stance in Somalia (Box B-2). In 'failed states', the lack of a central authority or its weakness 
makes the delivery of aid more difficult. As a result the cOnflict management tend to be weak 
and crises prolong into what is often called 'protracted crises' (Hendrickson, 1998; Grune-
wald, 2001; Harmer and Macrae, 2004a). In such situations, there is no democratic process 
and elites lacking legitimacy are not held accountable for their actions. It is a 'failure of the 
entire process of govemance' (Cliffe and Luckham, 1999:33). 
The DECD and United Kingdom Department for Intemational Development (DFID) call these 
states 'fragile', associating them with characteristics such as loss of territorial control, low 
administrative capacity, political instability, neo-patrimonial politics - earlier referred to as 
predatory practices from rulers - and repressive policies (Moreno-Torres and Anderson, 
2004; Morcos, 2005). DFID (2005:27) has published a list of 46 'fragile states,4, which ac-
count for 14 per cent of the world population and in which 30 per cent of people live with less 
than a dollar a day (DFID, 2005). 
1 the capacity of a political system to govem efficiently and to provide the necessary political conditions for 
the public good' (Alien et ai, 2006:45). .'
2 'a mutual agreement between specific groups or elements within a society' Oxford English Dictionary. 
3 See the notion of warlord in Box B-1 page 35. 
4 Afghanistan, Angola, A2erbaijan, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Rep., Chad, Comoras, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Cote d'lvoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Georgia, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Kenya, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Liberia, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, 
Papua New Guinea, Silo Tome, & Prlncipe Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan Tajikistan, Timor 
Leste, Togo, Tonga, Uzbekistan Vanuatu, Yemen and Republic of Zimbabwe. 
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Box B-2: War In Africa 
Also based on: Nathan, 2004; Luckham et aI, 2001; Austin, 1999; and ChtiJtien, 1991 
. ETHNICITY AND ARMED CONFLICTS 
The range of the possible causes of armed conflicts would not be complete without referring 
to ethnicity. It has often been considered as a major parameter and Viiyrynen (1996) con-
siders civil wars as 'expressions of ethnic hatred or secessionist projects'. Many examples 
such as Bosnia Herzegovina, Rwanda or Sri Lanka would support this view. Yet, Nafziger 
and Auvinen (2002: 159) do not consider ethnicity as a deciding factor. They argue that: 'eth-
nic antagonism' is more likely to emerge during conflicts rather than to be a root-cause. Col-
lier (2003) considers ethnicity instrumental to rebellion when insurgents exploit ethnically-
based social networks to carry out their struggle. That is what Goodhand and Hulme 
(1999:17) refer to as groups manipulated by 'conflict entrepreneurs and political opportun- " 
ists·. Collier'S (2003) analysis of the likelihood of conflict in relation to ethnicity finds out that 
wherever the largest ethnic group represents an absolute majority of the population, the risk 
is increased by 50 per cent. Finally. Reynal-Querol (2002) examines the relation between 
ethnic conflicts and religion and finds a strong correlation. She concludes that religious po-
larization carries greater risks of civil war than. for instance. linguistic differences. 
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• Consequences on civilian population 
The direct consequences of conflict are the increased vulnerabilitv of civilian population. This 
concept was earlier defined in the context of natural disasters'. Factors such as poverty influ-
ence both vulnerabilities to natural disasters and to armed conflicts. Adopting a more general 
posture, Le Billon (2000:11) states: 'a population is vulnerable when people are powerless' and 
adds that their protection and welfare depend on the legitimacy and representativity of political 
structures as well as on the state of the economy .. 
Viiyrynen lists four specific aspects of humanitarian crises deriving from armed conflicts: 
• Casualties; 
• Diseases; 
• Hunger; and 
• Extemal and intemal displacement. 
They are examined hereafter. 
CASUALTIES 
Smith (1994) states that data on war are often unreliable because: 'nobody has the job of . 
counting most of the dead, injured and displaced'. Yet, Uppsala University (2006) database 
estimates that, in 2003, more tlian 20,000 people died in battle2• The majority ofthese casu- . 
alties happened in Iraq - 8,300; Sudan - 2,300; India - 1,600; and Liberia - 1,500. This, 
however, is just a fraction of the death toll due to armed conflicts. Ever since the beginning 
of the 20th century, civilians have suffered the brunt of death-tolls due to armed conflicts 
(Smith, 1994; Eade and Williams, 1995; Carbonnier, 1998; Kaldor, 1999) and, as mentioned 
earlier, this tendency has been accentuated during the last thirty years3• Bezacier (2004) in-
dicates that during the First World War, about 10 per cent of the victims where civilians. The 
percentage. increased to about 50 per cent during the Second World War and to 75 to 90 per 
cent today. It corresponds to a ratio of military to civilian casualties close to 8 to 1 (Kaldor, 
1999:8). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 31,000 people, mostly civilians die every 
month (Coghlan et al., 2006). 
DISEASE 
Diseases caused by emergencies - and in particular war-related emergencies -: make 
more victims among children and elderly people (Viiyrynen, 1996:23). They are often related 
1 See page 22. 
2 'Typically, battle-related deaths occur in what can be described as "normal" warfare involving the armed forces 
of the warring parties. This includes traditional battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities (e.g. hit-and-run attacks / am-
bushes) and all kinds of bombardments of military units, cities and villages etc. The tarrlets are usually the military 
itself and its installations or state institutions and state representatives, but there is often substantial collateral 
damage in the form of civilians being killed in crossfire, in indiscriminate bombings etc. All deaths - military as 
. well as civilians- incurred in such Situations, are counted as battle-related deaths'(Uppsala University, 2006b). 
3 See page 32. . 
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to close"living conditions experienced when displacement of population occurs 1. According 
to Perrin (1996:124), the most common forms of disease among refugees are measles; diar-
rhoeal diseases - in particular cholera - and acute respiratory infections. 
HUNGER 
Famines are among the most common manifestation of armed conflicts. They may originate 
in natural phenomena such as drought but their consequences are usually exacerbated by 
human activity. War is particularly 'effective' in this respect (Vayrynen, 1996:24); 
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 
. Statistics conceming population displacement are unreliable given the difficulties in carrying 
out census in the field, however, in 2002 the UNHCR estimated that 50 million people were 
'victims of forced displacement'. 13 to 18 million ofthem were refugees, defined by UNHCR 
as: 
\4ny person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is un-
willing to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a na-
tionality and being outside the country of his fonner habitual residence as a result 
of such events,· is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to retum to it' 
(UNHCR, 1951 cited by Hoitennann et ai, 2001:1-4). 
The remaining people were Intemally Displaced Persons (lOPs). defined by the United Na-
tions as: 
'Persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in 
large numbers, as a result of anned conflict, intemal strife, systematic violations 
of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters, and who are within the teni-
tory of their own country' (UN Secretary General 1992, cited by Holtennann et aI, 
2001:1-4). 
Most of the refugees were fOund in Asia - over six million - and Africa - seven to eight 
. million - whilst a majority of lOPs were found in Sudan, Colombia, Afghanistan, Angola, Sri 
Lanka and Burundi. 87.6 per cent of the UNHCR-assisted population stayed in camps, 
where they often remained long after the resolution of the crisis (Agier, 2002:318-320). The 
global evolution and figures for 2004 are shown in Figure B-8. 
1 See hereafter. 
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Figure 8-8: lOPs and Refugees (1989-2005) 
Source: tOMC and USC for tOPs' figures, UNHCR and UNRWA for refugees' figures, chart 
. from tOMC, 2006 . 
3. Focus 
3.1 Water and sanitation in urban areas 
Water and sanitation belong to what is usually designated as urban services and more specifi-
cally to infrastructure services, which include water supply, drainage, sewerage, roads and elec-
tricity supply (Amos, 1993; Sohail et al., 2001). Amos (1993) points out that, besides being ser-
vices for the general public, they represent important economic activities that require consider-
able investments. Another important characteristic of water and sanitation services is their status 
of basic services (Slaymaker et aI., 2005:9-10), to which everyone is entitled4 • 
• Different types of urban water and sanitation services 
The presence of networked infrastructure. is a characteristic of urban areas. It makes possible 
higher levels of service, compared to traditional rural water and sanitation systems. Only the 
economy of scale allowed by higher population densities found in urban areas justifies the high 
cost of building, operating and maintaining networks (Bakker, 2003:332). These high costs are 
responsible for the often predominant presence of non-networked systems5 in developing coun-
tries' cities, which cannot afford this expensive level of service for the entire population (Cotton 
and Tayler, 2000). Networks are classified into feeder networks, which are piped-water supply 
and collector networks, which are 'sewered' sanitation. 
Non-networked services are the same as those commonly found in rural areas: 
1 International Displacement Monitoring Centre. 
2 US Committee for Refugees. 
3 United Nations Relief and Worns Agency. 
4 See page 26. 
5 See 
Table 8-5 page 44 and Table 8-6 page 44. 
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• Wells and hand-pumps":'" including hand-dug wells or bore holes; 
• 'Unsewered' sanitation - including latrines, septic tanks etc. 
The main other options are: collecting water from a river or another surface source and harvest-
ing rainwater. 
Most of the possible ways of obtaining water in cities of the Developing World are illustrated in 
Figure B-9. It is based on a study of African cities but re'mains mostly valid for other geographi-
cal regions. The figure shows that two different types of urban areas can be distinguished in 
terms of water SUpply: 
1. The areas served by city water mains and small local networks, mostly the city centre; 
2. The peri-urban and other areas not reached by piped water, usually low-income areas. 
In areas served by city water mains and small 
local networ1<S 
I Citywale, mains I 
Middle and high Income 
households are connected 
to the city mains 
(20te 80 'fa) 
Low-income hOuseholds 
fetch water from 
standpipe or neighbour 
end pay for it 
(101030 'fa) 
In perl-urban ~d other areas not 
reached by pIped water 
Very.IOW income 
households without 
access to dty water 
drew water from 
mostly free sources 
(51030%) 
Figure 8-9: Main water supply options in Third World cities 
Source: Collignon and Vezina, 2000:23 
Similar arrangements exist in terms of sanitation 1. In most cases, sewerage 'systems, when they 
are present, only serve par! of the city centre whilst peri-urban areas rely on 'unsewered' sanita-
tion (Alien et aI., 2006:50). Theyare illustrated in Figure B-lO. 
For Le Bris (2002), the conditions in peri-urban areas - and small towns - are neither totally 
urban nor rural. Systems characterising both environments often coexist. The use of a certain' 
type of system may depend on the social status of the household or even on the season -:- as 
1 In this section, the tenn sanitation designates only excreta and wastewater disposal and treatment. 
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'traditional' systems, such as rivers or springs may be difficult to access or even become flooded 
during the rainy season (Le Bris, 2002). 
As 'mentioned earlier', the conditions of access to urban services"": in particular water and sani-
tation, are particularly deficient in peri-urban areas. For that reason those living in these areas are 
often considered as 'water poor' (Alien et al., 2006). It means that their conditions of access to 
water and 'sanitation are close to what is defined as 'basic' - respectively a water point or a toi~ 
let within 1 kilometre or 30 minutes round-trip, see pages 26 and. 
Figure 8-10: Main,sanitation options in Third World cities 
Adapted from Collignon and Vezina, 2000:23 
The conditions of access to water supply and sanitation were assessed worldwide in 2000 by 
WHO and UNICEF (WHO and UNICEF, 2000). The section of this survey on urban water supply 
is based on data from a number of cities across the world. Whilst it does not seem fully reliable 
for the other continents2, data on Africa, collected in 43 cities3, look comprehensive and are used 
in this section. This is summarized in Table 8.5 and Table 8.6 and shows that, in African cities, 
access to piped water is relatively low - less than half of the population - whilst access to sew-
f See page 20. , 
2 India has only one city represented - Mumbai - China, vel}' few, no data on Australia, data on Europe do not 
include countries such as France, Gennany or the United Kingdom, etc. 
3 Abidjan, Accra, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Antananarivo, Asmara, Bamako, Bangui, Bissau, Blantyre, Brazzaville, 
Bujumbura, Cairo, Casablanca, Cotonou, Dakar, Dar es Salaam, Djibouti, Doua/a, Freetown, Garobone, Harare, 
Kampala, Kigali, Kinshasa, Ubreville, Lome, Luanda, Lusaka, Ma/abo, Maseru, Monrovia, Moroni, Nairobi, 
, N'Djamena, Niamey, Nouakchott, Ouagadougou, Port·Louis, Sao Tome and Windoek. 
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ered sanitation is even lower - less than 20 per cent. The proportion of unserved households is 
also high - respectively 31 and 19 per cent. 
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Table B-5: Conditions of access to water In African cities, survey of 43 locations, 2000 
Table B-6: Conditions of access to sanitation in African cities, sUlrve,v 
• Stakeholders3 involved 
Three types of stake holders may be Involved in the provision of water and sanitation services in 
urban areas: 
1. The public community, i.e. governmental institutions4; 
2. Consumers either as a community - sometimes through Community Based Organisa-
tions (CBOs) or NGOs':-' or as individual households. 
3. The private sector: formal or informal5 enterprises; 
Alien et al (2006) classify all the possible types of arrangements according to the role played by 
these three categories of stakeholders6: 
• They call 'policy-driven' the formal types of arrangement for water supply and sanitation. 
They refer to services delivered with the participation of water sector institutions (1). They 
may involve a public utility, which may work in partnership with consumer communities 
(2) or with private companies (3); 
1 See footnote page Errorl Bookmark not defined .. 
2 'Small bore or seltled sewerage is a means of conveying domestic sewage which has been settled In a septic 
tank' (Mara, 1996). 
3 Stakeholders are individuals, groups or institutions with interest in a project/programme, who are affected posi-
tively or negatively (Gosling and Edwaros, 2003:302). 
4 Concemed govemments may be municipal, regional or national. 
5 See definition of7nformal sector' page 21. . 
• Numbers within brackets refer to the three slakeholders: (1) govemment/publicutility, (2) community / consum-
ers, (3) private vendors or companies. 
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• They call 'needs-driven' the arrangements made when no water sector institution is in-
volved. The service may, in such case, be provided by consumers themselves (2), indi-
vidually or in community, or by informal enterprises (3). 
In the case of water supply, 'policy-driven' arrangements include piped-water distribution, either 
directly carried out by a public utility or implemented through partnerships with the private sector 
or consumer communities. 'Needs-driven' arrangements include direct collection from a water 
source - such as a well, a spring or a river - water illegally collected, and water vendors. In 
Figure B-9, 'policy-driven' arrangements appear under 'areas served by city water mains and 
small local networks' whilst 'needs-driven' arrangements appear under 'peri-urban and other ar-
eas not reached by piped-water'. 
In the case of sanitation 'policy-driven' arrangements include sewerage networks run by a public 
utility, sometimes in partnership with consumer communities. It may also be the emptying of pits 
and septic tanks with vacuum-trucks owned and operated by a public utility or by private contrac-
tors. 'Needs-driven' arrangements may be individual or collective systems or services - such as 
sewers or public toilets - run by consumers, by communities or by informal enterprises. It may 
also be no access to sanitation facilities - open defecation. In Figure B-10, 'policy-driven' ar-
rangements appear under 'city centre' whilst 'needs-driven' arrangements appear under 'pe ri-
urban, illegal settlements'. 
The 'Water Supply Wheel' (Figure B-11) and the 'Sanitation Wheel' (Figure B-12) illustrate both 
cases. 'Policy-driven' arrangements range from 'public community' partnership to 'fully public' and 
the participation of formal private companies described as 'public-private cooperation'. 'Needs-
driven' arrangements range from community management of water and sanitation services de-
scribed as 'community cooperation' to services offered by informal private supplier described as 
'private competition' • 
• The Water and Sanitation Cycle· 
Alien et al (2006) suggest a model that illustrates, in general terms, the different elements of 
water and sanitation production and consumption 1. 
These elements are: 
• Water extraction, treatment and storage and distribution; 
• Water access and use; 
• Wastewater management; 
• Sanitation. 
1 The term 'production' does not fully apply to sanitation, although it can be considered as a service that can be 
consumed. 
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As shown in Figure B-1 3, they form a cycle. The various components of this cycle are detailed 
hereafter. 
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f For a description of the various options, see pages 56, 57 and 58. 'Passive private investments are private in-
vestors in government operations, such as through their purchase of municipal bonds in some countries' (Bennett 
et al., 1999:5) . 
47 
B. Review of the Literature 
Extraction Distribution 
! 
i .' , 
Waslewater 
management 
~........................................................................................... Sanitation 
Figure 8-13: The Water and Sanitation Cycle 
Source: Alien et aI, 2006:63 
The Water and Sanitation Cycle' is a model applying to any type of urban water and sanitation 
services. Figure B-14 shows how it translates in the case of networks, most common in urban 
areas. 
Water treatment 
Service 
storage 
water 
Distribution to " .••.. / 
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Wastewater treatment 
'-----_ Effluent 
Figure 8-14: Main components or water and sewerage systems 
Source: North West Water, 1994 cited by Tynan, 2000:5 (adapted) 
EXTRACTION 
Water can be extracted from the ground - wells and springs, from water ways ..,- rivers and 
lakes, or collected from roofs or ad-hoc systems when it rains - rainwater harvesting. 
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The various options are summarized in Table B.7. 
~~~~~~~ll~~[Bll~~~ir~~~Hi~~l~~~l!~~~Jii'j!~~~'!~;~'i~ii~HI~16'~~~~~lh~:u~~~~~~~;~~)1~;~~~~~fj~;~~~~~~~~I~i!~~~;:il 
Based on Alien et aI, 2006 and Collignon and Vezina, 2000 
TREATMENT AND STORAGE 
The required treatment depends on the source and mode of extraction. The various options 
are summanzed in Table B.S. Treated water is stored in reservoirs before distribution. 
Table e-8: Options for water treatment 
~~~~. 
Adapted from WELL, 1998:191 
DISTRIBUTION 
Water can be distributed in many different ways: 
• . Collected directly from the source - river, lake, stream, spring, well or rainwater catch-
ment - with buckets or other recipients; 
• Distributed through a piped-network to individual households or tap-stands; 
• Distributed with water tankers; 
1 Such as: lining, cover, and platform, avoiding the infiltration of surface water. 
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• Distributed by 'Small Scale· Independent Providers'. (SSIPs): water vendors, often 
equipped with push carts, bicycles or animal carts. 
In the case of piped-water distribution, the options are (Sansom et aI., 2004:59): 
• Private connections; 
• Yard connection; 
• Shared group-connection at the level of a street or a group of households; 
• Bulk supply to a group of users - community management; 
• Water-kiosks, which can be opEm or sheltered; 
• Tap-stands, where water may be free or supplied for a small fee. Free water is becoming 
increasingly rare because fiscal revenues from municipalities tend not to be able to cover 
the costs (Collignon, 1999). 
Distribution systems are usually made of three types of pipelines (Twort et al., 2000:613): . 
1. Trunk mains,1 conveying water from the place where it is produced to service reservoirs; 
2. Principal feeder mains or principal mains, conveying water from service reservoirs to de-
mand areas; 
. 3. Distribution "mains, supplying water to the individual connections. 
These three categories are sometimes called primary, secondary and tertiary networks. 
There are also different regimes in terms of (Sansom et aI., 2004:60): 
• Pressure: conventional networks2, first storel, ground or trickle feed; and 
• Service regularity: from permanent service to a few hours a day or a week. 
In some cases - private connections, water-kiosks - water can be supplied through 
ground tanks or overhead tanks in order to limit problems resulting from irregular service. 
(Sansom et aI., 2004:62). 
ACCESS 
As shown in Table B.3, levels of access to water depend on the proximity of a water source. 
It varies from less than 5 litres per person and per day, considered as 'no access', when the 
source is at more than 1 km from the household, to more than 155 litres per person and per 
day when multiple taps are available in a house. 
A research, carried out in 2000, in 10 African cities4 (Collignon and Vezina, 2000) showed 
that people with access to piped-water, i.e. private connection or tap-stand, consume be-
tween 22 litres per person and per day - in Cotonou, Benin - and 100 litres per person 
1 Also caffed: 1ransmission line'. 
2 100 m water column or 10 bars. 
3 25 m water column or 2. 5 bars. 
• Cotonou, Benin; Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire; Conakry, Guinea; Nairobi, Kenya; Ba-
mako, Mali; Nouakchott, Mauritania; Kampala, Uganda; Dakar, Senegal and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 
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and per day - in Nairobi, Kenya. It can be assumed that 20 to 100 litres per person and per 
day is approximately the range for levels of consumption of people having access to piped-
water in developing countries. Those without access to piped-water consume smaller quanti-
ties. 
Level of access to water services can also be measured with other parameters such as (Al-
Ien et aI., 2006:73): 
• The regularity of the service; 
• Its sufficiency, i.e. the volume of water available per person; 
• Its affordability; 
• Its quality, including water quality; 
• Its safety; 
• Its cultural acceptability. 
These parameters may apply to water supply, in particular in the case of piped-water distri-
bution, to sanitation, or both. 
WATER USE AND WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT 
Water is not used in a sustainable way in most countries. Wherever water is available, it is 
used unsparingly, in particular by the 'urban elite', for whom it is usually inexpensive (Bak-
ker, 2003:333). This behaviour tends to reduce even more water access for the 'water pOOr'1 
(Alien et aI., 2006:78). 
The use of water produces wastewater, which can be separated into two categories (Alien et 
aI., 2006:80): .. 
1. 'Slack water' - or sewage, which contains urine and faeces; 
2. 'Grey water' - or 'sullage', produced by laundry, washing dishes, and preparing food. 
SANITATION 
Sanitation is included in the 'water cycle' because of the risk of water contamination and 
subsequent impact on health that inadequate sanitation may cause. The main possible op-
tions are shown in Figure B-10. They include (Collignon and Vezina, 2000): 
• Pit latrines; 
• Pour flush toilets; 
• Septic tanks; 
• Small-bore sewers and; 
• Sewerage network. 
1 See page 43. 
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As stated earlierl , sewerage networks usually serve only the city centres. Smal.l-bore sewers 
are a simplified version which is more adapted to low-income areas but nevertheless re-
. . 
mains rare. 
In most cases, sanitation systems are individual or communal - shared between identified 
families. They may also be public toilets, operated by communities or by private operators. 
Those with no sanitation system at all, 19 per cent of people in African cities (Table B-6) may 
Use the so-called 'flying latrines', which are simply plastic bags in which people defecate and 
throw away.- sometimes by flinging them, hence the term: 'flying' (Water Utility Partnership, 
2003:65) . 
• Management options 
Networked and non-networked systems are managed differently. Management options range 
from central management by public institutions to household management as shown in Table B.9. 
Table 8-9: Urban water and sanitation management systems 
. r~rori;plof~ens;'hand:pUmps;~ ~ •. Tlie6wnef6fpI6t·fiO\def·is~j1tli 
". t~~g~:~f~~~;~~~[if'1~~;i1 !i[~~!nr~l~m~ill~.I;\i!]:~i:![JI!!!!j 
Source: Adapted from Cotton and Tay/er, 2000:1.10 
One important option that does not appear in this table is the provision of services by Small Scale 
Independent Providers (SSIPs), which in general applies to individual households. 
The management options involving institutions, i.e. 'centrally managed', are part of the 'policy-
driven' sections of the 'water wheel' and the 'sanitation wheel'l. Individual household manage-
1 See page 42. 
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ment is part of the 'needs-driven' section. SSIPs and Community-based options, i.e. 'user group 
managed', may belong to both depending on their relationship with the water utility . 
• Institutional options 
When water and sanitation services are delivered by a utility, often for networked services, a 
number of options are possible, which are summarized in Table B.10. 
Source: WELL, 1998:122 
Whatever their management model, water utilities - ideally - function through a number of 
'organisational systems', which are listed below (WHO, 1994:9): 
• A planning system, comprising the analysis of the needs according to the population to 
supply and corresponding policies and standards. Based on these analyses, the creation, 
expansion or modification of water systems is planned. It includes. not only the feasibility 
of construction of physical infrastructure but also the financial aspects - funding and vi-
ability; 
1 See Figure B-11 page 46, and Figure B-12 page 46. . 
2 'non-<:orporate entities ( ... ) taking up management structures or other features and behaviours employed by 
corporations' www.wikipedia.org. . 
3 'An organization or Industry, now especially in some African countries. having political authority and serving the 
state indirectly' Oxford English Dictionary. 
4 'A company whose shares are available to the public through a stock exchange. The liability of its members in 
respect of the company's debts is limited' (Bufler et al., 1997). 
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• An. operational system, representing the resources and activities necessary to the con-
struction and O&M of the installations and equipment; 
• A commercial system, which is a tool for the promotion and sale of water supply services 
allowing the institution to attain, or pursue, self-sufficiency. This system is linked to spe-
cific water laws and regulations; 
• Financial, human resources, administration support, and management information sys-
tems: representing 'support' systems that allow a smooth running of the utility • 
• Deficiencies in water and sanitation services provision 
CAUSES 
One of the most common causes for deficient water and sanitation services is the low capac-
ity of water utilities. It is often due to a lack of financial resources, usually linked to manage-
rial practices, such as water prices well below the cost of provision 1, over-staffing, poor bill-
ing, and a high proportion of unaccounted-for water. A reduction in the intemational funding 
for water throughout the 1990s has also contributed to the lack of financial resources (DEeD 
Development Assistance Committee, 2006). 
The growth of the urban population, in particular in low-income peri-urban areas, has been a . 
worsening factor. It has prevented water utilities from keeping up with demand2• The illegal 
status of many of these settlements. has often been a barrier to the extension of the service3• 
When armed conflicts provoke population displacement and influx of lOPs in cities, levels of 
service may suffer even further (UNCHS-Habitat, 2003:101). 
CONSEQUENCES: 
As seen earlier, deficient water services have public health consequences4• There are also 
wider effects, for instance on household economy. This is linked to the time spent in fetching 
water when sources are far away or on the money spent in seeking treatment for illnesses 
caused by poor water access. There may also be consequences on education, as children, 
, -
especially girls, may need to help their mothers to fetch water. Poor services may affect spe-
cific ethnic or social groups, thereby enhancing discrimination (Bosch et aI., 2002; UNCHS-
Habitat, 2003). 
, See cost of water page 28. 
2 See page 21. 
3 See page-21. 
4 See page 23. 
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The main consequences of deficient water services are summarized in Figure 8-15. 
Figure 8-15: Consumption and income effects of deficient water and sanitation services 
Source: Bosch et ai, 2002:378 
• Private sector involvement in urban water and sanitation 
A wide range of private enterprises may be involved in urban water and sanitation. It could ap-
ply to water utilities' operations becoming partly or completely seconded to private companies, 
or, on a smaller scale, to the involvement of small companies, sometimes informally, in the de-
livery of water and sanitation to certain customers or in certain areas. These small-scale water 
enterprises are the 'Small-Scale Independent Providers" (SSIPs). Non Govemmental Organisa~ 
tions or Community-Based Organisations may also be involved (Bennett et aI., 1999:4). 
The term privatization designates any involvement of the private sector but it is more com-
monly employed in the case of formal companies taking over in part or completely the service 
delivered by a public utility. In such cases, privatization is sometimes called 'Private Sector Par-
ticipation' (PSP), 'Public Private Partnership' (PPP) or Private Participation in Infrastructure 
(PPI). 
1 First mentioned in the options for water distribution, see page 48. . 
2 '"Privatization" In the water sector involves transferring some or all of the assets or operations Qf public water 
. systems into private hands' (G/eick et al., 2002). 
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Two types of private partners may be involved (McGranahanand Lloyd Owen, 2006): 
'. Multinational water companies 1; 
• Smaller-scale local water companies. 
For Bakker (2003:337), privatization, understood as PSP, does not mean introducing a water 
company in totally public-run service. She finds privatization better described as: 
~n overlapping set of strategies - industrialization, corporatization, and interna-
tionalization - of water supply in zones where a high degree of non-corporate 
activity already exists'. 
This 'high degree of non-corporate activity' is what she called an 'archipelago', 'spatially sepa-
rated but linked "islands· of networked supply in the urban fabric'. Such metaphor becomes 
clear looking at the diagram in Figure B-16. The various modes of water supply provision in ur-
ban areas are separated by the nature of water production and distribution ranging from ar-
tisanal to industrial, and the way it is managed, which can be through the community - or in-
deed the household - public utilities or companies or, at the other end of the scale, by private 
companies. 
Figure B-16: Modes of urban water supply provision2 
Source: Bakker, 2003:337 
Govemments often choose to privatize water utilities because of their poor perfonmance. The 
operation is expected to produce results such as (The World Bank, 1997; Batley, 2001): 
• Improving the technical and managerial capacity of the utility; 
• Delivering a service which is economically more efficient; 
1 A few ofthem dominate the world market, in parlicular the French companies Suez and Vivendi (Hall, 2003). 
Suez alone has 200 million customers around the world, www.suez.com. 
2 Water MNC: Water Multi-National Companies. 
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• Benefiting from large-scale private investment capital; 
• Limiting public subsidies for the service and direct them in benefit of those not yet served; 
• Preventing or limiting 'political exploitation' of water supply services 
'
; . 
• Allowing a better adaptation of water services to the needs of consumers. 
This may apply to water supply, sanitation or both; however, as pointed out by McGranahan and 
Lloyd Owen (2006:4), water supply is largely predominant. This is partly due to the fact that wa-
ter is a more 'saleable' good than sanitation. Water distribution is simpler and private initiatives 
require less 'encouragemenf from govemments. However, sanitation is a service as essential 
as water supply and the fact that, in many areas, water supply improvement has not been ac-
companied by a similar move in terms of sanitation is a major health concem2 • 
• Main Private Sector Participation strategies 
The possible options for PSP are listed below (The World Bank, 1997): 
SERVICE CONTRACTS 
The private company performs specific tasks for a water utility, such as reading meters or 
monitoring losses. Service contracts are widely used; they may contribute to improved effi-
ciency in service delivery provided that the utility is well managed. 
MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS 
O&M activities of the water utility are carried out by a private company for a fixed fee or for a 
fee depending on the achievement of performance targets. Govemments remain in charge 
for investments. 
LEASE CONTRACTS 
O&M activities of the water utility are carried out by a private company, which recovers costs 
and draw benefits from exploitation. The company pays a lease fee to the govemment, 
which remains in charge of investments. However, certain lease contracts allow a certain 
level of private investment, for instance for infrastructure rehabilitation. 
CONCESSION CONTRACTS 
The arrangement is similar to lease contracts but in addition, the private company is in 
charge of investments. Assets ownership remains with the govemment. 
BUILD-OPERATE-TRANSFER (BOT) OF BUILD-OPERATE-OWN (BOO) 
CONTRACTS 
This type of arrangement applies when a private company builds components such as water 
treatment plants or wastewater treatment plants. With BOT contracts, the utility pays for the 
1 See page 30. 
2 See page 25. 
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water - produced or treated - at a rate allowing the private company to recover costs and 
obtain a reasonable profit over the period of the contract. On completion, the ownership of 
the facility is transferred to the water utility. In the case of BOO contracts, the arrangement is 
similar, but the private company remains the owner of the facility at the end of the contract. 
FULL OR PARTIAL DIVESTITURE 
With this type of contract, the totality of water and/or sewerage assets, or part of it, are sold 
to a private company. Govemment's role is limited to regulation. 
The allocation of responsibilities under these arrangements is summarized in Table B.11. 
responsibilities under the main PSP options 
Joint-venture is another option. It is not reviewed in this table. It is a semi-privatization process, 
whereby a public utility and a private company create a new company or take over an existing 
one. In this way, a private company and a public utility share the responsibility and co-
ownership for the delivery of water services (Bennett et aI., 1999:11) . 
• Small-Scale Independent providers (SSIPs) 
A large proportion of the urnan population in developing countries is not served by water distri-
bution networks. In African large cities, this represents more than 30 per cent of the cases 1; in a 
survey of eight Asian cities2, the proportion was 20 per cent. Service may be non-existent in ar-
eas too far away from the water distribution network, considered 'illegal', or located on hazard-
ous ground. These areas are often served by SSIPs, in particular in situations when free water 
sources :- such as wells, rivers, springs or tap-stands where water is free of charge- are not 
1 See 
Table 8-5 page 44. 
2 See page 61. 
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easily available. SSIPs may also offer a complement to the service available from the utility 
(Conan, 2003). 
SSIPs can be classified into two categories (Water Utility Partnership, 2003:53): 
1. 'Intermediate' providers, who deliver water they buy from the utility through a kiosk, their 
own small network or by other means - such as water tanker, push-carts etc. This cate-
gory would also include utility customers who resell water; 
2. Real 'independent providers', who may be in competition with the water utility and obtain 
water from other sources - for instance, their own borehole. 
SSIPs may be wholesale vendors - selling to distributing vendors or operating with tankers -
or distribute water selling door to door or through a network - the latter are called pioneers 
(Snell, 1998; Albu and Njiru, 2003). They may also work with complete illegality when selling 
water from an illegal connection. Network water resellers are sometimes part of this illegal busi-
ness, however, when they own a legal connection, the utility may recognise this practice as a 
mean of 'filling the gap' and adapt its tariffs in order not to penalize water resellers (Kjellen and 
Mcgranahan, 2006:9). 
Bottled or pre-packaged water selling is another field in which SSIPs are present. It has become 
a 'rapidly emerging business' (Kjellen and Mcgranahan, 2006:3). Bottled water may be treated 
by small companies using sophisticated processes such as ultra-violet, 'ozonation' or even re-
verse osmosis. This is particularly the case in some Asian cities (Conan, 2003). In Africa, wa-
ter is usually just boiled and sold in plastic bags in the street. 
In the field of sanitation, SSIPs mainly offer services such as public toilets; manual cleaning of 
pits; suction trucks for septic tanks; sludge disposal and treatment1. (Collignon and Vezina, 
2000:33) . 
• Community Management 
Communities2 may manage the O&M of non~network systems such as hand-pumps, wells or 
communal latrines3• This is possible provided there is a certain level of social cohesion that al-
lows this option to be envisaged4• The acceptance of traditional forms of leadership, the homo-
geneity of the population, the ethnic background and the time community members have stayed 
in the area are determining factors (Wegelin-Schuringa, 1998). In the case of networked sys-
tems, and in particular for water distribution networks, users' management committees may be 
created in order to regulate and organise water distribution. According to Kalbermatten 
1 In spite of the huge environmental problem, there is a limited demand for this service. 
• This type of service may also be defined as Implemented by 'clvif society' (McGranahan and Lloyd Owen, 
2006:3). 
3 See Table 8-9 page 51. 
• See page 103 for a definition of community and more details on communities relevant to urban areas. 
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(1999:14), it is often the best way of avoiding illegal connections while reducing management 
costs .. 
Water may be provided for free, through public tap-stands. In such cases, the role of the man-
agement team would be to ensure that the tap-stand area is kept clean and to replace or repair 
the tap when it is broken or damaged. As mentioned earlier, this model, more typical of rural 
areas, has been shown to be rarely sustainable (Collignon et aI., 1999:36). In most cases, water 
is sold and communities may be a 'collective customer' for the water utility. This conresponds to 
the 'public--community partnership' that appears in the 'water supply wheel' (Figure B-11). Wa-
. ter utilities may establish a contract with a community, whereby it supplies water in bulk - often. 
at a discounted rate - and receives payment from a water management committee. This com-
mittee may be elected by users groups and organises water delivery, in most cases through wa-
ter-kiosks. The responsibility for the maintenance of the distribution network in their locality is of-
ten left to the community. Water sellers are either salaried or paid at a marginal rate (Collignon 
et aI., 1999; Sansom et aI., 2003). In some rare cases, management committees have sec-
onded water distribution to private companies. This happened in Bamako, Mali, where a. water 
users' association has leased water distribution in their .neighbourhood (Water Utility Partner-
ship, 2003:57). 
Table B.12 shows the possible level of involvement of the community, the municipal water utility 
.and the private sector in this type of management: 
Table 8-12: Community-management optlons1 
~!g~:i::l·:!~!).'.!~;t;gs~~[!;1~C~~~~rii~~:~~~'!~g~j%2;r;;;i21?l~[[E~c;~~~~~t~fU~b~~~"~I'B;~n.~~:[;~~rO~f~e8f.a];ti?~i~n~;;ii~i,.t~;ii;~M;~~!;'~:it~~t~~~~c~:~~~;d 
,rTotal community.' i A; 
; takeover . .' .... , 
""", .. ","'." •• 111m~"~~~~B?r~~~~:1~1[~R~hl~~e~~t~ml; 
Based on Vezina and Valfrey, 2001:3 
Community management presents the advantage of ensuring the participation of consumers in 
the management of their water supply whilst limiting management costs for the utility (Collignon 
et aI., 1999:36). The legal status of users group may vary, and is sometimes not clearly defined 
or officially recognised (Water Utility Partnership, 2003:55). It is however important because of 
the legitimacy that it confers to them. Cooperatives and non-profit associations are among the 
most common options (Collignon et aI., 1999:46). Cooperatives may have a relatively complex 
structure, such as SAGUAPAC, which provides water to Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia .. The 
. 1 Translated from French by the author. 
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organisation has a concession 1 over a specific area covering nine districts of the city. Every 
owner of a water connection Is a member of the cooperative. The cooperative district councils 
monitor users concerns regarding their water supply (Yavari, 2005) . 
• Selecting the most appropriate option 
How can water and sanitation services be most effiCiently delivered in urban areas of the devel-
oping world has been the subject of deb~tes since the early 1990s. It is an issue of govemance2 
(Alien et aI., 2006:46) since it implies choices made by municipal authorities. The debate re-
volves around potentially competing approaches in water and sanitation services delivery by 
three entities: the state, the private sector and the communitY. 
The issue of Private Sector PartiCipation is sometimes controversial for reasons that will be ex-
amined in the next sections. Bosch et al (2002:392), suggest that governments confronted with 
choices for service delivery involving the private sector check the efficiency of the services of-
fered by the public utility and 'compare them to the efficiency of private services in cities of simi-
lar size in similar countries at similar income levels'. This does not seem to be so easy to do 
but, in any case, in the view of Bosch et al (2002:392): 
'There are few examples of successful refonn of inefficient, publicly run water 
and sanitation utilities, but failed attempts at such refonn are much more com-
mon' (Bosch et al., 2002:395). 
Privatization, according to this statement, would be the solution to make services more efficient. 
The controversy surrounding this option has to do with principles or equity and concerns about 
efficiency. It opposes the value of the water that is consumed and the rights4 of the citizens who 
consume it (Gutierrez et aI., 2003:12). The main arguments in favour of and against privatiza-
tion are summarized in Table B.13. 
1 See page 56. 
2 See definition in footnote 1 page 37 
3 In this case sometimes referred to as: civil society. 
4 See page 26. 
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Table B-13: Arguments In favour of and against privatization of water supply 
• Supplying the urban poor 
CONDITIONS OF ACCESS 
Low-income settlements are usually not supplied by water utilities. The reasons behind this 
situation were analysed by Conan (2003), in the case of eight Asian cities4• He concluded 
. that insufficient coverage was mainly due to the following reasons: 
• Insufficient water resources to cover the whole population; 
• Utilities considering supplying peri-urban areas, where most of the poor live, as not eco-
. nomically sustainable; 
• Utilities unwilling to cover illegal settlements or areas whose physical characteristics 
make them difficult to supply; 
• Utilities' technical standards, tariffs or management structure inadequate to serve the 
poor. 
In order to tackle this problem, the World Bank recommends a 'demand-driven' approach 
which consists of (Gulyani et aI., 2005:1248): 
• Charging the full cost of water and using the revenues to improve the service and expand 
coverage - turn the vicious circle of Figure B-6 into a virtuous circle; 
. 1 See hereafter. 
2 'Consequences for welfare or opportunity costs not fully accounted for in the price and marlcet system' (Bannock 
et al., 1998). 
3 See hereafter. 
4 Cebu, Philippines; Delhi, India; Dhaka, Bangladesh; Ho Chi Min city, Vietnam; Jakarta, Indonesia; Kathmandu, 
Nepal; Shanghai, China; and U1aan Baatar, Mongolia. 
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• Adjusting to the demand in terms of quantity, price and service options for each 
neighbourhood supplied, which incurs differentiating levels of service. 
Regarding the first of these points, Macintosh (2003:40), argues that excessively low tariffs 
penalize the poor. In his view, raising water tariffs would paradoxically help the poor because 
excessively low tariffs only benefit households connected to a network, which are predomi-
nantly 'non-poor'. Raising tariffs provides a source of revenue that would, in tum, help in in-
creasing coverage. For Le Bris (2002:136) however, this is only acceptable if the rise trans-
lates into actual improvements and if it is calculated in such a way that the poorest house-
holds connected to the network are not penalized. Gutierrez et al (2003:20) also recommend 
that precautions are taken when calculating the right price for water. Since paying for water 
may represent a large share of poor households' income, increasing prices cannot be made 
lightly because it may result in some households having to sacrifice on food, health or edu-
cation etc. An economic issue may be tumed into a moral one. 
The tariff increase may penalize the poor when it is done proportionally to consumption. This 
approach is called 'social tariff structure' and assumes that low-income translates into low 
water consumption (Tynan, 2000:14). Yet, in poor neighbourhoods, it is common to find sev-
eral poor households sharing the pri,ce for one connection. Their combined consumption 
reaches levels that may lead them to have to pay up to four times the production cost of wa-
ter. In this way poor households may end up subsidizing better-off households with private 
connections (Webster and Sansom, 1999; Tynan, 2000; Le Bris, 2002). 
One of the major obstacles to poor households getting access to piped water is the high 
price for connections. Subsidizing the cost of private connections and removing administra-
tive and legal barriers for residents of 'illegal' settlements are therefore very important to in-
crease coverage (Tynan, 2000; Water Utility Partnership, 2003). 
Increasing coverage may also be achieved, in the case of concessions, by 'mandates', 
which are clauses in the contract imposing the number of poor households to be connected. 
This technique has, in many cases replaced subsidies. It may be effective in the short term 
but, over long periods, it may in fact undermine investments in non-mandate areas. More-
over, towards the end of the concession periods, concessionaires may just choose to ignore 
their 'mandates' (Tynan, 2000:17). 
MANAGEMENT OPTIONS 
Weitz and Franceys (2002:22) evaluate the potential of the different water and sanitation op-
tions to serve the poor as shown in Table 9.14. 
Most of the options reviewed involve the participation of non-state actors. SSIPs, community 
management and concessions appear to be the most likely to encourage greater coverage. 
Yet, Tynan (2000:18) points out that 'concession contracts do have the potential to' harm 
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poor consumers, in particular when exclusivity clauses are included in the contract, thereby 
limiting competition. 
According to Segerfeldt (2005), public utilities have less incentive than non-state actors to 
extend coverage because, for public utilities, larger networks imply new costs and often 
greater deficits, while private actors may find it an opportunity of increasing benefits. 
PRIVATE' SECTOR PARTICIPATION AND THE POOR 
While it is true that non-state actors may benefit from extension, it is also true that they may 
be inclined to choose to extend in areas where they expect to maximize their profit. Covering 
. Iow-income areas is rarely seen as a priority for the private sector. Experience has shown 
that, on the contrary, private companies tend to '"cherry-pick" ( ..• ) profitable neighbourhoods 
and types of consumers' (Bakker, 2003:329). 
McGranahari and Lloyd Owen (2006) believe that local water companies have a strong po-
tential,in terms of serving the poor because of their size. 'Large and powerful' multinational 
companies and 'small, diverse and dispersed' SSIPs are difficult to regulate. Local water. 
companies are more likely to comply with objectives of coverage and quality standards. 
The issue of service regulation is, indeed, particularly important (Box B-3). Before designing 
a contract, appropriate legal provisions should ensure that consumers, including those living 
in low-income areas, have a voice regarding issues such as service options, tariffs and con-
SUltation (Tremolet, 2002). 
1 See page 52. 
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This last aspect underpins the whole process of service provision. It is related to accountabil-
itv in service delivering 1, Samuel (1992:1048) defines as: 
1he extent to which the public has access to altemative suppliers of a given pub-
lic seNice. The question here is whether there is potential or scope for the public 
to exit when dissatisfied with a public service'. . 
Box B-3: Regulating services 
Source: Smith, 2000 
Accountability is also important to those who promote alternatives to privatization. They de-
fend 'water democracy' that would be 'decentralized', 'community-based' and above all re-
sponsive to consumers needs, in particular in the case of the poorest. A number of examples 
of how these initiatives contributed to improve urban .water and sanitation services are re-
viewed by Balanya et al (2005). 
In the end, it appears, according to Budds (2003:111), that private companies have not been 
more successful than public utilities at covering low-income areas. She expresses that: 
.1he role of privatization in meeting the Millennium water and sanitation targetll, 
and the global challenge of ensuring that people have adequate access to af-
fordable water and sanitation services, is clearly Iimited~ 
Franceys and Weitz (2003:4), on the contrary, believe that the private sector, in its diversity, 
. can be beneficial to the poor provided it is 'allowed and encouraged to be creative and inno-
vative'. The debate remains open. 
f A general definition of accountability and its application to the field of humanitarian aid appears on page 89. 
2~t the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000, 189 heads-{)f-state adopted the Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs), which set clear, numerical, time-bound targets for making real progress, by 2015, in 
tackling the most pressing issues developing countries face. Cutting in half the proportion of the world's popula-
tion without access to clean drinking water and basic sanitation is not only one of the eighteen targets embedded 
in the MDGs, but also a critical factor for meeting all the goals, including eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; 
achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and women's empowerment; reducing child 
mortality; improving matemal health; combating major diseases; and improving environmental sustainability' (Len-
ton and Wright, 2004:10). 
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SMALL-SCALE INDEPENDENT PROVIDERS AND THE POOR 
In terms of serving the poor, the debate over privatization often seems to be missing the 
wood for the trees. PSP arrangements only serve five per cent of the world's popuiation 
(Budds and McGranahan, 2003; Gutierrez et ai., 2003) and, if the vast majority of urban poor 
rely on the private sector, it is on SSIPs rather than on multinational companies. According 
to Albu and Njiru (2002:14), SSIPs supply more than 75 per cent of the urban poor. In Ba-
mako, Mali, it amounts to 84 per cent of households for water supply and 98 per cent for 
sanitation (Collignon and Vazina, 2000:13). Coverage by SSIPs in Asia is also high: for wa-
ter supply, it represents more than 35 per cent of households in Cebu, in the Philippines, and 
. almost 45 per cent in Jakarta, Indonesia (Conan, 2003). The very existence of SSIPs indi-
cates the failure of water utilities to serve the poor, although SSIPs do not serve them exclu-
sively (Gutierrez et ai., 2003). 
The predicament of the urban poor regarding access to water is often considered to be the 
high price they pay when buying water from SSIPs, compared to households supplied by a 
utility. They are on average 12 times as expensive (Segerfeldt, 2005) and this ratio may 
reach up to 100 times (World Water Commission cited by Francis and Weitz, 2003). 
Yet, a survey of SSIPs in 10 African cities found a number of advantages to the service they 
provide (Collignon and Vazina, 2000:47): 
• SSIPs are demand-responsive, offering services adapted to the needs of their customers. 
• They supply areas with difficult access, flood-prone areas, illegal settlements etc. 
• They accept the delivery of even small quantities of water; 
• They are self-financing; 
• They· are eager to expand their services, mobilising investment capital to purchase new 
equipment 
• They manage to obtain payment in areas where it was previously thought difficult. 
• For certain sanitation services - such as manual pit emptying, they are often the only 
choice available. 
The survey also found that water delivered by SSIPs was of a quality similar to that of water 
companies (Collignon and Vazina, 2000:49). However, this is somehow contradicted by the 
fact that WHO and UNICEF consider water vendors as a 'non-improved' water source and 
do not consider households served by vendors as 'covered' (WHO and UNICEF, 2000)'. 
Given the intense competition existing in this market, SSIPs' profit margin is usually modest, 
for a work which is often physically very demanding (Collignon and Vazina, 2000:49). Col-
lignon and Vezina (2000:49) consider that comparing prices charged by SSIPs and by utili-
1 See page 28. 
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ties does not reflect the investments that water companies would have to make in order to 
reach areas supplied by SSIPs. Water prices reflect transport costs. In areas difficult to ac-
cess, customers can often make more than enough money with the time saved to pay for the 
difference of price. 
Despite their importance, SSIPs have been overlooked by most aid agencies as a viable op-
tion for urban services to the poor. Maximizing the benefits of the contribution to water and. 
sanitation services offered by SSIPs would require that they are officially recognised as le-
gitimate actors. This entails offering legal security and promoting transparency and competi-
tion by opening public contracting to this type of small entrepreneurs The legalisation of in-
formal settlements would also contribute to their development since SSIPs often tend to 
avoid long-term investments in unplanned areas where their property would lack legal pro-
tection (Collignon and Vezina, 2000:53). Another possible move would be, for water compa-
nies, to increase the bulk quantity of water supplied to low-income areas, which would in turn 
be distributed through SSIPs or community-based arrangements (Collignon et al., 1999; Col-
Iignon and Vezina, 2000; Albu and Njiru, 2003; Water Utility Partnership, 2003). 
3.2 Water and Sanitation in war-related Emergencies 
War-related emergencies are exceptional situations that radically change the interaction between 
human settlements and their environment. This is analysed by Perrin (1996), who describes their 
consequences on health. As mentioned earlier1, people affected by armed conflict undergo dra-
matic changes in their life conditions: their access to essential services and to food may be hin-
dered; they may be obliged to flee their homes etc. For instance, when displaced populations re-
group in a certain place or when water and sanitation services collapse, the contamination result-
ing from the inadequate disposal of human waste, leads to increased diarrhoea I diseases and the 
release more pathogens into the environment. In addition to an increased amount of waste, other 
changes may include pressure on water resources and energy. The result is a vicious circle that 
affects human health, as shown in Figure 8-17 in the case of the relation between the presence 
of human waste and the incidence of diarrhoeal diseases. In 'ordinary situations', the interaction 
between a population and its environment is balanced and. characterised by a certain level of 
morbidity depending on living conditions. In 'exceptional situations' this eqUilibrium is broken. The 
inadequate disposal of human waste amplifies disease transmission and may lead to epidemics. 
This translates into an increase in the mortality rates which are often used as indicators of the 
severity of an emergency, as shown in Table 8.15. 
1 See page 39. 
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Figure B-17: Interaction between a population and Its environment in emergencies 
Source: Perrin, 1996:79-80 
Table B-15: Crude Mortality Rate' In emergencies 
In the emergency created by the influx of an estimated 800,000 Rwandan refugees into Zaire, in 
July 1994, the average Crude Mortality Rates during the first weeks - from mid-July to mid-
August - were between 19.5 and 31.2, more than catastrophic! 80 to 90 per cent of the deaths 
were associated with diarrhoeal diseases, -an estimated 57 per cent of which were due to cholera 
(Goma Epidemiology Group, 1995:340-341). Children under five, and more particularly infants 
under one, have the highest mortality and morbidity risks (Burkholder and Toole, 1995). 
1 The rate of death in the entire popula;ion, including both sexes and all ages (Sphere, 2004:301). 
2 This threshold corresponds to a doubling of the baseline level and in fact varies according to the regions. It 
varies between 0.3 in the Middle East, North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean to 0.9 in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica. It is 0.5 in industrialised countries (Sphere, 2004:260-261). 
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Emergency relief aims at stabilizing the situation. This results in a reduction in mortality and mor-
bidity rates. It is widely acknowledged (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994; Burkholder and 
Toole, 1995; Natsios, 1995; Oavis, 1996; Waldman, 2001) that its main components are: food; 
water supply; shelter; sanitation; and health care. Burkholder and Toole (1995:1013) consider, 
food, water and sanitation and shelter as the most vital needs, which should be answered in the 
first month of an emergency . 
• Water Supply 
QUANTITY AND QUALITY 
The daily quantity of water that is necessary to maintain the health of a population in an 
emergency situation has been estimated differently by various sources and at different peri-
ods. 
Roberts' (1998) shows how the recommended minimum volumes of water to provide in an 
emergency have followed a downward trend: 
• WHO standard was 30 litres per person per day in the 1960s. This figure was based on 
what 'experts' estimated necessary for drinking, cooking, personal hygiene, washing etc.; 
• It became 20 litres in the 1970s; 
• In 1982, the UNHCR recommended 15 to 20 litres, that; 
• In 1992 - and still in 1999 - became a 'minimum survival allocation' of seven litres per 
person and per day that 'should be increased to 15-20 litres per person as soon as pos-
sible' (UNHCR, 2004:217). 
Sphere minimum standards in disaster response, established in 19961, adopt the same 
minimum volume of 15 litres per person per day (Sphere, 2004:63). 
Roberts (1998) considers that the 1992 standards reflect volumes of water actually provided 
in the field during these periods. The average water provision in African refugee camps was, 
at the time, estimated to 12 litres per person per day. He argues that 15 to 20 litres of water 
per person per day are essential to survival in the acute phase of a crisis - in the first month 
- but less so in the following period. The notion of 'minimum survival allocation' would 
therefore not make much sense in terms of public health and only reflect logistical problems. 
Perrin (1996:81-87) underlines the priority to be given to quantity, while respecting quality. 
As mentioned earlier2, prioritising water quantity was found more effective in terms of pre-
venting diarrhoeal diseases than concentrating on quality. However, Perrin (1996:81-87) 
points out that water quality is more important for young children, who are more vulnerable 
to malnutrition. 
1 See page 90. 
2 See page 26. 
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Table B-16 compares the difference between service levels accessible in emergencies and 
those obtained in stable situations. It is based on the above mentioned standards and on the 
level of access to water supply, as detailed in Table B.3, page 28. Water is considered as 
originating from an 'improved source'. 
Table 8-16: Service level In emergencies and stable situations 
Stable: 
Rehabilitation/development 
Based on Howard and Bartram, 2003:22 and Skinner, 2003:4 
PROTECTION OF WATER SUPPLIES DURING ARMED CONFLICTS 
Since water is an absolute need, its provision to the civilian population during armed conflicts 
is guaranteed by intemational treaties - in particular by the Geneva Conventions - as re-
ported by several authors (Ozerdem and Barakat, 1997; Zemmali, 1998; Anand, 2005). The 
1977 additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions prohibit 'the destruction of objects in-
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. dispensable to the· survival of the civilian population'1, which includes water supply. How-
ever, Zemmali (1995b) points out that the protection of water supply systems by the Geneva 
conventions applies in the case of intemational conflicts only but for intemal conflicts - the 
most frequent, see page 33 - no legal provision exists. 
In spite of legal protection, water supply systems are commonly damaged or destroyed dur-
ing armed conflicts, sometimes accidentally, but often on purpose. Water supply may be 
tumed into a weapon (Mulli, 1995; Zemmali, 1995a). Zemmali (1998:32) cites examples 
such as the irrigation systems destroyed by the Russian troops in Afghanistan in 1979 or the 
bombing of hydroelectric power stations in Iraq in 1993. The looting of water systems in Ka-
bul, capital of Afghanistan, and Monrovia, capital of Liberia are other examples2• 
ACCESS TO WATER AND SANITATION AND PEACE 
The rapid restoration of water and sanitation services following an armed conflict is a particu-
larly sensitive problem in urban areas, given the large population they serve. In Baghdad, for 
example, the lack of water and power supply more than two years after the end of fighting in 
the capital is an issue which has raised discontent (McCartthy, 2003; Poole, 2005) and cer-
tainly contributes to current levels of instability. Thus, it may be argued that the restoration of 
services essential to health and wellbeing such as water and sanitation contributes to peace-
building. However, no formal study could be found investigating this particular issue . 
• Sanitation 
Excreta-related diseases, such as cholera or typhoid, are causes of serious emergency situa-
tions. As highlighted earlier', sanitation is fundamental to prevent their spread. For that, human 
faeces must be isolated and treated (Eade and Williams, 1995:923). It may represent a consid-
erable task and in this respect, Perrin (1996:103) points out the sheer volume of the waste to 
process in the case of large populations. Another aspect to consider is the socio-cultural one. 
Eade and Williams (1995:924) insist on the need to take into account 'sensitivities relating to 
tradition, acceptable behaviour or inhibitions' when dealing with sanitation. 
, Protocol I, Article 54, paragraph 3. 
2 See page 139 and page 177. 
3 See page 25. 
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• Types of interventions 
WATER SUPPLY 
The type of emergency water system to be selected depends on the locally available water 
sources. The following parameters are taken into consideration for their selection (Holter-
mann et aI., 2001:5-11): 
• Reliability; 
• Quantity needed1; 
• Intended length of the operation; 
• Local skills and resources; 
• Capacity of the implementing agency. 
There are different possible water sources (Holtennann' et aI., 2001; Davis and Lambert, 
2002): 
1. Surface water: from rivers, lakes and streams. It requires a treatment to limit its turbiditr 
and make it safe for drinking through disinfection - usually with chlorine. Water may be 
'taken straight from the source by buckets. It may also be distributed by tankers or through 
an existing water distribution network; 
2. Groundwater: from springs or wells. Springs need to be protected so that water is not 
contaminated. Wells may be hand-dug or drilled, shallow or deep. Extraction can be 
made through hand-pumps or electric submersible pumps depending on the depth of the 
water table, the flow required and availability. 
The distribution of bottled water may also take place - in rare cases - at the beginning of 
an emergency. Water has, in most cases, to be stored in emergency tanks before distribu-
tion. Different types of emergency storage tanks are used with distribution ramps (Pinera, 
2006). 
SANITATION 
When selecting a sanitation option for an emergency operation, the following criteria are 
considered (Pinera; 2006): ' 
'. Whether it is culturally acceptable; 
• Whether all population may' have access - in particular young children, pregnant, 
women, elderly people, people with disability etc.; 
• Whether the population know how to use the system; 
• Whether its maintenance can be organised; 
1 See' page 68. 
2 Sedimentation and filtration, see Table 8-8 page 48. 
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• Whether it may pollute drinking water sources; 
• Whether drainage can protect the system from surface water. 
The most common sanitation systems found in emergency situations are defecation fields, 
trench latrines, barrel latrines and pour-flush toilets (Holtermann et al., 2001 :5-7). 
3.3 Armed conflicts in urban areas 
• Incidence and manifestation 
Urban areas have been the theatre for an increasing number of armed conflicts in .the last thirty 
years. Analyses, based on data from CE-DAT (2006): the 'database on the human impact of 
complex emergencies' managed by Louvain-Ia-Neuve University in Belgium and from the web-
site 'ReliefWeb', managed by OCHA, show that over 150 cities of the developing worldexperi-
enced war-related emergencies between 1975 and 2004. Details and trends appear in Table 
B-17 and Figure B-18.They are based on data, which can be found in Appendix 1. 
Table B-17: Number of cities of the developing world directly affected by armed conflict, 1975-
2004 
Based on data obtained through CE DA T, 2006 and ReliefWeb www.reliefweb.int 
In these statistics, African cities and towns appear as the most affected - over 40 per cent. The 
rising trend is clear and starts from the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
1998 was a particularly 'busy' year with crises simultaneously in Africa - the Great Lakes re-
. gion, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia versus Eritrea among others - Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sri 
Lanka. The other peak is in 2003. It corresponds to the second Iraq war, the second 'Intifada' in 
Palestine and the wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Burundi. 
73 
B. Review of the Literature 
Figure B·18: Incidence of armed conflicts in the developing world's cities, 1975·2004 
as 
Wars can be fought in cities in many different ways. Coquoz (2004) explains this diversity 
through a - not necessarily exhaustive and not mutually exclusive - typology of urban wars, . 
which distinguishes seven different types: . 
1. 'Surgical' strikes, which are meant to avoid touching basic infrastructure such as water 
and· electricity production plants. Communication centres are nevertheless usual targets 
and their destruction make ·assistance more difficult. Strikes in cities of Iraq and Serbia 
are recent examples of this type of urban war, 
2. The destruction of the city by the massive bombing and shelling, which may lead to the 
complete annihilation of its infrastructure. Massive population displacements are usual 
consequences. Groznyl in Chechnya, Huambo in Angola, and Kabul2 in Afghanistan have 
suffered these levels of destruction; 
3. The 'clean-up' of the city, when civilian populations become targets of Indiscriminate kill· 
ing and hostages-taking by fighters controlling their areas. In such cases, population 
groups are converted into fighters. This kind of situation has happened in Monrovia, the 
capital of Liberia3, and Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, as well as in cities of the 
Ituri region ofthe Democratic Republic of Cong04; 
·4. The cOntrol and/or the occupation of cities, characterized by violence exerted by police 
and occupying forces. Civilian population is under permanent control. Such situations 
have prevailed in Palestinian towns; 
1 See Page 224. 
2 See Page 133. 
3 See page 167. 
• See page 194. 
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5. The siege of the city, in which case the population !s taken hostage while the city is cut 
from essential resources. Sarajevo and other cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as 
Jaffna in Sri Lanka 1, and Huambo in Angola have been besieged; 
6. The fragmentation of the city, when war is fought between factions controlling specific 
neighbourhoods. This has happened in Brazzaville in the Republic of Congo, in Kabul2 
and in Beirut, the capital of Lebanon; 
7. The uprising of the city, when a large part or the entire population takes part in an upris-
ing. The response may be indiscriminate reprisal from the military as in Port-au-Prince in 
Haiti or in cities and towns of Cote d'lvoire . 
• Causes of conflicts in urban areas 
For Castro (2004) 'prolonged civil war takes place in the countryside whereas the city is.a place 
for insurgency'3. The reasons behind the disposition of cities to become places of insurgency 
are explained by Ashworth (1991:87). He argues that, while insurgency sometimes takes place 
in rural areas, it is 'relatively more important in urban than in rural areas', or at least, this pre-
dominance is more apparent because of greater population densities. In his view, 'insurgency -
and revolutionary lawlessness' happens in three phases: preparation; propaganda; and terror-
ism4• Preparation may take place anywhere but propaganda and, terrorism activities are always 
set in urban areas. The causes for armed conflicts earlier analysed5 can be found in greater 
number in urban areas, the main ones being poverty and inequalities6• Poor communities, ac-
cording to Murshed (2002:389) are likely to offer 'readily available combatants'. In this respect, 
Austin (1999:6-7) considers unemployment and socially marginalisation of young males in Af-
rica as a driving force for urban wars. For them, partiCipating in a civil war would be a way of 
escaping from a reality of poverty. 
Urban conflicts may develop from inside a city. Karachi, the economic capital of Pakistan's is a 
good example. In the 1980s, Mohajir7 and Pashtun communities were opposed over means of 
transportation. In the 1990s, the struggle became more political and opposed different factions 
of the Mohajir nationalistic party MQM8 (Goldenberg, 1997). After 2001, the relations between 
MQM and the government over its support of United States 'War on Terror' was another cause' 
for violence (Rash id , 2002). Violence developed on misery and benefited from the presence of a 
1 See page 154. 
2 See page 133. 
3 Translated from French by the author. , 
, Defined as: 'organised and directed acts of violence designed expressly to undermine confidence in the capacity 
of the authorities to maintain order, with the twin purpose of demoralizing the particular groups to which more or 
less random violence is offered - such as the security forces or civilian groups loyal to, or working in support of 
the authorities - while simultaneously demonstrating to the potentially supportive social groups both the effec-
tiveness of the insurgents and the impotence of the authorities' (Austin, 1999:86). 
5 See page 32. . 
'See page 34. 
7 Mohajir emigrated from India when the country split from Pakistan. 
8 Mohajir Quami Movement. . 
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numerous and highly politicized youth (Gayer, 2004). Conflict may also originate from outside. 
Barakat (1998) considers many urban conflicts are 'conflicts between the "have" and the "have 
not"', meaning the 'long-ignored rural communities' versus 'urban centres that have always re-
ceived more attention'. He cites the cases of Kabul and Sarajevo. According to this theory, cit-
. ies would come under attack from insurgents lured by their wealth and political power 
(Ashworth, 1991:88). Peters (1996:43) emphasizes the symbolic value of controlling cities as an 
indicator of military success. They are what Ashworth (1991 :88) calls 'the self-conscious show-
cases of the countries'. Physical characteristics of cities, in particular the concentration of trans-
port and communication means are, according to Ashworth (1991:88), another factor helping 
insurgency to develop. Their population may also be used as an instrument of warfare. As 
pointed out by Bezacier (2004) urban dwellers can serve as protection for conflicting parties, the 
so-called 'human shields', and they may also be hostages, in particular in the case of terrorism. 
War may literally feed from cities, as it is where food can be found for combatants and cities 
may provide logistic support and recruits 1 • 
• Consequences of armed conflicts on urban services 
Urban dwellers are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of armed conflict because their 
living conditions are dependent on a type of infrastructure much more sophisticated than what is 
necessary in rural areas (Stocker, 2004). This infrastructure may be damaged, destroyed or 
made impossible to use (Barakat et al.,1998). Water and sanitation systems and power supply 
are essential to urban dwellers. They are also linked since, in most cases, specifically urban wa-
ter systems such as networks cannot function without power (Nembrini, 1995). 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Infrastructure is broadly defined by Anand (2005:1) as: 
'Goods and services which are essential ingredients of quality of life and eco-
nomic activity and these include water supply and sanitation services, health and 
education services, transport and communications, electricity and other energy 
sources~ 
Destroying or damaging infrastructure necessary to the provision of essential services - in 
particular water supply - is prohibited by the .Geneva Conventions2• Yet, urban infrastruc-
ture is often targeted by warring parties. For Anand (2005:2) reasons for targeting infrastruC-
ture may be: 
• A strategy to weaken opponents; 
• Collateral or unintended damages; or 
1 As mentioned earlier in the case of Africa, see page 74. 
. 2 See page 69. . 
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• A means of preventing resources from being diverted from war1. 
PUBLIC SERVICES 
Public authorities have a prominent role in the provision of infrastructure services, some of 
which are public goods2• In situations of armed conflict, states are weakened and conse-
quently, public services suffer (Anand, 2005:3). Moreover, services often depend on the 
presence of qualified personnel, who may have fled the conflict area, as pointed out by Ba-
rakat (1998), who also notes that, in cities affected by armed conflicts, the most educated 
people tend to leave -sometimes to go abroad - whilst rural populations often migrate into 
cities. In times of armed conflicts, urban population may experience sudden changes as a 
result of this migration. These changes also have consequences on the functioning of public 
services . 
• Armed conflict and communities: consequences on social capital 
Duffield (1994:38) emphasizes the profound 'eroding effect' of armed conflict on economic and 
social networks. These networks include governmental institutions, which according to van 
Horen (2002) become either ineffective or predatory. He also emphasizes the effect of armed 
conflicts on communities and more specifically on their social capital. . 
Social capital is a useful concept, when looking at the effects of armed conflicts on urban com-
munities, to describe their characteristics and the consequences violence has on them. In re-
cent times, Bourdieu (1980) was among the first to propose a definition for social capital, which, 
in his view, is: 
'the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession 
of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual ac-
quaintance and recognition or in other words, to membership in a group which 
provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity3-owned capital, 
a "credential' which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word i4• 
McClenagham (2000:569) distinguishes two forms of social capital (Putnam, 2000:22): 
1. Bonding social capital, which refers to the links within a community and tends to reinforce 
exclusive identities; and 
2. Bridging social capital, which refers to the links across social cleavages, with external 
groups. 
1 It is a rather perverse strategy. For Instance, with no schools left, teachers can be conscripted; likewise, destroy-
ing buildings cuts down on their maintenance expenditure. 
2 See page 28. 
3 Community. 
• "ensemble des ressources actuelles ou potentielles qui sont liees a la possession d'un reseau durable de 
relations plus ou mains institutionnalisaes d'interconna/ssances et d'inter-reconnaissance ; ou, en d'autres 
termes, a I'appartenance a un groupe, comme ensemble d'agents qui ne sont pas seulement dotes de proprietas 
communes (susceptibles d'/Hre perr;ues par I'observateur, par les autres ou par eux-memes) mais sont aussi unis 
par des liaisons permanentes et utiles' (Bourdieu, 1980). Translation appearing in Bourrfieu (1986: 248·249), cited 
by Fo/ey and Edwarrfs (1999 :143). 
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A third type, introduced by Woolcock (1998), is: 
3. Linking social capital, which includes the capital to 'leverage resources, ideas and infor-
mation from formal institutions beyond the community itself. 
Analysing this last form of social capital, McClenaghan (2000: 570) argues that social capital 
and state institution are related as they help in reinforcing the links between those institutions 
and community networks. 
Keams (2004) describes the main components of social capital as: social networks; social 
norms; and level oftrus!. The relationship between types of social capital, their components and 
intermediate outcome or manifestation is summarized in Table B.18. It shows what can be 
achieved, the added value of social capital in its different components. 
Table 8-18: Social Capital, Outcomes and Ope~ation 
I~~~~~i~~ ,'![~~!ilj ~ i I'ij:. \,1: [ij1~~lil)iu1· 
,:,o,urce: "RRI7J.". 2004:7 
Social capital and the related concept of social cohesion, which are in general seen as an asset 
for communities, may also have negative aspects (Portes, 1998; Keams, 2004). Social capital 
has a 'perverse effecf when it generates conflict between communities (Goodhand, 2001a). In 
armed conflicts, structural social capital declines and increased 'perverse' social capital in-
creases (Colletta and Cullen, 2000:26). Quinn (2002:3) finds that: 
'in situations of armed conflicts, local civil society is hampered by insecurity, s0-
cial disintegration, politicisation and fragmentation while govemments are often 
weak and non-accountable: 
Similarly, Schafer (2002:27) notes that many authors consider that armed conflicts destroy so-
cial capital, and in particular: 
'bonds of trust within communities, relations of reciprocity, shared social norms 
and rules, and sOcial networks'. 
However, Colletta and Cullen (2000:6) consider that this only happens when certain conditions 
are present such as: an authoritarian state, no political rights, state weakness and a lack of in-
stitutional capacity to manage conflicts. 
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4. The mechanisms of humanitarian assistance' 
Le Billon (2000: 13) lists the various coping strategies to which populations affected by armed 
conflict may have recourse. They include: 
• Falling back on subsistence farming, the 'direct entitlements' previously cited1; 
• Participating 'in the informal economy, a common solution for urban poor2, who may be 
controlled by criminal gangs and involve illicit products - e.g. drugs; 
• Resorting to violence, called 'base-level' or 'bottom-up' violence. It represents an option 
for protection and obtaining resources. 
Humanitarian assistance is another of the means people may have to help them cope with the 
consequences of armed conflict on their living conditions. Darcy and Hofmann (2003) emphasize 
the lack of agreed definition for 'humanitarian agenda' but, drawing from their experience and 
from research, they suggest four related 'core elements': the protection of life, health, subsistence 
and physical security. 
People may benefit from it from where they live, but often they have to move to other places and 
become IDPs or refugees3• 
4.1 Principles of intelVention 
• Mandates and values 
, The interventions of humanitarian organisations are based on a mandate and a set of ethical 
values. In this respect, two types of organisations can be distinguished (Rona, 2004): 
'1. International or intergovernmental organisations such as the Red Cross and Red Cres-
cent Movement, United Nations Agencies, the Organisation of Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) etc. whose mandates are granted by a government or an intergovern-
mental agreement. Their scope may be universal or regional; , 
2. Non Governmental Oroanisations (NGOs), national or intemational, which do not neces-
sarily possess an official status and have largely self-imposed mandates. 
THE RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT' 
Ever since its creation in 18635, the movement has been guided by a number of principles, 
which have evolved and were lastly formalised in 1965 as the 'Fundamental Principles of the 
Red Cross'. They are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, 
unity, and universality (Piquet, 1979). 
1 See page 34. 
2 See page 21. 
3 See page 40. 
• ICRC, IFRC and national societies, see page 9. 
5 Bya Swiss citizen, Henry Dunant (1828-1910). 
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The ICRC has a mandate to work in armed conflict situations. It is supported by Intemational 
Humanitarian Law (IHL)' and consists of providing protection and assistance to victims of 
conflict. As far as civilians are concemed, the legal basis to this mandate is the 1949 Fourth 
Geneva Convention as well as the 1977 Additional Protocols - in particular the Article 3 
from Additional Protocol 11 (Perrin, 1996:387). 
UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES 
UN agencies' mandates were conferred on them by resolutions of the UN General Assembly 
passed at their creation, between the 1940s and the 1960s in the case of UNHCR, UNICEF, 
.WFP, UNOP and WHO, which are the agencies most active in emergency response (Eade 
and Williams, 1995; Minear, 1995). 
NGO ETHICAL VALUES 
NGOs define their own mandate on the basis of certain ethical values. Finucane (1993) de-
fines the motivation of NGOs as based on a Westem philosophy of 'caring for the needy'. 
Stoddard (2003) classifies these values into three types, defining three 'families' of NGOs: 
1. Religious NGOs: most of them do not proselytize in any way. They include, among oth-
ers, Catholic organisations such as Catholic Relief Services or Caritas Intemationalis, 
Muslim organisations such as Islamic Relief, Protestant I Anglican ones such as World 
Vision and Christian Aid; 
2. 'Ounantist'2 NGOs; who largely draw their founding principles from Red Cross and Red 
Crescent values. They advocate independence from govemments, long-term horizons 
and advocacy. Save the Children-UK, Oxfam and MSF can be classified into this cate-
gory; 
3. 'Wilsonian' NGOs, named after United States president Wood row Wilson (1856 -1924) 
whose ambition was to promote US values and influence as a source of good. 'Wilsonian' 
NGOs find compatible humanitarian aims and United States foreign policy objectives. 
They are more cooperative with govemments than 'Ounantist' and focus their activity on 
short-time operations and service delivery. Care, the Intemational Rescue Committee 
(IRC) and Save the Children-US are examples of 'Wilsonian' NGOs. 
Many NGOs strive to be or appear independent. However, Ouffield (1997) points out that, in 
order to work 'within a mandated system' they have often to become affiliated bodies of UN 
agencies and have to accept UN interpretation of neutrality for the specific context in which 
they operate. 
1 ~ set of rules aimed at limiting violence and protecting the fundamental rights of the Individual in time of anned 
conflict'. United Nations Charter, Ch. VI, Art. 33, Part 1 (1945). 
2 The name comes from Henry Dunant, founder of the Red Cross. 
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CODE OF CONDUCT 
In 1994, members of the Red Cross and Red Crescent' movement joined six prominent re-
lief organisations networks2 to create the 'Code of Conduct for The Intemational Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief' (Box B-4). It was meant to be a 
'body of intemational standards to guide their work'. By establishing this code, organisations 
recognised that their action may sometimes be inappropriate, in particular because of the 
pressure NGOs may put on themselves during emergencies (IFRC, 1994). This code ex-
presses the will of the Red Cross and NGO community to achieve better results whilst em-
phasizing the moral values on which their action is based. 
Box B-4: Intemational Red Cross I NGOs Code of Conduct: principal commitments 
Source: IFRG, 1994 
• Humanitarian aid and politics 
Whilst the link between aid and politics has always existed (Duffield, 2001), it seems to have 
become stronger during the 1990s (Macrae, 2002a:7). The main underlying cause for this evo-
lution was a greater awareness among govemments that preventing armed conflict was not only 
an issue for politicians and the military, but also about development. To a certain extent, this 
was the consequence of changes in world geopolitics following the end of the Cold War. With 
the withdrawal of major powers from countries which had lost their strategic value, aid agencies 
were left as the only players. Humanitarian aid became part of a global strategy by donor's 
1 The IFRC, the ICRC and national Red Cross or Red Crescent societies. 
2 Caritas Intemationalis, Catholic Relief Services, International Save the Children Alliance, Lutheran World Fed-
eration, Oxfam and the World Council of Churches. 
81 
B. Review of the Literature 
countries to prevent or manage armed conflicts. That was known as 'New Humanitarianism' 
(Curtis, 2001; Macrae, 2002a). 
The so-called 'Coherence Agenda' is a corollary to this 'New Humanitarianism'. In order to 
achieve long-lasting stability, it advocates 'coherence' between aid and activities such as diplo-
macy, politics, trade and military intervention. This meant a greater involvement of donors in 
strategic choices about assistance, often referred to as 'bilateralisation' of humanitarian re-
sponse (Leader, 1998; Macrae and Leader, 2000b; Macrae and Leader, 2000a; Cuiiis, 2001). 
For Dutfield (1997:529) 'humanitarian assistance has become the West's favoured response to 
political crisis beyond its borders'. Of course such situation is at odds with some of the princi-
ples on which humanitarian action is based. The Red Cross principles 1, and in particular univer-
sality, impartiality, Independence, and neutrality, were adopted by most aid agencies. The 'Co-
herence Agenda' infringes all these principles if politics determines where and how humanitar-
ian aid is to be delivered (Curtis, 2001; Dutfield, 2001). Leader (1998:2) explains how the princi-
ple of 'neutrality' has been adapted to this situation. Agencies may either elevate or abandon 
their neutrality, depending on their level of aCceptance of the 'Coherence Agenda': They may 
also seek a 'third way', recognizing the role of relief over peace-building and dealing with root-
causes of conflict without really taking sides. It is however hard to say whether agencies have a 
choice in determining their position since, as Curtis (2001:13) points out, many of them depend 
on major donor states for financial support. The prinCiple of independence is therefore compro-
. mised from the very start. 
Macrae and Leader (2000) wam against the blur between political aims and humanitarian inter-
ventions that 'bilateralisation' implies. They believe it may not be worth compromising humani-
tarian values since there is no evidence that aid is more effective than diplomacy at achieving 
peace. 
4.2 Trends in assistance 
The last thirty years have seen a large number of war-related emergencies in developing coun- . 
tries2• This increase was particularly dramatic at the end of the Cold War, in the early 1990s. The 
number of emergencies decreased in the second half on the 1990s and the years 2000. The. 
large number of emergency situations has translated into larger aid operations, more aid organi-
sations and larger relief budgets . 
• NGO proliferation 
Finucane (1993:176) considers the Nigeria-Biafra war (1967-1970) as a tuming point in the role 
NGOs have been playing in the provision of humanitarian aid. From then only, they have be-
1 See page 78. 
2 See section 2.3 page 32. 
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come major players, with an accepted role in transferring resources in emergencies. Whilst the 
majority of large NGOs were created before the 1970s 1, the last three decades or so have seen 
a real proliferation. The Biafra crisis was the first to be amply reported in the media, including a 
then relatively new one: television. It created a greater awareness in the West of the plight of 
disasters, war and famine affecting the Third World. This greater awareness contributed to the 
emergence and groWth of many new NGOs in the 1970s. MSF and the Irish NGO 'Concern' 
were both created during the years that followed the war in Biafra. 
According to Finucane (1993:186) NGOs tend to be more effective in war situations than bilat-
eral and multilateral agencies - apart maybe from the ICRC. This belief may explain the need 
felt by Western civil society to trust NGOs to operate in such situations. The evolution of the 
number of NGOs working in partnership with UNHCR is a significant indicator of NGO 'prolifera-
tion': Macrae (2002:15) reports their number to be 20 in the 1960s and several hundred in the 
1990s. The increase in the number of NGOs continued until 1995, when funding started to di-
minish (Borton, 1998:6). The number of NGOs registered in the UN system was 1,500 in 1995 
according to Natsios (1995:406), but he estimates that only 20 ofthem in the United States and 
another 20 in Europe work in armed conflict areas. 20 European and North American NGOs re-
ceive about 75 per cent of all public funds for emergencies . 
• Trends in funding 
The growth in number and size of NGOs is largely related to the increase in funds from gov-
emments (Finucane, 1993:182). Govemmental funds accounted for 1.5 per cent of UNHCR's 
NGO-partners in 1970 (Macrae, 2002a:15). This share increased to 40 per cent in the late 
1990s (Hoschchild et aI., 1997:1). 
Throughout the 1990s, NGOs received more funds from govemments for emergencies - both 
through bilateral and multilateral aid"':"" but the share of funds allocated to UN agencies as mul-
tilateral aid decreased. It was 31 per cent between 1989 and 1993 and 25 per cent between 
1994 and 1998 (Randel and German, 2002:21). The OECD Development Assistance Commit-
tee (DAC) maintains a database in which aid flows from its member-countries2, both for relief 
and for development, are recorded. This database distinguishes Official Development Assis-
tance (ODA), which comes from govemments, from private sources. and NGOs grants. Non-
DAC funding may be substantial in some countries3, but, globally, DAC funding represents a 
very large share of the aid flows. 
1 See Box A-3 page 10. . 
2 Australia. Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lux-
embourg, the Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the 
United States of America and the European Commision. 
3 For instance, Arab countries aid to Afghanistan or Somalia (Randel and German, 2002:19). 
83 
B. Review of the Literature 
The DAC calls 'Emergency and Distress Relief: emergency food aid, assistance to refugees as 
a whole, and support to refugees for a year in the donor country during the first year of resi-
dence. It is part of ODA - peace-keeping operations are not. This portion of ODA is a good in-
dicator of the progression in the amount of funds allocated to emergencies. As shown in Figure 
8-19, ODA relief funding has multiplied almost seven times between 1988 and 2004. 
Figure 8-19: Progression of ODA in USD at 2003 prices and exchange rate1 
Source: OECD Development Statistics: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm 
Figure B-19 also shows a decrease in non-emergency ODA throughout the 1990s. However, 
this trend was reversed from 2001. Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994:11) explain declining 
. aid budgets for development in the 1990s by the increased political conditionality on aid includ-
ing criteria of good governance and human rights. Since such issues do not apply to emergency 
situations, Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994:11) call relief aid 'easy money'. This however 
only applies to the emergency phase and, also according to Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 
(1994:11), 'aid money for rehabilitation and recovery is often hardest of all to access'. Similarly, 
Harmer and Macrae (2004b) point out that relief is sometimes preferred for countries where do-
nor governments do not wish to engage in development activities because of political issues 
such as human rights and corruption. As a result, many aid agencies tended to focus their activ-
ity upon short-term relief assistance, which is easy to fund and well publicized .. 
1 Deflated by the total DAC deflator; emergency food aid included with developmental food aid up to and including 
1995. 
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4.3 Competition versus coordination 
Minear (1993:236) defines coordination as: 
'The systematic utilization of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assis-
tance in a cohesive and effective manner'. 
Given the large number of organisations working in relief, coordination between them is essential 
in order to avoid duplication or omissions in sectors of activity and target groups, and to ensure 
that the assistance delivered is of constant and uniform quality (Minear, 1993; van Brabant, 
1997). This, however, has proved difficult. Minear (1993:236) recognises that coordination is a 
concern for all aid organisations but adds that: 'everyone reveres co-ordination but few wish to be 
co-ordinated'. This lack of enthusiasm for coordination is often due to competition over funding 
and media attention (Munslow and Brown, 1999; Griinewald, 2001; Cosgrave, 2005) as organisa-
tions attempt to be the first at every 'hot spor. Another reason is neutrality or independence 1 
(Bradbury, 1995:19), as certain organisations are unwilling to coordinate with agencies they con-
sider to be markedly linked to a government or waITing party (Stephenson, 2005:338). In order to 
overcome some of these difficulties, softer mechanisms of coordination such as 'consultation' or 
'cooperation' among aid agencies have been proposed that would avoid differing interests and 
agendas (Nembrini, 1997). 
Humanitarian agencies' incentives to cooperate depend largely on mechanisms of accountabil-
iti, in particular towards donors. This is illustrated in Table B.19. 
OCHA is the UN organisation in charge of coordinating humanitarian action in emergencies3• 
However, as reported by Stephenson (2005:338), it has no controlling authority over UN agen-
cies, let alone over other types of aid agencies. Thus, formal coordination mechanisms in the field 
are loose, to say the least. In 2005, OCHA and the UN Under-Secretary-General for humanitarian 
affairs commissioned a review of existing humanitarian response mechanisms. The resulting re-
port recommended. that humanitarian response to disaster be organised through a 'cluster ap-
proach', whereby lead- agencies would coordinate responses in a specific sector. This would ap-
ply to UN agencies, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and. NGOs (Adinolfi et aI., 
2005). In the field of water and sanitation, the designated lead-agency was UNICEF. 
1 See page 79. 
2 See page 89. 
3 See page 9. 
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4.4 Questioning relief 
Larger and more expensive operations brought relief under scrutiny. Following dysfunctional in-
terventions, at the beginning ofthe 1990s, agencies and donors became more concemed about 
the amount of funds spent and the quality of the assistarice provided (Buchanan-Smith and Max-
well,1994; Borton, 1998). Moreover, although, as Buchanan-Srnith and Maxwell (1994:11) em-
phasize, relief is often seen as more 'neutral' than development, some governments remained 
concemed about whether relief was compatible with their foreign policy agenda '- the 'coher-
ence' agenda highlighted earlier (Borton, 1998:4). These concerns tumed into critics, many of 
which were coming from development actors given the prevailing climate of contention, largely , 
. created by the reduction of the budgets allocated to development activities during the 1990s 1 
(Borton, 1998:4). The multitude of organisations involved in relief was seen as creating 'confus.ion 
and dysfunction' (Minear, 1994), a system 'grossly inefficient' at improving living conditions, using 
funds almost exclusively on immediately consurned material and salaries (Seaman, 1994). Relief 
was blamed for its reliance on e~pensive .external resources that create dependency, instead of 
fostering self-sufficiency by strengthening local communities and institutions (Minear, 1994; 
Griinewald, 2001; Schafer, 2002). By neglecting local capacity, relief would perpetuate conflict by 
1 See Figure 8-19 page 83. 
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fuelling the war economy. This idea, or rather its remedy, is based on the 'Do not harm'\ principle, 
a concept, which originated in the United States, and prescribes the design of relief programmes 
avoiding these detrimental effects (Munslow and Brown, 1999:210) . 
. • Linking relief and development 
Regaining self-suffiCiency can be understood as the empowerment of recipient communities. Ac-
cording to Eade and Williams (1995:9), this is the main objective of development, which, in their 
view, is about: 
. Women and men becoming empowered to bring about positive changes in their 
lives; about personal growth together with public action; about both the process 
and the outcome of challenging poverty, oppression, and discrimination; and 
about the realisation of human potential through social and economic justice. 
Above all, it is about the process of transforming lives, and transforming socie-
ties'. 
It was therefore suggested that, in order to improve the results of relief operations, they should 
be designed in such a way that immediate assistance acquires a longer-term perspective, thereby 
linking the concepts of relief and development. This longer-term approach was among the main 
manifestations of a greater willingness among agencies and donors to appear accountable to-
wards beneficiaries in terms of the quality of their programmes. 
The concept was already given some thought at the beginning of the 1980s by Cuny (1983:11), 
but it was then applied to relief operations following natural disasters. He argued that: 
'The concept of a disaster as a separate event requiring a rapid response led to 
efforts those were not only vel}' ineffective but in many cases counterproductive. 
Relief does not address the roots of the problem: poverty and underdevelopment' 
About ten years later, Duffield (1994:38) made similar remarks stating that, in operational terms, 
the response to complex emergencies was organised in the same way as for natural disasters, 
paying little attention to social and political aspects of the problem. Anderson and Wood row 
(1989) provided an important theoretical framework to the issue by recommending that relief ef-
forts support and enhance existing local capacities. They propose an analytical framework used 
to evaluate the 'capacities' and 'vulnerabilities' of the affected population. For Duffield (1994:40), 
this was a revenge of the 'developmentalists' over relief workers whose position had become 
overly strong. 
Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994:6) describe relief operations as often 'centralized, top-down, 
standardized, resource-intensive, donor-dependent and subject to sudden-termination'. The re-
sult, in their view, is often the 'decapitation of local administration'. Linking relief to development, 
on the contrary, implies integrating local administration or - when absent - local NGOs or civil 
society institutions and building their capacities. This approach also recommends that emergency 
relief is used to develop infrastructure remaining in place after the intervention {Buchanan-Smith 
1 The term is based on the Hippocratic Oath of Western medicine. 
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and Maxwell, 1994:8). It requires using developmental techniques such as community participa-
tion and empowerment, capacity building and vulnerability analysis. 
The concept of linking relief and development has gained recognition from the United Nations. In 
its 1991 resolution 46/182, in the creation ofthe Department of Humanitarian Affairs was decided 
- it would later become OCHA -' the General Assembly declared: 
'There is a clear relationship between emergency, rehabilitation and develop-
ment. In order to ensure a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and de-
velopment, emergency assistance should be provided in ways that will be sup-
portive of recovery and long-term development. Thus, emergency measures 
should be seen as a step towards long-term development' (United Nations, 1991: 
Article 9). . 
This notion was known as the 'continuum' between relief and development. It was based on ex-
perience drawn from assistance to areas affected by natural disasters, in which the integration of 
response, preparedness 1 and recovery was found beneficial for the mitigation of the impact of 
subsequent disasters (Borton, 1998:4-5). The concept proved hard to transpose to armed con-
flicts and the 'continuum' was almost immediately questioned. In situations of 'protracted crises', 
Duffield (1994 and 1999) argued that the treatment of armed conflicts as an 'irrational occurrence' 
- as an earthquake - was erroneous. Underlying causes of conflicts are rooted in society and 
required a different approach. Furthermore, for some authors, the very distinction between relief 
and development has become irrelevant. Bradbury (1995:31) argues that such distinction is 
merely a 'financial and managerial tool', which by no means reflects the nature of chronic armed 
conflicts with multiple underlying causes. As mentioned earlier, the opinion expressed by Harmer 
and Macrae (2002:4) is that such distinction is rather political, and reflects the reluctance of cer-
tain donor govemment to provide aid classified as 'developmental' to countries known as corrupt, 
repressive or undemocratic. 
In recognition of these concems, the term 'continuum' was replaced by the even more puzzling: 
'contiguum'. The change was officially endorsed by the United Nations and the European Com-
mission3 (European Commission, 1996b; UNECOSOC, 1998). The terms 'Synergy' or 'develop-
ment relief probably describe best a change acknowledging that relief and development can take 
place simultaneously since different types of need can be found in a same area or country (DHA, 
1997; Schafer, 2002). 
1 Preparedness can be defined as: 'Activities and measures taken in advance to ensure effective response to the 
impact of hazards, including the issuance of timely and effective early wamings and the temporary evacuation of 
feople and property from threatened locations' (UNISDR, 2004: Annex1). 
Seepage 83. 
3 This distributes relief funds from the European Union. 
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According to White and Cliffe (2001 :319), the core expectation of this approach was: 
'potential for reliefldevelopmentlpeace-building synergies to reduce the need for 
relief through supporting capacities for coping and recovery and helping to pre-
vent, mitigate and resolve the conflict that causes complex political emergencies, 
and to sustain peace'. 
In their view, assistance should be defined according to its goals or objective rather than its mo-
dalities and the emphasis, of assistance may change in the course of a crisis. This is illustrated in 
Figure 8-20 which shows relief as predominant at the beginning of the crisis and minimal at the 
end. Eade and Williams (1995:829) suggest that, in contexts of long-lasting crises, programmes 
that have best adapted are those that were based on the development of communities and insti-
tutions. 
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One of the main obstacles to integrating relief and development is that budgetary separation be-
tween relief and development remains strong (Schafer, 2002:11). Moreover, as pointed out by 
Rebelle (1999), certain aid agenCies, who deal with both relief and development1, tend to operate 
through separate structures within their own organisations, between which limited dialogue takes 
place. 8y contrast, this 'compartmenting' of aid obliges organisations to propose to donors differ-
ent modes of actions for situations requiring for 'skills' to be 'combined'. 
1 For instance, CARE, Oxfam, UNICEF and several others, 
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Likewise, GrGnewald (2001 :2) describes situations in which: 
'Funding organisations simply seize up because a crisis is not an emergency, but 
nor is it a situation calling for rehabilitation or development assistance. Which of-
fice should we apply to? What budget heading does it come under?' 
Since the 1990s and the debate over 'continuum' and 'developmental relief, these sorts of un-
certain situations have been commonplace . 
• A vague intermediate stage: Rehabilitation 
Knowing whether the time is right to undertake rehabilitation 1 is difficult. For Green (2000:343) 
sustainable peace depends on 'reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction', what he calls 
the 'three pillars: RRR'. He defines reconciliation as: 
~ social and political process of building or rebuilding non-violent relationships, 
needing the suspension of total distrust and overl hatred to build functional co-
operation and social capital and re-legitimating and re-capacitating state and so-
cial institutions' 
This step is olten the most difficult and in numerous cases situations have evolved from lUll, 
back to war instead of progressing towards peace. Haroff-Tavel (2003:5) calls it a period of 
transition that she defines as: 
~ period of indetenninate duration which constitutes the prolongation of an 
anned conflict or intemal strife, in which open anned confrontation has ended or 
at least entered a period of remission, generally following a ceasefire 0 'peace 
agreement"'. 
Indeed, as Green (2000:354) points out, rehabilitation is a risky business and its resources may 
go to waste with peace efforts. This explains why rehabilitation is olten funded as emergency 
aid, although it needs that recipient governments are recognized as legitimate in order that 
funding for sizeable projects is forthcoming (Green and Ahmed, 1999) . 
• Humanitarian Accountability 
In addition to the 'relief to developmenf link, accountability has been a major concern for hu-
manitarian agenCies in the last 10 years or so. It is largely a conseql,lence of the earlier men-
. tioned NGOs. 'proliferation,2. 1994 and the altermath of the genocide in Rwanda (Eriksson et aI., 
1996) was a turning point. Many of the numerous agencies involved - more than 200 (Eriksson 
et aI., 1996) - were criticised for their poor performance and the conditions under which they 
operated (Macrae, 2002b:56). Critics focused mainly upon quality, moral integrity and account-
ability (van Brabant, 2002:17-19): 
• The lack of supervision of the work of aid agencies in the field was seen as a problem 
that could only be solved by establishing clear quality standards; 
1 Seepage 6. 
2 See page 81. 
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. , 
• Agencies were sometimes perceived as part of a 'service delivery industry' (Smillie, 
1995), moved by their own institutional self-interest, reluctant to be coordinated1 and 
paying little attention to local counterparts; 
• With the rise of relief budgets, donors were more demanding of the use made of their 
funds. The 'coherence agenda' linking humanitarian aid with politics was another incen-
tive for donors to exert a tighter control on how money was spent. 
These critics encouraged aid agencies to find ways 'Of demonstrating their accountability to-
wards the beneficiaries of their programmes. 
Edwards and Hulme (1995:9) define accountabilitv as 
'the means by which individuals and organisations report to a recognized author-
ity, or authorities, and are held responsible for their actions. 
A definition more specific to aid agencies is proposed by 'Humanitarian Accountability Partner-
ship' (HAP, see below): 
'Accountability involves two principles and mechanisms: 
(i) those by which individuals, organisations and States account for their actions 
and are held responsible for them, and 
(ii) those by which they may safely and legitimately report concems, complaints 
and get redress where appropriate. 
Humanitarian accountability is concemed with ethics, rights and responsibilities 
... and agreed standards and benchmarks. Men, women and children affected by 
disasters have a right to assistance and protection. They also have a right to in-
formation, to partiCipation, to be heard, and to redress'. (Herson, 2003) 
Humanitarian accountability involves three major stake holders: the aid agencies, their donors 
and the recipient communities or institutions. Natsios (1995) pointed out that humanitarian 
agencies are mostly accountable to their boards. Accountability to their donors and to aid re-
cipients is more 'tenuous'. He deplores the absence of mechanisms of accountability that would 
allow donors to be aware of the quality of the assistance they fund and for beneficiaries to be 
able to exert a judgement on what they receive. This absence of accountability mechanisms has 
however changed, since 1994, with the creation of a 'Code of Conduct for The International Red 
'Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief2. Two major initiatives fol-, 
lowed, that considerably enhanced aid agencies' approach to quality: 
1. In 1997, the Sphere project was launched. Initially, it was intended as a technical devel-
opment of the 'Code of Conducf and started as a discussion between NGO managers 
about introducing quality standards in humanitarian assistance. It developed into a rights-
based approach including a rights charter and a set of standards. The outcome to the 
'Rwanda multi-donor' evaluation, in which shortcomings of large-scale humanitarian as-
sistance were exposed, was, according to Young and Harvey (2004), a 'catalysf in the 
1 See section 4.3 page 84. ' 
2 See Box B-4 page 80. ' 
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process. Sphere defines minimum requirements necessary to sustain human life with dig-
. nity. Signatory aid agencies commit themselves to fulfil them. The project considers 
minimum standards as universal and formalizes the notion of quality in humanitarian as-
sistance. Despite a certain level of opposition, as shown inBox B-5, 'Sphere' was consid-
erably successful: over 800 people contributed to the technical content ofthe project and 
a handbook was produced in 1999 - and re-edited in 2004. Representatives of 1,500 
agencies were part of the project's management committee (Lowrie, 2000; Darcy, 2004; 
Walker and Purdin, 2004). 
2. Also in 1997, the concept of having an ombudsman 1 for humanitarian assistance 
emerged. The initial idea was to allow beneficiary groups to voice their concems about 
the assistance they receive. In practice, it was feared that this would add another layer of 
bureaucracy to assistance and distract agencies from their fundamental tasks. In the end, 
the idea evolved toward creating a structure t~at would determine which agencies are in 
compliance with the agreed codes and standards and to give advice to agencies on sup-
porting accountability to beneficiaries (Christoplos, 1999; Mitchell and Doane, 1999). In 
2000, the Humanitarian Assistance Ombudsman was replaced by the 'Humanitarian Ac-
countability Project', whiCh, in 2001, became 'Humanitarian Accountability Partnership' 
(HAP). HAP is considerably different from the original 'ombudsman' concept and eventu-
. ally limited its ambitions to 'make humanitarian action accountable to its intended benefi-
ciaries through self-regulation and compliance verification'. The organisation has 13 full-
member agencies2 (Doane, 2000; HAP, 2004). 
The 'Code of Conduct " Sphere and the Ombudsman - turned into HAP- have been three 
major accountability initiatives tackling three related aspects of accountability as illustrated in 
TableB.20. 
1 'Ombudsman'is an old Swedish world. It designates a person who represents or protects the interests of an-
other. Applied to humanitarian assistance, the term refers to a function rather than to a person (Mitchell and Do-
ane, 1999). 
2 As of July 2006, HAP full-members include: Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), CARE Inter-
national, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP), Medai" Mercy Malaysia, Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC), Office Africain pour le Deve/oppement et la Cooperation (OFADEC), Oxfam GB, Save 
the Children UK, Tearfund, Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC) and World Vision 
Intemational (WVI). 
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Table B·20: Accountability initiatives 
Box B·5: The reactions to Sphere 
Sources: van 8rabant, 2000; Terry, 2000; Dufour et aI, 2004; Tong, 2004; Groupe URD, 
2002 and Zeg/ie, 2004 
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• Evaluating the impact 
The whole debate around linking relief and development, being accountable and complying with 
standards is, in the end, about evaluating the impact of humanitarian aid, of which Roche (2003) 
proposes the following definition: 
A significant or lasting change in people's lives brought about, at least in part, by 
a given intervention. These changes may be positive or negative, expected or 
unexpected. Change may result directly from a given intervention, e.g. saving 
. lives by providing food; or indirectly, e.g. lobbying to protect a group of people. 
The key questions are: what has changed? Is it significant or lasting, and to what 
degree can it be attributed to a given set of actions? And who decides? 
Roche (1999), cited by Hofmann (2004:8), illustrates the causality link between humanitarian 
impact and its effect as a chain: 
inputs -+ activities -+ outputs -+ outcomes -+ impact 
However, DECD Development Assistance Committee (1999:12) points out that the 'complexity 
and interrelatedness' of the response makes it difficult to separate causes from effects in an 
evaluation and questions the linearity of such an approach. 
While the inputlimpact link may not always be linear, it can still be considered that humanitarian 
aid outputsloutcomes have the greatest influence on its impact. These outputsloutcomes de-
pend on aid agencies performance, DECD Development Assistance Committee (2002) defines 
as: 
The degree to which a development intervention or a development partner oper-
ates according to specific criteria/standards! guidelines or achieves results in ac-
cordance with stated goals or plans. 
Performance, in terms of humanitarian aid, depends on a number of criteria. They may slightly 
vary according to the evaluating entity but a few 'core criteria' are almost always cited. They 
are: 
• Efficiency; 
• Effectiveness I Cost Effectiveness; 
• Appropriateness; 
• Sustainability; and 
• Coverage. 
The definitions of these criteria appear in Box B-6. 
These criteria must be applied to evaluate the effect of aid projects on communities, but also on 
institutions. Apthorpe and Neville (1998) stress the need for the latter to be considered in the 
case of complex emergencies. 
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Box B-6: Main evaluation criteria 
.) ",. , 
,.)":1 ></"" 
Sources: DECD Development Assistance Committee, 1999
'
; Minear, 19942 
4.5 Humanitarian aid in urban areas 
. As highlighted in section 3.3, urban areas are increasingly common settings for armed conflicts. 
Aid agencies have consequently to deal with their particularities and this has proved difficult. 
Ruffin (2004:2) recognises that, whilst aid agencies have significant experience of responding to 
war-related emergencies in 'classic' situations - populations, usually displaced, regrouped in 
camps - when it comes to urban areas, they may be overwhelmed by the complexity of the envi-
ronment. For instance, combat zones and civil zones are mixed. They are attacked indiscrimi-
nately and non-combatants know the same fate as combatants. Moreover, cities are dependent 
on extemal resources for their food and water. When they are besieged, aid agencies must pro-
vide substitution for a whole range of 'imported products'. Stocker (2004:21) adds that cities' de-
pendence on public services is much heavier than in rural areas because urban dwellers have 
limited altematives for their ordinary supply. These services include water and power. Finally, as 
pOinted out by Miribel (2004:34), high population densities are also among the factors tuming 
humanitarian assistance in cities into a difficult enterprise. The consequences of epidemics and 
socio-economic breakdown spread fast. However, once assistance has reached, benefits can 
also be felt relatively quickly. 
1 Efficiency, effectiveness, sustainabifity, and cost-efficiency. 
2 Appropriateness, coverage. 
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The difficulties linked to interventions in cities are not limited to the emergency operations. When 
undertaking rehabilitation/reconstruction activities, aid agencies may be confronted with the same 
problems as development agencies working in cities. In this regard, one of the main issues 
pOinted out by Le Bris (2002) is the 'fragmentation' of the urban habitat linked to the 'logic of pro-
ject'. By focusing upon specific areas, agencies may create disparities in access to water - or, 
for that matter, to other services - thereby increasing inequalities, which may be factors of insta-
bility. It may also undermine uriban government credibility because it creates a multitude of new 
actors and institutions working on the provision of uriban services . 
• Approaches to the rehabilitation I reconstruction process 
Infrastructure damage is a common and visible consequence of uriban wars 1 and aid agencies 
involved in uriban rehabilitation/reconstruction are frequently confronted with the task of,rebuild-
ing infrastructure. Both Anand (2005) and Barakat (1998), believe it can be a crucial compo-
nent of the transition to peace2, provided that it is adequately carried out. ,As pOinted out by An-
and (2005), the failure of infrastructure rehabilitation programmes may, on the contrary, be ex-
ploited by opponents to peace to promote social unrest. 
For van Horen (2002:114), rebuilding infrastructure and in particular uriban services infrastruc-
ture such as water, sanitation, power etc. is only the first step of a process that includes 
strengthening the capacity of institutions running these services3• He sees it as a necessary 
step to ensure long-tenm improvements. Such initiative is in line with the strategy of linking relief 
and development4 (Berry et aI., 2004). Considering development aspects, Mog (2004) similarly 
underlines the link between the notion of sustainabilityS, which demands that immediate benefits 
of assistance continue for an indefinite period, and engaging with communities and local institu-
tions. However, this is usually not what agencies do, at least during the first steps of their inter-
ventions. Lombardo (2004:33) notes that they tend,on the contrary, to deliver services in lieu of 
local institutions. Agencies sometimes even deprive local institutions from their most capable 
personnel by offering better salaries and perspectives (Dollar and Pritchett, 1998:56). In the 
end, Berry et al (2004:10) see humanitarian interventions as good at alleviating immediate 
needs, but not very effective when it comes to ensuring long-tenm 'systems building'. In their 
view, it is due to the very fundaments of humanitarian aid, which is designed to bypass govem-
mental structures, in order to be faster and more effective at delivering assistance to the recipi-
ent population. That is what Slaymaker et al (2005:32) call 'state avoidance'. They explain that 
aid agencies often do not trust 'weak or dysfunctional' governmental institutions, finding gov-
1 See page 75. 
2 See also page 70. " 
3 See the definition of an institution page 12. 
4 See page 86. 
5 See 
Box B·6 page 94. 
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ernment policies 'incoherent or inadequately prioritised'. Another justification to this state of 
mind is that some local institutions may be parasitic and even manipulate aid agencies, allowing 
warlords 1 to tap aid resources, as explained by Christoplos (1998). The principle of independ-
ence, which is according to Kent (1987:98) one of the comerstones of humanitarian interven-
tion, is also an incentive for agencies to work directly with people rather than through govern-
ments. 
Perrin (1996:363) analyses the level.of cooperation between aid agencies and 'local systems' at 
different stages of the assistance process. He distinguishes three phases: 
1. 'Autonomous' emergency programmes: they are not connected to the local systems and 
substitute them. This phase is. not meant to last as it cuts local authorities from their re-
sponsibilities and recipient populations become dependent on aid; . 
2. Rehabilitation as a form of emergency intervention: the deficiencies of the local system 
are compensated through rehabilitation works and supply of personnel; 
3. The combination of direct aid and rehabilitation programme: substitution may be neces-
sary until normal systems are restored. 
From a more general point of view, Smillie (2001 :7) states that relief programmes are character-
ized by a 'preponderant externality' in terms of source of input, accountabilities, approach to 
management and reliance on expatriate staff. This tends to 'undermine rather than strengthen 
. indigenous capacity'. Aid agencies work 'around' govemmental structures, with their own 
strategies, policies and programmes, building projects 'parallel' to often deficient govemmental 
structures (Munslow and Brown, 1999; Slaymaker et aI., 2005). The consequence of 'state 
avoidance' is a vicious circle illustrated in Figure B-21. Slaymaker et al (2005:33) considers that 
the 'ultimate consequence' of this cycle is to make aid-dependent govemments accountable to 
donors rather than to their people. 
1 See Box B-1 page 36. 
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I state Avoidance I 
-Undermining or inhibtting of 
the state's capacity to function 
-Legitimacy of the state 
eroded or constrained 
Government not delivering, 
managing or resourcing 
services for its population 
Declining use and 
effectiveness of national 
systems 
Line-ministries liaise directly 
with donors for resources -
sometimes in competition with 
NGOs - instead of with the 
ministry of finance 
Govemment planning irrelevant: . I".$J 
prioritisation, resource raising and 
allocation mechanisms are more 
fragmented 
Figure B-21: The consequences of 'State avoidance' 
Based on Slaymakeret al (2005:32) 
• Working with local institutions 
1 See 
ANALYSING INSTITUTIONAL SUSTAINABILITY 
Aid agencies engage with local institutions in order to obtain sustainable results (Cotton and 
Tayler, 2000:2.7). The notion of sustainability, applied to humanitarian assistance, was de-
fined and analysed earlier1. Another of its applications is institutional sustainabilitv, which 
applies to the activities carried out by institutions. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (1992:371) de-
fine it as follows: 
'A sustainable institution is one that eamed the adherence of a sufficient body of 
people so that it gets the continuing encouragement and support it needs to han-
dle, at a minimum, a stable volume of transactions'. 
Both the notions of institutional sustainability and sustainability of aid projects are linked. It is 
only by helping organisations to achieve sustainable services that agencies may deliver as-
sistance which is sustainable. 
Box B-6 page 94. 
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A more specific analysis of institutional sustainability is proposed by Sohail et al (2001) when 
applied to institutions delivering urban services 1. They separate urban services sustainability 
into three components: 
1. Technical sustainability, which depends on the technical capacity of the institution to op-
erate and maintain the infrastructure allowing the delivery of the service; 
2. Institutional sustainability, which depends on the capacity of the water utility to function as 
an institution. This relies on the recognition of its prerogatives by customers, administra-
tions and other public services. It entails the right to impose regulations (Uphoff, 1986), in 
addition to commercial activities - such as receiving payment for the service; 
3. Financial sustainability, which depends on the ability of the utility to recover costs. 
As mentioned earlier, armed conflicts have an 'eroding' effect on society and its institutions 
(Duffield, 1994), which make sustainable service more difficult to achieve for utilities. War 
damage and/or the lack of maintenance, combined with the loss of personnel and assets are 
major constraints preventing utilities from reaching acceptable levels of service. This com-
promises their technical sustainability. As a result, utilities may lose credibility and authOrity. 
This may lead to situations in which no regulation can be enforced. Other likely conse-
quences are illegal access to the service and. the unwillingness to pay due to poor perform-
ance, which in turn compromises both institutional and financial sustainability. 
Institutions may end up depending on government subsidies or external aid and struggle to 
pay their employees, who may leave. Funds are no longer available for repairs and the ser-
vice further deteriorates. It is a downward spiral, which may lead to the complete annihilation 
ofthe service if no action is taken. 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Edwards (1988:1) recommends institutional development as a way of achieving 'institutional 
learning or sustainability'. Israel (1987:11) defines it as: 
7he process of improving an institution's ability to make effective use of the hu-
man and financial resources available: 
According to Healey (1998), the capacity of an institution comprises three aspects: 
1 .. Knowledge resources: the capacity to run the service and the acquaintance with the local 
environment; 
2. Relational resources: with communities, administrations and the private sector; 
3. Capacity to mobilise: based on the recognition of the service. 
Knowledge resources of urban services include technical, managerial and financial knowl-
edge as well as accumulated experience and awareness of its cultural and religious envi-
ronment. Relational resources fall back on the links existing between the institution and other 
1 See page 12. 
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stakeholders to the service such as its customers, governmental authorities, other public 
services, and potential sponsors. Capacity to mobilise depends on the institution's credibility 
as a service provider and regulatory entity. 
The capacity of an institution and the sustainability of the service it provides are linked. 
Technical sustainability depends on knowledge resources necessary to run the service; insti-
tutional sustainability depends on all three aspects of institutional capacity while financial· 
sustainability depends on capacity to mobilise, in particular in order to recover costs and ob-
tain subsidies. This is illustrated in Figure B-22. 
, 
,--------,. 
Institutional 
capacity 
Urban services 
sustainabiJity 
Technical 
sustainability 
Institutional f-------~ sustainability 
L:.-'-'-:;-'-'-'-:...J 
Capacity to 1"'-------01 Financial 
mobilise sustainability 
Figure B-22: Link between institutional capacity and urban services sustainability 
Based on Sohail et a/ (2001) and Hea/ey (1998) 
Esman (1972) details the range of activities aid agencies may carry out to develop the ca- . 
pacity of an institution. They are: 
• To provide change models: institutions are conscious of their shortcomings and they ex-
pect external assistance to supply better models and the necessary knowledge to apply 
them and adapt them to local conditions; 
• To partiCipate in the leadership function: in the framing of doctrine and priorities, devel-
opment programmes and internal organisation building; 
• To provide resources such as advisors, training opportunities, equipment, money, infor-
mation and prestige; 
• To transfer and adapt technology through teaching, training and demonstrations; 
• To carry out evaluative processes allowing institutions to gain conscience of their pro-
gress. 
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In the case of water utilities, WELL (1998b) lists a number of 'constraints to effective service 
provision' to be addressed by tackling some key institutional issues through institutional de-
velopment. This is summarized in Table 8-21. 
Table B-21: Problems addressed by Institutional de'velloprnel~t 
;lt~o:~:Sr:i [ ,Wi '!i1i!~! :i !'p~: !~!~l 
The changes to be brought up by institutional development represent various levels of diffi-
culty depending on aspects of the process' from which they originate. This is assessed by 
Cullivan et al (1986:74) and shown in Table B.22. 
16 activities are listed in this table. Their degree of difficulty is considered as high for six of 
them, moderately high for five, medium for four and low for one. It is therefore hardly surpris-
ing that Edwards (1988:2) notes that 'effective institutional development projects are not 
common', adding that the process may carry a lot of difficulties. One of the main problems, in 
his view, is that professionals involved in institutional development are chosen for their ex-
perience and technical knowledge but not necessarily for their skills at transfering this 
knowledge. Likewise, Smillie (2001:20) notes that aid workers are often inexperienced, 
'overworked', and subject to high tumover. As a result, 'their capacity to build capacity' is 
commonly low. 
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Israel (1987:3) .calls institutional issues a 'messy area'. He states that few development· 
agencies are good at it and they are not encouraged by aid policymakers, who: 
'shy away from areas they cannot grasp or that experts do not seem to under-
stand well. Although many policymakers are aware of the importance of institu-
tions in a development strategy, they still do not give it the necessary priority, in 
part because they believe there is no clear way of going about it'. (Israel, 1987:4) 
If such situations prevail with development agencies, relief agencies, which are even less 
experienced at dealing with local institution, would be even less inclined to carry out institu-
tional development. 
Another important reason for neglecting institutional development is that both aid agencies 
and donors prefer 'hardware' components of projects, which, according to Moore (1995:91), 
may be completed with 'relative speed and enthusiasm'. In contrast, aspects such as O&M 
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are politically less attractive in terms of image both for donors and for aid agencies, always 
concemed about 'visibility'. 
Israel (1987:4-5) describes institutional development as a 'Iow specificity activity'. He defines 
, specificitv in relation with two groups of factors: 
(1) The extent to which it is possible to specify for a particular activity the objec-
.fives to be attained, the methods of achieving those objectives, and the ways of 
controlling achievement and rewarding staff; 
And (2) the effects of the activity - their intensity, how long it takes for them to 
become apparent, the number of people and other activities affected, and the 
practical possibilities of tracing the effects. 
The lack of specificity makes the management of institutional development much more com-
plex than more 'straightforward' activities as, indeed, the previously mentioned 'hardware' 
components of projects. 
Another potential obstacle to institutional development is the nature of the recipient institu-
tions and the govemments on which they depend. Slaymaker et al (2005:34) point out that 
collaborating with local authorities to organise relief distributions in an emergency is not the 
same as building their capacity so that they are able to carry out services by themselves. It 
requires a closer relationship, which may not be acceptable depending on the political con-
text. Eade (1997:180) stresses: 
'Clearly, there are many situations in which it is inappropriate to coordinate hu-
manitarian relief programmes through local authorities or govemment structures.' 
She refers to govemments violating human rights. In such circumstances, it should be all the 
more unacceptable for agencies to engage in institutional development. 
Moore (1995:91) summarizes all these obstacles stating: 
'Institutional building is doubly difficult for aid agencies: first because they are aid 
agencies and second because the task itself is difficult. Unfortunately, there are 
no ,clear or simple solutions'. 
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• Working with communities 
The notion of community is probably the most fundamental to humanitarian aid since communi-
ties are meant to be the end-beneficiaries of most assistance programmes. It is defined by 
Holtennann et al (2001 :1-26) as: 
'A group of people living in the same environment and sharing resources. They 
have common problems, concerns, hopes, and ways of behaviour that give them 
a sense of belonging to each other. The group also has leaders, ways of com-
municating ideas and activities, rules and ways of dividing work and participating 
in functions that are vital to its members'. 
The notion of social capital may be used as a tool for a better understanding of the importance 
of working with communities in such situations. As highlighted earlier' social capital may be 
'bonding' - based on kinship or ethnic ties, or 'bridging' - 'cross-cutting' ties. These aspects of 
social capital refer to social relationships within a community and could be seen as 'horizontal 
social capital' (Colletta and Cullen, 2000:1). 'Linking' social capital was also defined. It refers to 
the links between communities and extemal entities such as the state and markets. This could 
be defined as 'vertical social capital' (Colletta and Cullen, 2000:1). According to Colletta and 
Cullen (2000), weak social cohesion increases the risk of 'social disorganisation, fragmentation 
and exclusion', which potentially may lead to conflict. Therefore, in a post-conflict society, re-
storing horizontal and vertical social capital would be a factor of stability. It was already men-
tioned that, in a crisis Situation, individuals and community have to rely on direct and illegal enti-
tlements for their survival2• These intemal coping mechanisms rely on bonding social capital 
rather than on bridging social capital in situations where state and markets cannot be trusted. 
Urban communities are more vulnerable in this respect and need longer recovery periods than 
their rural counterparts. Coping mechanisms may come under severe strain but are usually not 
destroyed by crises. Extemal assistance must take them into consideration, being conscious of 
them and taking advantage of their existence during relief and rehabilitation programmes. The 
goal of agencies should be to encourage the building up of bridging and linking soCial capital, 
strengttlening civil society and trust in govemment institutions (Colletta and Cullen, 2000). Col-
letta and Cullens (2000:31) consider the goal of assistance programmes in favour of communi-
ties should be 'connecting and empowering' people: 
• Connections refer to social reconciliation, which is fundamental to successful rehabilita- . 
tion and reconstruction; 
• Empowennent gives people a sense of control of their future. 
Figure B-23 illustrates the process of building social cohesion. It shows that, in situations of low 
social cohesion and high conflicts, people rely on relations of kinship/ethnicity within their local 
communities or individual households. On the contrary, when social cohesion is high, conflict 
1 See page 76. 
2 See page 34. 
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low and civil society stronger, people may rely on their own governmental institutions. Institu-
tional development may therefore contribute to this evolution. 
Figure 8-23: Building social cohesion 
Source: Col/elta and Cullens, 2000:5 
Hodgson (2004:20-21) looks at how aid agencies 'rebuild' communities in post-disaster situa-
tions through projects covering shelter and housing, income generation and water and sanita-
tion. In his view one of the major concems for aid agencies is the sustainability of such activi-
ties 1. For instance, the rehabilitation of water distribution network cannot be successful in areas· 
where communities are divided. In the same way as Collelta and Cullens (2000) recommended 
looking for 'connections' between communities, Hodgson (2004:20-21), .considers that restoring 
water supply 'for the common good' may contribute to reconciliation and concludes that 'political 
. considerations may, however, outweigh practical engineering solutions'. Brown (2002) similarly 
argues that working with local communities is a necessary step to achieve 'sustainable infra-
structure'. He stresses that many rehabilitation projects in post-conflict areas have neglected 
this dimension, which compromises their long-term prospects. 
Communityparlicipation is considered as a basis of development. For Goulet (1995:99-100), it 
contributes to bringing dignity and mobilising people as problem-solvers in their own social envi-
ronment. It also allows them to get in contact with 'larger macro arenas' of decision-making. The 
idea is to give people a voice. Rehabilitation in urban areas affected by armed conflicts should 
1 See 
Box B.IJ page 94. 
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therefore ideally be a 'bottom-up' process. This grassroots approach is often facilitated by 
Community-Based Organisations, who are in principle representative of their communities. They 
tend to depend on extemal assistance for funding and often work in partnership with NGOs, lo-
cal govemment or the private sector and may facilitate community participation in infrastructure 
work (Slaymaker et al., 2005) . 
• Time frame 
Time is an important dimension both for institutional development and community participation. 
Ideally, programmes need to be 'flexible and responsive' (Slaymaker et aI., 2005:31) and given 
time to evolve. Short term programmes have limited impact. For Smillie (2001:19), it is a matter 
of 'mindsef that should be changed. He argues that, in current practice, there is often no time 
to identify local capacities, let alone to carry out capacity-building. He also points out that many 
complex emergencies have been ongoing for sometimes more than a decade and that such 
short-term focus is not often justified. 
The issue of the time needed and the degree of difficulty involved in achieving organisational 
change is illustrated in Figure B-24. It shows that having an impact on attitudes and behaviours 
are the most difficult to achieve and requires the longest time. 
TIme needed 
Organisational Behaviour 
Depth and breadth of change 
Degree of difficulty 
Figure 8-24: Time and complexity in organisational change 
Source: Smillie, 2001:19 and Fowler, 1997, based on Campbelf, 1989 
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. 5. Restoring water and sanitation services 
The amount of published material on water and sanitation emergency response and rehabilitation. 
in urban areas affected by armed conflict is limited. Most of the available information consists of 
conference papers and a few publications listed in Table B.23 and Table B.24. 
Table 8·23: Case-studies on urban water and sanitation in armed conflicts, conferences 
1 See page 167. 
2 Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit. 
3 See page 224. This case is authored by Hodgson Hogdson (1997) and was mentioned earlier. 
• See page 133. 
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Table B-24: Case-studies on urban water and sanitation in armed conflicts, publications 
These publications are limited in number and, for most of them, offer little insight in terms of ana-
lysing the strategies adopted. Watering thoms', by Cosgrave (1999), is among the few excep-
tions. It is a critical review of urban projects carried out by the NGO Oxfam in the 1980s and 
1990s on water distribution networks in Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Kabul, Afghanistan5 and Goma, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The report analyses a number of flaws such as: . 
• The incapacity of the organisation to deal with projects technically too complex and in-
volving a wide range of actors in a complex environment; 
• Human resources issues such as staff tum-over, the lack of technical support from head-
quarters and limited institutionalleaming from other experiences; 
• The lack of control mechanisms, including financial, to manage large projects; 
• Poor initial assessments, which failed, in particular, to consider the broader social and in-
stitutional picture. 
It concludes on the need for a greater involvement of communities and institutions. in the design 
and management of projects, and warns against difficult exit strategies. These concems,. com-
mon among agencies involved in rehabilitation, have a direct link with the timeframe of projects. 
1 See page 224. 
2 No longer available because the 'Geneva Foundation' has disappeared. 
3 See page 133. . 
• See page 167. 
5 See page 133. 
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In addition to 'Watering thoms', a few genuine analyses of strategies adopted by aid agencies in 
this context have been published: 
• A theoretical framework of 'preventative maintenance' developed by the ICRC(2006) is 
available on their website; 
• A paper by Hogdson (1997) presented during the 'Water under Fire' conference (Table 
B-23); and 
• A PhD thesis by bzerdem (1998) from the University of York. 
They are reviewed in the following sections. 
5.1 Preventative maintenance 
The notion of 'preventative maintenance', introduced by the ICRC (2006) , is a strategic frame-
work which recommends that, in a criSiS, measures are taken before the level of functioning of 
systems falls below the 'emergency line', a' situation in which morbidity and mortality are af-
fected1• In the case of water distribution networks, preventative maintenance consists of ensuring 
that three measures are taken to guarantee that water is safe when it reaches the consumer: 
1. To add extra chlorine to water in order to kill pathogens as it travels through the pipes; 
2. To maintain the network constantly under pressure; and 
3. To configure sewers so that wastewater is kept away from water pipes i.e. sewers not 
pressurized, buried in different trenches from water lines and, ideally. lower. 
The first two measures should, In principle, be sufficient to avoid negative consequences from 
,contamination of water supplies from sewerage pipes. In any case, a large proportion of urban 
areas have no sewers and people use latrines instead (Roberts and Faramusova, 1998:84). 
If the rehabilitation process is delayed, for instance because of a lack of funds, political instability 
or security constraints, these protective measures cannot be implemented and th~ system's level 
of functioning falls under the emergency line and requires more efforts to stabilize a potentially 
recurrent emergency situation. 
The framework is not presented by the ICRC as specific to the urban environment, however, it is 
particularly well adapted to urban characteristics Le. complex systems highly dependent on con-
sumables and maintenance. This is illustrated in Figure B-25. 
1 See page 66. 
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Figure 8-25: Preventative maintenance 
Source: IGRG, 2006 
5.2 'Top-down' versus 'bottom-up' 
Hodgson (1997) looked at water supply assistance in Mostar, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Grozny, 
Chechnya, between 1993 and 1996. He distinguishes two types of approaches to water assis-
tance for cities affected by armed conflict: 
1. 'Top-down': whenever agencies take the responsibility of designing their assistance pro-
grammes independently; hiring their own personnel and using imported material; 
2. 'Bottom-up': when they collaborate with local public services utilities and make use of lo-
cal material when available. 
He argues that agencies tend to adopt a 'top-down' approach in the emergency phase, with the 
purpose of stabilizing the Situation, while they may tum to a more 'bottom-up' policy during the 
rehabilitation period in order to obtain sustainable results. 
5.3 The 'ATAM' framework 
Ozerdem (1998) studied rehabilitation works in the city ofTuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose 
water distribution network was considerably damaged by war in 1993. He proposes a framework 
for water supply reconstruction that he calls 'ATAM': Appropriate, Targeted, Applicable and Main-
tainable: 
• Appropriate to local environment and existing technology; 
• Targeted at strengthening the existing communal and institutional structures through 
partnership; 
• Applicable considering logistics and operations; and 
• Maintainable by local structures. 
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This model proposes a structure analysis of rehabilitation I reconstruction projects, looking at their 
. wide impact on the societies they target. It may help to improve the design of such projects by 
listing general aspects to consider in order to achieve optimal performance. The elements it com-
prises are detailed in Table B-25. 
Table 8-25: The 'ATAM' framework 
~~ ... 
Ozerdem (1998) also recommends a 'holistic approach' to reconstruction, arguing that: 'post-war 
reconstruction of urban water supplies is often carried out by NGOs on an ad-hoc basis and 
purely from a technical perspective'~ Coordinating systems rehabilitation is particularly important 
in cities because, as stated earlier1, they tend to be interconnected and interdependent - water-
schemes usually need power supply, sewerage schemes sufficient water, health structures both 
water and sanitation facilities etc. 
6. Findings from the review 
This review has covered a wide range of issues based on the current state of research on the. 
root-causes and consequences of urban armed conflicts in the developing world. It has focused, 
on the one hand, on how urban areas, urban dwellers, and water and sanitation services are af-
fected, and on the other, on analysing the response from humanitarian aid through ifs motiva-
tions, strategies and flaws. 
It has been shown that it is particularly important to study urban poverty in order to. understand . 
how urban areas are affected by armed conflicts. Poverty is present in Third World cities, inde-
pendently from any crisis. Rural poverty is among the main drivers of urbanization and urban 
poverty its main consequence. In contrast, cities also generate wealth. Modem economies are 
based on industrial production, technology and services which are mainly urban outputs. As a 
1 See page 75. 
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result, prosperity and destitution often coexist in cities, creating inequalities, which are considered 
the main factors of instability. Inequalities are one of the main links between urban poverty and 
urban violence. Violence may also come from outside. Cities, which are symbols of power and 
wealth, are decisive targets for rebel groups who may recruit unemployed male youth from poor 
urban suburbs. 
Vulnerability is another of the important concepts reviewed. It was originally defined in the context 
of natural disasters but it is also commonly used to describe the level of exposure of urban poor 
to the consequences of anmed conflicts. Violence affects social cohesion, destroying social capi-
tal, the social networks which allow communities to function. When confronted by crises, coping 
mechanisms in urban areas, while not inexistent, are less strong than in the countryside. Urban 
dwellers are more dependent on mechanisms of solidarity as well as on municipal services for 
their daily life, sometimes for their survival. When anmed conflicts destroy livelihoods, erode social 
networks and weaken institutions, urban dwellers are those who suffer most. 
The first priority for aid agencies intervening in cities affected by anmed conflicts is to help the 
most vulnerable to cope with the crisis. Water and sanitation is among the most important com-
ponent of assistance because it is essential to both the health and the well-being of the affected 
population. Extending the coverage of water and sanitation services to those most in need is 
therefore a major concem when designing assistance programmes. It is particularly the case in 
the rehabilitation phase, when penmanent or semi-penmanent solutions are sought. In most 
cases, the complexity of the urban environment tums the task into a considerable challenge be-
cause water supply and sanitation services are delivered by a multitude of public and private pro-
viders, offering various levels of services, and sometimes running sophisticated systems. 
One additional and fundamental aspect of the rehabilitation of urban water and sanitation sys-
tems is the notion of sustainability. A medium to long-tenm perspective is all the more important 
given that sometimes substantial funds are involved. Since the mid 1990s, aid agencies have 
been more concemed about the long-term consequences of their interventions. Many have de-
clared themselves ready to be held accountable for it and there was a declared commitment to 
design relief activities while taking into account subsequent development projects. Standards of 
quality in humanitarian action were simultaneously established. 
Achieving sustainability in the urban context requires working with communities, but also with in-
stitutions. In the field of water and sanitation, these institutions are water utilities, which run water 
and sewerage networks. Water utilities are affected by armed conflicts in many different ways. 
The most evident one is the damage to the infrastructure they operate, but in addition, they tend 
to suffer from looting and often lose many of their essential staff. Their capacity is considerably 
weakened and they require support from aid agencies to improve it and be .able to deliver an ac-
ceptable level of service. For that, it is necessary to carry out institutional development. 
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Unfortunately, aid agencies tend to avoid this kind of programme. Firstly because water utilities 
are in most cases public entities and many aid agencies - particularly NGOs - avoid working 
with governments, in general because of concerns over their independence. Secondly, because 
institutional development is a difficult task for which they are ill-prepared and which is poorly re-
warding in terms of visibility. Finally, because institutional development is a long process and 
most agencies and donors prefer shorter timeframes for their programmes. Institutional develop-
ment is therefore an option every actor involved in rehabilitation recognises as crucial but in 
which few dare to engage. 
The review has emphasized the limited number of documents produced on analysing water and 
sanitation assistance strategy in urban areas affected by armed conflict. During emergencies, 
ICRC (2006) recommends that timely 'preventative maintenance' is carried out on essential infra-
structure in order to avoid public health consequences of further deterioration. In terms of rehabili-
tation, Ozerdem (1998) recommends a holistic approach when working on water distribution net-
, works, that implies coordinating interventions between agencies and sectors - for instance water 
and power. He also proposes a framework for reconstruction that encompasses the right level of 
service, technology and maintainability. Finally Hodgson (1997) looks at how agencies work with 
local water utilities, from substitution in the early stage of an emergency to greater sup'port I col-
laboration in the following period. 
Limited analysis may be due to the difficulty in accessing war areas. Those involved in emer-
gency operations in such contexts are aid workers who carry out operations without necessarily 
analysing them - or at least without writing up and publishing their thoughts on the issue. In the 
end, aid agencies are left with few guidelines on how to operate in a difficult context. As Cos-
grave (1999) found out in the case of Oxfam, this may lead to projects lacking sustainability. The 
issue of coverage is another major difficulty. In peaceful areas, the access of the poor to water 
services underpins a lively debate on options for service delivery, and the possible involvement of 
the private sector. Suitable solutions are all the more difficult to find in war-affected countries. 
High levels of poverty, typical of such situations, exacerbate the moral issues behind the right to 
water. In these conditions, it is often hard to reconcile universal services and sustainability. 
Finding answers to these problems is important, not only because of the potential benefits on 
health and general well-being but also because basic services such as water and sanitation con-
tribute to maintain stability and may be essential to securing peace. 
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1. Justification of the study 
The review of the literature has described the importance of water and sanitation services. It has 
shown its double nature: services essential to health and wellbeing, which are often perceived as 
a right, and at the same time, especially in large cities, important economic activities. This duality 
applies to other aspects of the service. Access to water and sanitation is part of daily life and 
. 'everyone's problem'. Yet, when facilitated on a large scale, it requires the intervention of a spe-
cific group of sometimes highly specialized people. Thus, two main stakeholders are involved: 
• Consumers, who may be perceived as having a right to access these services but often 
depend on service providers; and 
• These service providers, who may strive to offer the best possible service, but must make 
sufficient profit to ensure that the activity is viable, or at least approaches viability. 
Recognizing the right to access water and sanitation implies looking for ways of aChievin'g univer-
sal access. In practice, it means coverage of low-income areas. Another fundamental objective is 
achieving sustainable services. ReconCiling both of these goals has been the object of abundant 
publications, some of which have been reviewed in the previous chapter. It includes detailed 
analyses of the role of different actors such as govemments, public utilities, private water compa-
nies, small-scale independent providers, consumer groups etc. and the various possible ar-
rangements for service delivery. However, most of the studies carried out focused on 'stable 
situations'. As pOinted out at the end of the review of the literature, situations of armed conflict 
have, in this respect, been poorly researched. 
The occurrence of water and sanitation emergencies in the context of armed conflict introduces a 
third stakeholder: the so-called 'intemational community'. As mentioned earlier, foreign assis-
tance is meant to help developing countries to cope with the consequences of emergencies. In 
most cases, it has a paramount influence on how the crisis is resolved. In reality, describing it as 
a single entity is misleading. The 'intemational community' manifests itself sometimes through a 
multitude of aid agencies witti different agendas, means and strategies. They are confronted with 
situations in which the relationship between consumers and service providers has changed. The 
latter may have disappeared or be incapacitated, in which case, an aid agency may substitute 
them. A retum to 'normal' may largely be dependent on the reconstruction of the infrastructure. 
However, the review of the literature teaches us that this reconstruction is just the tip of the'ice-
berg. Long-lasting crises have an 'eroding effecf on institutions and societies, which makes prob-
lems more persistent. In order to take into account this longer timeframe, aid agencies have to 
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deal with both consumers and service providers, who are involved in water and sanitation ser-
vices over the long run. Local institutions such as water utilities are key players. 
The interaction - or the absence of interaction - between aid agencies and water sector institu-
tions in contexts of armed conflicts is the object of this study. It explores situations in which the 
security situation, whilst sometimes precarious, still allows aid agencies to operate. Its justification 
is double: 
• On the one hand, as it was shown in sections 5 and 6 of the review of the literature, the 
amount of research carried out ?n this particular aspect of water and sanitation response 
to emergencies is very limited; 
• On the other, the nature of this. interaction has an influence on the potential benefits of 
aid for the recipient population, and this represents a problem for aid agencies, as is de-
tailed in the following section. 
2. Problem statement 
This study explores the problem related to th.e clear contradiction between a declared intention by 
aid agencies to work with longer-term objectives, and aid strategies, which do not give them the 
means to achieve these ambitions. 
The literature review has shown that, in times of disasters, this long-term perspective relies on 
'building on local capacities'. It is the bottom line of the 'relief to development link', which is, in 
principle, defended by both aid agencies and donors. However, in practice, and in particular when 
local capacities depend on local governments, difficulties appear: 
• During acute emergenCies, aid agencies may neglect local institutions because they see 
them as not sufficiently efficient to deliver quick results; 
• When rehabilitation or reconstruction is carried out, local institutions may be seen as un-
acceptable or unsuitable partners. This may be due to political concerns or because the 
institution is considered as too inefficient and/or corrupt. 
In some cases, these concerns may be legitimate. However, a number of publications earlier de-
tailed reports on the general 'state avoidance' tendency, which has been a characteristic of the 
work of relief agencies 1. 
Whilst some aspects of the problem are perceived as inherent in local institutions, others are 
purely the result of characteristics of aid agencies and aid policy: 
• Firstly, working in partnership with local institutions in cities affected with armed conflicts 
implies supporting them. As shown in the literature review, tasks such as institutional de-
1 See page 97. 
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velopment are particularly unappealing tQ. most aid agencies, which often lack the com-
petence to carry them out; 
• Secondly, supporting local institutions requires a commitment from aid agencies over 
relatively long periods. This is something their funding patterns rarely allow them to do. 
As a result, most projects lack long-term perspectives. 
3. Research question and hypothesis 
The goal of this study is to answer the following question: 
How do partnerships between 'water sector institutions and aid agencies influence the 
performance of emergency opel"Cltions and rehabilitation? 
. 
Levels of performance are evaluated according to three fundamental sets of criteria described in 
the review ofthe literature: 
1.· Efficiency and effectiveness; 
2. Appropriateness and Sustainability; 
3. Coverage in terms of access to the services provided. 
In the case of emergency operations, the first set of criteria is preponderant. Answering the re-
search question should allow the following questions to be addressed: 
• In which cases is it justified for aid agencies to collaborate with local water sector institu-
tions? 
• What are the best possible strategies for partnership and why? 
• What benefits can be expected for the recipient population? 
Two different situations are examined, both in the case of armed conflicts: . 
1. Emergency response; 
2. Rehabilitation / reconstruction. 
The study concentrates on the interaction between the various stakeholders involved in water 
and sanitation services including aid agencies and water sector institutions, but also consumers, 
taken individually or in communities, and the private sector. It looks, in particular, at how the type 
of aid agency involved may influence partnership. The research hypotheses to be tested can be 
. expressed as: 
• Partnership between local water sector institutions and aid agencies improves the effi-
ciency and effectiveness in emergency response; 
• Partnership between local water sector institutions and aid agencies contributes to 
sustainability in rehabilitation/reconstruction programmes . 
. 
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1. Selecting a research strategy 
Based on research by 'COSMOS' corporation 1, Yili (2003: 5) defines three conditions that deter-
, mine a research strategy: 
1. The type of research question asked: How?, Why?, Where?, How much? etc.; 
2. The extend of control of behavioural events; 
3. The degree of focus upon contemporary events. 
The appropriate research strategy can then be selected by answering the questions included in 
Table D.1. 
Table 0-1: Relevant situations for different research strategies 
b;;;~;IZ';~';:'''''''''\''''L ." {:~[o/t:'~~]:1I~·::~::.J~i·,:f~·.:,:10.:.~?~T~:':r!1 ~:~r~1~I;;:;t1!J·:::!.r-li~:.:~~:'·~q·:·':ff:·~::::::·.: ,-:~.;;;:,:.:~:~: ~:::: ;,::.:.;~::::::f~t'::~:~: .. ,:'::~!::~'::::.y'~.~:.(:~ .... '.·_·.',·,.· .. '.·.,·,·.w.'.·.".·.,~ 
Source: Yin, 2003, based on 'COSMOS Corporation' 
In the case of this study, the' research question2 has a clear explanatory nature - it is a 'how?' 
question. 'It requires establishing connections between how water sector institutions interact with 
aid agencies and the outcome of emergency operations or rehabilitation projects. In theory, this 
can be done through experiments, surveys or case study research. It is hard to ir:nagine 'experi-
menting' with anned conflicts, therefore, the adequate strategies are either history or case study 
research. These two notions are defined hereafter: 
• Historv refers to 'any written account of the past' (Jary and Jary, 1991). 
• Case study research can be defined as: 
'The study of a single instance of a phenomenon, either for its own sake, or as 
exemplar or paradigm case of a general phenomenon, perhaps as a test of a 
general proposition'(Jary and Jary, 1991). 
1 www.cosmoscorp.com. 
2 See page 115. 
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Both methods are part of qualitative research, which 'relies on in-depth studies of small groups of 
people to guide and support the construction of hypotheses,l. The study will mostly be using a 
case study strategy, which in turn explores the history of events, in particular to set the back-
ground to each case .. 
The review of the literature which is also part of this study can be considered as 'archival analy-
sis' according to Table D.1. It was used to describe the background to this study and define its 
conceptual framework. Answering the research questions and testing its hypotheses will mostly 
rely on case study research. 
Case study research is particularly adapted to cover 'contextual: situations, i.e. situations in which 
conditions external to the observed system have a major influence. It is certainly the case for this 
research in which the strategies adopted for emergencies and the interaction between aid agen-
cies and local institutions depend on factors such as the nature of the armed conflict, the gov-
ernment, the agency, the remaining humanitarian actors etc (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
Case study research can be based on a single-case or on multiple-case. In the case of this study 
the number of cases should be at least two: one for emergency response and one for rehabilita-
tion .. Actually, a much larger number of cases were selected, firstly because multiple-case strat-
egy gives more strength to the analysis and secondly because a sufficiently large number of 
cases were needed to illustrate certain characteristics of emergency operations and rehabilitation. 
More details on these characteristics are provided in section 6 on case selections. 
The following sections describe the framework on which case studies used in this study were de-
signed. Unless stated otherwise, theoretical elements appearing in the rest of this chapter are 
based on: Vin (2003). 
2. Case study design 
A case study has five components: 
1. A research question; 
2. Its hypotheses, if any; 
3. Its units of analysis; 
4. The logic linking the data to the hypotheses; 
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings. 
This section details what these components are in the case of this study, starting with the third 
component since the research question and hypothesis were defined in the previous chapte~. 
1 'Qualitative research consultants association': http://www.qrca.org 
2 See page 115. 
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2.1 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis defines the nature of the 'cases'. In this study they are specific emergency 
operations or rehabilitation projects in a determined urban area. For convenience, each will be 
desigl"\ated from here as an 'intervention'. 
Each 'intervention' is characterized by: 
• Its aims and objectives, sometimes called 'General and Specific Objectives'; 
• A 'target group', benefiting from the 'intervention. This is usually identified by a geo-
graphical area; 
• A budget; 
• A timeframe; and, 
• Occasionally a defined 'Exit Strategy'. 
Several cases may target the same or similar groups - for instance different neighbourhoods in 
the same city or town. 
2.2 Linking the data to the hypothesis 
For each 'intervention', the way water sector institutions and aid agencies interact is analysed. 
Conclusions are then drawn on how the nature and level of partnership between water sector in-
stitutions and aid agencies relates to its overall performance • 
. It is therefore necessary, to systematically review whether such a partnership exists. If, it does, 
how it was implemented, and how its nature influenced the immediate and/or long- term outcome 
ofthe 'intervention' . 
• Evaluating levels of partnership 
Partnership can be defined as: 'a cooperative relationship between people or groups who agree 
to share responsibility for achieving some specific goal,1. In Chapter C, it was stated that work-
ing .in partnership with local institutions in cities affected with armed conflicts implies supporting 
them. For this reason, a good way of evaluating levels of partnership between local water sector 
institutions and aid agencies may be looking at whether the latter engage in institutional devel-
opment. As seen earlieiZ, Esman (1972) defines categories for the type of assistance aid agen-
cies can carry out when doing so. Among them, the most relevant to those involved in urban 
water and sanitation are: 
• To participate in the leadership function; 
• To provide resources ; 
1 www.wordnet.princeton. edu 
2 See page 99. 
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• To transfer and adapt technology. 
Table 0.2 is a summary of the main relevant indicators. 
Table 0·2: Indicators of level of partnership 
• Evaluating the performance of 'interventions' 
The parameters to be considered are those earlier defined and detailed2 arid referred to when 
the research question was defined3• They include: efficiency, effectiveness, appropriateness, 
sustainability, and coverage. The first two of these apply prinCipally to emergencies, the final 
three to rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
1 Extra payment to utility personnel in order to ensure that work in done. In practice, with utilities unable to pay 
their personnel, these 'incentives' are often their only Income. 
2 See 
Box B·6 page 94. 
3 See page 115. 
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EMERGENCIES: LOOKING AT EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Determining efficiency and effectiveness consists of an input/output analysis: 
• When estimating the efficiency of the intervention, its benefits for each target group over 
the considered period are compared with the resources mobilised, taking into account the 
timeframe i.e. speed of the operation. These resources may be: equipment, consum-
abies, manpower, expertise, and cash. 
•. Determining the effectiveness of the intervention requires comparing what was set as an 
objective with what was actually achieved. 
However, whilst this is true in theory, it should be noted that, in practice, emergency opera-
tions rarely start with a detailed statement of objectives, which often make such evaluations 
difficult. 
REHABILITATION/RECONSTRUCTION: LOOKING AT APPROPRIATENESS, 
SUSTAINABILITY AND COVERAGE 
• Considering the appropriateness of an 'intervention' requires looking at whether it was 
the best solution to achieve the required impact on the target population. Appropriate-
ness depends on the environment in which the 'intervention' takes place; the most impor-
tant element, in this respect, being the target population or institution and its level of ac-
ceptance ofthe assistance provided. 
• Evaluating sustainability entails defining what elements are threats to the continuity of 
benefits from the considered 'intervention' and whether the recipient population / institu-
tion is able to overcome these threats. 
• Coverage estimates the proportion of the target population that benefits from the 'inter-
vention'. At the level of a city or town, it may also be seen as the proportion of its entire 
population that is covered .. This parameter is particularly important when looking at 
whether an 'intervention' benefits low-income communities. 
2.3 Criteria for interpreting the findings 
levels of collaboration between water sector institutions and aid agencies depend on elements 
linked to local conditions and local circumstances. They also depend on external conditions 
and/or pressures affecting the agency intervening . 
• local conditions and circumstances 
The political situation, in which the intervention was carried out, has a tremendous impact on 
how findings can be interpreted. This refers to circumstances such as the stability or, conver-
saly, the volatility of the situation. Socio-economic conditions - in particular the strength of the 
private sector and security conditions, may also be influential. 
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• External conditions 
This aspect refers mostly to the type of aid agency, its experience, competence, financial 
means, mission statement/mandate etc. and the donors that support its intervention. 
3. Quality of the research method 
The criteria commonly used to evaluate the quality of research methods are: 
• Construct validity, that applies to the data collection; 
• Internal validity, that applies to the analysis; 
• External validity, that applies to the research design; and 
• Reliability, that applies to the data collection. 
One of the major concerns in terms of validity when using the case study method, or in fact any 
qualitative research method, is the possible subjective bias towards verification introduced in the 
study. This concern appears in all four aspects of validity listed below. Bias is hard to avoid and 
Flyvbjerg (2006:235) pOints out that it is not specific to the case study method, adding that: 
'The advantage of the case study is that it can ·close in" on real-life situations 
and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice '. 
The rest of this section indicates how this bias problem can be overcome, looking at each aspect 
of validity. 
3.1 Construct validity 
This criterion is particularly difficult to overcome because it is linked to the objectivity of the inves-
tigator when interpreting findings. The relation between data and hypothesis is based on evalua-
tion criteria commonly used and tested in the evaluation of aid operations. They are usually ap-
plied by 'external evaluators' in order to achieve objective data collection. Yet, avoiding bias 
completely is difficult when looking at the impact of intervention on human lives because evalua-
tors cannot avoid having their own conceptions and values. 
Achieving construct validity requires that multiple sources of evidence are examined. When look-
ing at the outcome of 'intervention' this may sometimes be difficult, in particular when it refers to 
events from the past - in which case, only reports giving one particular point of view may be 
available. Whenever pOSSible, data should be verified by consulting different sources as, for in-
stance: the aid agency, the utility, and beneficiaries of the intervention. Quantitative data should 
be used when they exist and are accessible .. 
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3.2 Internal validity 
This aspect is concerned with whether the establishment of a cause/effect link between· partner-
ship and performance is valid. A possible way of verifying this form of validity is to 'pattern-rnatch', 
an aspect that is developed in the 'Analysis' section 1. 
3.3 External validity 
External validity refers to the possibility of generalising the findings of one case study to a variety 
of others cases. This is also related to the 'pattern-matching' technique that will be developed in 
the 'Analysis' section, hereafter. 
3.4 Reliability 
This criterion evaluates whether results from the study could be produced in the same way with 
similar conclusions by another investigator. It is again linked to bias introduced in the research. 
As for construct validity, it affects data collection. The same reservations in the case of this study 
can be made regarding objectivity. Reliability is however more concerned with the way data are 
collected. Reliable data collection is systematic and a constant pattern should be followed. The 
same applies to how data are analysed. 
4. Analysis 
The analysis follows a 'pattern matching' technique. Figure 0-1 illustrates the various interactions 
between stakeholders involved in water and sanitation assistance. The study isolates specific in-
terventions and, for each one, evaluates two of their facets: 
1. Levels of partnership, that may range from no relationship to close relationship and relate 
to the criteria listed in Table 0.2. 
2. Levels of performance, looking more speCifically at efficiency and effectiveness in emer-
gency operations and, in addition, at appropriateness, sustainability and coverage in the 
case of rehabilitation / reconstruction projects .. 
Levels of partnership and performance represent the patterns. Examining to which extent part-
nership contributes to improving the performance of a given intervention will allow the research 
question to be answered and verify the validity of the hypothesis. 
For that, a diagnosis of the level of success of each intervention is made, based on its environ-
ment, as shown in Figure 0-1. Comparing the various diagnoses in a variety of contexts gives the 
basis for the conclusions of this study. 
1 See section 4 hereafter. 
123 
D. Methodology: Case Study Research 
Figure 0-1: Relationship between stakeholders 
S. Data collection 
Data have been collected from documents, interviews, and direct observation on the field. 
5.1 Documents: 
The majority of the data was taken from aid agencies and donors' reports, and from local institu-
tions. Most of them are unpubliShed. They define the background to the project and provide 
some ofthe quantitative data. 
5.2 Interviews 
People interviewed were expatriate and national staff from aid agencies, staff from water sector 
institutions and members of the recipient population. 
5.3 Direct observation 
Field observation allows a direct account of the actual output of the project, thereby drawing a 
more concrete and accurate picture of the project performance. In most cases, it was not possible 
to directly collect quantitative information due to a lack of time and resources. 
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6. Cases selection 
A number of cities affected by armed conflicts were initially short-listed from amongst the over 
150 cases identified in the period 1975 - 2004 (Appendix 1). These cases were obtained using 
CE-DAT Database' managed by 'Universite catholique de Louvain' in Belgium and the United 
Nations-maintained website Reliefweb2• The selection was done on post-1990 events because it 
would have been more difficult to obtain documents and testimonies on earlier events. They rep-
resent various geographical areas since cultural and political backgrounds are particularly impor-
tant. A wide range of agencies were also represented, both in terms of type - NGOs, UN, Gov-
emments, Red Cross etc. - and donors involved. Finally the nature of th'e armed conflict was 
also taken into account with both high and low intensity3 armed conflicts being represented. This 
set of criteria permitted the selection of 59 cities in 22 countries. They are listed in Appendix 2. 
This list includes both emergency operations and rehabilitation projects. The NGOs and intema-
tional organisations appearing most frequently were: 
• The ICRC - cited 34 times; 
• Oxfam - cited seven times; 
• ACF - cited five times; 
• GTZ - cited five times; 
• The United State NGO: Intemational Rescue Committee (IRC) - cited four times; 
• The French NGO: Acted - cited twice; 
• Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) - cited twice; 
• The French NGO: 'Solidarites' - cited twice; 
• UNDP - cited twice. 
The donors most frequently cited as funding rehabilitation projects, usually managed through 
commercial consulting firms were: 
• The World Bank - cited seven times; 
• KfW - cited five times; 
• The Asian Development Bank - cited twice; 
• The European Union - cited twice. 
The European Union, through ECHO and the United States govemment, through OFDA4 support 
the largest number of emergency operations. 
1 Armed conflict database: www.cred.be/cedat/ 
2 www.Reliefweb.lnt 
3 Seepage 8. 
4 The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance. 
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This list does not pretend to provideg an accurate picture of the agencies involved in emergency 
response and rehabilitation operations because it relies solely on information published on the 
intemet. However, it reveals some likely major actors such as the ICRC, Oxfam, ACF, GTZ and 
the World Bank. 
The author visited the headquarters of some of these organisations and collected a number of 
reports that influenced the final choice of case studies. The level of accessibility of the places, 
and in particular security, was another criterion. In the end, seven urban areas in six countries 
across Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Europe were selected. They are listed in Table D.3. 
Some of the cities and towns on this list were already known by the author1. This also influenced 
the final choice. 
Most of the cases selected are 'paradigmatic' (Flyvbjerg, 2006) meaning that they illustrate typical 
situations such as: 'NGOs interventions', 'large-scale rehabilitation projects', 'important population 
movements', 'Iow-capacity utilities' etc. In addition, certain of them are critical cases (Flyvbjerg, 
2006). This applies to security I violence constraints in Grozny and Port-au-Prince and to extreme 
water scarcity in Jaffna. 
The selection aims at providing a sufficiently wide range of these situations in different environ-
ments in terms of geographical area and size of the urban centres. Selecting a relatively large 
number of cases also allows parallels to be established between 'interventions' in different areas 
that may allow conclusions to be drawn, thus reinforcing the 'validity' of the study. In each city or 
town selected, a number of "interventions",' emergency response or rehabilitation, were selected 
according to their relevance; value, and amount of data available to document the case. 
Field visits were carried out to Kabul in April I May 2005, to Jaffna in July 2005 and to Monrovia in 
December 2005. Data collected by Silvia AJegre in Monrovia in July 2006 were also used. The 
rest of the case studies were primarily desk-studies, based on documents and interviews. 
Three documents were produced following field visits: 
1. An evaluation report for ECHO on ACF activities in Kabul2 (Pinera, 2005a); 
2. An assessment report for ACF on water and sanitation conditions in Monrovia (Pinera, 
2005b); and 
3. An MSc. thesis by Silvia AJegre on community-based projects in Monrovia (Alegre, 
. 2006). 
All three were used as sources for the review of case studies. 
1 Grozny, Kabul and Jaffna. . 
2 A paper for 2005 WEDC conference was also produced on the issue (Pinera and Rudge, 2006). 
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Table 0-3: Case studies 
1 Calculations by World Gazettee": www. www.world-gazetteer.com. except for B(mi: L'Expansion, Jaffna: JMC 
and Port-de-Paix: ACF. 
2 Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation. It is actually the reason of the conflict. Given the wide difference 
between the Chechnya and the rest the Federation, it will be considered as a separate entity in this study. 
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7. Problems and limitations 
. The level of information available varies according to the cases. Obviously, those most docu-
mented concem cities where a field visit was carried out. As a consequence, not all the cases 
. . . 
have the same value. 
The amount of information on operations that took place relatively long ago is sometimes scarce. 
The quality of the information collected is another concern. Emergencies are usually poorly 
documented; information is often inaccurate and fragmented. Furthermore, a large part of the 
data collected is based on interviews and cannot always be considered as objective. Information 
from various sources, when available, was sought in order to reduce possible shortfalls but, in the 
end, the whole study involves judgements based on evidences. 
Finally, and most importantly, some of the 'interventions' studied were ongoing at the t!me of the 
study. Their final outcome could therefore not be observed. In such cases, evaluating the .sus-
tainability in particular is mostly based on what the author estimates is gOing to happen according 
to the evidences available at the time of the study. This somewhat limits the validity of the evalua-
tion but it is hard to find a way around this problem. Such limitations are all the more relevant 
when political situations are in constant flux and local actors are changing. For instance, following 
recent major elections, as has been the case in all six countries 1 studied. 
, 1012004: presidential elections in Afghanistan; 0912005: regional and pariiamentary elections in Afghanistan; 
1112005: presidential elections in Sri Lanka; 1112005: pariiamentary elections in Chechnya; 1212005: presidential 
elections in Uberia; 0212006: presidential elections in Haiti; 08/2006: presidential elections in the DRC. 
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E. Review of the Case Studies 
The locations ofthe various cities on which this study is based appear in Map E-1. 
Map E-1: Case studies' locations 
Background map: Perry-Castafieda Map Col/ection, University of Austin, Texas 
www.lib.utexas.edulmaps/ 
They represent countries covering four continents, and with very diverse characteristics: 
• The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Haiti. Liberia, and Sri Lanka are tropical coun-
tries, whereas Afghanistan, and Chechnya have 'mountain climates' - Kabul lies at 1850 
m - with cold winters; 
• Haiti is located in the Caribbean sea, Liberia, and the DRC are African countries, Af-
ghanistan and Sri Lanka are South-Asian countries, Chechnya is located at the oriental 
end of Europe: the North Caucasus; 
• In 2005, and according to the World Bank classification', Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia, and 
the DRC were in the 'Iow-income' group of countries. Among them, Liberia and the DRC 
were considered 'severely in debt'. Sri Lanka was classified in the 'lower middle-income' 
group and the Russian Federation in the 'upper middle-income'. However, it should be 
kept in mind that the situation in the north and east of Sri Lanka, which are the regions 
most affected by war, is much worse than the rest of the country. The same applies to 
Chechnya in relation to the Russian Federation. Details on GNP and standards of living 
-- in all these countries but the Russian Federation2 appear in Table E.1. -
1 See page 4. -
2 The Russian Federation was not considered in the review of GNP and standard of living because no specific 
data on Chechnya were available. 
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Table E-1 General statistics on the six case study countries 
~llltC~~:~;rgj ~]diil~~~K~r~I~ ~Mjijnil~I9~31~~1 ij'jY!l,id,i:,ii0iii:;;i Sources: The World Bank and WHO 
The population ofChechnya is1.1million people, according to 2002 census5• 
In terms of levels of resolution of the armed conflicts in these countries, Afghanistan and the ORC 
remain unstable; the situation in Sri Lanka, which had improved until mid 2005, has since dra-
matically deteriorated, and combats have restarted in 2006; Haiti and Chechnya seem more sta-
ble but suffer from high levels of gang violence; Liberia appears, at this stage, to be the only one 
of the six countries on a path towards stabilization .. 
The cities studied are also diverse: 
• Kabul, Monrovia, and Port-au-Prince are large cities, approaching or largely exceeding 
one million inhabitants. Kabul contains more than half of Afghanistan's urban population. 
This proportion is one third in the case of Monrovia, and almost two thirds for Port-au-
Prince. The remaining cities are smaller: Jaffna, and Port-de-Paix do not exceed 100,000 
inhabitants, whereas Beni and Grozny are around 200,000; 
• Kabul, Jaffna, Grozny, Monrovia, and Port-au-Prince were directly affected by combat, 
the first three of them suffering considerable infrastructure damage. The effect of armed 
conflicts on Beni and Port-de-Paix was real but indirect; 
• All seven cities experienced sudden changes in their population's size due to large-scale 
migration. In some cases, they were deserted, or, in others, received massive influxes of 
refugees or retumees. Beni, Kabul, Jaffna, and Monrovia were the most 'severe' cases; 
1 Male and female average. .' 
. 2 2002 estimate by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). 
3 Data refer to a year or period other than that specified, differ from the standard definition or refer to only part of a 
country. 
, Under 0.5 is considered as low. See definition of Human Development Index in the 2005 Human Development 
Report (UNDP, 2006). 
• www.world-gazetteer.com. 
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• Kabul, Jaffna, Port-au-Prince, and Port-de-Paix suffer from water scarcity. The problem is 
particularly acute in Jaffna because of intrusions of saline water from the sea - among 
other quality problems. 
•. The crises in these seven cities occurred between 1986 and 2003. Some of them were 
simultaneous. 
It should be noted that wars in all of the six countries were intemal, or 'intemationalized,1 in the 
case of the DRe. In all cases but Haiti, the conflict had strong ethnic motivations. 
Four different types of agencies have been involved in the considered 'interventions': 
1. International NGOs, usually working in emergencies and/or in development projects: . 
~IA~W~, 
"I"1VU'D'W'UlrrrrP 
II··'~· , • 
'Action contre la Faim' (ACF) operates exclusively in emergency and post-
emergency situations. The organisation has four affiliates2• The affiliate present 
in Kabul and Port-de-Paix case studies was ACF-France; 
The United States NGO Care operates sometimes in emergency situations but 
more commonly in developmenf; 
'Groupe de Recherche et d'Echange Technologique' (GRET) is a French NGO 
working exclusively in development, or ·in the case of Haiti, in post-emergency 
programmes4; 
'Medecins Sans Frontieres' (MSF) has 18 affiliates. It is a medical organisation, 
operating mostly in emergencies5• It intervenes in the water and sanitation 
sector in camps and medical facilities and exceptionally for the general popula-
tion. The affiliate present in Monrovia and· Groznycase studies was MSF-
Belgium; 
Merlin is a British medical organisation, occasionally involved in emergency 
water and sanitation6; 
The British NGO Oxfam operates both in emergencies / rehabilitation and in 
development, through two separate departments. The 'Humanitarian Depart- . 
men!' deals with emergencies andrehabilitation7; 
1 Seepage 8. . 
2 France, United-States, Spain and United Kingdom. www.actioncontre/afaim.org. 
3 www.care.oll!. See Box A-3 page 10. 
4 www.gret.org. 
5 When no other organisation Is present to do so. www.msf.oll!. See Box A-3 page 10 
• www.merlin.org.uk. 
7 www.oxfam.org.uk. See Box A-3 page 10. 
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'Solidarites' is a French organisation created in 1981. It operates exclusively in 
emergency and post-emergency situations 1. 
2. Intemational organisations2: 
gtz 
unicef@ 
GTZ is the German development agency. It operates mostly on development 
projects, and sometimes in emergencies3; 
The Intemational Committee of the Red Cross operates exclusively in war-
related emergency and postcemergency situations; 
UNICEF operates both in emergency operations and development. 
3. A French professional organisation: 'Aquassistance' 
Aquassistance has the status of a non-profit organisation. It is run by profes-
sionals working or having worked for the French water company 'Suez'. 'Aq-
uassistance' operates in emergencies I rehabilitation as well as on development 
projects, usually in partnership with French NGOs4• 
4. Intemational Financial Institutions (IFls), govemments, or multilateral govemmental or-
ganisations, usually funding commercial consulting firms. They work in rehabilitation I re-
construction projects: 
1 www.solidarites.org. 
2 Seepage 9. 
The German firms RRI-Belle~ and Kocks6, working in partnership on 
Kabul water supply rehabilitation I reconstruction project, funded by the 
German Development Bank KfW and the World Bank; 
The consulting firm Geoscience, based in Florence, Italy, which was 
funded by EDF for the rehabilitation of Monrovia water supply between 
1996 and 2003; 
The German firm Hydroplan funded by the EU for the rehabilitation of 
Monrovia water supply from 2004; 
The World Bank, from 2004, partnered with the EU on the rehabilitation 
of Monrovia water supply. 
3 www.gtz.delen. 
4 'Aquassistance'is in fact an NGO aiming at providing specific professional expertise. 
http://aquassistance.blogspirit.com. 
• 'Rhein-Ruhr Ingenieur' Beller www.bellerconsult.de 
• www.kocks-ing.de 
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A few other organisations are cited, but their action was not studied in detail. 
The types of operations in which these agencies were involved are summarized in Table E.2. 
Table E·2: Agencies involvement in the cases studied 
For each considered urban area, the review starts by presenting its location and population at the 
time of the study i.e. in 2005 and 2006. Then, it details the historical background to the crises for 
which a number of 'interventions' are stUdied. Background information on water and sanitation -
as found in 2005 and 2006 - follows and includes: 
• The level of access to water supply and sanitation in each urban area; 
• The capacity of the water sector institutions - in. particular those involved in each of the 
'interventions'; 
• The impact of the armed conflict on the infrastructure, population and water sector institu-
tions. 
Then, an 'analysis of the relationship between stakeholders in emergency situations and rehabili-
tation', as summarized in Figure D-1, page 123 is carried out for each 'intervention'. Distinctions 
are made between emergency reponse and rehabilitation. The different factors taken into consid-
eration are: 
• The level of partnership between the aid agency and the -water sector institution, in par--
ticular leadership recognition and resource sharing; 
• The relationship between the aid agency and the target population for each of the 'inter-
ventions'; 
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• The level of perfonnance of each of the 'interventions', in particular in tenns of effi-
ciency/effectiveness during emergency operations, and in tenns of sustainability, appro-
priateness and coverage in rehabilitation projects. 
From one 'intervention' to another, the quantity of details is not unifonn. For emergency opera-
tions, the main sources are reports or interviews with people having taken part in the operation. 
Reporting in this type of operation is almost always limited and tends to cover the sequence of 
events rather than the strategy adopted. Therefore, emergency cases are less detailed than re-
habilitation cases, for which more infonnation is available, and which, in some cases, were ongo-
ing at the time of the study. Kabul and Monrovia, which are the main 'paradigmatic' cases of the 
study" are reviewed more in depth. For each "intervention', the main sources of evidence are 
listed. 
1. Kabul, Afghanistan 
Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, is situated in the eastem part of the country. It lies in a valley 
along the Kabul River and south of the Hindu Kush, a chain of mountains belonging to the Hima-
, 
layas (Map E-2). The Hindu Kush occupies most of the central part of the country and creates a 
natural border with Pakistan. The Khyber Pass, about 200 kilometres east of Kabul is the main 
road of access between the two countries. 
Kabul is the largest city of Afghanistan. According to last official population census, in 1986, its 
population was approximately 1.3 million2• It reached 1.78 million in 2000, according to a semI-
official census sponsored by the United Nations3• In 2004, it was estimated by the government at 
2.43 million4. 
1 See page 116. 
2 Central Statistic Office: http://www.cso.gov.af/Census/CensuS/103PopulaUon.pdf. 
3 www.aims.org.af/maps/nationaVpopulation/kabuf..population_data_1999.xls. 
4 Central Statistic Office: http://www.cso.qov.af:Estimatedpopulation 2004. 
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Map E-2: Afghanistan 
Source: ICRC (adapted) www.icrc.org 
The country is multi-ethnic. Its main ethnic groups live in territories extending outside the limits of 
the borders of Afghanistan: 
• The largest one, the Pashtun, or Pathan, are present in the Pakistani North·West Frontier 
province and beyond. In Afghanistan, the majority of them live in the southem and south· 
eastem regions - Jalalabad and Kandahar are predominantly Pashtun cities. Many 
Pashtun people are nomadic between Afghanistan and Pakistan. They speak Pashto; 
• The second largest ethnic group, the Tajiks, also live in Tajikistan and form the majority in 
Afghanistan westem and north eastem regions - in particular in Herat and the Panshir 
valley. They tend to be in the majority in urban areas, including Kabul. They speak Dari, a 
Persian dialect very close to Farsi spoken in Iran. It is the most commonly spoken lan· 
guage in Afghanistan; 
• The Uzbeks represent a smaller group present in Uzbekistan and in the north of Afghani· 
stan - Mazar-e·Shariff. They speak a Turkish dialect; 
• . Finally the Hazaras live in the Centialregion= Hazarajat;i::apital: Bamiyan::':"'-andin-
towns, where they often work as petty tradesmen. They speak Dari. They tend to be de-
spised by the rest of the population. 
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Other smaller ethnic groups live in certain areas - e.g. Turkmen in the north-west, Nuristani in 
the eastem mountains. All afghan are Sunni Muslim with the exception of Hazaras, who belong to 
Shi'ite Islam (8rigot and Roy, 1988). 
1.1 Historical background 
Civil unrest and war in Afghanistan started in the early 1970s. Kabul came under heavy fighting 
between 1992 and 1996 when different 'Mujaheddin,1 factions struggled for power before being· 
disbanded by the Taliban. In November 2001, the city was bombed during the war between the 
United States and the Taliban regime. Recent historical events in Kabul are summarized in Figure 
E-1 and detailed in Appendix 3. 
Saur [ -
Revolution I Sovi et withdrawal I 
04n8 02189 
I Daoud Soviet Invasion Coup 27/12179 07173 
Reign of Daoud Tarakil Karmal Presidency Najibulleh 
King Zaher Presidency Amin Presidency 
Shah Regime 
1933 1973 1978 1980 1987 
Figure E-1: Timeline Afghanistan and fighting in Kabul 
Intensity of armed conflict (Uppsala University, 2006): 
• 1978-2001: war; 
• 2003-2004: minor; 
• 2005: war. 
1.2 Water and sanitation systems 
• Water Supply 
The main water sources in Kabul are: 
~ ,,/1 ~~ Fallot g:. the Tallban 
~ Fighting ~ '" 11~1 ~ In Kabul Tallban ~~ L 04192· victory . 
1998 """'.. V \I VV"I 
Rabbanl Teliban Regime ATA 
Presidency 
1992 1996 2002 
• Private wells. In 2002, estimations put their number between 100,000 and 120,000 
(Nembrini et aI., 2002:1). Most of them are hand-dug wells, and a few are boreholes 
equipped with hand-pumps. They are primarily used for washing and bathing - espe-
cially those which are open; 
1 'Fighters of the holy war'. 
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• Public wells, of which about 80 per cent are boreholes. In 2002, the number of hand-
pumps installed by aid agencies was estimated at 2,600 (Nembrini et aI., 2002:2). Public 
wells are usually used for drinking and cooking. For many households, they represent 
the only available water source; 
• In 1999, piped-water was supplied through 11 interconnected water networks and 20 in-
dependent water schemes 1, six of them supplying apartment-blocks2 (Pinera, 1999). In 
1999, there were about 43,000 private connections and 1,600 public tap-stands. In 2005, 
a large proportion of tap-stands were out of order and water was only distributed a few 
hours per day or per week due to the lack of maintenance and limited resources to run 
the pumps. The three main well-fields supplying Kabul are logar well-field, located in the 
south-east; Allaudin well-field, located in the south; and Afshar well-field, located in the 
south-west (Map E-3). In 2005, logarwas the largest well-field, with 10 bore holes. In ad-
dition, an underground eanal- called in Persian: 'Karez' - brings water by gravity from 
Qargha lake, situated about 12 km west ofthe city; 
• Water vendors operate in certain neighbourhoods. Their customers usually live in areas 
were groundwater is difficult to access - e.g. on hills, or where quality is poor, salty, or 
brackish. They may also complement network supply when it is insufficient, which is often 
the case. Vendors usually own boreholes from which they sell water either on the spot or 
by distributing it with tankers. 
Apart from the water from Qargha lake, groundwater is the only water source for domestic use 
in Kabui. In most parts of the city it is easily aocessible, although it is salty in certain areas (Map 
E-3). 
The quality of the water delivered by the network is usually aoceptable. Its chemical quality is 
good and it is disinfected with chlorine. The quality of the water available from public wells var-
ies. Borehole water may be of an aoceptable quality provided they are sufficiently deep and well 
designed. Public open wells provide a water of poor quality. Water quality in the case of private 
wells also varies, depending on the type. Open private wells tend to be kept cleaner than public 
ones. 
The development of the water distribution network was made according to a master-plan estab-
lished in 1974, with the assistance of a Canadian consultancy firm. The portion of the city sup-
plied by the central water distribution network, according to this master-plan, is shown in Map 
E-3. 
1 Some of them are located in peri-urban areas. The situation had not changed in 2005; although many inde-
~endent water schemes were not functioning. 
These figures may have changed slightly given the constant works currently carried out on the water distribution 
network. 
137· 
E. Review of the Case Studies 
• Sanitation 
The main excreta disposal systems in Kabul are: 
• Vault latrines, which represent, by far, the most common systems. In 1999, the ICRC es-
timated their number at 180,000 (Pinera, 1999). Night-soil collectors traditionally empty 
them from the street and re-use night-soil as fertilizer, usually after a composting proc-
ess. Many of these latrines have been improved by the ICRC and other organisations 1 
(Figure E-2); 
Urine 
Emptying 
Soak 
Figure E-2: ICRC improved latrine 
_'Vent pipe with fly 
mesh on top 
design 
size and design 
to suit householder 
~·~'jo,orofwooden poles 
under wooden planks under 
mud with cement skim 
walls of masonry 
with cement mortar 
Source: Reed and Khan, 2003: v 
• Collective and individual septic tanks. In 1999, collective ones served nine apartment-
blocks totalling 3,200 households, whereas an estimated 15,500 households had individ-
ual septic tanks (Pinera, 1999); 
~-. -A sewerage network. The only large-scale sewerage scheme serves Microrayon apart-
ment-blocks2 - built in the 1960s with the support of East-Germany. Wastewater is di-
rected to aalai Wazir wastewater treatment plant, which is currenUy not functioning (Map. 
E-3). 
1 About 100,000 latrines wern improved between 1996 and 2005, half of which by the [eRe (Source: leRe). 
2 Smaller schemes equip university compounds. 
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Map E-3: Kabul main water and sanitation systems and limits of 'planned areas' 
Background map produced by AIMS http://www.aims.ora.aflmaps/urbanlkabul.pdf 
1.3 Water sector institutions 
The Central Authority for Water Supply and Sewerage (CAWSS) is the public utility in charge of 
water services in urban areas of Afghanistan2• It covers Kabul and 12 other cities and towns. 
CAWSS is a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the Ministry of Urban Development 
and Housing (MUDH). The utility is primarily in charge of the operation and maintenance of water 
distribution networks3, whilst different departments of the MUDH are responsible for policy mak-
ing and regulation (MUDH, 2005b). 
In 2005, CAWSS employed about 1,200 people, one third of whom were based in Kabul. In 2003, 
_ CAWSS institutional capability, according to the criteria listed in Table 8-22 page 100, was con-
sidered as low (Fischaess, 2003). Fi';1mcial data from Kabul water supply in 2002 indicate that 
, Afghanistan Information Management Service. . 
2 In Afghanistan, 'urban areas are defined as those with a population generally in excess of five thousand and 
falling within the jurisdiction of an authority established and governed by the Law of Municipalities' (MUDH, 
2005a:4). 
3 And sewerage In Kabul. 
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only 13 per cent of the operational costs were covered by revenues, the rest being subsidized by 
the government (Fischaess, 2003). 
Onsite sanitation - latrines and septic tanks - is in principle the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Health and Kabul Municipality. In practice, these administrations do not significantly intervene in 
this field. 
r 
Solid waste collection in Kabul is carried out by Kabul Municipality. In 2003, it barely managed to 
collect 25 per cent of the total volume of waste produced (Turbot et al., 2003:11). 
1.4 Effects of the armed conflict 
• Buildings 
Kabul suffered considerable damage during the struggle for power between Mujaheddin fac-
tions between 1989 and 19961• As a result, more than 15,000 houses were destroyed, (Pinera, 
1999). The majority of them were in the south and the west of the city - districts 3, 5, 6 and 8 
(Map E-3) . 
• Water supply 
When fighting erupted around Kabul in 1989, Afshar and Logar well-fields were almost immedi-
ately looted and stopped operating. In 1992, power stations were also looted and, given the ab-
sence of power supply, all other boreholes stopped functioning. The only source of piped water 
was Qargha Karez because it is gravity-fed. Pre-war production of 86,000 m3/day fell to a mere 
,--- 5,000 m3/day (Table E.3 and Figure E.3). Assistance from aid agencies allowed water produc-
tion to be restored in part. It remained between 15,000 and 18,OO() 1T13/day~~till~~ge-sca-lere:-""­
habilitation projects started, in 2002. There was no major investment in the water distribution 
network throughout this period. In the course of the US-led campaign, at the end of 2001, sev-
eral transmission and distribution waterlines were destroyed by bombs. It caused Afshar well-
field to stop operating and disrupted water supply for a densely populated area of the north of 
the city. Water supply was restored during the following weeks (Nembrini et aI., 2002:13). 
1 See page 271. 
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Figure E-3: Water production for Kabul in m3/day 
. Based on field-data co/lecilon 
• Water utility 
CAWSS, which used to employ 34 qualified engineers, was down to only two in 2005 ~ includ- . 
ing its president. Most of its stock, tools and vehicles were looted first in 1992 and again in 
2002_ Under the Taliban, the utility was run by a religious scholar and its activity was very lim-
ited . 
• Population 
Kabul has experienced several sudden changes in the number of its inhabitants during the last 
two decades. From 1.3 million in 1986, its population went down to 800,000 in 1992, when fierce 
fighting was raging. When peace retumed to the city with the Taliban in 1996, it was estimated at 
about one million people. People from areas of the country affected by war, such as the Panshir 
Valley and the Bamyian area at the centre of the country (Map E-2), moved to Kabul. The popula-
tion increased to reach 1.78 million in 1999. In 2002, there was a massive influx of retumees from 
Pakistan and Iran, following the fall of the Taliban, and the population increased suddenly to 
reach an estimated 2.47 million in 2003. 
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Figure E-4: Kabul population 
Sources previously mentioned and estimations collected in the press -1992 and 1996 
In addition to the consequences of migration, population figures were affected by movements 
within the city: People living in areas most affected by combats, i.e. the South and the West 
moved to the North, which was preserved. As a result, the northem part of Kabul extended con-
siderablyand became more densely populated - districts 11 and 15 in particular (Jansen et aI., 
2001) .. 
The city expanded, and its hills became covered with new houses. In the 1999 population sur-
vey', 50 per cent of houses were 'not registered'. The same proportion was found in 2002, ac-
cording to MUDH (cited in Grinnell and Trec, 2004:23). An estimated 60 per cent of Kabul popula-
. tion lives in 'unplanned area' (Grinnell and Trec, 2004:3), with poor urban services, and some-
times a very dense population. According to a 2003 survey, 26 per cent of Kabul households 
have to spend over 30 minutes per trip to fetch water. The same survey found that 51 per cent of 
people living in District 1, which is among the most densely populated, staid in a single room with 
an average size of 15.5 m2 (Grinnell and Trec, 2004:3-4). 
1.5 Emergency response 
Selection of cases 
# Aid Agency "Intervention" Period· 
1 Care Rehabilitation of pumping stations at Six months 
Afshar well-field in 1995 
2006 status 
Handed over to 
'Solidarites' 
2 'Solidarites' Operation, repair and maintenance 
of pumping stations - including Af-
shar - and independent networks 
in Kabul and its periphery. 
1995-1998 . Interrupted in 
1998 
Water sector institution: CAWSS. 
1 www.aims.org.aflmaps/nationallpopulation/kabu/JJopulation_data_1999.xls. 
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In addition to the two selected 'interventions', Oxfam, from 1995, initiated the rehabilitation of 
Logar well-field (Map E 3). All ten boreholes were rehabilitated and equipped with generators and 
their high-lift pumping station was fully overhauled and equipped with a new chlorination system. 
(Cosgrave, 1999). This case was not selected because available data were insufficient. 
• Intervention 1: Care's rehabilitation of Afsharwell-field,1995 
Main sources of evidence: 
- Interview with Dad Mohamad, Care water and sanitation programme manager, in Kabul 
in May2005; 
- Visits to Afshar well-field in 2003. 
Care started working in Kabul in 1994, collecting solid waste and distributing water with tankers 
in areas with salty groundwater (Map E-3). 
The 1995 operation was funded by ECHO. It consisted of repairing I replacing parts of the sub-
mersible pumps, surface equipment and generators in Afshar well-field. Once the works were 
completed, the responsibility for O&M was handed-over to 'Solidarites'. 
OBJECTIVES AND TARGET POPULATION 
Providing piped-water for the population of the north-west part of Kabul, a very densely 
populated area. No data were available on the precise number of beneficiaries given the dif-
ficulties to ascertain quantitative data at the time the operation was carried out. 
COLLABORATION WITH CAWSS 
Care intervened independently from CAWSS because, at the time, the utility was not opera-
tional. 
EFFICIENCY / EFFECTIVENESS 
The operation was implemented over a relatively brief period, allowing Afshar well-field to 
resume operations with immediate benefits for a large population. It concentrated mostly on 
'hardware' . 
• Intervention 2: 'Solidarites" repair and maintenance of pumping stations and in-
dependent networks in Kabul and its periphery, 1995-1998 
Main sources of evidence: 
- reports by 'Solidarites' (Solidarites, 1995; Solidarites, 1998a; Solidarites, 1998b; 
Solidarites, 1998c); 
- Field visits in 1998 and 1999. 
'Solidarites' started its operation in Kabul in 1994. The organisation was mostly funded by 
ECHO. 
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Its main activities were: 
• Drilling or repairing and maintaining more than 1,000 boreholes equipped with hand-
pumps1; 
• Rehabilitating and ensuring the O&M of 27 water-schemes in and around Kabul. They in-
cluded all water-schemes in the city centre, with the exception of Allaudin and Nasaji 
well-fields - supported by Care - and Logar well-field - supported by Oxfam (Map 
E-3); 
• The rehabilitation and O&M of Oalai Wazir wastewater treatment plant, and part of the 
wastewater-scheme serving Microrayon apartment-blocks (Map E-3); 
• The construction and maintenance of 40 septic tanks and 40 wells in schools, and the 
operation of a vacuum-truck servicing them; 
• The rehabilitation of a canal used for the drainage of surface water. 
The operation was abruptly interrupted in July 1998, when the Taliban govemment decided that 
all foreign NGOs had to relocate to one compound on the edge of the city. All NGOs who dis-
agreed with this decision were forced to leave the country. 34 NGOs, including 'Solidarites', left 
Kabul and as a result ECHO suspended its funding for the city. 
OBJECTIVES AND TARGET POPULATION 
The objective of the operation was to limit the incidence of water-bome and excreta-related 
diseases in Kabul and surrounding areas. 
The number of beneficiaries was estimated at 200,000 people for wells, 450,000 people for 
water-schemes and almost 200,000 people for the sewerage network serving Microrayon. 
COLLABORATION BETWEEN CAWSS AND'SOLIDARITES' 
Despite its relatively longtimeframe, the programme was designed as an emergency opera-
tion. It should be mentioned that, even after the Taliban took Kabul, shelling in the periphery 
- and, occasionally, in the centre - of the city was common, and the situation was, by no . 
means, considered as 'stable'. 'Solidarites' found CAWSS' capacity insufficient to allow the 
utility to take any Significant role in the operation. Moreover, there was a clear mistrust from 
the organisation and its donor ECHO given the close ties between CAWSS and the Taliban 
govemment. In such condition the collaboration between CAWSS and 'Solidarites' was 
mostly limited to formal authorizations. 
1 According to a 1999 survey by the ICRC (Pinera, 1999), 'SO/idarites' had 621 hand-pumps in the centre of Ka-
bul, 85 percent of which were located in districts 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 15 (Map E-3). 
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LINKS BETWEEN SOLIDARITES AND THE TARGET POPULATION 
There is no evidence that the recipient population was consulted or participated in this pro-
gramme. 'Solidarites' was ensuring the maintenance of all systems, even for those poten-
tially maintainable by the population, such as hand-pumps. 
No hygiene promotion programme was carried out. This may be partly explained by the fact 
that, under the Taliban, female staff, often employed for this task, were not available 1 and 
female beneficiaries not allowed out of their homes. 
EFFICIENCY / EFFECTIVENESS 
One of the main difficulties reported by 'Solidarites' was the lack of capacity of government 
institutions in general, and of CAWSS in particular. The organisation managed to work with 
Kabul municipality for its rehabilitation of septic tanks in apartment-blocks, but its links with 
CAWSS were purely formal and there was no participation of CAWSS personnel in the op-
eration. 'Solidarites' provided expertise, tools, equipment and consumables, including fuel for 
. generators. This allowed operations to run smoothly and resulted in a large number of pro-
jects and certainly substantial benefits for the recipient population, albeit at a high cost. 
SUSTAINABILITY 
Given the relatively long period of time over which this 'emergency' operation was carried 
out, the link between emergency and development should have been considered. This was 
the case neither at institutional nor at community level, probably because of the kind of the 
authorities in charge. 'Solidarites' considered the issue of sustainability at other levels: 
• First, it tried standardizing the spare-parts used, in partnership with Care. It proved a dif-
ficult task because of the difficulties in procuring from a single source; 
• Second, it supported local hand-pump factOries, despite the relatively poor quality of the 
equipment they produced; . 
• Third, it tried electrifying pumping stations in order to limit the quantity of fuel required for 
the generators. 
No efforts were made to train mechanics from the targeted communities to repair hand-
pumps. When 'Solidarites' withdrew, in July 1998, the volume of water distributed dropped 
dramatically, since only government subsidies to CAWSS were available to pay for fuel and 
out of order hand-pumps were no longer repaired. 
1 Women were not allowed to work outside their homes, except in certain cases such as medical professions. 
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1.6 Rehabilitation 
Following the withdrawal from Kabul of 'Solidarites' and of many other NGOs, in July 1998, sup-
port to the water distribution network drastically diminished. Only two organisations continued op-
erating in this field: 
• Care ensured the O&M of Allaudin and Nasaji well-fields (Map E-3).The organisation con-
tinued operating them until both were transferred to CAWSS in 2006; 
• Oxfam, whose project in Logar well-field was meant to be commissioned in 19991• 
CAWSS did not accept it because it lacked funds for fuel for the generators. Under Ox-
fam supervision, the well-field only produced water for a few hours during the initial tests 
(Cosgrave, 1999). 
The situation changed in 2002, after the fall of the Taliban, when the German Development Bank 
KfW and later the World Bank became involved both in capacity building of CAWSS and the re-
habilitation of the water distribution netWork. The ICRC, which until this date was mostly involved 
in sanitation, also started implementing water projects in Kabul. ACF was another major player, 
but was not involved in the rehabilitation of the central water network. 
One of the major interventions by the ICRC, in collaboration with the British Red Cross, was the 
electrification of Logar well-field. This took place between mid 2002 and November 2003 and 
consisted of the reconstruction of seven kilometres of 15 kV power supply line between 'Power 
Station East' and the well-field (Map E-4). Personnel from CAWSS and from the Ministry of 
Power and Water were trained on the operation of pumps and monitoring of the electrical equip-
ment. The other major project undertaken by the ICRC is reviewed below. 
Selection of cases 
# Aid Agency 
1 . KfW - World 
Bank I 'RRI-
Beller/Kocks' 
2 
3 
ICRCI 
Spanish Red 
Cross 
ACF 
'Interventions' 
Urgent repairs on Kabul network. 
KfW. Phases I and 11 
Rehabilitation and improvement of 
water supply in the north-west of 
Kabul 
Water and sanitation programme 
Water sector institution: CAWSS. 
1See page 141. 
Period . 2006 status 
2002-2008 Ongoing 
2002-2003 . Commissioned 
2001-2005 Completed 
146 
E. Review of the Case Studies 
• Intervention 1: KfW - World Bank I 'RRI·Beller • Kocks' water project in Kabul, 
2002·2008 
Main sources of evidence: 
, . 
- Interview with Najibullah Pattan, president of CAWSS, Kabul, May 2005; 
- Interview and quantitative data provided by Claudius Witting, KfW I 'RRI·BellerlKocks' 
project manager between 2002 and 2005, Kabul, May 2005 (Witting, 2005); 
- Interview with Bemd Fischaess, KfW I 'RRI-Beller/Kocks' project manager from 2005, 
Kabul, May 2005; 
- Interview with, Mohamad Salim Karimi, CAWSS manager in the 1990s, at the time of 
the visit working with 'RRI·BellerlKocks', Kabul, May 2005. 
- Report by Bemd Fischaess for KfW and the Ministry of Urban Development and Hous-
ing (MUDH) (Fischaess, 2003); 
- Reports on water reform by MUDH. 
- Field visits and interviews with Kabul residents. 
The rehabilitation of the water distribution network, supported by KfW and the World Bank, was 
carried out in two phases: 
1. Phase I: including 'Emergency works' - 2002·2003 - and 'Immediate assistance' -
2003-2004 - was funded by KfW with approximately 13 million USD1, and by the Af-
ghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund2 with 3 million USD (KfW, 2003). This consisted of . 
repairs on the water distribution network and assistance to CAWSS in terms of equip-
ment, training, consumables and vehicles. Details on these repairs appear In Table E-4. 
2. Phase 11: 'Extension of Kabul water supply network' was initiated in 2005. It was co-
financed by KfW and the World Bank with a budget of approximately 130 million USD3 
(KfW, 2004) over four years. This consisted of the extension of the water distribution net-
work, including (Fischaess, 2003): 
• 26 new boreholes, requiring 46 km of pipeline, 26 km of electricity supply line and 15 km 
of access road; 
• Three new pumping stations; 
• Five new reservoirs, with capacities ranging from 750 to 5,000 m3; 
·925 km of distribution line. 
In addition, it was planned to carry out a reform of CAWSS and possibly, partially or completely 
privatize it. 
1 9.6 million EUR. 
2 'The ARTF is administrated by the World Bank under the supervision of a management committee comprising 
the Asian Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the UNDP, and the World Bank' (The World Bank, 
2006). 
3 100 million EUR. 
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Table E-4: Repairs and improvements carried out by KfW 1 RRI-Beller Kocks between 05/02 and 
11/04 . 
OBJECTIVES AND TARGET POPULATION 
Phase I of the project was designed to 'swiftly improve the inhabitants' living conditions' 
(KfW, 2003:8). Phase 11 aimed to 'contribute to long-term structural refonns' (KfW, 2003:8). 
All the inhabitants of Kabul were targeted1, but in practice it was unlikely that anyone living 
outside the 'planned areas' (Map E-3) would see significant benefits. 
COLLABORATION BETWEEN RRI-BELLER KOCKS I KFW -WORLD BANK AND 
CAWSS 
In this project, the collaboration with CAWSS was part of a broader approach involving 
MUDH, in charge of defining water policy for urban areas. CAWSS, as an institution, was it-
self a target and the programme worked closely with the utility, which benefited from this in 
aspects such as: 
• The provision of new tools, vehicles and machines - 22 were provided including cars, 
trucks, cranes and excavators etc; 
• The provision of spare parts; 
• The provision of diesel to run the pumps, in particular for Logar well-field before its elec-
trification; 
• The training of staff, mostly on the job, but also abroad for some of the managers. 
However, there was a clear lack of trust between the two entities. RRI-Beller Kocks manag-
ers blamed CAWSS for its inability or unwillingness to recruit new qualified staff. Nepotism 
was commonplace during recruitment and selection for training. Given the lack of qualified 
1 Water demand and all other calculations were carried out considering a population estimated at 1.9 million peo-
ple in 2002, which was likely to be close to the actual figure for the entire city. 
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personnel within CAWSS, a great part of the technical staff employed by the programme 
were extemal and trained to fulfil the immediate requirements of the project (Witting, 2005). 
In tenns of water policy, the project mostly intervened at the MUDH level, where experts 
from the World Bank inspired a refonn of water services. In September 2005, the 'Urban Wa-
ter Supply and Sewerage Sector Policy' and the 'Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Sector 
Institutional Development Plan' were produced (MUDH, 2005b; MUDH, 2005a). They define 
the decentralization of CAWSS I.e. its break-up into regional entities. It was a move CAWSS 
- and in particular its current president - opposed. 
LINKS BETWEEN RRI-BELLER KOCKS I KFW -WORLD BANK AND THE TARGET 
POPULATION 
The KfW-World Bank programme and CAWSS have had a sometimes stormy, but close re-
lationship. In contrast, there was almost no direct link with the target population. The social 
component of the project has been mostly overlooked and CAWSS was by no mean en-
couraged to talk directly with consumers. It is interesting to note that the feasibility report for 
Phase 11 'extension' of the water distribution network recommends that a 'partnership' with 
'NGOs operating in Afghanistan' is established in order to cover 'mostly non-investment 
elements of the project' i.e. 'training, campaigning, hygienic on-site measures, support in se-
lected fields of O&M' (Fischaess, 2003:15). In other words, the 'social aspects' of the pro-
gramme were left to NGOs and remained something vague the project seemed reluctant to 
confront. CAWSS would have no part in it, which seems contradictory with the 'customer ori-
entation' encouraged by the project. 
EFFICIENCY I EFFECTIVENESS 
During Phase I, collaboration with CAWSS was not beneficial in tenns of efficiency in re-
building/repairing infrastructure. This was largely due to the lack of managerial personnel 
within CAWSS, 'political interferences' and poorly trained technical staff. As mentioned ear-
lier, RRI-Beller Kocks often had to employ and train extemal personnel instead of CAWSS 
staff in order to achieve quicker results and meet agreed deadlines, (Witting, 2005). 
Phase 11 was more ambitious in tenns of institutional development but, by mid 2006, had 
produced little visible results on the infrastructure. This was mostly due to land ownership 
problems. 
In terms of effectiveness, official figures show a clear increase in water production. Precise 
data on water access on a global scale were unavaible; however, with a substantial raise in 
water production, access is likely to have increased, at least in 'planned areas' Water pro-
duction has grown almost three fold compared to its 2002 levels. It was 45,000 m3 per day in 
2005 (Figure E-3). The electrification of the Logar well-field carried out by the ICRC and the 
British Red Cross also contributed to this increase since Logar well-field alone produces 
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20,000 m3 per day. Water was meant to be distributed for one to two hours every day but 
findings from a random survey in some of the areas covered by the network in May 2005 
showed that supply was sporadic, with no fixed schedule and occasionally no service at all 
for several days. Consumers largely relied on altemative water sources such as public hand-
pumps, their own wells, and private water vendors 1 in areas where the groundwater is salty. 
The earlier mentioned water reform under implementation according to which CAWSS 
i 
should be replaced by Afghanistan Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Corporation 
(AUWSSC), managed by a board of directors with branches in 13 cities or towns is meant to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of the service. For that, each branch may have re-
course to 'service providers', which may be private companies. At the time of the study, this 
reform was not yet implemented and no data were available on its effects at improving the 
service. 
SUSTAlNABILITY 
The sustainability of the whole operation depended on the ability of CAWSS to improve its 
capacity as well as on the outcome of the water reform fostered by MUDH. In 2005, efforts 
by KfW-World Bank to achieve sustainable water supply2 in Kabul had failed: 
• Technical sustainability was not reached given the almost complete absence of compe-
tent managerial staff; 
• Institutional sustainability was compromised by CAWSS' image of inefficiency among 
customers, administrations, and, indeed, aid agencies; 
• Financial sustainability was far from being reached. CAWSS depended on subsidies from 
MUDH to balance its accounts despite a substantial increase in water tariffs3. Billing rates 
were poor and the number of metered customers limited despite current efforts to in-
crease their number. 
A management contract with a private company was part of a strategy recommended by 
RRI-Beller to achieve sustainability. It may improve cost recovery and bring competent man-
agers but this largely depends on whether a suitable company is found. In a country where 
between 80 and 90 per cent of the activity is informal, this looks unlikely in foreseeable fu-
ture (The World Bank, 2005a). Foreign investment is an equally improbable option given the 
current security conditions. Comuption at all levels is an additional problem, which was cited 
by 53 per cent of potential private sector investors as a major or severe constraint, in a re-
cent survey carried out by the World Bank (The World Bank, 2005a:14). 
1 Mostly tankers. 
2 Let alone seweragel 
3 The flat rate for unmetered households has increased 20 folds between 2002 and 2005. 
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Sustainability also depends on a renewable access to water resources. In Kabul, water 
stress has increased in recent years as the whole country has gone through a severe 
drought between 1999 and 2002. Current trends in population growth may lead to depletion. 
Water demand calculations appearing in the feasibility report of the extension phase of the 
programme were based on a very modest consumption of 50 litres per person and per day1. 
Even at this limited level, it was foreseen that current water resources, in addition to water 
produced by new bore holes to be drilled in the short term, could only meet the growing de-
mand until 2015 (Fischaess, 2003:15). After this date, new water sources would have to be 
found, probably outside Kabul's region2, which would require major investments. 
APPROPRIATENESS 
Piped-water distribution in a city of over two million inhabitants seems the most appropriate 
solution. Yet, much of Kabul's water and sanitation systems are more typical of rural areas. 
In terms of water supply, wells remain the primary water source. In terms of sanitation, vault 
latrines, shown in Figure E-2, are the most widely used sanitation system. It is traditional, 
and the only potentially sustainable solution since limited water resources do not allow large 
scale waterbome sanitation. 
Groundwater access is relatively easy. In many areas the waterlable lies at depths ranging 
from 5 to 15 m, and provides consumers with an altemative to piped-water. Moreover, there 
is currently no enforced reg~lation on groundwater extraction~ 
As long as the service provided by the water utility remains deficient, there is no incentive for 
consumers to support networked solutions, especially in peri-urban areas, despite the econ-
omy of scale they represent. 
COVERAGE 
The issue of coverage is among the most controversial when evaluating the benefits of the 
current rehabilitation projects on Kabul water supply (Pinera and Rudge, 2006). The KfW-
World Bank project focuses on areas covered by the central water distribution network which 
represent an estimated 40 per cent of Kabul population (Grinnell and Troc, 2004). House-
holds living outside this area benefit from very limited urban services. 
Within the area actually served by the project - the 'planned areas', it was estimated in 
2005 that about half of the population had access to the water network3• Even in the areas it 
covered by the project, many of the inhabitants prefered relying on their private wells be-
cause private connections to the network were found too expensive. 
1 A volume insufficient to allow sewerage systems to function. 
2 Panshir valley or further away (Map E-2). 
3 It is a common estimation, which appears in some reports by the Wortd Bank and other entities but it is unclear 
how it was made. 
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• Intervention 2: ICRC I Spanish Red Cross rehabilitation project, 2002·2003 
Main sources of evidence: 
- A Spanish Red Cross report (Diago and Amalich, 2004); 
- Interview of Mir Ahmad Shah, former ICRC/Spanish Red Cross project officer in Kabul, 
in April 2005; 
- Field visits in 2003 and in April 2005 (Pinera, 2005a: Appendix 5). 
The project was designed in 2001 by the ICRC and its implementation was delegated to the 
Spanish Red Cross. It followed a number of emergency repair works that the ICRC carried out 
after the brief battle for Kabul in October and November 2001 (Nembrini et aI., 2002). It was one 
of three interventions on the water distribution network ongoing simultaneously in 2002 and 
2003, along with the Ktw·funded water project and the electrification of the logar well-field car-
ried out by the ICRC and the British Red Cross. 
The project was implemented in five areas (Map E-4): 
1. In Afshar well-field, two new boreholes were drilled, equipped and connected to the six 
existing ones (Table E.3); 
. 2. In Proja Jadid, in the north of the city, four boreholes were rehabilitated, 15 km of new 
distribution lines were installed and 900 households newly connected; 
3. In Qoli Abchakan, a new distribution network, including the rehabilitation of 54 public tap-
stands, was built. A new 180 m3 reservoir was also built on a hill to replace a small 16 m3 
reservoir, located in the centre of the neighbourhood, which was functioning with a 
booster pump 1. The borehole feeding the system was cleaned and its pump replaced; 
4. In Karte Perwan, a new borehole was drilled, equipped and connected to the network; 
5. In Wazir Abad, a new bore hole was also drilled, equipped and connected to the network. 
This included the installation of a 1.5 km water pipeline. 
The budget for the rehabilitation was approximately 1.3 million USD2, funded by the Spanish 
Red Cross, the ICRC, and a number of Spanish donors. 
OBJECTIVES AND TARGET POPULATION 
The general objective of the project was to improve access to water for the 'vulnerable' in· 
habitants of the north-west area of Kabul. The population of the areas covered by the differ-
ent components of the project ranged from 25,000 people to 350,000 people, as shown in 
Table E.5. 
1 This system was built by 'Sofidarites' between 1994 and 1998. 
21,040,911.40 EUR. 
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Table E-5: Population covered by leRC / Spanish Red Cross Wiatieirii~ii 
COLLABORATION BETWEEN ICRC / SPANISH RED CROSS AND CAWSS 
The project was mainly designed by the ICRC. CAWSS was consulted in relation to the se-
lection of sites. The Spanish Red Cross, in charge of its implementation; revised the selec-
tion of sites and technical options. CAWSS formally approved all technical designs, in most 
cases without effectively reviewing them. 
The implementation was primarily done through private contractors selected by the Spanish 
Red Cross. CAWSS supervisors were present on site during the implementation. The Span~ 
ish Red Cross tried to 'delegate' the responsibility for laying pipes to CAWSS in Proja Jadid .. 
This failed because of long delays 1 and quality problems. The Spanish Red Cross eventually 
decided to implement the work with a private contractor. 
LINKS BETWEEN ICRC / SPANISH RED CROSS AND THE TARGET 
POPULATION 
The project hired local labour for pipe laying both in Proja Jadid and Qoli Abchakan. This re-
quired meetings with community leaders. Hygiene promotion campaigns were also under-
taken in both areas but sessions only lasted while the project was active. 
EFFICIENCY / EFFECTIVENESS 
The implementation of the project was meant to last six months. In fact, it lasted almost three 
times as long. The main problems it faced were poor initial design, logistics problems -
mostly linked to procurement from Pakistan - and unreliable contractors. 
At the end of the project, in November 2003, the results listed in the final report were (Oiago 
and Amalich, 2004): 
• Increase in water production from Afshar by 6,000 m3/day; 
• Increase in water production from Karte Perwan by 600 m3/day; 
• Increase in water production from Wazir Abad by 380 m3/day; 
• Sufficient capacity to provide 50 litres of water per person and per day in Proja Jadid; 
1 Trenches were left open in the streets for days. 
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• Sufficient capacity to provide 50 litres of water per day and per family in Qoli Abchakan. 
However, in May 2005, a number of flaws were apparent: 
• Whilst Afshar new wells, Karte Perwan and Wazir Abad remained functional, the quality 
. of the materials used in the rehabilitation of boreholes was criticized by a reponsible rep-
resentative from the KfW-World Bank project who argued that clay particles were 
pumped out as a result. The choice· of galvanized iron pipes in certain places was also· 
criticized because of their shorter lifetime compared to more expensive solutions such as 
ductile iron (Witting, 2005). 
• In Qoli Abchakan the yield of the borehole, only 15 m deep, proved insufficient to fill-up 
the new 180 m3 reservoir. As a result, it has never been used. The drilling of a new, 
deeper, borehole, which was initially cOnsidered, proved impossible because Qoli Ab-
chakan is situated at the heart of the city and no suitable altemative place could be 
found. The booster pump used before the 'intervention' has been put back in operation. 
During the visit, many taps were found broken and never replaced. CAWSS envisaged 
charging a monthly fee for each tap-stand, to be shared between the families using them. 
This decision was not discussed with the community and, based on a few reactions from 
residents, appears to have been rather badly received; 
• In Proja Jadid, the new water-scheme is operational but service, although improved, re-
mains irregular. 
The project reached the majority of its objectives in terms of infrastructure, albeit with techni-
cal shortcomings, but its actual effects are hindered by poor management by CAWSS. 
SUSTAINABILITY 
As in the case of the KfW-World Bank project, sustainability is linked to CAWSS' capacity to 
run the facilities. The lack of interest of the utility for public tap-stands casts doubts on 
whether the benefits of Qoli Abchakan scheme rehabilitation are going to last. The other 
sites are part of KfW-World Bank project, which should ensure that benefits last longer. 
Aid agencies are often confronted with the choice between buying locally - or in the region, 
in this case: Pakistan - and contributing to the development of the local economy, or buying 
state-of-the-art material, in most cases from overseas. In this case, ICRC and the Spanish 
Red Cross chose the first option, which offers cheaper prices and, in general, shorter deliv-
ery time. On the other hand, 'local standards' may compromise the quality of the rehabilita-
tion. It is difficult to determine the long-term consequences of this choice although accotding 
to Beller-Kocks, some detrimental effects can already be felt (Witting, 2005). It may have 
been worth spending more money on high quality eqUipment imported from overseas in or-
der to avoid compromising the long-term technical sustainability of the operation. 
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APPROPRIATENESS 
The same remarks can be made on appropriateness as in the case of the Ktw-Word Bank 
project. 
COVERAGE 
The project was meant to target 'vulnerable communities' .and it did in Qoli Abchakan. It is 
more questionable for the remaining communities since the minOrity of Kabul households 
owning a private connection can hardly be defined as 'vulnerable'. Water access was gener-
ally improved in the targeted areas, but not for all residents. 
Map E-4: Locations of Kabul main piped-water supply rehabilitation projects 
Background map produced by AIMS http://www.aims.orq.afimapslurbanlkabuI.Ddf 
• Intervention 3: ACF water and sanitation programme 
Main sources of evidence: 
- Programme evaluation made in April-May 2005 (Pinera, 2005a). 
The ACF intervention in Kabul started in 1995. A nutritional survey was carried out, that showed 
the need for a feeding programme. As a result, a network of feeding centres and Mother and 
, Afghanistan Information Management Service. 
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Child Health clinics was established. Data from these centres showed a coincidence between 
malnutrition and diarrhoea in summer months. These findings justified the launch by ACF of a 
water and sanitation programme, which started in April 2000 and consisted of upgrading drain-
age ditches in the north of Kabul. Later the programme diversified, covering private and public 
wells rehabilitation, private latrines construction, solid waste management, organic waste recy-
cling and hygiene promotion. 
The programme budget, between 2000 and 2005 was approximately 1.7 million USD, 45 per 
cent of which was funded by OFDA1, 20 percent by ECHO, and 20 percent by the UNHCR. 
OBJECTIVES 
The programme had two specific objectives: 
1. 'To reduce environmental risks in vulnerable neighbourhoods through better drinking wa-
ter supply and environmental sanitation facilities'; 
2. 'To reduce sanitary risks amidst the target pcipulation through better hygiene practices'. 
WORKS CARRIED OUT AND TARGET POPULATION 
The programme focused specifically on 'unplanned areas' and on the most 'vulnerable' 
communities. Some of the target areas were predominantly populated by the Hazara minor-
ity, who suffered from discrimination regarding employment and access to services. Origi-
nally, areas of intervention were selected according to the prevalence of diarrhoea among 
children, as monitored in ACF and MSF clinics. In 2003, a more precise study was under-
taken, that used multiple criteria and allowed the 'mapping of vulnerability' in Kabul (Grinnell 
and Troc, 2004). In terms of infrastructure works, the programme's main activities were drill-
ing or rehabilitating boreholes equipped with hand-pumps, building or rehabilitating private 
latrines and constructing other types of systems such as drainage channels and solid-waste 
containers. The areas of intervention, number of beneficiaries, and works canried out are 
summarized in Table E.6. District 13is a newly-created district located in the south-west of 
the city (Map E-3). It did not exist before 2002. 
1 The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance. 
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, 
Table E·6: ACF Water and sanitation programme, 2000·2005 
~~ 
Private latrines rehabilitation or reconstruction was done almost identically to ICRC's design 
shown in Figure E·i. 
COLLABORATION BETWEEN ACFAND CAWSS 
There was no direct link between this programme and CAWSS. ACF did try to establish links 
with Kabul Municipality, which was approached to take the responsibility for supervising the 
O&M of hand·pumps. This however did not prove successful because of Kabul Municipality's 
lack of interest in hand·pumps. 
LINKS BETWEEN ACF AND THE TARGET POPULATION 
Hygiene promotion/education - house to house visits, mostly for females, and group-
sessions for males and children in mosques - were carried. out in the different working ar· 
eas. Wherever latrines were built, hygiene promoters distributed hygiene kits consisting of a 
water tank, a jug, soap, and a roll of toilet paper .. 
The programme encouraged communities to get organised in order to achieve effective 
O&M of the facilities: 'Local Capacity Building (LCB) advisors' were assigned to the different 
1 ICRC's design. 
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project areas. Their role was to encourage the community to organise the O&M of the infra-
structure by creating water committees. Local mechanics identified by the community were 
trained by ACF on hand-pumps repair and paid by the users for each repair carried out. 
Water committees were also trained by ACF and had a variety of roles ranging from collect-
ing money from the community for the maintenance of hand-pumps, or the operation of a 
water-scheme, to organising the emptying of latrines by night-soil collectors, and the removal 
of solid waste. 
'EFFICIENCY /EFFECTIVENESS 
ACF employed local contractors and masons for infrastructural work and achieved quick re-
sults. Figures in the various areas of intervention show a relatively low coverage of water 
supply systems, ranging from 200 to 900 people per hand-pump. Coverage of improved la-
trines, ranged from 12 to 81 per cent. 
Effects on health are difficult to evaluate rigorously; however, increasing the 'number of water 
supply and sanitation systems in the various target areas is likely to have contributed to limit-
ing the incidence of waterbome and excreta-related diseases. 
Surveys aimed at evaluating the knowledge of the population 1 on hygiene practices showed 
a clear progress after hygiene promotion campaigns were carried out. 
SUSTAINABILITY 
The sustainability of the programme depended on local capacity. Water committees only 
'survived' the end of the project when their leaders where sufficiently motivated to carry on 
without extemal support. 
In a water-scarce environment, communities always found ways of repairing hand-pumps 
even when water committees no longer existed. The long-term future of the latrines was a 
more complex issue. The presence of night-soil collectors and the reuse of human waste as 
fertilizer was increasingly threatened by the expansion of the city, leaving less and less 
space for agricultural land on its periphery. 
APPROPRIATENESS 
In terms of water supply, hand-pumps were the most reliable source of water in Kabul's 'un-
planned' areas. Whilst water distribution networks would be more appropriate given the high 
population density in certain areas, CAWSS' incapacitY to extend the municipal water supply 
to low-income communities left ACF with few alternatives. 
1 Know/edge, Aptitude and Practice sU/vey. 
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COVERAGE 
Reports on the levels of coverage achieved by the programme were mentioned earlier, and 
show relatively low values. Non-networked solutions do not allow much better results unless 
the installation of a massive number of systems is carried out ... Which would probably be 
more expensive than opting for a networked solution. However, the programme had the 
merit of covering what ACF calls 'left-behind areas', a majority of Kabul residents who 
seemed to have been forgotten by large-scale rehabilitation projects. 
2; Jaffna, Sri Lanka 
Jaffna is located on a peninsula at the northem tip of Sri Lanka, at no more than 150 km east of 
the Indian coast. It is separated from the remaining regions of the country by a lagoon, which only 
allows access to the peninsula through a narrow strip of land called 'Elephant Pass' (Map E-5). 
Jaffna is the capital of Sri Lanka's Northem Province. In 2001, the population of Jaffna Municipal 
Council (JMC) was 74,122 people, of which 25 per cent were displaced1• It was estimated at 
85,000 people In 2005. 
Map E-5: Sri Lanka 
Source: IGRG (adapted) www.icrc.org 
1 Jaffna local government cited In (Kraf!, 2002). 
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Sri Lanka's population is divided into several ethnic groups. Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims 1 ac-
count for almost the entire population2• About three quarters of the population is Sinhalese, 
Tamils represent about 18 per cent, and Muslims six per cent (Goonasekera, 2001). Sinhalese 
and a majority of Tamils migrated to the island from India several thousand years ago. Some 
Tamils were brought by the British colonial power in the 19th century to work in tea plantations-
they are the so-called 'Indian Tamils'.Muslims are descendants of Arab3, Indian and Malay mer-
chants who settled on the island. Tamils live mostly in the northem and eastern regions, with the 
exception of the 'Indian Tamils' who live in the central hills. They are primarily Hindu. Sinhalese 
live in the rest of the island. Most of them are Buddhist. Muslims live in both areas. Sinhalese 
speak Sinhala whereas both Tamils and Muslims speak the Tamillanguage . 
. 2.1 Historical background 
Sri Lanka has been affected by civil unrest from the late 1950s, which tumed into war between 
the 'liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam' (L TIE) and the Govemment of Sri Lanka from 1984. Fight-
ingin Jaffna town took place first in 1986-1987 and later in the last months of 1995. Jaffna penin-
. sula came again under fire in 2001 when the govemmental stronghold Elephant Pass fell under 
L TIE control and, most recently, in 2006 when the 2002 ceasefire was broken. Recent historical 
events in Jaffna are summarized in Figure E-5 and detailed in Appendix 3. 
Figure E-5: Timeline Sri Lanka and fighting in Jaffna 
IntenSity of armed conflict (Uppsala University, 2006): 
• 1983-1984: minor; 
of Elephant Pas •.•.. 
2001 
, Although Muslim normally designates the followers of Islam, Sri Lankan Muslims are considered as a specific 
ethnic group. 
2 The remaining groups are the Burghers, descendant from Portuguese and Dutch colons and the Veddah, a vel}' 
small abOrigine group, descendant from the ancient inhabitants of the island. 
3 97% 
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• 1985-1988: minor, possibly war; 
• 1989-2001: war; 
• 2003 and 2005: minor 
2.2 Water and sanitation systems 
Map E-6: The Jaffna peninsula 
Source: Perry-Castaneda Map Col/ection, University of Austin, Texas www./ib.utexas.edulmapsl 
• Water supply 
Water scarcity is a major problem on the Jaffna peninsula where groundwater consists of a 
freshwater lens floating on saline water. The thickness of this lens varies between 15 metres 
and 29 metres. It is recharged by rainfall and discharges to the sea. The variation of the water . 
table level between the dry and the rainy seasons does not exceed 1 metre (Kraft, 2002:14-15). 
As a result of excessive water extraction, both for drinking and irrigation, added to the extraction 
of sand to use as building material, salinity levels are high all over the peninsula. Furthermore, 
insufficient efforts have been made to harvest storm-water, most of which nuns off to the sea 
(Kraft, 2002:33). Ponds and tanks with interconnected channels, which used to contribute to the 
conservation of rainwater and recharge the watershed, have tended to disappear and be re-
placed by new houses (Navaratnarajah, 1994). 
An additional water quality problem is created by the excessive use of chemical fertilizers, which 
increases levels of nitrates in drinking water. Their concentration, measured in November 2001 
from the water distribution network - Gununagar water-scheme, see hereafter -:- was 76.6 
mg/l, far higher than the limit of 50 mg/l, set by WHO standards (Kraft, 2002:27). The detection 
161 
E. Review of the Case Studies 
of high levels of free Ammonia and Nitrite 1 also reveals contamination by wastewater and solid 
waste, through leachate. 
As a result, no water source in Jaffna, apart from rainwater and bottled water, is totally safe for 
drinking. This includes piped water. Most households have a private well, usually of large di-
ameter - 2.5 to 3 metres - and very shallow - less than 10 metres deep. Because of salinity, 
few of them are used for drinking and cooking. The areas most exposed are those nearest to 
the sea. Households unable to use a domestic well are in principle supplied with piped water. 
The network covers about 40 per cent of JMC's area and is divided into three systems (Map 
E-7): 
1. Gurunagar scheme was established in 1952. It supplies almost 7,000 people living in an. 
area close to the coast, one of the most densely populated. Gurunagar water-schema's 
well-field is located in Thirunelvely, 5 kilometres north-east of Jaffna. Water is pumped 
into a 160 mm diameter pipeline, which connects the well-field to a·110 m3 reservoir. Wa-
ter is distributed through a network of 61 tap-stands - about 110 persons per tap-stand 
(Kraft, 2002:35); 
2. Jaffna Town scheme was established in 1962. It supplies almost 30,000 people. The 
scheme's well-field is located in Kondavil, only a few hundred meters from Thirunelvely. 
Water is pumped into a 315 mm diameter pipeline, which connects the well-field to a .560 
m3 reservoir. Water is distributed through a network of 550 tap-stands - about 55 per-
sons per tap-stand (Kraft, 2002:34); 
3. Six Mini Water Supply Schemes (MWSS) in areas not covered by Jaffna Town water 
supply, which are known for their 'bad water'. They consist of a well - sometimes a 
borehole - an overhead tank, to which water is pumped with a motor-pump, and a few 
tap-stands (Kraft, 2002:36). 
The water distribution network was originally designed for 70,000 people. In addition to tap-
stands, there are 400 private connections. 
• Thirunelvely well-field consists of two interconnected wells (Figure E-6). Water is pumped 
with two submersible pumps used alternately. Water distribution takes place for 45 min-
utes each day. 
• Kondavil well-field consists of four interconnected wells (Figure E-6). Water is pumped 
with three submersible pumps used alternately. Water distribution takes place for 1 hour 
and 50 minutes each day. 
• The Mini Water Supply Scheme provides water for between 45 and 90 minutes each day. 
' 0.34 mg/l of Ammonia - WHO limit: 0.05mg/l- and 0.263 mg/l of Nitrite- WHO limit: 0.1 mg/l- where de-
tected in domestic well in JMC area in December 2001 (Kraft, 2002:27). 
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These system~ are currently able to provide up to 1,800 m3/day over two hours. This amount Is 
reduced to 1,100 m3/day during the driest months. Pumping more would threaten the resource 
given the risk of saline water intrusion. These volumes are in principle sufficient to provide every 
individual with 20 litres of freshwater per day . 
• Sanitation 
Households are equipped with pour-flush toilets connected to a single chamber septic tank and a 
soak pit, or to a simple pit. Grey water is directed to open ditches along the streets (Kraft, 
2002:66-67). 
Map E-7: JMC piped-water supply 
Based on Kraft, 2002 and on field visits 
163 
E. Review of the Case Studies 
Figure E-6: Jaffna well-fields 
Based on Kraft, 2002:34-35 and on field visits 
2.3 Water sector institutions 
Two water sector institutions work in the Jaffna peninsula: . 
1. Jaffna Municipal Council (JMC) water services, in charge of water supply in JMC area; 
2. The National Water Supply and Sewerage Board (NWSB), in charge on water supply 
elsewhere in the peninsula. 
The NWSB is in general in charge of urban water supply in Sri Lanka, however, given the rela-
tively modest size of the system existing in Jaffna, this responsibility was left to JMC. 
JMC water services are under the responsibility of a chief engineer in charge of public health is-
sues. The department is also in charge of solid waste collection and disposal1 and works in col-
laboration with the department for 'physical planning, roads, lands and buildings'. It employs 
about 1,000 people. 
In 2005, JMC water services' income represented only about 55 per cent of its operational costs. 
This was paid through the property tax - 2 to 3 per cent of the amount charged. 
1 30 m' are removed out of the 42 m' produced. 
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2.4 Effects of the armed conflict 
One of the major effects of the conflict was the isolation of Jaffna. When L TIE took control of the 
Vanni region' in 1996, the road to Jaffna was cut-off and the peninsula could only be reached by 
air or by boat. There' was an embargo or strict control from the Ministry of Defence on what it 
. called 'sensitive' items, i.e. any item or product the L TIE could use for their benefit. This included 
construction material. On the Jaffna peninsula, the Sri Lankan Army was de facto an occupying 
army and imposed a curfew. This situation partly changed after the 2002 ceasefire: the embargo 
was relaxed and the road to Jaffna reopened. It changed again for the worse by mid-2006 when 
fighting resumed. 
Once a rich town, Jaffna has become totally economically dependent on central govemment's 
transfers and foreign aid (van Horen, 2002:120). 
• Buildings 
Jaffna peninsula has been thoroughly devastated by conflict. In 1998, it was estimated that 
about 30 per cent of its houses had been totally destroyed and 40 percent badly damaged 
(RRAN, 1998, cited by van Horen, 2001:119). As many as 81,000 houses were damaged or de-
stroyed in Jaffna town. A strip of land surrounding most of the Jaffna peninsula has been mined 
and is controlled by the Sri Lankan army (van Horen, 2002:119). 
• Water Supply 
Fighting inflicted considerable damage to the water distribution network. Gurunagar scheme, lo-
cated near to the coast where most of the fighting took place, was completely destroyed. It was 
built with relatively fragile Asbestos Cement (AC) pipes. Jaffna town scheme was considerably 
damaged, not only by bombs but also by the trenches dug during street fighting. There was no 
electrical supply and the pumping stations were stopped. Therefore, people could only rely on 
their wells for water supply. 
Water quality was also affeCted by the interruption, due to a lack on maintenance, of the service 
provided by anti-salinity mechanisms, built by the govemment's irrigation department in the 
1950s. Moreover, dams preventing salty water from the lagoon seeping into groundwaterwere 
damaged by bombs (Liyanaarachchi, 2005). 
• Water utility 
JMC building was destroyed during the fighting in 1995 and the institution had to relocate to an-
other building, where it was still in 2005. The institution lost 40 per cent of its personnel. 
1 Region of Northern Sri Lanka controlled by the L TTE since 1995, See map in Appendix 3, section 3. 
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• Population 
Jaffna town population was 118,000 people 1 in 1981. Between October 1995 and April 1996, it 
was completely emptied for six months, on instructions from the L TIE .. After that date, about 
40,000 people retumed. The process continued and there were about 65,000 people in 1997 and 
74,000 in 2001. In 2005, JMC area population was estimated .at 85,000 people. Renewal of light-
ing in 2006 may have again changed this number (Figure E-?). 
I 
120,000 .. 118000 
100 000 -"-" ' . '~ 74,000 II;),U~ 
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Figure E-7: Jaffna town population 
1995 1997 
1996 
2001 2005 
Based on www.citypopulatlon.de (1981) and JMC estimations 
2.5 Emergency response 
Selection of cases: 
. Aid Agency 'Intervention' 
GTZ Emergency water supply for lOPs 
Water sector institution: JMC water services 
Main sources of evidence: 
- GTZ reports (Rajapakse, 2002; GTZ, 2003); 
- A paper by van Horen (2002:121); 
Period 2006 status 
1996-1997 Completed 
- Interview with G.R.R Rajasingham, GTZ Executive Project Officer, present in Jaffria 
since 1996, July 2005; 
- Interview with Mr Navaratnarajah, engineer in charge of water supply and public health, 
present in Jaffna since before 1990, July 2005; 
- Visit to Jaffria in July 2005; . 
- Visits to Jaffna in 2001 . 
. GTZ has been present in Jaffria since 1996. Its Jaffna Rehabilitation Project (JRP) was part of 
GTZ Development Orientated Emergency Aid (Hoffmann et al., 1998). Following the battle for 
1 www_citypopu/ation_de 
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Jaffna, at the end of 1995, a lot of people moved from various areas of the peninsula to Jaffna 
town, where they found shelter in public buildings such as schools and Hindu temples. In April 
1997, GTZ installed 30 fibreglass water tanks, each with a 2000 litres capacity, in the most 
crowded areas of the town, and supplied them with freshwater using four tractors and six tankers. 
• Objectives and target population 
The objective of the operation was to increase the amount of water available per person and per 
day, thereby limiting the risks of disease 1. The population servedwas 11,000 people. 
• Collaboration with JMC water services 
Before 1997, JMC had already intervened in this kind of emergency operations. In 1990, the in-
stitution distributed water with trucks or tractors in the coastal areas of the town and had three 
distribution-points in the town centre. In 1997, JMC was fully in charge of running the operation. 
GTZ was only supporting it logistically and financially. 
• Links between GTZ and the target population 
Water tanks were identified with stickers as belonging to GTZ, but most of the staff working on 
the field were JMC personnel. 
• Efficiency I effectiveness 
A large number of public wells and some private were available to IDPs in and around Jaffna. 
However, many had salty or non-palatable water that could only be used for washing and bath-
ing. The supply of freshwater supported by GTZ was essential and undoubtedly had a tremen-
dous impact on the wellbeing of IDPs. Using JMC resources and personnel was certainly bene-
ficial in terms of efficiency. Already present in Sri Lanka long before the emergency took place, 
the relationship between GTZ and public institutions was well established . 
. 2.6 Rehabilitation 
Selection of cases: 
Aid Agency 'Intervention' Period 2006 status 
GTZ Jaffna Rehabilitation Project 1997 - 2003 Completed 
Water sector institution: JMC water services 
Main sources of evidence: 
- GTZ reports (Rajapakse, 2002; GTZ, 2003); 
- A paper by van Horen (2002:121); 
1 See page 23. 
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- Interview with G.R.R Rajasingham, GTZ Executive Project Officer, present in Jaffna 
since 1996;, July 2005; 
- Interview with Mr Navaratnarajah, engineer in charge of water supply and public health, 
present in Jaffna since before 1990, July 2005. 
Having sorted out the emergency operation, GTZ sponsored the rehabilitation of the water distri-
bution network. It started in December 1997, with Guranagar scheme (Map E-7). The following 
tasks were carried out: 
• Reconstruction of Thirunelvely pump-house and repairs on the intake well; 
• Installation of new pumps and a generator; 
• Repairs on the 5 kilometres of transmission line and on a 110m3 reservoir; 
• Reconstruction/repair of 7 kilometres of distribution line and reconstruction of 85 tap-
stands. 
The project was completed in March 1999 and was funded by ECHO. 
In March 1998, Jaffna Town scheme (Map E-7) rehabilitation started. It consisted of: 
• The reconstruction of Kondavil pump-house and repairs on the intake well; 
• The installation of new pumps and of a generator; 
• Repairs on the 5 kilometres transmission line and a 560 m3 reservoir; 
• Repairs on 40 kilometres of distribution pipeline and reconstruction of 420 tap-stands. 
This project was completed in 2001 and funded by the German govemment. 
In addition, GTZ carried out the construction of Nayanmarkadu mini water-schemes in March 
2001 . 
• Objectives and target population 
'Jaffna Rehabilitation Project' (JRP) was a multi-sectorial operation covering water supply, 
school rehabilitation and sanitation, housing and social mobilization. It benefited the entire pen-
insula. 
The objective of the water supply component of JRP was to durably improve access to water for· 
the residents of JMC living in areas covered by the water distribution network. In its Phase I, it 
aimed specifically at rehabilitating Gurunagar water-scheme. Its Phase 11 aimed at rehabilitating 
Jaffna town water-scheme. 
The target population represented about 10,000 people in Gurunagar water-scheme area, and 
50,000 people in Jaffna town water-scheme areas, in addition to the 800 families, or about 4000 
people, supplied by Nayanmarkadu mini water-scheme. 
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• Collaboration between GTZ and JMC water services 
GTZ's role in JRP was specifically: 
• Project planning within the framework of the govemment's 'Resettlement and Rehabilita-
tion Plan'; 
• Recruiting local and expatriate experts to support project activities; 
• Procuring material and equipment; . 
• Monitoring and evaluating the project's activities and outputs. 
All water supply activities were implemented by JMC water services. JMC's personnel involved 
were paid by GTZ for their work. 
GTZ also donated to JMC water services: a computer, four tractors and four tankers - out of 
order in July 2005 - a computer and some fumiture. Training sessions were also organised for 
some of JMC water services' technicians. 
• Links between GTZ and the target population 
'Social mobilization' was an important component of JRP. The project encouraged beneficiary 
participation by collaborating with CBOs such as women's societies, sport clubs, etc. A team of 
social-workers visited the various communities benefiting from the project in order to raise 
awareness on water conservation and hygiene. One of the effects sought was that people 
should understand a number of basic rules regarding water distribution and in particular the 
fixed volume of water allocated to each family. JMC technical staff were also involved since 'so-
cial mobilization' was introduced as the responsibility of every member of the team. 
Communities' participation consisted of digging the trenches for the pipelines. After completion, 
they carried out simple repairs on tap-stands when needed. 
• Efficiency I Effectiveness· 
The project fully benefited from the experience, local knowledge and expertise brought by JMC 
water-technicians. The provision of a minimum quantity of 'safer' water through the water distri-
bution network had a strong impact given the severity of water scarcity in the area. 
In 2002, an assessment of the water and sanitation situation carried out by the German consult-
ing firm Kraft for GTZ (Kraft, 2002) revealed a relatively high level of bacteriological contamina-
tion in the water supply. No chlorination system was installed with the original system. Following 
this assessment, the authorities decided to carry out regular chlOrination, pouring chlorine di-
rectly into the intake wells (Figure E-6). As a result, the submersible pumps started being se-
verely corroded and were breaking down regularly - in 2005, they needed to be sent to Co-
lombo to be repaired. 
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• Appropriateness 
The nature of water resources on the Jaffna peninsula imposed public tap-stand and supply 
limitation. The number of private connections could not be increased in spite of the demand in 
order to avoid excessive pumping. 
• Sustainability 
The corrosion of the submersible pumps due to 'direct' chlorination, observed during the field 
visit in 2005 and reported here-above should be addressed since, in the long run, it may jeop-
ardize the functioning of the whole system and affects technical sustainability. Cost recovery is 
. only partial and represents another obstacle to the achievemept of sustainability. However, the 
main concem regarding sustainability is whether the quality of groundwater is going to remain 
stable. A project funded by the Asian Development Bank was meant to bring fresh water to the 
Jaffna peninsula·trom lranamadu tank, located 50 km south of Jaffna, in L TTE-controlled terri-
tory (Liyanaarachchi, 2005). However, given 2006 collapse of the peace-process, this plan 
seemed compromised. 
• Coverage 
Current level of coverage is determined by the availability of water resource. It cannot be in-
creased unless new sources of freshwater are found - a GTZ assessment (Kraft, 2002) sug-
gests mitigating the outcome by developing rainwater harvesting. 
3. Monrovia, Liberia 
Monrovia is the capital of Liberia. It is located on a coastal peninsula of the West-African coast -
Cape Mesurado, about 100 km south of the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone (Map E-8). 
The city spreads south of the mouth of Saint Paul River - one of Liberia's major rivers - and 
along the swamp formed by a coastal river: the Mesurado. A stream joining the Mesurado and the 
Saint Paul isolates an area. of Northern Monrovia, which is known as Bushrod Island (Map E-9). 
Monrovia is the largest Liberian city. Its population was 421,000 in 1984\ when the last official 
census was carried out. In 2005, it was estimated by most to be approximately one million peo-
ple. 
1 www.world-gazetteer.com. 
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Map E-8: Liberia 
Source: ICRC (adapted) www.icrc.org 
95 per cent of the population of Liberia belong to a multitude of ethnic groups who, altogether, 
speak 29 languages (BBC News, 2006b). The main groups are the Kpelle, the Bassa, the Gio 
and the Khru. 55 per cent of the population is Animist, 32 per cent is Christian and 13 per cent 
Muslim. The latter are Mandingo tribes, living in the north of the country, near the border with 
Guinea. English is the official language. 
3.1 Historical background 
The final years of William Tolbert presidency in the 1970s saw the beginning of a period of politi-
cal instability and profound economic crisis in Liberia, which culminated with war in the 1990s and 
early 2000. By the end of 1989, Charles Taylor was the leader of the rebellion and became presi-
dent in 1997. He was in tum attacked by rebels to his govemment and eventually ousted in 2003. 
Monrovia was attacked three times: first in 1992 by Taylor's troops during what remained known 
as 'Operation Octopus', later in 1996, and finally in 2003 at the final phase ofthe struggle against 
Taylor's govemment. Recent historical events in Monrovia are summarized in Figure E-8 and de-
tailed in Appendix 3. 
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Figure E-8: Timeline Liberia and fighting in Monrovia 
Intensity of armed conflict (Uppsala University, 2006): 
• 1980 and 1989: minor; 
• 1990: war; 
• 1991: minor; 
• 1992: war; 
• 1993-1995 and 2000-2002: minor; 
• 2003: war. 
3.2 Water and sanitation systems 
• Water supply 
The main water supply sources in Monrovia are: 
.... 
Charles Taylo, Transitional 
Presidency Government 
1997 2003 
• Rainwater, mostly during the rainy season, which lasts for several months. It is abundant1 
but only used at household level; 
• Groundwater, through a large number of public and private wells; 
• Surface water, from Saint Paul river, which is treated at White Plains water treatment 
plant, located 15 km north-east of the city (Map E-9). 
HAND-DUG WELLS 
Despite high preCipitation and permeable superficial ground layers, Central Monrovia has lit-
tle groundwater because a large portion of the city is built on top of a bedrock which extends 
from Mamba-Point to Sinkor (Map E-9). On Bushrod Island, the proximity of the Mesurado 
river swamp affects groundwater quality. Hydro-geological conditions in Paynesville (Map 
E-9) are, on the contrary, excellent. In spite of difficult conditions in most areas of Central 
Monrovia, a large number of wells have been dug. Their number grew from 500 before the 
1 Annual rainfall exceeds 5 m acconding to BBC Weather. http://www.bbc.co.uklweatherl. 
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war to 3,500 in 2003 (Smith and Kpakolo, 2004:12). Table E.7 summarizes their quantity and 
characteristics. 
Table E-7: Monrovia's wells 
In Central Monrovia, where wells are relatively rare, people are usually charged for using 
water from privately owned wells. In the peri-urban areas, obtaining water from private wells 
is usually free. However, queuing and walking over long distance.s may be necessary (Ox-
fam, 2005:11). 
BOREHOLES 
Two boreholes were drilled in Paynesville in 1992 and 1993, when White Plains water treat-
ment plant was not functioning. Since 1996, the water utility has been selling water to trucks 
and occasionally to wheelbarrow vendors 1 from one of these boreholes2• Trucks primarily 
supply areas were piped-water is not functioning. Their customers are well-off households 
owning their own water cistem or water vendors selling from a fixed tank in the street. 
THE WATER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 
Water from the network is sold by the water utility in different ways: 
• To private customers. They used to be around 20,000 before the war reached Monrovia 
in 1992 (Willson, 2003: Appendix 3.3) but only 758 registered customers remained in 
February 2006 according to the water utility (Alegre, 2006). Most customers resell water 
to their neighbours (Browne and Tsikisayi, 2004). In 2004, private customers represented 
. only 16 per cent of water sales. 
1 Wheelbarrow vendors get water from Paynesville borehole only when there Is no water available from the net-
work. 
2 The other one is exclusively for the consumption of USTC soft drink company. 
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• To business customers who accounted for 64 per cent of sales in 2004 (Browne and 
Tsikisayi, 2004). Five big customers 1 and the UN peace-keeping force UNMIL represent 
a large part of the demand (Figure E-9); 
• Through Gantry filling-station (Map E-9), a water outlet on Bushrod island which sells wa-
ter to trucks; 
• Through water-kiosks. The utility used to run several but, in 2005, only one in Vai Town 
(Map E-9) was functioning. Water was mostly supplied to wheelbamow-vendors, who sold 
it door to door in areas with no piped-water or with an irregular service. Vai Town water-
kiosk also supplied 'coldwater vendors' who sold water in small plastic bags to drivers 
stuck in traffic jams (Alegre, 2006). 
Figure E-9: Water Utility's customers in Monrovia 
1:1 Big Five 
I:IUNMIL 
Ell Other Business 
B3 Private 
IlTrucking 
• Kiosks 
t210thers 
Based on Browne and Tsikisayi, 2004:34-38 
Another way of obtaining water from the network is the so-called 'water mining'. This con-
sists of making an illegal connection on the water-network, but, since prl;lssure is low, a hole 
has to be dug in the ground or existing man-holes have to be used (Photograph E-1). Water 
'mining' is of course illegal, although some of the improvised kiosks have water-meters and 
pay fees to the utility. There are a lot of water 'miners' on Bushrod Island and in West Point 
(Map E-9). According to Smith and Kpakolo (2004), it is likely that most of the 55 to 60 per 
cent of unaccounted,for water is due to water 'mining' (Figure E-10). Water mining' delivers 
water in very unhygienic conditions since surface water accumulates in the holes when pipes 
are not under pressure and may be contaminated by seepage. Some of the wheelbarrow 
vendors buy water from 'water miners'. 
1 The 'Big Five' are: USTC soffdrinks producing Coca Cola and other drinks, Free Port ofMonrovia, the Brewery, 
the US Embassy and Mercy Ship, a floating hospital run by an American Christian NGO. 
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o Sales 
• Losses in transmission line 
Cl Unaccounted for 
Figure E·10: Proportion of water losses In 
Monrovia's network 
Photograph by the author; figure based on Smith and Kpakolo, 2004 and Browne and Tsikisayi, 
2004 
The various ways in which piped water is distributed in Monrovia are summarized in Figure 
E·11, 
Water produced in White Plains is treated and, in principle, of a good quality at the plant but 
gets contaminated in the network given the multiple illegal connections and the poor state of . 
the, distribution lines. 
White Plains water treatment plant supplies the city through two water mains (Map E-9): 
1. A 26 km-long 16" diameter (-400 mm) line, which supplies Bushrod Island south of New 
Khru Town. It splits into two branches, one going north and ending at the brewery across 
the bridge on Saint Paul river, and one going south and ending in Mamba point across 
Mesurado River bridge - from where a secondary line supplies West Point. Its diameter 
reduces to 12" (-300 mm) after Mesurado Bridge (Smith et aI., 2001:3); 
2. A 29 km long 36" diameter (-900 mm) line, which links White Plains to Paynesville in a 
straight line. From Paynesville, two lines create a loop: a 24" diameter (-600 mm) line 
supplies the areas along Somalia Drive and a 16" diameter line supplies Congo Town, 
Sinkor and Central Monrovia (Willson, 2003:6). 
The 36" line was damaged in 1992 (Geoscience, 1998), and remained out of order for 14 
years. Only Bushrod Island and, occasionally, West Point were supplied, usually for eight 
hours per day (Oxfam, 2005). The remaining quarters"':'" Central Monrovia, Singkor - which 
are located on a hill, were not supplied because of insufficient pressure. In 2006, the situa-
tion changed. In agreement with a commitment by President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf during 
her electoral campaign to ensure that running water is restored in Monrovia within six 
months from her inauguration (IRIN, 2005), the 36" line was repaired and started functioning 
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in July, with a substantial increase in water production. Since then, water is distributed in ar-
eas such as Central Monrovia and Sinkor (Daygbor, 2006). 
Network f-H Private f-- Secondary AreIlS with 
customers customer piped-water (resale) 
H Business .1 
customers' I Wheelbarrow 
H 'Water I I I sellers 
Mining' I I H Coldwater I Customers 
sellers 
1valTown 
Kiosk Wheelbarrow I 
sellers j 
1 Gantry filling ~ I Customers I station In cars 
Areas without Customers I 
piped-water 
Fixed-tank Customers I 
Paynesville I Trucks ~ sellers borehole I Well-off 
households 
Figure E-11: Water supply options in Monrovia 
. Sourr:e: Author 
• Sanitation 
The various excreta disposal systems existing in Monrovia are: 
• Private pour-flush toilets equipped with septiC tanks, or connected to the city's sewerage 
network; 
• Public pour-flush toilets with the same configuration;, 
• Private overhung latrines in areas around Mesurado river swamp (Map E-9); 
• Private dry latrines; 
• Public dry latrines - usually VIP latrines 1 •. 
Open defecation is also common practice. Some people use the so-called 'doodoo bags', which 
are plastiC bags in which people defecate before disposing of them in refuse heaps . 
. A wastewater treatment plant used to serve the densely populated coastal strip through 61 km 
of line. It was located in Fiamah neighbourhood (Map E-9) and was discharging treated waste-
water into. both the Mesurado River and the sea. There were 4,000 registered connections 
(Willson, 2003: Appendix 3,4-5). In 2006, the plant was not functioning any more but some 
households were still connected to the sewerage network although it blocked in many places. 
1 See footnote page Errorl Bookmark not defined •. 
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Map E-9: Monrovia main water and sanitation systems 
Background map adapted from Smith and Kpakolo (2004) 
WATERBORNE SANITATION 
Well-off families of the central parts of Monrovia have toilets either equipped with septic 
tanks or connected to the sewerage network. A vacuum-truck, run by the utility, used to be· 
available to empty them, but broke down in 2006. 
There is a relatively dense network of public toilets in Monrovia - some of them owned by 
the government. Public toilets are also either connected to a septic tank or to the sewerage 
network. Caretakers are in charge of maintaining cleanliness of the toilets. 
DRY LATRINES 
Dry latrines are in use in areas of Bushrod Island as well as in peri-urban Greater Monrovia 
(Map E-9). Some are private, but the majority are public and have been built with the support 
of NGOs. A caretaker is in charge of the maintenance. The latrines can be either elevated or 
pit latrines, depending on the depth of the water table. 
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3.3 Water sector institutions 
Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (LWSC) is the public utility in charge of water services in 
urban areas of Liberia, defined as agglomerations with more than 5,000 inhabitants. It covers 
Monrovia and 10 other cities and town 1 (Willson, 2003). 
The institutional set-up in terms of water supply in Liberia is complex. It was being reviewed in 
2006. LWSC works jointly with institutions such as (Alegre, 2006:64): 
• The Liberian Hydrological Service for the exploitation of surface and groundwater re-
sources; 
• The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, who set standards for water quality control 
and environmental health; 
• The Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry Planning and Economic Affairs for the im-
plementation of infrastructure works. 
LWSC has the exclusive rights to produce and distribute water in the urban areas of Liberia. In 
2006, the institution employed 156 people, mostly in Monrovia (Alegre, 2006:68). It was heavily 
indebted. Its liabilities2 reached 33.4 million USD, of which 97 per cent was a foreign loan. Its op-
erational costs for water production amounted to 92,725 USD per month. Monthly income be-
tween February and April 2006 increased from 74,700 USD to 93,172 USD, with levels of unac-
counted-for water above 50 per cent (Alegre, 2006:68). 
Onsite sanitation -latrines and septic tanks - is in principle the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare whilst solid waste collection is managed by Monrovia City Corporation 
(MCC). 
3.4 Effects of the armed conflict 
• Buildings 
Monrovia's infrastructure was mostly spared during the early phase of the armed conflict. This 
changed with the 2003 crisis, which involved heavy weaponrY. Rocket attacks destroyed or 
heavily damaged a number of buildings in the capital . 
• Water supply and sewerage 
Rebel troops controlled and damaged White Plains treatment plant in June 1990. As a result, 
the city stopped being supplied. In July 1990, the Mount Coffee dam, that provided hydro-
electric power, collapsed. Since then, Monrovia has lacked a centralized power supply. Given 
its strategic location, the treatment plant area was again attacked three times -. in 1992, 1996, 
1 In which It served a total of only 35,000 people. 
2 In accounting: 'a liability is a present obligation of the enterprise ariSing from past events, the settlement of 
which is expected to result in an outflow from the enterprise of resources embodying economic benefits; Intema-
tional Accounting Standards Board (IASB) Framework [F.49(b)J. 
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and 2003. Between 1990 and 2003, interruptions and breakdowns totalled 24 months, about 15 
per cent of the total period (Smith and Kpakolo, 2004:11). With no piped-water, people had to 
rely solely on wells and rainwater. 
Piped-water supply was later restored but, until 2003, production did not exceed about 5 per 
cent of its pre-war level (Figure E-12). It increased slightly in 2004 and 2005, but only putting 
the 36' pipeline back in service, in July 2006, produced a substantial increase in supply. 
The drilling of two boreholes in Paynesville was a direct consequence of the crises, as was the 
previously described proliferation of independent providers. 
Fiamah wastewater treatment plant stopped functioning in the mid 1990s, but the lack of main-
tenance and design shortcomings were more to blame than effects of war (Smith and Kpakolo, 
2004:10). 
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Figure E-12: Water production for Monrovia in m3/day 
Based on Smith and Kpakolo, 20D4; Smith et aI, 2001; Alegre, 2006 and data col/ected from 
field-visits 
• Water sector institutions 
Before 1990, LWSC operated with a staff of 320 people and with 35 vehicles (Smith and Kpa-
kolo, 2004:10). After war reached Monrovia, LWSC gave up operations outside Monrovia. Most 
of its qualified engineers left, and by 2005 only two remained. All its vehicles were stolen, ex-
cept for a vacuum-truck used to service septic tanks, which broke down in 2006 . 
• Population 
In 1998, it was estimated that war in Liberia displaced two thirds of the country's population, 
equivalent to 1.5 million people. Many fled the northem regions where war was raging and 
moved to Monrovia (Posthumus, 1998). 
Between 1992 and 1995, about 200,000 people lived in camps around Monrovia (Atkinson and 
Mulbah, 2000). A survey carried out by the local NGO SELF1 in 1996 estimated Monrovia's 
1 Special Emergency Ufa Program. 
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population at 885,000 people (Browne and Tsikisayi, 2004:3-4). In 1998, there were still . 
150,000 people in camps and 45,000 living 'dangerously' in disaffected high-rise blocks in the 
capital (Posthumus, 1998). It is believed that the 2003 crisis displaced 300,000 people to Mon-
rovia (Briand et aI., 2003). They found refuge in private homes or public buildings, such as the 
national stadium. The population more than doubled between 1988 and 2003, from 400,000 . 
people to about one million. 
1,500,000 
885,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 
,~--~--.. ~,-~-~~~,~~-~"-"-"," , .. ~-~-
500,000 --..!~!~~ ._.-
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. 
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Figure E.13: Monrovia population 
Based on Perry, 1988; Browne and TsiklsaYI, 2004 and Smith and Kpak%, 2004 
The successive influxes of population created very densely populated areas. Still in 2006, areas 
such as Bushrod Island, where a majority of the urban poor lived were highly congested. The 
same could be said of Central Monrovia as shown in Map E-10. On Bushrod Island, highest 
population densities are often found around Mesurado river swamp (Map E-9), in particular in 
Clara Town and Logan Town. West Point, built on land reclaimed from the sea, is also very con-
gested. 
Levels of poverty in Monrovia are very high. In 2004, it was estimated that 80 per cent of Liberia's 
population live on less than a dollar a day (Smith, 2004:7) Unemployment is also very high and 
most of the employment is infonnal. No rigorous study of household income has been carried out 
in Monrovia in recent years; however, Browne and Tsikisayi (2004) guessed the average income 
to be between 20 and 50 USD per month. For rice alone, a family of five requires 19 USD per 
month, which means that for bare survival, 30 USD per month was necessary. The poverty line is 
around 40 USD per month. 
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3.5 Emergency response 
Selection of cases: 
# Aid "Interventions" Period 2006 status 
1 
2 
3 
Agency 
UNICEF I 
MSF- Bel-
gium 
ICRC 
GTZlMSF-
Belgium 
Support to the water utility, repairs on 
power supply 
Emergency water and power supplies 
for Monrovia 
Drilling of Paynesville boreholes, re-
pairs - including the installation of 
. generators- on White Plains water 
treatment plant 
1990-1991 Handed over to 
the ICRe 
Six months Handed over to 
in 1991 UNICEF 
1993 Commissioned . 
Water sector institution: LWSC 
Main sources of evidence: 
- Conference paper by Ockelford (1993); 
- Report by Smith et al (2001); 
- Visit to Monrovia in December 2005 . 
• Intervention 1: MSF-Belgium I UNICEF's support to water and power public utili-
ties, 1990-1991 
The involvement of MSF-Belgium in restoring power and water - an uncommon activity for the 
agency - only happened because no other agency was present in Monrovia when war broke 
out in December 1989. Until March 1990, the agency employed electrical and water engineers 
to assist LWSC and the power supply utility, Liberia Electricity Corporation (LEC). It is hard to 
assess the impact of this relatively short operation since actual fighting had not reached Mon-
rovia. 
In July 1990, the Mount Coffee power plant was attacked and ceased supplying both Monrovia 
city and White Plains water treatmeniplant with electricity. From September of that year, power 
supply was again established using a number of generators located on Bushrod Island. They 
were ordinarily used as a back-up power supply in the driest months of the year, when the water 
level in Mount Coffee dam was too low (Map E-9). These generators functioned, albeit with nu- . 
merous technical problems, until November 1990, when diesel stocks ran out. 
In December 1990, MSF brought two engineers to carry out repairs to the power plant. At that 
time, UNICEF had retumed to the country after its withdrawal at the beginning of the crisis. The 
, 
organisation took over from MSF supporting the power plant, which was running at only 25 per 
cent of its capacity. It also took over support to the operation of the water treatment plant. 
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In 1990 and 1991, the interventions by MSF and UNICEF prevented water and power supplies 
from being totally interrupted. Levels of service, whilst basic, did not fall under the 'emergency 
line,1, which explains a remark by Ockelford (1993) pointing out that 'it was difficult to define an 
emergency' . 
• Intervention 2: leRe's emergency water and power supplies for Monrovia, 1991 
The ICRC started operations in Monrovia in December 1990. Its initial activity was constructing 
. and rehabilitating shallow wells throughout the city. 
From March to October 1991, the organisation took over from UNICEF as the main partner to 
the water and power utilities. It started a six month project that consisted of: 
• The rehabilitation of Bushrod Island power station; 
• The provision of equipment to White Plains water treatment plant; 
• Repairs on the water distribution network, including the construction of 52 public tap-
stands; and 
• Incentive payments2 for LWSC personnel. 
In order to limit the consumption of chemicals, water production was restricted to 30 per cent of 
the plant capacity. By October 2001, the volumes produced fluctuated between 22,500 and 
37,500 m3/day (Figure E-12). The programme was later handed back to UNICEF. 
OBJECTIVES AND TARGET POPULATION 
The operation was the continuation of what had been started by MSF-Belgium and UNICEF 
and aimed at limiting the incidence of diarrhoeal diseases. In was justified by a survey car-
ried out by MSF-Belgium in February 1991 of 302 households representing 4,191 people, 
that showed a mortality rate of 40 deaths/1000 people/year, up from 17 deaths/1000 peo-
ple/year in 19863 (Smith et aI., 2001 :15). 
Water was distributed to Bushrod Island, Sinkor and Paynesville (Map E-9), serving slightly 
more than 100,000 people as well as govemmental and intemational institutions4• 
COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE ICRC AND LWSCs 
LWSC personnel managed the entire operation, albeit with technical support and incentives 
to staff paid by the ICRC. 
1 See Figure 8-25 page 109. 
2 See Footnote 1 page 119. . 
3 40 deathsl1OO0 people/ year = 1.09 deaths / 10.000 people / day, considered as 'very serious~ see 
page 66. The 1986 value was provided by Liberia Demographic Health Survey. 
In particular ECOMOG. 
5 Liberia Electricity Corporation was also involved. 
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LINKS BETWEEN THE ICRC AND THE TARGET POPULATION 
No evidence of any. 
EFFICIENCY / EFFECTIVENESS 
The operation proved to be a quick and effective way of supplying 100,000 people with water 
. of a reliable quality. The collaboration with LWSC appears to have been essential to the 
success of the operation, in particular because ICRC staff on their own would have had diffi-
culties to cope with the technical complexity of the systems - in particular the treatment 
plant. 
SUSTAINABILITY 
The operation depended entirely on the provision of parts and consumables by the ICRC and . 
was meant to help public utilities to recOver and resume their normal service. It was therefore 
not sustainable but time-bounded . 
• Intervention 3: GTZ I MSF-Belgium boreholes drilling and rehabilitation of White 
Plains treatment plant. 
Following another attack on White Plains on the 19th of October 1992, water supply was again 
interrupted. Immediately, UNICEF and LWSC identified seven large-diameter wells from where 
. water could be trucked throughout the city. From the 21 st of October, 24 trucks delivered up to 
600 m3 per day of water. Water-trucking involved LWSC, UNICEF, MSF-Belgium and the ICRC. 
In 1993, two boreholes were drilled by MSF-Belgium and GTZ in Paynesville (Map E-9) on rec-
ommendation from UNICEF. These were used for water-trucking and replaced the large-
diameter wells. GTZ also rehabilitated White Plains treatment plant. The power plant on Bush-
rod Island was replaced by diesel generators in situ. The plant delivered 7,100 to 7,500 m3/day 
to Bushrod Island, only through the 16" line (Figure E-12). From there, it could be trucked to dif-
ferent areas of the city. The operation was funded by ECHO and water was delivered free of 
charge until 1995. 
OBJECTIVES AND TARGET POPULATION 
After the April 1992 attack on Monrovia, the operation started to acquire all the characteris-
tics of an emergency. Water-trucking and securing a safe and reliable source of water be-
came even more essential to prevent waterbome diseases. The number of. cases of diar-
rhoeal diseases - including cholera - increased considerably in November 1992 to about 
7,000 cases and climbed over 10,000 cases in January 1994 (Smith et aI., 2001:20). 
Water was distributed to every area with tankers filling a number of storage tanks distributed 
around the city as well as to hospitals and institutions. 
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EFFICIENCY / EFFECTIVENESS 
The replacement I repair of generators in the White Plains water treatment plant was aimed 
to diversify water sources and limit the distance from where tankers had to distribute water 
since they could refill from the city centre. The role of LWSC in operating White Plains as 
well as Paynesville boreholes was essential. 
SUSTAINABILITY 
This emergency situation, with trucks delivering water across the city became 'normality' in 
Monrovia. It was still the prevalent situation in 2006, although piped-water supply considera-
bly increased after July of the same year. LWSC had to adapt to this situation and find ways, 
with the assistance of aid agencies, of making supply sustainable. 
3.6 Rehabilitation 
Selection of cases: 
# Aid Agency "InterventIons" Period 2006 Status 
1 EDFI Essential repairs and support to 1996-2003 Completed 
Geoscience LWSC 
2 EDF Rehabilitation of Monrovia 'water 2005-2006 Ongoing 
IHydroplan/Wor1d distribution network and water dis-
Bank tribution reform 
3 Oxfam Water and sanitation project in Since 05/2005 Ongoing 
Clara Town 
4 UNICEF Support to water supply in Central Since 06/2004 Ongoing 
Monrovia 
Water sector institution: LWSC 
• Intervention 1: EDF/Geoscience water distribution network rehabilitation and sup-
port to LWSC, 1996-2003 
Main sources of evidence: 
- Geoscience reports (Geoscience, 1998; Smith, 2001; Smith, 2004); 
- Interview of John Kpakolo, former LWSC Deputy Managing Director for Technical Ser-
vices, in Monrovia in December 2005 (Pinera, 2005b: Appendix 3); 
- Contacts with Craig C. Smith, former Geoscience Technical Assistant in Monrovia. 
The European Development Fund (EDF) funded GTZ in 1995 and early 1996 to truck water and 
carry out essential repairs in collaboration with LWSC. 
In May 1996 the commercial consulting firm 'Geoscience' took over for a six months project enti-
tled: 'Maintenance of water supply of the population of Monrovia'. This first phase was extended 
185 
E. Review of the Case Studies 
to eight months and lasted until February 1997. Funding was again extended three more times 
and lasted until October 2003. From February 1997, the project also covered rural areas . 
. The main tasks carried out were: 
• Support to water production: equipment was repaired or replaced in the White Plains wa-
ter plant. Fuel, lubricants, and chemicals were also provided; 
• Support to water distribution: construction/rehabilitation of overhead tanks, leak detection 
and control, water-trucking; 
• Institutional strengthening: support to cost recovery, reduction of staff on a voluntary ba-
sis; 
• Incentive payments for staff; 
• Supply/repairslhire of vehicles, including two vacuum trucks 1; 
• Public wells rehabilitation I chlorination; 
• Removal of sludge from the sewerage system; 
• Removal of refuse; 
• Clearance of drains. 
Between 1997 and 2003, funding from EDF reached almost 8 million USD, of which 70 per cent 
was spent in Monrovia. 
OBJECTIVES AND TARGET POPULATION 
As far as Monrovia was concemed, the objective of the project was to maintain piped water 
supplies at a sustainable level. For that, particular attention was paid to the cost-recovery 
capacity of LWSC. 
The target population was LWSC customers, but beyond that, the whole population of Mon-
rovia was reached given the existing complex pattern of water vendors and re-selling 
schemes (Figure E-11). In addition, some 'humanitarian water trucking' was carried out, that 
provided water free of charge to some pOints of the capital. 
Another target of the programme was LWSC itself to try and improve its efficiency at deliver-
ing water services. 
COLLABORATION BETWEEN GEOSCIENCE AND LWSC 
LWSC personnel were implementing the programme, whilst Geoscience had only one expa-
triate on site, in charge of monitoring expenditure. Despite this close collaboration, LWSC 
personnel complained that more capacity building could have taken place. For instance, 
Geoscience sometimes decided to recruit extemal contractors when LWSC personnel could 
have done the job and taken the opportunity to get trained. It is likely that deadlines and tar-
1 Today one of them has disappeared; the other one has broken down. 
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gets imposed by the contract between EDF and Geoscience led to such practices since con-
tractors were likely be more efficient than LWSC personnel. In 1998, Geoscience expressed 
pessimism regarding the capacity of LWSC to run the service and recommended private 
sector participation: 
'The project did not make any progress in the general objective of nurturing 
LWSC to become an independent, self-sustaining institution. On the contrary, the 
performance of the present LWSC staff ( ... ) is so poor that the water system can 
be expected to fail within a matter of weeks if daily, hands-on support is with-
drawn. In this respect, the project was still basically an emergency programme 
but with essential development components. One obvious antidote to the looming 
dependency syndrome is to preempt the privatisation option and franchise, with-
out delay, certain activities to private sector specialists' (Geoscience, 1998). 
An important factor to be taken into account is that, at the time of Charles Taylor's admini-
stration, no encouragement was given by government officials to the development of reliable 
public institutions. 
LINKS BETWEEN GEOSCIENCE AND THE TARGET POPULATION 
There was no direct contact between Geoscience and the ultimate beneficiaries of the pro-
gramme I.e~ Monrovia residents. 
EFFICIENCY I EFFECTIVENESS 
Efficiency was probably increased by falling back on external contractors for most of the re-
habilitation work carried out. Yet, this was done at the expense of sustainability . 
. The programme helped maintain water production, albeit at very modest levels - not more 
than 5 per cent of the nominal capacity in 2003. Given LWSC's limited number of private 
customers, most of its impact was linked to the activities carried out by private trucks and 
vendors. 
SUSTAINABILITY 
As reflected in the above mentioned quotation by Geoscience, LWSC was considered - in 
1998 - as poorly prepared to run the service and depended heavily on EDF subsidies, even 
for consumables and salaries. When EDF funding was interrupted in 2004, the utility man-
aged to maintain water production only by getting into debt with local banks. 
Cost recovery at the end of phase 11 (1998) was considered better than expected but unac-
counted-for water remained at very high levels, over 60 per cent. 
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APPROPRIATENESS 
Groundwater appears to be the most appropriate source for the inhabitants of the peri-urban 
areas of Monrovia 1 because it is abundant, usually of good quality and obtained free of 
charge. 
The situation is very different in the densely populated city centre. People living in this area 
heavily rely on piped-water2, directly, for a tiny minority, and through trucks and vendors for 
the vast majority. For this reason, supporting the O&M of the water distribution network was 
an appropriate option which benefited a large population. 
COVERAGE 
As mentioned earlier, the programme benefited the area covered by the network - Bushrod 
Island and West Point see Map E-9 - and the rest of the city through trucks and vendors . 
• Intervention 2: Eu/Hydroplan and the World Bank water distribution network re-
habilitation and support to LWSC, 2005-2006 
Main sources of evidence: 
- Interview with John Kpakolo, former LWSC Deputy Managing Director for Technical 
Services, in Monrovia, in December 2005 (Pinera, 2005b: Appendix 3); 
- Interview with Achim Riidinge and Franck Rogalla, representatives of Hydroplan, in 
Monrovia, in December 2005 (Pinera, 2005b: Appendix 4); . 
- MSc. thesis by Silvia Alegre who carried out field work in Monrovia in July 2006, and 
met LWSC , a representative from EU, Achim Riidinge from Hydroplan, and a represen-
tative from the World Bank (Alegre, 2006). 
From 2004, the EU decided to carry out a number of assessments in order to redefine the orien-
tation of the assistance it had been providing until 2003 through Geoscience. Four studies were 
launched with the collaboration of intemational consultants. They covered the following fields: 
1. Hydro-geological conditions in Monrovia and surrounding areas; 
2. Water demand and market study in Monrovia (Browne and Tsikisayi, 2004); 
. 3. Water law in Liberia; 
4. LWSC marketability. 
These studies recommended supporting the introduction of the private sector in the manage-
ment of Monrovia water distribution network. Initially, an intemational bidding process was tried 
but no company was ready to risk investing in Monrovia's water supply. It was then decided to 
divide Monrovia into concessions3 to be exploited by private companies or local user groups. 
Selected companies or user groups would have to make the investments necessary to provide 
1 Greater Monrovia, see Map E-9. 
2 Less so in the rainy season due to rain-water harvesting. 
3 See definition page 56. 
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the level of service selected for the concerned areas. They may choose between private con-
nections, water-kiosks, water-trucking, or a combination of these solutions. LWSC would still be 
in charge of water production and of the delivery of water to the various concessions through 
the transmission lines. This is what LWSC called the 'liberalization' of water supply. 
This project required repairing the 36" and 16" transmission lines and increasing water produc- . 
tion. In 2004, the EU agreed to fund this part of the project1, for which it allocated a 4 million 
USD budgef. This would also cover the rehabilitation of White Plains water production plant. 
The distribution lines, which are in a poor condition, and on which a large number of households 
are illegally connected, would then be disconnected for each concessionaire to register custom-
ers and organise its service. 
The plan was to create concessions according to the current. administrative division of Mon-
rovia. This is not official but widely accepted (Map E-10). The process would take place under 
the supervision of a regulatory body, with representation from the concessionaires, the govern-
ment and the consumers. This body would determine tariffs for the water sold to the private 
companies. The tariffs imposed on consumers would be decided by the private companies ac-
. cording to the level of investment involved. The granting of concession would be the responsibil-
ityofLWSC. 
It was also planned to explore the Paynesville area for possible new deep wells. If successful, 
these would eventually partially or totally replace the White Plains water treatment plant. The 
World Bank was ready to finance this part ofthe project with a budget of 2.5 million USD. 
This programme was initiated in March 2005 and the first concessions were expected to be 
granted by mid 2006. The German engineering firm 'Hydroplan' managed the part of the project 
funded by the EU. 
The 2005 presidential election contributed to considerable modifications of this plan. In Febru-
ary 2006, the government changed and so did LWSC's management board. The new govern-
ment was committed to an increased piped-water supply in Monrovia within six months. A 
budget of 450,000 USD from the government, complemented by 100,000 USD from LWSC, was 
used to repair the 36" transmission line and, as promised, by the 26th of July, water had reached 
areas of Central Monrovia after almost 15 years of interruption. Water production increased al-
mostfourfold (Figure E-12). 
There were a number of disagreements between the new LWSC management board and Hy-
droplan. The main one was the reluctance of LWSC to replace the White Plains treatment plant 
with new boreholes in Paynesville. LWSC prefered a rehabilitation of the treatment plant, argu-
ing that this solution was cheaper - 450,000 USD instead of 2.5 million USD for two new bore-
1 Clarifications about the exact source of funding were not sought during the InteNiews, but it is likely to be EDF 
via EuropeAid. 
2 3 million EUR. 
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holes. It was also faster and avoided the risk of sea-water intrusion. Hydroplan argued in turn 
that operational costs almost doubled those of exploiting two boreholes and that the decision to 
rehabilitate White Plains was mainly politically motivated. The World Bank's revised strategy 
was an additional blow to Hydroplan's position. The institution decided to support the rehabilita-
tion of White Plains with a budget of up to 5 million USD and to limit the budget allocated to new 
boreholes to only 400,000 USD. 
In the end, it was agreed in a memorandum of understanding that, as a first phase: 
, 
• The World Bank would support the rehabilitation of White Plains treatment plant and of 
the 36" transmission line but would not support an increase in water production that 
would be kept to January 2006 levels of 4,500 m3/day; 
• "The govemrnent would have to pay for extra fuel to increase water production up to 
18,000 m3/day;" 
• The EU would support the rehabilitation ofthe 16" transmission line to Bushrod Island. 
The organisation of water distribution through concessions would be part of a second phase 
that the E!;l agreed to support. The new LWSC management seemed keen to involve the com-
inunity in the management of these concessions and had already planned to turn abandoned 
public tap-stands into new water-kiosks for low-income areas. 
At this stage, it is hard to draw conclusions in terms of impact for a project that has been evolv-
ing with the political changes taking place in the country. It is hoWever interesting to follow the 
evolution of the rapport de force between LWSC and its potential donors from one of clear mis-
trust but submission of LWSC to the conditions imposed by the 'international community', to one 
in which LWSC is clearly retaking the initiative. Time will tell whether LWSC can be reborn from 
its ashes under the impulse of its new management. 
Including PSP in the project raises the question of whether sustainability is not sought at the 
expense of universal service. Whilst private operators are likely to be found for Central Mon-
rovia and other areas where a relatively large number of well-off customers are present, it may 
be more difficult for low-income areas. Moreover, there are concerns about affordability given 
that the investment necessary for rehabilitating the distribution network will have to be recouped 
through the water sales. In this regard, the regulatory board to be put in place would have a 
fundamental role to play . 
• Intervention 3: Oxfam's project in Clara Town, since OS/2005 
Main sources of evidence: 
" - An Oxfam report (Oxfam, 2005); 
- Interview with Silvia Alegre who visited the project in July 2006; 
- Field visit in December 2005. 
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Clara Town is one of the most densely populated areas of Bushrod Island (Map E-10). It is a 
low-income area with very poor urban services, especially roads and drainage. However it is 
supplied with piped water like the rest of Bushrod Island. The neighbourhood has also 11 blocks 
of public toilets, which have been abandoned for several years .. 
People obtain drinking water primarily from illegal vendors, the so called 'water miners'l. About 
60 of them operate in the area. Clara Town usually receives piped-water daily,from approxi-
mately 6AM to 2PM. The rest of the time, the distribution network, which is in a very poor state, 
is not under pressure and vulnerable to surface water seepage. This is likely to be heavily con-
taminated because of the lack of appropriate sanitation in ttie area. The accumulation of surface 
water in the holes or manholes used by 'water miners' increases the threat of contamination 
(Photograph E-2). 
The project consisted, on the one hand, of ensuring that water delivery is hygienic and on the 
other of helping the community get organised and obtain the legalisation of their water 'miners'. 
Oxfam selected 38 of them and started improving distribution by installing proper plumbing on 
connections to the network as well as 2000 litre plastiC water tanks allowing a more constant 
distribution (Photograph E-3). Vendors recognised by the community would have the exclusive 
right of selling water in the area. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between 
the community, Oxfam and LWSC for this project, implemented through a CBO. 
Oxfam also planned the rehabilitation of the 11 blocks of public toilets. These toilets are 
equipped with septic tanks connected to the sewerage network, today out of order. 
The project was funded by ECHO. 
Photograph E·2: 'Water mining' in Clara Town Photograph E-3: Reservoirs installed by Oxfam 
Source: Author 
1 See page 172. 
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OBJECTIVES AND TARGET POPULATION 
Clara Town is considered as one of Monrovia's 'cholera hot spots'. Monrovia suffers from 
outbreaks every year and risks have increased as a consequence of the war (Briand et aI., 
2003). Ensuring the distribution of clean water in the area is aimed at limiting this threat. 
The project was meant to cover the whole neighbourhood, a population estimated at 75,000 
people' in 2005. 
COLLABORATION BETWEEN OXFAM AND LWSC 
The collaboration between Oxfam and LWSC was key to ensure the sustainability ofthe pro-
ject and was formalized through a MoU, which also involved the community. It was more a 
recognition ofthe project by LWSC than a real operational partnership. 
The new water selling points were meant to function as water-kiosks, equipped with water 
meters. The former water miners would become legal LWSC customers. 
LINKS BETWEEN OXFAM AND THE TARGET POPULATION 
The community was in charge of monitoring the price at which water was sold, and the level 
of hygiene surrounding water distribution. For this purpose, Oxfam tried to support the CBO 
in charge of the implementation, improving its capacity through on-field training. Oxfam so-
cial workers admitted that this was a difficult task. 
EFFICIENCY / EFFECTIVENESS 
Unfortunately, one of the fundamental flaws of the project was linked to the functioning of the 
water distribution network itself. Because of low pressure, the newly-installed water reser-
voirs could not fill up. However, since the pressure increased at the end of July 2006, this 
may have changed for the better. 
A similar problem compromises the effectiveness of the rehabilitation of the toilet blocks: in 
2006, there was no vacuum-truck available in the city able to service them2• There was no 
concrete information on whether this service will soon be again available but this is likely to 
happen because of important demand. 
SUSTAINABILITY 
As far as water distribution is concemed, it is too early to evaluate the sustainability of the· 
project since only few of the new water distribution points were put into operation. It depends 
on several factors such as sufficient pressure maintained in the network and a proper super-
vision from LWSC and from the CBO involved. The project contributed to the sustainability of 
the service offered by LWSC by reducing the number of illegal water sellerS. 
f According to Hie, see Map E-l0. 
2 Apart from one owned by the UN peace-keepers UNMIL. 
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The same applies to the rehabilitation of the toilets as none of them were functioning at the 
time of the study. The absence of a vacuum-truck is likely to be resolved in the near future 
but the service may come at a price too high to be affordable for low-income communities. 
Another problematic issue is that achieving sust;;linability would have required Oxfam to fol~ 
low-up the project over a relatively long period, which was clearly incompatible with ECHO 
funding. 
APPROPRIATENESS 
The project adapted to the reality of water supply in Monrovia, which is a service provided by 
SSIPs. NGOs tend to avoid working with SSIPs because they often consider it is like sup-
porting private interests instead of the interests of the community. Oxfam's choice was a re-
alistic and pragmatic one and seemed the most appropriate, if not the only one possible, in 
an area such as Clara Town. 
COVERAGE 
The services supported by the project covers the whole neighbourhood . 
• Intervention 4: UNICEF's project in Central Monrovia, since 06/2004 
Main sources of evidence: 
- MSc. thesis by Silvia Alegre (Alegre, 2006); 
- A UNICEF-sponsored publication (Slavin, 2006); 
- Interview",:,ith UNICEF WASH1 project manager in Monrovia, Kabuka M. Banda (Pinera, 
2005b: Appendix 4); 
- Field visit in December 2005. 
Since June 2004, UNICEF has been supporting eight communities in Central Monrovia zone B 
(Map E-10) by donating a number of plastic water reservoirs, with a total capacity of about 150 
m3• The project encouraged communities to manage water distribution by creating water com-
mittees and avoiding intermediary water sellers. 
UNICEF delivered water for free during one or two months. The sale of this water was meant to 
create sufficient cash-flow to allow the· communities to buy from private tankers and maintain 
the service. This stage was scheduled for January 2006 but happened only in April of the same 
year. However, some of the community had already taken the initiative of starting the service by 
funding the initial purchase of water themselves. 
1 'Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene' partnership. 
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OBJECTIVES AND TARGET POPULATION 
The main objective of the project was a more regular service with better prices and constant 
quality that would benefit the health of the community. 
The total population covered was almost 58,000 people 1. 
COLLABORATION BETWEEN UNICEF AND LWSC 
The role of LWSC was mainly to partiCipate in the training of the water committees. 
UNICEF's main partner was Monrovia City Corporation (MCC). 
LINKS BETWEEN UNICEF AND THE TARGET POPULATION 
UNICEF and its partners had to maintain a regular presence in the area in order to promote 
the creation of water committees, which were elected by the community. 
EFFICIENCY / EFFECTIVENESS 
It is unclear why a project that was launched in June 2004, only started to be fully imple-
mented in April 2006. At least two of the eight communities did not wait that long before tak-
ing the initiative of using the provided water reservoirs. 
Once started, the project is likely to improve the quality of life in the area by providing a regu-
lar and secure source of water. 
SUSTAINABILITY 
This project may be short-lived if the supply of piped-water in the area, which restarted in 
July 2006, remains regular. It may however stay in place even if this happens, as a comple-
ment to piped-water. Sustainability depends on a regular cost-recovery and therefore on how 
capable and trustworthy water committees are. 
APPROPRIATENESS 
The project responded to a demand from the population, who complained about high prices 
and irregular service from pushcart water vendors. The system was the easiest and most 
obvious one to be put in place. 
COVERAGE 
The project covered the entire population of the target neighbourhoods. 
1 Population figures from HIe. 
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4. Beni, Democratic Republic of Congo 
Bani is a town situated near the northern border of the North-Kivu province, south of the Ituri re-
gion, in the north-east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Until the approval of the Feb-
ruary 2006 constitution, Ituri was a region of the 'Haut-Congo,1 province bordering with Uganda 
(Map E-11). The new constitution has replaced the 10 provinces shown in Map E-11 by a new 
division into 25 provinces, Ituri being one ofthem (Wikipedia, 2006). 
Bani's population was estimated at 240,000 people in 2006 (Neumann, 2006). 
Map E-11: Democratic Republic of Congo 
Source: IGRG (adapted) www.icrc.org 
The DRC has more than 250 ethnic groups and almost as many languages. However, four lan-
guages have the status of national languages: Lingala, spoken in Kinshasa and in the northem 
half of the countrl, Swahili, spoken in the eastem part of the country, including the Kivu3, 
Kong04, spoken in the south-west and Tshiluba5 spoken in the south, mostly in the Kasai region. 
1 Also known as 'Province Orienta/e'. 
2 Ungala is also spoken in large parts of the Republic of Congo and in areas of the Central African Republic and 
of Angola. . 
3 Swahili, also called Kiswahili, is spoken by 50 million people across East-Africa, from Southern Somalia to Mo-
zambique. 
4 Kongo or Kikongo Is also spoken in parts of the Republic of Congo and of Angola. 
5 Also called Luba-Kasai and Luba-Lulua. 
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80 per cent of the Congolese are Christians, of which Roman Catholics make up the majority 
(Wikipedia, 2006). 
4.1 Historical background 
The Democratic Republic of Congo was affected by war soon after its independence in 1961 
when two of its southem provinces declared independence. After the seizure of power by Mobutu 
in 1965, the country remained mostly peaceful despite episodes of civil unrest in the eastem and 
southem provinces. In 1996, the rebellion of the "Banyamulenge', an ethnic group of the Kivu 
provinces (Map E-11), was the beginning of a war that ended with Mobutu's regime and involved 
several neighbouring countries. From 1999, Eastern Congo was also affected by the war oppos-
ing two ethnic groups of the Ituri region (Map E-11): the Hemas and the Lendus. Historical events 
in the DRC are summarized in Box E-1. More details can be found in Appendix 3. 
Intensity of armed conflict (Uppsala University, 2006): 
• 1960-1962 - Katanga and Kasai conflicts: minor; 
• 1964-1965: war; 
• 1967: minor; 
• 1977-78: minor, possibly war; 
• 1996: minor; 
• 1997-2000: war; 
• 2001: minor, possibly war. 
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Box E·1: Timeline Democratic Republic of Congo 
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4.2 Water and sanitation systems 
• Water Supply 
The main water sources in Beni are (Solidarites, 2003a): 
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• A large number of rivers and streams, which cross the city. Water becomes very turbid . 
during the rainy season and is heavily contaminated because of the poor level of sanita-
tion; 
• . Rainwater, collected in most houses during the rainy season; 
• Private hand-dug wells, which equip most households. They are unprotected and, as in 
the case of the rivers and streams, their water becomes very dirty during the rainy sea- . 
son; 
• Between 30 and 40 springs located in the city centre and in the pe ri-urban area. About a 
third of them have been protected, sometimes with the support of local NGOs or of 'Soli- . 
darites'. The bacteriological quality of their water is poor since some of these springs are 
located in densely populated areas. Nevertheless, this water is used for drinking and 
cooking; 
• Two separate water distribution neiworks supply the city: 
- The original one, built by the water utility between 1977 and 1984, supplies the city cen-
tre as well as the agricultural products treatment factories located at the north of the 
town. It has about 600 private connections and probably many more illegal ories. The 40 
water-kiosks that were originally built have been broken down and abandoned. The 
network is fed by a water treatment plant using water from the Tua River. Water is dis-
tributed on only two half days per week. The quality of the water supplied by this net-
work is unreliable due to poor monitoring by the utility; 
- A new water distribution network, built with assistance from the French NGOs 'Solidari-
tes' and Aquassistance between 2003 and 2005, for areas of the city not supplied by the 
original network. This project is studied in details hereafter1 • 
• Sanitation 
Most households have a dry latrine. Houses located in the city centre are usually equipped with 
pits or septic tanks. Open defecation is common practice. 
4.3 Water sector institutions 
The water utility 'Regie de distribution d'eau de la Republique Democratique du Congo' 
(REGIDESO) is a state-owned enterprise under the Ministry of Energi and the Ministry of 
1 See page 200. 
2 Ministere de I'Energie. 
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Budgetl, which has exclusive rights on water production and distribution in the DRC. It is respon-
, sible both for urban and rural water supply, run by different sub-sectors within the institution. 
REGIDESO has branches in 11 provinces and runs 94 supply centres. In 2005, the utility em-
ployed 4633 people, 2500 of them in Kinshasa (Bousquet and Katende Muya, 2005:4). 
REGIDESO-Blmi is under Goma's provinciaroffice (Map E-11).lt had 13 employees at the end of 
1996, and approximately the same number in 2003 (Solidarites, 2003a:10). 
At national level, cost recovery by REGIDESO was considered 'very poor' in 2005 (Bousquet and 
Katende Muya, 2005:4). National average does not exceed 15 per cent (Neumann, 2006). Beni is 
no exception: In 2001, only 45 per cent of the bills for private customers were paid, the situation 
was much worse in the case of administrations, which rarely pay their water-bills (Solidarites, 
2003a:12). 
4.4 Effects of the armed conflict 
No fighting took place in Beni during the wars in the Kivu and in Ituri but the town was affected by 
the disorganisation of its water supply and by a large influx of IDPs . 
• Water supply and the water utility 
The volume of water sold by REGIDESO in Beni has decreased from a peak in 1988 at 
250,000 m3 down to 69,000 m3 in 1993. Production later increased slowly to reach 122,000 m3 
in 1996, less than half of what was produced a decade earlier. The number of private custom-
ers also diminished. It went from 927 in 1992 down to about 600 in 1996 (Figure E-14). 1996 
levels of water production and the number of customers were maintained until the end of 2005 
. when the new water treatment plant came into service. 
The reasons to the decline in sales are multiple. Not all of them are directly linked to the anned 
conflict situation (Solidarites, 2003a:10-11): 
• In 1990 and 1991 'Tracheomycosis', also known as Coffee Wilt Disease appeared in the 
region and affected the coffee processing plants present in Beni, which closed and dis-
missed their employees; . 
• In 1990, a severe economic crisis affected Zaire, which reduced ~he level of income of its 
population and the activity of commercial enterprises such as hotels and restaurants. 
Supplies from REGIDESO headquarters in Kinshasa also became more irregular; 
• Finally, in 1993, due to high inflation, REGIDESO-Beni decided to index water tariffs on 
the value of the US Dollar, which produced a sudden and considerable increase in the 
price of water, resulting in the loss of one third of its customers. 
1 Ministere du Portefeuille. 
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The effect of the two armed conflicts both at the north and the south of Beni - respectively Ituri 
and North-Kivu -contributed even further to the deterioration of the service and lack of mainte-
nance. Some of the equipment and vehicles belonging to REGIOESO-Beni were looted during 
the political turmoil affecting the region. Functioning pressure dropped to 2 bars, with about 40 
per cent leakage. The main 1,600 m3 storage reservoir was taken out of service in 1997 and di-
rect pumping, with only one failing pump, was carried out. 85% of bills from commercial custom-
ers remained unpaid. The repayment rate for govemment institutions and warring factions pre-
sent in Beni was even lower. As a result of the de facto easVwest partition of the country, and de-
spite the peace accords, REGIOESO-Beni, like many other government institutions, has been cut 
from Kinshasa headquarters and worked autonomously. It kept only loose links with its regional 
headquarters in Goma (Solidarites, 2003a:11). Given the centralized nature of the institution, the 
absence of support from Kinshasa headquarters was dramatically felt. However, this situation has 
evolved for the better with the 2006 political changes in the country. 
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Figure E·14: Annual volume of water sold by REGIDESO and number of customer in Benl, 
1985·1996 . 
Source: REGIDESO-Beni cited by Solidarites, 2003 :11 
• Population 
Beni's population has more than doubled between 1988 and 2002 (Figure E-15). There was a 
clear acceleration in population growth in 1998, due to the wars in the Kivu and Ituri regions. 
Beni, where several high-ranking political and military leaders were based, was considered as a 
safe haven and sheltered about 40,000 lOPs in 2002 (Solidarites, 2003a:6). 
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4.5 Rehabilitation 
Selection of cases: 
Aid Agency 'Intervention' Period 2006 status 
'Solidarites'l Aquassistance New water distribution network 2003-2005 Commissioned 
construction 
Water sector institution: REGIDESO 
Main sources of evidence: 
- Reports by 'Solidarites' (Solidantes, 2003a; Solidarites, 2003b; Soiidarites, 2005); 
- An article published by the French economic magazine 'L'Expansion', in July-August 
2006, based on a visit of a special envoy to Beni during the year following the comple-
tion of the project (Neumann, 2006); 
- Report by Bemard Auclair, member of Aquassistance (Auclair, 2005a); 
- Interview with Bemard Auclair in December 2005, in Paris (Auclair, 20035b); 
- Contact with Francois Bellet,'Solidarites' head of mission in Goma, DRC, who was 
based in Beni during the implementation of the project (Bellet, 2006). 
REGIDESO-Beni first contacted 'Solidaiites' in July 2000, requesting the construction of a water 
intake on the Matepe River to replace the original treatment plant using water from the Tua River, 
An official request was transmitted in December 2001, Following an initial assessment, 'Solidari-
tes' proposed, in addition to a new intake, to build a new distribution scheme with water-kiosks, to 
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cover the area of the town not served by the original network. Both water schemes would share 
an existing 1,600 m3 storage reservoir, to be rehabilitated. 
The project comprised three phases, the first one, initiated in October 2003 and completed in Oc-
tober 2005, was considered as 'post-emergency', and was funded by EuropeAid, with approxi-
mately 3.3 million USD 1. 
It included (Figure E-16): 
• Two water intakes on Matepe and Biautu river, with a total of 12 km .pipelines; 
• A new water treatment plant and the rehabilitation of a 1,600 m3 storage reservoir, 
• A 15 km transmission line; 
• A new distribution network totalling 34 km of pipes; 
• A new 200 m3 balance reservoir; 
• 54 water-kiosks, each equipped with a 10m3 reservoir, and 10 taps (Photograph E-4). 
The water treatment plant was designed by the French water treatment firm Aquatrium2• The 
process used is called 'Retrofiltration®'. It is a biological slow sand-filtration process, adapted to 
the treatment of waters with low turbidity levels. It was selected because of its simplicity, relatively 
low cost, low maintenance and low energy consumption. The plant had a treatment capacity of 
100 m3/hour. Its cost of the treatment plant was approximately 430,000 USD3, not including 
65,000 USD4 paid to Aquatrium for design and training. In addition to the biological treatment, the 
water was chlorinated 
Aquassistance provided human resources and equipment. The organisation worked closely with 
'Solidarites' on assisting REGIDESO to design a management framework for the new system. It 
also provided technical advice on the various components of the infrastructure., Aquassistance 
initiated its involvement in the project in 2003, when objectives and some of the technical options 
were already defined. 
'2,574,872 EUR. 
2 www.aquatrlum.com. 
3330,000 EUR. 
, 50,000 EUR. 
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Figure E-16: Benl water distribution network 
Source: Solidarites, 2005 
Photograph E-4: Beni's water-kiosks . 
Source: Solidarites, 2006. www.solidarites.om 
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• Objectives and target population 
The project's general objective was to ensure a sufficient and permanent water supply for the 
entire population of BEmi, estimated at 176,000 people in 2002. 
Three specific objectives were considered: 
1. To address the needs of the population of Beni for at least 10 years by constructing a new 
gravity-fed water distribution network; 
. 2. To guarantee the financial and technical sustainability of piped-water supply by strength-
ening the capacity of local stakeholders and supporting the design of management pat-
tems; 
3. To raise awareness among users regarding the O&M of the network. 
The old network supplied 600 private households, representing about 6,000 people. The new 
one targeted about 155,500 people living in 12 neighbourhoods . 
• Collaboration between 'Solidarites' I Aquassistance and REGIDESO-Beni. 
On the 3rd of December 2003, an agreement was signed between 'Solidarites', REGIDESO-
Beni and Beni Municipal Council regarding the. implementation of the project. This agreement 
established a partnership between REGIDESO and 'Solidarites' regarding the implementation of 
infrastructure works as well as the social and institutional aspects of the project. In accordance 
with this agreement: 
• 'Solidarites' coordinated the implementation of the project, sometimes using contractors 
supervised by both 'Solidarites' and REGIDESO; . 
• 'Solidarites' was in charge of implementing the most 'sensitive' tasks such as stock man-
agement and procurement.· This was, in principle, done 'in collaboration' with. 
REGIDESO; 
• A coordinating structure supervised community mobilization tasks in the neighbourhoods 
targeted by the project; 
• Beni Municipal Council and REGIDESO were in charge of resolving land acquisition 
problems. 
In practice the role of REGIDESO-Beni in the actual management of the project was limited. 
Firstly, because REGIDESO is a very centralized institution and all technical details of the pro-
ject were approved by its headquarters in Kinshasa independently from its branch in Beni. 'Soli-
darites' did not make significant efforts to include REGIDESO-Beni in the process and most of 
the infrastructure works were carried out by local contractors. Secondly, because REGIDESO 
. did not believe that community management of water-kiosks was feasible. The institution would 
have preferred to distribute water through individual connections. As a result, 'Solidarites' 
worked largely independently from REGIDESO-Beni. Aquassistance visiting-expert achieved a 
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much closer working relationship with the utility (Auclair, 2005b). In addition, the agreement, be-
tween 'Solidarites' and REGIDESO speCified that only personnel working full-time on the project 
received payment from 'Solidarites'. As a result, some of REGIDESO-Beni staff working for the 
. project were neither paid by their employer nor by 'Solidarites'. This obviously limited their moti-
vation to perform adequately. 
REGIDESO-Beni's personnel were trained by the company Aquatrium on how to run the new 
water treatment plant. Training sessions on network management were also organised with the 
participation of 'Solidarites', Aquassistance and REGIDESO-Kinshasa training department.. 
Assistance from 'Solidarites' did not include donation of equipment such as vehicles, computers 
or generators to,help running the service • 
• Links between 'Solidarites' and the target population 
The population benefiting from the project has played a major role in its implementation: 
• They donated some of the material required for the construction of water-kiosks, such as 
sand, gravel, boulders, and bricks; 
• They provided personnel for digging trenches; 
• They prepared the ground for the construction of water-kiosks. 
In addition, members of the community gave land for the construction of water-kiosks - about 
15 m2 per water-kiosk. Their locations were defined through meetings between 'Solidarites', lo-
cal authorities and communities in each of the targeted neighbourhoods. 
'Solidarites' encouraged the creation of water committees in each of the 12 neighbourhoods 
covered by the project as well as management committees for each of the 84 water-kiosks. An 
association of users regrouped all water committees. Its initial task was to organise community 
participation in the delivery of construction material. Later, it became an interface between water 
committees and REGIDESO, ensuring that consumers had a voice regarding the management 
of water services. Finally, 'Solidarites' conducted an awareness campaign on the benefits of 
clean water. They used a variety of different media such as radio, posters, drama etc . 
• Efficiency I Effectiveness 
Efficiency suffered from logistics problems linked to the choice of suppliers and the transport of 
equipment, most of which was imported. There were also delays in the official attribution of land 
by the Municipal Cou~cil, in particular for the construction of a new 200 m3 balancing-reservoir. 
Another difficulty was the poor communication between 'Solidarites' and REGIDESO. In some 
cases, REGIDESO realised .too late that certain structure were inadequate and had to be re-
built. There were also technical deficiencies identified by Aquassistance. Finally, there were 
problems linked to the tum-<lver of expatriate personnel. They were often young and inexperi-
enced and changed every six months (Auclair, 2005b). 
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Despite these problems, the project considerably improved access to water supply as much in . 
quantity as in quality. However, in February 2006, increases in levels of consumption were still 
below what was expected, which meant that part of the population continued consuming water 
from umprotected sources. 'Solidarites' hoped to reach its targets thanks to awareness cam-
paigns (Bellet, 2006). Water was distributed for two hours in the morning and two hours in the 
evening seven days a week and was sufficient to provide at least 10 litres of clean water per 
person and per day. The average time necessary to fetch water was reduced from up to six 
hours to just 15 minutes (Neumann, 2006) . 
. The project also contributed to the strengthening of civil society through the management of wa-
ter-kiosks by communities. Its financial aspects appear below . 
• Appropriateness 
Whilst REGIDESO would have preferred private connections, the choice of water-kiosks seems 
the most appropriate since most households lack regular income. It is a simpler and cheaper 
solution that takes advantage from social cohesion . 
• Sustainability 
The project was designed in order to maximize technical sustainability: 
• The treatment plant was simple to operate and required a remarkably small volume of 
consumables: 150 kg of chlorine per month and 70 litres of diesel per day for a nominal 
production of 100 m%; 
• The maintenance at water-kiosks was limited to the replacement of taps and valves and 
the cleaning of reservoirs, both tasks easily performed by the management committees. 
In terms of institutional sustainability, the creation of a community-based management structure 
at neighbourhood level was the most appropriate. On the other hand, the project had a very lim-
ited impact on the institutional development of REGIDESO-Beni, which may affect how the wa-
ter network is run when extemal support is withdrawn. 
Financial sustainability of the project is the cornerstone of its success. This depends on the 
level of income of REGIDESO from both networks. Given the poor level of service with the old· 
network, cost recovery from its customers is unlikely to increase Significantly unless improve-
ments take place. It is therefore important to rehabilitate the old network and Tua river treatment· 
plant1 (Figure E-16). This project is planned for 'phase 2' of the programme (Auclair, 2005b). 
Funding from EuropeAid and the French development agency AFD2 has already been re-
quested. 
1 Oxfam has already done some work on this plant . 
. 2 Agence Franr;aise de Developpement. 
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The management of the 84 water-kiosks was attributed to users committees and not to 
REGIDESO. These committees buy water from REGIDESO - each water-kiosk is equipped 
with a water meter - and sell it per 20 litre jerry-cans. Each jerry-can costs· 5 Congolese Francs 
or about 0.01 USD. It is half of the price Aquassistance recommended to reach finanCial bal-
ance. It is likely that the new water network will require subsidies. Water sellers make a profit of 
about 20 per cent, which ensures revenue of about 32 USD per month'. 
Water-kiosks sold 5,200 USD of water in May 2006, up from only 500 USD in September 2005. 
In February 2006, it was estimated that only .t5 per cent of revenue was collected by 
REGIDESO. This is due to the lack of authority of REGIDESO and embezzlements within man-
agement committees. 'Solidarites' expects to improve this result by working with the community 
and, in particular, with a greater involvement from female groups (Bellet, 2006) . 
• Coverage. 
66,000 people, living in the peri-urban areas of Beni are not covered by the new network. They 
represent almost 30 per cent of current population. An extension is expected in the second 
phase ofthe project. 
1 It was originally foreseen that water vendors would eam about 50 USD per month, however this amount Is al-
ready above the average income in Beni. 
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5. Port-au-Prince, Haiti 
Port-au-Prince is the capital of Haiti, a Caribbean state which, together with the Dominican Re- . 
public, shares the island of Hispaniola, where Christopher Columbus first landed in 1492. It is a 
mountainous country, located about 1,000 km south-west from the coasts of Florida, in the United 
States. Port-au-Prince is a coastal city that lies on a bay of the gulf of 'La Gonave' (Map E-12). It 
is the largest city of Haiti and has three 'satellite towns': Carrefour, Delmas and Petionville, which 
are today part of Port-au-Prince's agglomeration. According to the 2003 census, the total popula-
tion of the Port-au-Prince agglomeration is 1,977,000 people\ 
Map E-12: Haiti 
Source: leRC (adapted) www.icrc.org 
95% of Haiti's population is black and speaks Creole. The rest is mostly mulatto - mixed Cauca-
sian-African - and speaks French. Haitians are Christian - mostly Roman Catholic - but many 
of them practice Voodoo2• 
1 www.citypopulation.de 
2 :4 form of religious wftchcraft prevalent among Blacks in the West Indies, esp. Haiti, and the Southem United 
States, and ultimately of African origin' Oxford English Dictionary. 
208 
E. Review of the Case Studies 
5.1 Historical background 
Haiti has been affected by civil unrest since the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986. Since then, a 
. military coup in 1991 and intense political repression prompted tWo extemal military interventions: 
one by the United States in 1994 and one by the United Nations in 2004. Riots affected Port-au-
Prince and the main urban centres during each episode of instability, more particularly in 2003. 
Historical events in Haiti are summarized in Box E-2. More details can be found in Appendix 3. 
Box E-2: Timeline Haiti 
. Intensity of armed conflict (Uppsala University, 2006): 
• 1989, 1991 and 2004: minor. 
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5.2 Water and sanitation systems 
• Water supply 
Groundwater is not easily accessible in Port-au-Prince and most households depend on the wa-
ter distribution network and on supply from tankers and vendors. The division according to the 
type of source is shown in Table E.8. 
PRODUCTION BY THE WATER UTILITY 
In 2005, the water utility exploited 18 springs and 13 boreholes - the latter being the most 
recent. Spring-water comes from mountains surrounding the city1 and is brought by gravity 
(CAMEP, 2005 cited by Saade, 2005:8). The network was built between 1950 and 1970. It is 
in a very poor state. Water is distributed between a few hours per day to a few hours per 
week to 54,000 legal private connections and an estimated 10,000 illegal ones (Valfrey, 
1997; Saade, 2005). 
PRIVATE BOREHOLES 
Small Scale Independent Providers (SSIP) also produce water in Port-au-Prince. They use 
boreholes, which were drilled between 1986 and 1994. These bore holes are mostly located 
to the north of Port-au-Prince. Some of them were previously used for irrigation or industrial 
production and serve private tankers. The utility charges a flat rate for water supplied (Val-
frey, 1997:18). 
WATER TANKERS 
In 1997, the number of water tankers operating in Port-au-Prince was estimated to be be-
tween150 and 200. Their main customers are (Valfrey, 1997:21): 
• Well-off families, who may also own a private connection but complement their needs 
with trucked water; 
• Water sellers living in low-income areas, who stock water in cisterns for resale to 
neighbours and vendors (Table E.8); 
• Local industries, including construction. 
1 Massif de la Selle. 
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WATER VENDORS 
Most of the water vendors are women.-selling water house-to-house in a 10 to 151 covered· 
bucket1• They buy water from cistem owners or from households reselling· piped-water. 
Some vendors also sell cold water by the glass at a much higher price (Valfrey, 1997:29). 
The various options for water supply in Port-au-Prince are summarized in Figure E-17. 
Network 
Prhiate 
cisterns 
Figure E-17: Water supply options In Port-au-Prince 
Customers 
Secondary 
customers (Resale) 
Customers 
Based on Valfrey, 1997 . 
• Sanitation 
Table E.9 shows that the coverage of excreta-disposal systems in Port-au-Prince and other Hai-
tian urban centres is low. The same applies to solid waste-disposal systems. 
Table E-9: Access to urban sanitation systems in Haiti, end of 2003 
lit; 
In Port-au-Prince's shantytowns, there is insufficient space to build new latrines and public toi-
lets are very rare. Houses equipped with toilets have simple soak pits. Wastewater is dis-
charged to open ditches without treatment (Saade, 2005:28). 
5.3 Water sector institutions 
'Centra le Autonome Metropolitained'Eau Potable' (CAMEP), a public utility under the Ministry of 
Public Works, Transport and Communications2 is in charge of water production and distribution in 
Port-au-Prince. With 300 employees, the utility is overstaffed and has a poor cost-recovery re-
cond. In 1997, it was estimated that only one thind of the water produced was billed, but the situa-
tion was then considered as improving (Valfrey, 1997:13). 
1 Locally called a 'Bokit'. 
2 Ministere des Travaux Publics, des Transports et des Communications (MTPTC). 
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'Division d'Hygiene Publique,1, depending on the Ministry of Health and Population, is responsible 
for monitt;lring sanitation systems (Saade, 2005:16). 
5,4 Effects of the armed conflict . 
Port-au-Prince has not suffered from major destructions of its infrastructure during the prolonged 
periods of political instability through which the country has gone. Most of the degradation came 
from a lack of maintenance. The constant worsening of living conditions in the countryside was at 
the origin of a large-scale migration to the capital, whose population has more than quadrupled 
since 1970. Most migrants ended up in about 20 shantytowns, which, in 2004, contained about 
800,000 people (Valfrey, 1997; Matthieussent and Carlier, 2004; Saade, 2005). The largest one, 
'Cite Soleil', has seen its population increase from 48,000 people in 1982 to 186,600 in 1988, at 
the end of Duvalier's dictatorship. It further increased, between 1988 and 2005, to reach about 
. 200,000 people (ICRC, 2005a). This considerable expansion of low-income areas in Port-au-
Prince was accompanied by the development of criminal gangs, especially in 'Cite Soleil', which 
. has become a 'no-go zone' for most aid agencies (ICRC, 2005b). 
The water utility CAMEP suffered from the virtual absence of government during most of the last 
twenty years and has been unable to cope with the rapid expansion of the city. 
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1 Public Hygiene Division. 
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5.5 Emergency response 
Selection of cases: 
Aid Agency 'Interventions' 
ICRC Water project in 'Cite Solei I' . 
Water sector institution: CAMEP 
Main sources of evidence: 
Period 2006 status 
Since 12104 Ongoing 
- ICRC reports (ICRC, 2005c; ICRC, 2005a; ICRC, 2006a) ; 
- Contact with Jean-Yves Clemenzo, ICRC infonnation delegate in Port-au-Prince, in 
2006. 
'Cite Soleil' is the largest single shantytown in Haiti, with a population estimated at 200,000 peo-
ple and covering about 2 km2 - very high population density. Since 2000, the area has been af-
fected by alanning levels of gang violence \ sometimes perpetrated by teenagers. The area has 
become a 'no-go' area, with little employment, poor public services and no investments. As a re-
sult, the water scheme that was originally set-up with the support of the French NGO GRET, as 
described hereafter, was partly dismantled, and water committees ceased playing their role. From 
December 2004, the ICRC tried to revive the process by launching the rehabilitation of water and 
sanitation systems in 'Cite Solei!'. 
Sources for water supply in this neighbourhood are independent from the rest of Port-au-Prince 
water distribution network. It consists of three boreholes, tWo of which were not functioning at the 
end of 2004. The rehabilitation project consisted of: 
• Repairing the two boreholes, thereby increasing water supply by 60 per cent; 
• Rehabilitating 69 tap-stands; 
• Promoting the creation of water committees recognized by CAMEP; 
• Organising the clean-up and disposal of solid waste; 
• Rehabilitating six blocks of public latrines; 
• Promoting health messages.· 
• Objectives and target population 
The main objective of the project was to contribute to the improvement of living conditions in 
'Cite Soleil'. It was expected that the operation would be beneficial, not only in tenns of im~ 
proving health and wellbeing, but also on limiting levels of violence. The entire 200,000 people 
living in the shantytown were targeted. 
1 According to ICRC 2005 annual report on Haiti, MSF reported an average of 115 people a month being 
wounded by gunshot in 'Cite SoleiI'. 
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• Collaboration between the ICRC and CAMEP 
The ICRC fully collaborated with CAMEP, which is in charge of running water supply in 'Cite 
Solei!' but is prevented from doing so because of violence. All technical interventions were car-
ried out by CAMEP technicians and CAMEP participated in the selection of water committees. 
The electricity utility, EDH1 was also involved in the 'electrification' ofthe boreholes. 
• Links between the ICRe and the target population 
Most of the social 'networking' necessary for the implementation of the project was done by the 
Haitian Red Cross. Working through a 'local intermediary' was compulsory because of the secu-
rity conditions. 
• Efficiency I Effectiveness 
Given the conditions of security, the project was only possible because of the contacts ICRC 
managed to establish within 'Cite Solei!' through its Haitian counterpart the Haitian Red Cross. 
The role of the organisation in terms of 'social facilitation' was more important than its technical 
input because CAMEP's technical capacity was sufficient. ICRC vehicles escorted CAMEP's 
fuel-truck into 'Cite Solei!', enabling the fuelling of the generator supplying the functioning bore-
hole. These arrangements maintained water supply in the area for 250 consecutive days, at a 
unit consumption of eight litres. 
5.6 Rehabilitation 
Selection of cases: 
Aid Agency 'Interventions' 
GRET Water supply for low-income 
neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince 
Water sector institution: CAMEP 
Main sources of evidence: 
- A GRET publication (BraTlovsky et aI., 2000); 
- A paper by Matthieussent and Carlier (2004); 
Period 2006 status 
1995 - 2005 Commissioned 
- A publication in Waterfront (Colin and Lockwood, 2002); 
- A BPD publication (Col in and Lockwood, 2002). 
Since 1995, GRET has been working on the improvement of water supply in a number of shan-
!ytowns in Port-au-Prince. What started as an emergency operation has evolved into institutional 
development, both of community groups and of the water utility: CAMEP. 
1 Electricite de Haili. 
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The programme aimed to extend the water distribution network to these shantytowns. It also 
worked with communities in order to enable them to manage water distribution and cost recovery 
in their neighbourhoods. 
• In 1995 and 1996, GRET directly implemented works in the targeted shantytowns and su-
pervised water committees; 
• From Hi97 to 1999, the responsibility of implementing works was transferred to CAMEP, 
. which dealt directly with water committees; 
• From 2000, contracts with the various partners were established, and the role of GRET 
. was limited to what the organisation called 'social mediation'. 
Since the initial phase of the programme was considered as an emergency, it was funded by 
ECHO. Later, the development fund of the EU (DG VIII) and the French development agency1 
(AFD) took over funding . 
• Objectives and target population 
The general objective of the programme was to provide regular, affordable, and sustainable wa-
ter services to the low-income population of Port-au-Prince. 
Institutional development of CAMEP and the training of water committees were specific ob-
jectives. 
The tiuget population lives in Port-au-Prince shantytowns. In 2004, it represented about 
800,000 people or nearfy 40 per cent of the total population of the capital. 
.• Collaboration between GRET and CAMEP 
At the beginning of the operation, CAMEP did not believe that extending piped-water service to 
shantytowns was manageable. However, the programme endeavoured to change this opinion 
and, in this respect, was totally successful. GRET considered that granting Port-au-Prince low-
1 Agence Fran~ajse de Deveioppement. 
2 7,785,000 EUR. 
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income communities access of municipal water services was the best way of establishing or re-
· storing a feeling of 'citizenship', which is fundamental to the reconstruction of social capital in a 
· context of state failure. 
After infrastructure works were initiated in the first eight neighbourhoods, GRET helped to es-
tablish service contracts between communities and CAMEP. Once this was done, CAMEP pro-
· gressively took over the full responsibility for dealing with communities. For this purpose, 
CAMEP created, in 1998, the 'Unite de Coordination des Quartiers Defavorises' (UCQD: coor-
dination unit for underprivileged neighbourhoods)l, a group in cha~e of low-income areas 
(Figure E-19). 
Figure E-19: The evolving role of GRET in Port-au-Prlnce 
Adapted from Matthieussent and Carlier (2004) 
Institutional strengthening consisted, for GRET, in recognizing CAMEP leadership whilst training 
its staff in various fields including technical management of networks and social work. The latter 
aspect led to the creation of UCQD . 
• Links between GRET and the target population 
The entire programme was based on empowerment of recipient communities. As a result, the 
presence of GRET in the field was constant, in particular at the beginning of the operation, in 
order to establish close contacts with them. The future users of the service were consulted both 
in the design of technical solutions and the establishment of a water distribution management 
system. After the first phase during which GRET explained the benefits of community-managed 
water distribution, communities themselves selected their committees through elections in order 
to guarantee their legitimacy. The strategy sometimes involved a certain level of confrontation 
with communities but proved successful and, in the end, people were proud of being customers· 
of municipal services and gaining equal status with consumers from high-income areas. 
1 Unite de Coorrfinalion des Quartiers Detavorises. 
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• Efficiency I Effectiveness 
The programme achieved what was believed to be very difficult or impossible to carry out in 
Haiti. This was recognized by the govemment, which used it as a model to frame the reform of 
its domestic water supply policy. It is also intemationally recognized as a model for community-
managed water supply. 
In the early stage of the operation, GRET's strategy was to rely on local NGOs for imple~ 
mentation. This proved unsuccessful in all neighbourhoods but one, because of the lack of ca-
pacity of most local NGOs in Haiti. The exception was the NGO SOLAM" which became a 
close partner for GRET and participated in the development of the social strategy aimed at ta-
cilitating the creation of water committees. 
Ten years after its opening, the programme helped 800,000 people to improve their access to 
drinking water at an affordable price - price per volume of water sold in the shantytowns was 
60 per cent of the price paid by private consumers in 'residential neigbourghoods'. One of the 
conditions for the success of the programme was that infrastructure costs were funded. Cost re-
covery only covered O&M . 
• Sustainability 
In a community-managed distribution system, the water utility is usually not responsible for the 
O&M of the distribution lines. Water committees were trained to organise the necessary mainte-
nance operations, thereby ensuring the technical sustainability of the system .. Water-meters 
were installed at the 'entry point' of each shantytown which measured the global consumption. 
Thiswas billed by CAMEP to the community and paid by the water committees. 
The utility was sceptical at the beginning of the operation but soon realized that it was func-
tioning as the first bills were paid in full and on time. After 1998, CAMEP fully supported the op-
eration. Water committees contributed to reduced unaccounted-for water by dealing with illegal 
connections at their level. Lower tariffs applied by CAMEP for these areas helped in achieving 
full cost-recovery, thereby insuring financial sustainability. 
At the beginning, CAMEP charged a fee. to GRET for the connection of each new neighbour-
hood and long delays were necessary before water was effectively delivered. This situation im-
proved dramatically once the system was up and running. No fee was charged and, from 2000, 
CAMEP, through its unit UCQD, organised the work in new neighbourhoods without any support 
from GRET. Community-managed water distribution was integrated into Haiti water reform ... Al-
though it is still pending official approval. 
1 'Solidarite Pou Lavi Mey6': Solidarity for a better life. 
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• Appropriateness 
As mentioned earlier, encouraging supply by a public utility rather than by private suppliers was 
part of a strategy to increase the feeling of 'citizenship' and facilitate the 'reconstruction' of so-
cial capital. 
• Coverage 
The level of violence, which rose dramatically after the last months of Aristide presidency, is the 
main programme limitation in terms of coverage. Certain neighbourhoods could not be reached, 
simply because it was too dangerous to go there. 
6. Port-de-Paix, Haiti 
Port-de-Paix is the capital of the 'Departement of Nord-Quest', a district located on the north 
coast of Haiti. The town faces the 'Tortue' island1 (Map E~12). 
The population of Port-de-Paix is estimated at about 80,000 (ACF, 2005a). 
6.1 Historical background 
The historical background to Haiti's cases is detailed in section 5.1 page 208. 
6.2 Water and sanitation systems 
• Water supply 
As in Port-au-Prince, groundwater in Port-de-Paix is not easily accessible and the population de-
pends for its water supply on a piped water distribution network, water vendors and the 'Trois 
Rivieres' River. 
The water distribution network supplies only the centre and the eastern neighbourhoods. It is fed 
by 'Cacao Spring', located 14 km east of the town (Map E-13). Water was initially distributed free 
of charge to 18 public tap-stands, and to about 2,000 private connections, for which a flat rate. 
was charged. Some of the private connections and a number of public tap-stands are connected 
directly to the transmission line over a 4 km-stretch east of the town. The network was damaged 
by floods in December 2003. It was rehabilitated and extended by ACF in 2004 and 2005 (ACF. 
2005a). This project is studied in detail in the following sections. 
Water supply used to be available at the tap-stands only oncea week, with occasionally long pe-
riods of intemuption. Households and tap-stands directly connected to the transmission line were 
supplied for 24 hours a day. 
1 lie de la Tortue: Turtle Is/and. 
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Map E·13: Port-de·Paix piped-water supply 
Source:based on documents provided by Si/via A/egre 
A number of water trucks supply the town, especially the western part, which is not covered by 
the network. They sell water to cistem-owners who, in turn sell it to their neighbours or to water 
vendors 1 (ACF, 2005a) . 
• Sanitation 
Sanitation is very poor. Latrines are rare, not used, or not functioning .. Many people practice 
open defecation on the beach or near the river. In addition, the drainage system is not main· 
tained and solid waste, which is rarely collected, accumulates in the road side-ditches (ACF, 
2005a). 
6.3 Water sector institutions· 
'Service National d'Eau Potable' (SNEP) is in charge of water supply outside Port-au-Prince's 
area. In practice, SNEP only covers urban areas. Like CAMEP, it is under the Ministry of Public 
Works, Transport and Communications (Saade, 2005:25). SNEP does not usually cover low-in- . 
come neighboughoods, which are left to SSIPs. 
SNEP headquarters for the 'Departement of Nord-Duest' are in Port-de-Paix. It has 10 to 15 em-
ployees, including the district manage~ and two third of them are technicians or plumbers. 
f Same system as in Port-a-Prince, see page 209. 
2 'Directeur departemental'. 
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6.4 Effects of the armed conflict 
Port-<le-Paix has been less affected by civil unrest than areas such as Port-au-Prince and Gona-
ives. Yet, the town suffered from the general economic depression resulting from instability. The 
rural depopulation also affected the north-west area of the country, and Port-<le-Paixpopulation 
increased from 27,000 people in 1988 to an estimated 80,000 in 2005. 
SNEP-Port-de-Paix suffered from a chronic lack of resources. Its income was sent to Port-au-
Prince for redistribution around the organisation and not much returned. SNEP headquarters staff 
never visited the place or gave any orientation or management support. SNEP-Port-de-Paix staff 
were rarely paid, had no vehicles and training, and their motivation was very low. 
6.S Rehabilitation· 
Selection of cases: 
Aid Agency . "Intervention" Period 2006 status 
ACF-Francel Emergency rehabilitation of Cacao spring 06/04 - 05/05 Commissioned 
Aquassistance water distribution network 
Water sector institution: SNEP 
Main sources of evidence: 
- ACF-France reports (ACF, 2005a; ACF, 2005b; ACF, 2005c; Alegre, 2005); 
- Interview with Silvia Alegre, ACF-France, head of project between June 2004 and April 
2005; in Loughborough, in June 2006 ; 
- Questionnaire from Paul Legouix, Aquassistance technical-assistant; 
- Contacts with Bertrand Brecqueville, ACF-France head of mission in Haiti in 2006. 
ACF-France intervened in Port-de-Paix following the floods that ravaged the area in December 
2003. Landslides resulting from these floods damaged the water distribution network and water 
was only available from water vendors supplied by water tankers from outside the town. ACF1 
teamed-up with Oxfam2 to distribute water with tankers. ACF covered the eastern part of the town 
whereas Oxfam operated in the western part. Oxfam pulled out in July 2004 but ACF continued 
. water-trucking for a few more months. Each organisation distributed water to about 40,000 peo-
ple. 
ACF decided to go beyond this purely emergency-based intervention and proposed to carry out 
the rehabilitation of the water distribution network. 
There are two catchments on Cacao spring, which provide a flow of between 25 and 60 m3/hde-
pending on the season. They are connected to a 10m3 pressure-break 1 sand-trap located 500 m 
1 Funded by UK DepartmentFor Intemational Development (DFID). 
2 Funded by ECHO. . 
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downstream. The transmission line initially consisted of a single 200 mm diameter PVC-pipe ex-
tending over 12 km between the pressure-break tank and the 1200 m3 reservoir. However, in 
order to Increase its income, SNEP accepted the connection of a relatively large number of pri-
vate households and of 11 public tap-stands directly to the transmission line. This and the effects 
'Of multiple leaks in the transmission line led to the water reservoir hardly filling. In order to solve 
the problem, SNEP installed a valve-box 4.5 km downstream, from where it connected a 100 mm 
diameter PVC-line supplying the reservoir exclusively. This improved the situation but the reser-
voir still took twice as long to fill-up as before connections were allowed on the transmission line. 
The different components of the network are shown in Figure E-20. 
, In terms of infrastructure rehabilitation, ACF's intervention consisted mainly of (Figure E-20): 
• Repairs and improvements on the catchments and on the existing 200 mm diameter 
transmission line; 
• Installation of a new 150 mm diameter PVC pipeline - 4.5 km - between the pressure-
break tank and the reservoir, 
• Repairs and extension - 600 m in total- of the water distribution network; 
• Construction of 17 tap-stands, each equipped with three taps - 11 were initially pro-
posed; 
• Construction of two water-kiosks equipped with 7 m3 reservoirs - five were initially pro-
posed; 
• Rehabilitation of the existing 18 tap-stands. , 
In total, 37 public water points - tap-stands or kiosks - were rehabilitated or constructed. For. 
each water point, a water committee was created and trained. 
AqLiassistance sent an expert for two weeks, who supervised the installation of the 150 mm new 
pipeline and advised on a strategy for the management of the water network. 
The operation was funded by ECHO, for a budget of approximately 480,000 USD 1. 
1 370,658.70 EUR. 
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Private·." •• ··••····· 
connectIOns 
Figure E·20: Cacao spring water distribution network 
Base on data from ACF reports and on an inteNiew with Si/via A/egre 
• Objectives and target population ~. 
The objective of the project was to prevent any outbreak of water-related diseases as a result of 
the poor access to clean water. The project also aimed at limiting the economic impact on the 
population of paying vendors to deliver water. 
The following results were expected: 
• Beneficiaries having an alternative water source to the river and water vendors; 
• Improved water quantity and quality; 
• Improved capacity of SNEP to operate and maintain the network; 
• Water committees created and able to manage each water point; 
• Improved knowledge on hygiene and related practices. 
The target population represented about 40,000 people, living in areas supplied by the water 
distribution netWork i.e. the central and eastern part of town; plus four eastern suburbs (Map 
E-13). A maximum of 250 people per tap was initially considered but, in practice, the number 
reached up to 1,000 people . 
• Collaboration between ACF and SNEP-Port-de·Paix 
SNEP authorized and supervised the project and most of its personnel worked on it. The utility 
was also involved in the selection of technical solutions and the planning of activities. However, 
institutional development as such was not part of the objectives of the project and training was 
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limited to chlorination. ACF provided SNEP personnel involved in the project with an incentive 
payment. It also donated tools and spare-parts at the end of its intervention. 
ACF obtained from SNEP the recognition of the water committees in charge of the management 
of each water point. 
• Links between ACF and the target population 
ACF had a team of seven social workers in order to assess the 'profile' of the areas targeted for 
the project. They helped in creating water committees for each water pOint. One SNEP staff 
member who was in charge of social issues, also partiCipated. 
The creation of water committees responsible for running water pOints was in line with a na-
tional policy based on GRETs experience in Port-au-Prince 1. Each had three members and car-
ried out basic maintenance operations and water sales at the water point. Water was sold by 10 
to 15 litres buckef. One third of the revenue generated went to SNEP. one third to the O&M of 
the water point and for one third as salary for the water committee. The ACF team organised a 
comprehensive three months training programme for the 37 water committees created. Training 
focused upon issues such as organiSing meetings, managing cash and basic plumbing. In addi-
tion, health education was carried in eight schools with distribution of didactic material. The 
knowledge on hygiene of the general population was also monitored . 
• Efficiency I Effectiveness 
The project was confronted with serious logistic problems. which produced delays. For instance, 
no PVC pipes with a diameter larger than 100 mm were available in Haiti. As a consequence, 
the 150 mm pipe had to be imported from the United States. Another problem was funding. The 
final approval from ECHO came late and the head of project had to remain on 'stand-by' for a 
relatively long time. In order to comply with deadlines, the bulk of infrastructure work had to be 
carried out during a short period. 
In the end, 37 water-points were constructed and/or rehabilitated but. in March 2005. only 27 
were actually functioning, some of which for only a few hours a week. Most of the problems en-
countered were linked to the lack of maintenance by SNEP and defective valves. The modifica-
tion of the transmission line greatly reduced the reservoir's filling-time but the problem of the. 
large number of private households and public tap-stands directly connected to the transmissi.on 
line remained. ACF was under such pressure from the population of this area that it was obliged 
to build another tap-stand on the transmission line, albeit with only one tap. How carefully SNEP 
manages the valves has a strong impact on the functioning of the tap-stands; Unfortunatelly. the 
utility has proved not to master it very well. It is particularly important to allow a proper flow bal-
ance between the 200 mm and the 100/ 150 mm transmission lines. The kiosks, which are 
1 See page 212. 
2 'Bokit'. 
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equipped with a reservoir, are more likely to function better but only two have been constructed, 
of which only one was functioning in March 2005. 
Surveys carried out by ACF1 found that hygiene promotion had a significant impact on the popu-
lation's knowledge on the health benefits of water, sanitation and hygiene. 
All in all, the project improved water access, but the effect of doubling of the number of public 
water-points was not up to expectations . 
• Sustainability 
The sustainability of the project depended on whether SNEP was able to operate the network 
and generate enough revenue to carry out repairs. In August 2006, eight months after ACF 
closed its office in Port-de-Paix, SNEP appeared to have been carrying 'out repair only when 
they were 'really' essential- at least one major repair was undertaken during this period. Sus-
tainability also depended on whether cost recovery could be implemented at the water, points. 
From the beginning of the project, ECHO insisted that the project was an 'emergency' one and 
that cost recovery was not to be envisaged. Accepting the building of a few water-kiosks - five 
planned, two implemented -ECHO only accepted on ACF's insistence. Eventually, all 37 water 
committees were trained on how to manage cost recovery and every water-point was meant to 
. function as a water-kiosk. Despite the formal OPPOSition of ECHO, the principles of the water re-
form were applied .. 
Haiti water reform was backed by the Inter-American Development Bank (lOB), which plans the 
complete rehabilitation of the water distribution network of four urban areas, including Port-de-
Paix. A new, more complete, rehabilitation should therefore be carried out in Port-de-Paix but 
this may take time because, by mid-2006, no signs of any works sponsored by the lOB we~ 
visible in Port-de-Paix . 
• Coverage 
The project only covered about half of the population of Port-de-Paix, although it is believed that 
part of the population living in the western part of town near water points would also benefit. The 
extension of the network was not considered for three main reasons: 
• Firstly, because of limited water resource; . 
• Secondly, because the project was funded by ECHO over a six months period and on the 
basis of an emergency situation. ECHO would have refused an extension; 
• Thirdly, and most importantly, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)1 was meant to 
carry out a rehabilitation of the network, using water from a spring located 15 km from· 
, 
Port-de-Paix. 
1 Know/edge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) sU/vey were canied out at the beginning of the project and after an 
health promotion campaign was canied out, 
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7. Grozny,Chechnya 
Grozny is the capital of Chechnya, one of the. six republics forming the border of the Russian 
Federation with Georgia and Azerbaijan. It is a small territory - about half the size of Belgium -. 
situated along the Caucasus mountain chain (Map E-14). 
Grozny's population was then 210,700 people in 2002. 
Map E-14: The Caucasus 
Source: [GRG (adapted) www.icrr:.org 
The North Caucasus is often described as a mosaic of people. In Chechnya, most of the popula-
tion is Chechen or Ingush2, with minorities from other areas of the Caucasus and from Russia -
mostly elderly people. The languages spoken are Russian and Chechen. Chechen pimple are 
predominantly Sufi Muslim. 
1 Through a Canadian consulting firm. 
2 From neighbouring Ingushetia. 
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7.1 Historical background· 
War in Chechnya erupted at the end of 1994; three years after the breakaway republic declared . 
its independence. Grozny was heavily bombed and, by 1996, large portions of its central area 
were almost completely destroyed. After a lull that lasted four years, war restarted by the end of 
1999. Grozny was again bombed during a short campaign during which Russia imposed its au-
thOrity. Recent historical events in Grozny are summarized in Figure E-21. More details can be 
found in Appendix 3. 
Figure E-21 :Timeline Chechnya and fighting In Grozny 
Intensity of armed conflict (Uppsala University, 2006): 
• 1994: minor; 
• 1995-1996: war; 
• 1999-2001: war; 
• 2002-2003: minor; 
• 2004: war; 
• 2005: minor. 
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7.2 Water and sanitation systems 
• Water supply 
Grozny is supplied with water from four sources consisting of both groundwater and surface water 
located at the south, north-east and west of the city (Map E-15). The list of these water sources 
and some of their characteristics appear in Table E.11. 
Table E-11: Grozny main water supply sources and status In August 2005 
As shown in Map E-15, each of the sources supplies a specific area of Grozny, through a number 
of pumping stations and boosters1• Coverage varied across the city, as shown in Table E.12 be-
cause, at the time of the study, Samashki well-field and a number of pumping stations were also 
not functioning. Figures are based on estimations by the water utility. 
Starapromislovsky, a densely populated area of the north-west of the city, was originally supplied 
by Samashki well-field and is now the area receiving the lowest quantity of water. 
1 They are numbered. 
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Water quality is regularly tested and considered adequate, although no disinfection is currently 
carried out. Given the frequent power cuts; which also affect pumping stations, the service in 
most areas is irregular. 
In order to complement the water supply in areas such as Starapromislovsky, water is sold by 
private trucks or distributed by trucks owned by the administrations of some of the districts of the 
city. Since 1996, the ICRC has been running a filling station connected to the network near Water 
Pumping Station1 (Map E-15). It consists of two 70 m3 emergency reservoirs1, from which water 
is de.livered with motor-pumps. In addition, the NGO Polish Humanitarian Organisation (PHO) has 
three filling stations, one of which is also near Water Pumping Station1. The organisation distrib-
utes water to 251 distribution points with 20 tankers (Photograph E-5 and Photograph E-6). They 
serve all districts but the city centre, and target health institutions, schools, social institutions, and 
the private sector. Finally, the NGO International Rescue Committee (IRC) operates a similar 
programme with eight trucks, but uses ICRC filling station. 
Photograph E-5: Distribution point, Grozny Photograph E-6: Water-trucking, Grozny 
Source: PHO www.pah.om.p/ 
There are also a number of hand-pumps in certain areas of Grozny. Their water is brackish but 
may be used for cleaning or washing (Meilhaud, 2001). 
1 Emergency-type reservoirs often called 'Oxfam tanks~ 
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Map E·15: Grozny water supply 
Source: Bessard and Darriu/at, 2005:5 
• Sanitation 
Grozny is equipped with an extensive sewerage network containing approximately 610 km of 
pipeline. The city is built on flat land and wastewater has to be lifted through a network of 14 
wastewater pumping stations, as shown in Map E·16. Wastewater used to be treated at waste 
stabilization ponds 1, but the plant ceased to function and wastewater is discharged to the river 
without treatment (Bessard and Darriulat, 2005:12). 
1 Waste stabillzaUon ponds are mainly shallow man-made basins comprising a single or several series of an-
aerobic, facultative or maturation ponds The primary treatment takes place in the anaerobic pond, which is mainly 
designed for removing suspended solids, and some of the soluble element of organic matter (BOD5). During the 
secondary stage in the facultative pond most of the remaining BOD5 is removed through the coordinated activity 
of algae and heterotrophic bacteria. The main function of the tertiary treatment in the maturation pond is the re-
moval of pathogens and nutrients - especially nitrogen'lRG, www.irc.nl 
229 
! 
E. Review of the Case Studies 
Map E·16: Grozny sewerage network 
Source: Bessard and Darriulat, 2005:13 
7.3 Water sector institution 
GrozVodocanal (GVC) is the state-owned enterprise in charge of water and sewerage services in 
Grozny. It functions under the Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities (MHPU) of the Chechen 
Republic. GVC employs a total of 580 people and played a major role in the reconstruction effort 
despite a chronic lack of resources (Bessard and Darriulat, 2005:10). 
GVC's only income is a subsidy from MHPU, which only covers half of salary costs. In order to . 
increase its income, the utility charges commercial companies for connections and for prioritizing 
the maintenance of areas of the network supplying them. GVC is only allowed to charge private 
companies, water for private consumers is delivered free of charge (Bessard and Darriulat, 
2005:10). 
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7.4 Effects of the armed conflict 
. • Buildings 
Massive bombing during the two military campaigns, especially the second, has caused wide-
spread destruction. The centre of Grozny was virtually flattened . 
• Water and sanitation 
With the destruction of power plants in 1996, most water supply sources where interrupted. The 
only one still available was spring water from Chemorechye (Table E.11), which reached the city 
by gravity, and was used by the ICRC and other organisations for distribution. This situation pre-
vailed until 2002-2003, after the second. military campaign, when rehabilitation works started on 
power stations and well-fields. 
There were also dramatic consequences to the sewerage system, as all wastewater pumping-
stations ceased functioning, resulting in the flooding of many pump-houses and apartment- block 
basements with wastewater. 
A survey carried out in 1995 by the NGO Merlin (Drysdale et al., 2000) showed the level of ac-
cess to basic services in Grozny (Table E.13). 
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• Water sector institutions 
GVC remained active throughout the war, in spite of the loss of much of their equipment and ve-
hicles. Their remaining personnel were rarely or never paid. Even in 2005, GVC was suffering 
from a chronic lack of resources, largely due to not being authorized to charge private consum-
ers for its service. The institution had only 15 per cent of the equipment it needed to function ef-
fectively. Many of its documents and the few computers it owned were lost in an accidental fire 
in 2003 . 
• Population 
Grozny's population was about 400,000 in 19891• With the departure of most ethnic Russians 
when independence was proclaimed in 1991, before the first Chechnya war, this figure dropped 
to about 150,000, although this number is hard to ascertain because no reliable data were 
available. It increased again after 2000 and the restoration of 'peace', to reach 210,700 people 
in 2002 -2002 census. 
Despite the omnipresence of the Russian army since 2000, criminality was high in Grozny, 
which became an extremely dangerous place for aid agencies to operate. Kidnappings of Rus-
sians, Chechens and foreigners were extremely frequent (Politkovskaya and Crowfoot, 2001). 
Figure E-22: Grozny population 
Based on www.worfd-aazetteer.comand Bessard and Darriulat, 2005 •. 
1 www.world-gazetteer.com. 
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7.5 EmergencY response 
Aid Agency "Intervention" Period 2006 status 
ICRe I MSF-Belgium IMerlin Emergency water distribution From 1995 Ongoing 
Water sector institution: GVC 
Main sources of evidence: 
- Paper by Hodgson and Oppliger (1998); 
- Paper by Hodgson (1996); 
- ICRC report (Meilhaud, 2001); 
- Visit to Grozny in 1996 . 
. The ICRC, in partnership with MSF-Belgium, started water-trucking in Grozny in February 1995. 
Water was distributed to the general public through a large number of water distribution pOints 
equipped with 'bladder' tanks and distribution ramps (Photograph E-5, page 227). Initially, water 
. was brought from a source 40 km away from the city. As security improved, water coming by 
gravity from the springs of the Chemorechye well-field was used instead. It was collected in 
emergency storage tanks at Pumping Station1 (PS1), run by· the ICRC'. The ICRC and MSF 
rented a fleet of 50 trucks to distribute the water. They were joined, from March 1995, by addi-
tional trucks supplied by Merlin. The average monthly volume distributed between 1995 and 1998 
varied from 3,000 to 5,000 m3 but this amount was doubled in the summer that followed the first 
assault on Grozny - July to September 1995 - as people were returning to the city and high 
temperatures increased water demand. It increased to over 20,000 m3 in September and October· 
1996, following the second assault on Grozny and the complete interruption of piped-water sup-
ply. This crisis only lasted until November. 
From 1995, security conditions in Chechnya started to deteriorate (Hansen and Seely, 1996) and 
in December 1996, six leRC aid-workers were murdered in the hospital at Novie-Atagi, south of 
Grozny. As a result the operations of most aid agencies were drastically reduced. MSF stopped 
its involvement in water distribution in 1996. The involvement of the leRC changed from the end 
of 1996. With no expatriate personnel present in Grozny the organisation limited its activity to the 
storage and disinfection of water at PS 1. Water was then distributed by trucks run by Merlin, the 
administrations of some of the districts of Grozny, and a multitude of private suppliers. Emer-
gency water supply continued through 1997 and 1998 from PS1 and during a certain period, from 
a new filling station open near water Pumping Station 6 (PS6) in Savadskoy district (Map E-15). 
During the December 1999 offensive, ICRC PS1 and PS6 water pumping stations were de-
stroyed by bombing. PS1 was rebuilt and resumed operations in November 20'00, albeit with new 
1 See page 226. 
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actors; UNICEF, the Intemational Rescue Committee (I RC), and later the Polish Humanitarian 
Organisation (PHD) became involved in distributing water, mostly to institutions such as hospi-
tals, hospices, schools etc. In 2000,100 trucks were filling up every day at PS1, one third ofthem 
private. A summary of emergency water supply activities in Grozny appears in Box E-3. 
In addition to water distribution, ICRC and Merlin supported GVC with spare-parts and tools. Mer-
lin helped in the repair of water pipelines in order to increase the population served directly by the 
network. The ICRC supplied GVC with pumps and equipment in order to extract wastewater from 
flooded sewerage network high-lift stations and apartment-block basements .. GVC could in tum 
repair the high-lift pumps. 
Box E-3: Emergency water supply in Grozny 
• Objectives and target population 
Cholera is endemic in Chechnya and, with high temperatures in summer and a dysfunctional 
sewerage network, risks of outbreaks were high. The distribution of chlorinated water and the 
evacuation of wastewater were aimed at limiting these risks. 
Between 1995 and 1998, the ICRC estimated that an average of 20,000 people benefited from 
water distribution. The majority of them lived in Starapromislovsky district, in the north-east of 
the city (Map E-15), which was still without piped-water in 2006, more than 10 years after the 
beginning of the war . 
. • Collaboration between ICRC I Merlin and GVC 
The collaboration between the ICRC or Merlin and GVC was of paramount importance in an en-
vironment where insecurity, mostly due to criminal gangs, made difficult the presence of expa-
triate personnel and limited the scope of activities directly carried out by aid agencies. The moti-
vation of GVC's· personnel and its knowledge of the network proved invaluable for carrying out 
essential repairs on the networks. 
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• Links between the MSF-Belgium IICRC I Merlin and the target population 
Until 1996, the leRe prepared and distributed cooked meals for destitute people and the or-
ganisation is well known to the Grozny population. It is less the case for the other organisations 
involved. National staff played an important role in targeting recipient communities, whose as-
sessment was made particulary difficult by harsh security conditions . 
• Efficiency I Effectiveness 
During certain periods, water distribution from PS 1 was the only water source available in 
Grozny. It was therefore essential to the survival of those remaining - sometimes trapped - in 
the city. 
Managing a large fleet of trucks in an environment of rampant criminality became increasingly 
difficult and leRe decided to limit its involvement to water distribution to private trucks at PS 1. It 
proved the only possible way of running the operation in favour of the general public. Only in-
stitutions were supplied by a limited and more manageable number of agency trucks - run by 
Merlin and later by IRe and PHO • 
.• Sustainability 
PS1 was meant to be handed over to GVC by the ICRC but this had not happened in 2006, 10 
year after it was put into service, because the institution lacks the capacity to run it. As long as 
. Samashski well-field remains out of service, water supply for Starapromislovsky district will de-
pend on water supply from PS1 and on the assistance provided by aid agencies. 
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F. Synthesis of Findings 
In this chapter, a synthesis of the review of the case studies is made, in which findings are used 
in order to answer the research question 1: 
How do partnerships between water sector institutions and aid agencies influence the global per-
formance of emergency operations and rehabilitation? 
And more specifically the sub-questions: 
• In which cases is it justified for aid agencies to collaborate with local water sector institu-
tions? 
• What are the best possible strategies for partnership and why? 
• What benefits can be expected for the recipient population? 
This chapter also investigates whether the hypotheSiS was verified, respectively for emergency 
response and rehabilitation. As highlighted in the methodology chapter. and in particular in Figure 
0-1, page 123. the process used in both cases is to describe the levels of partnership observed 
in the various 'interventions' and to observe how they influenced the results obtained. Observed 
trends will allow conclusions to be drawn, answering the research question in its different as-
pects: 
• Some of the findings focus on the circumstances under which partnerships are estab-
lished; 
• Others focus on the outcome of the strategies applied. 
• In every case, the benefit for the recipient population is measured in tenns of the effi-
ciency of the intervention, Le. benefits in tenns of increased access to water and sanita-
tion services; its coverage and its sustainability Le. who benefits and for how long. 
The last section of this chapter looks at the validity of the conclusions and the achievements of 
the studi 
1. Emergency response 
For emergency response, the hypothesis to verify is: 
Partnerships between water sector institutions and aid agencies improve effiCiency and effective-
ness. 
The analysis is based on 'interventions' in Kabul. Jaffna, Monrovia, Port-au-Prince, and Grozny. 
1 See page 115. 
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1.1 Levels of partnership 
Levels of partnership between aid agencies and water utilities in emergency response varied 
considerably among the various 'interventions' considered. A close collaboration existed in 
Jaffna, Monrovia, Port-au-Prince, and Grozny whereas in Kabul, it was very limited. The type of 
collaboration also varied. A comparison between the case studies suggests that the following fac-
tors have influenced levels of partnership: 
• The complexity of the water and sanitation systems; 
• The type of aid agencies involved; . 
• The capacity of the water utility; 
• The timeframe ofthe 'intervention'; 
• The political background to the 'intervention'. 
• Security conditions .. 
This is detailed in thi~f~6tiO~, i~ which, for each case, evidence. is provided that justifies the se-
lection ofthese factors. Table F.1 is a reminder of the cases on which the analysis is based. 
Table F-1: Summary of the main emergency operations reviewed in Kabul, Jaffna, Monrovia 
and Grozny . 
• Partnerships and water and sanitation systems complexity 
In Monrovia, 'preventative maintenance" was applied in both White Plains water treatment plant. 
and Bushrod Island power plant before fighting reached the city. Later, repairs were carried out 
in both plants. These operations required an in-depth knowledge of the technology and specific 
set-up. Likewise, repairs on Grozny water and sewerage networks were complex to carry out 
because the existing technology was specific to post-Soviet countries and implementing 'inter-
1 See page 108. 
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ventions' required being familiar with the particularities of Grozny's infrastructure. These opera- ' 
tions could not have been carried out without the expertise and experience of some of the water 
utilities' staff. In comparison, the rehabilitation of Kabul's pumping stations carried out by Care . 
and later by 'Solidarites' were relatively straightforward. Water trucking and emergency water 
storage in Monrovia, Jaffna, and Grozny were even simpler. In the case of Jaffna, the decision 
of establishing a partnership was more based on the policy of the concemed aid agency than on 
the level of technology. This is described hereafter. 
These observations suggest that the complexity of the task to be carried out in order to restore 
water services in an emergency is one of the main factors influencing partnerships between aid 
agencies and water sector institutions. Of course, this does not mean that partnerships never 
take place with simple systems but complexity is a factor that may oblige agencies to include lo-
cal water institutions in the planning of their interventions. 
, • Partnerships and aid agency type 
As mentioned earlier, despite the relative technological simplicity of emergency water distribu-
tion in Jaffna, it was done through JMC water services and not directly by GTZ. This was mostly 
due to GTZ's working methods. The organisation primarily works in development and rehabilita-
tion and usually implements projects through local institutions. GTZ did not have a large team of 
specialized staff in Jaffna to carry out such activity and chose instead to support JMC staff. Its 
involvement in emergency water supply in Jaffna is unusual and was only the initial phase of a 
much wider and longer-term programme. In Monrovia, GTZ contributed to the repair of the wa-
ter treatment plant and the drilling of two boreholes. The organisation intervened through a 
number of experts working in close relationship with lWSC during a lull in fighting. The nature 
of its involvement was similar to Jaffna's case. It was also designed as part of a wider recon-
struction programme. In contrast, NGOs and the ICRC often intervene by deploying a relatively 
large team and may operate on their own, employing local staff not necessarily linked to the wa-
ter utility. 
This suggests that agencies who commonly work through partners such as local NGOs or local 
institutions may have a direct involvement in emergency response only when such partnerships 
are possible. These types of agency also tend to carry out projects over long periods and their 
link with local institutions is usually tighter - see 'partnerships and timeframe', below. On the 
contrary, agencies considering themselves as specialized in emergencies may mobilize a suffi-
ciently large team and emergency equipment to be able to work independently from water sec-
tor institutions, as long as they can cope with technological aspects . 
• Partnerships and the capacity of the water utility 
One of the reasons for which emergency response in Kabul did not involve the water utility was 
its lack of capacity to work efficiently. As a result of damage and looting, the institution lacked 
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the skilled personnel and equipment necessary to carry out any sort of intervention, with or 
without extemal support. In Monrovia and Grozny, water trucking was carried out primarily with 
private trucks and specially hired personnel for similar reasons: trucks belonging to water utili-
ties had been stolen or damaged during fighting. 
. . 
This suggests that emergency response may be carried out independently from water sector in-
stitutions whose capacitY is too limited to allow efficient work. During the 'acute phase' of an 
emergency, local institutions may be recovering from the damage caused and be too weak to 
actively participate in emergency response. 
• Partnerships and timeframe 
Some conditions typical of emergencies such as: sporadic fighting, terrorism, political instability 
etc. may extend over several years and even over a decade or more. For instance, in Grozily, 
piped-water was still distributed free of charge in 2006, ten years after the beginning of the 
armed conflict. Aid agencies were still heavily involved in water distribution. During what is often 
called 'permanent emergencies,1, time is sufficient to allow a partnership with a water utility to 
take place, at least formally. Even in the case of Kabul under the Taliban, 'Solidarites' had to 
obtain the formal authorization of CAWSS in order to be allowed to work. In contrast, during the 
'acute phase' of an emergency, aid agencies do not always have time to seek formal approval 
from water sector institutions, which may have temporarily disappeared due to the political tur-
moil. For this reason, Care's short intervention in Kabul took place independently from CAWSS. 
This suggests that partnerships are more likely to take place during 'prolonged interventions'. 
• Partnerships and politics 
Politics may prevent or limit partnerships. Again, Kabul under the Taliban government is a typi-
cal example. 'Solidarites' had a formal agreement with CAWSS limited to a mere authorization 
to intervene but the agency did not work closely with the water utility. 'Solidarites' was funded by 
ECHO, and their activity was designed to answer basic needs but by no means to develop the 
capacity of the water utility. The same would apply to interventions by UNICEF, MSF-Belgium 
and the ICRC in Monrovia under the interim government which lead to the 1997 presidential 
elections. 
This suggests that, when local governments to which water sector institutions are linked are not 
'acceptable' for the 'international community', partnerships tend to be limited to formal agree-
ments. 
• Partnerships and security 
Security conditions also influence partnerships. From 1997, the ICRC implemented emergency 
operations in Grozny by 'remote control'. This means that, due to security conditions, only Che-
1 Seepage 5. 
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chen staff were permanently present on the field whereas expatriate staffs only paid brief visits 
- or were totally absent - until the 2000 Russian occupation. In Port-au-Prince, security prob-
lems were not the direct consequence of fighting but rather the result of gang violence. The 
ICRC, through its local partner the Haitian Red Cross, negotiated access of the water utility to 
the shantytown 'Cite Soleil' controlled by criminal gangs .. 
In such cases, the budgets involved in emergency response tend to be more limited and local 
water utilities may be the only channel able to deliver it to the recipient community. 
1.2 Results 
In emergency response, results are measured in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of 'in-
terventions' in delivering assistance to the affected population. 
In Kabul, where Care and 'Solidarites' carried out emergency repairs with little. input from 
CAWSS, aid agencies contributed to an increase in the amount of clean water available to the 
recipient community and thus limited the risk of disease spreading. 
The same could be said of emergency response in Jaffna, Monrovia, Port-au-Prince and Grozny, 
where aid agencies involved worked closely with the water utility. In Jaffna, JMC helped with wa-
ter trucking; in Monrovia, LWSC technicians fixed the water treatment plant; in Port-au-Prince, 
CAMEP fixed boreholes in 'Cite Soleil'and in Grozny, GVC helped with 'quick fixes' on the water 
and and the sewerage networks. 
On the surface, it could be concluded that levels of partnership may have little influence on the 
improvement of access to water and sanitation services. In Kabul, where Care and 'Solidarites' 
had a free hand in managing their interventions, efficiency may even have been greater since 
agencies were able to select the most competent personnel available on the market, without be-
ing obliged to work with utilities' staff. They avoided the delays involved in training and proce-
dures .. 
1.3 Conclusions 
Based on these results, it can be concluded that emergency response may be canned out effi-
ciently without a partnership with local water sector institutions. This means that aid agencies 
may, during a certain period, substitute local water institutions without detrimental effects and 
even sometimes with greater benefits. Nevertheless, a number of factors earlier detailed make 
partnerships, in most cases, necessary: 
.:. They have to take place when the complexity of the water supply or sanitation systems 
requires the expertise of local water institutions' staff. Since urban systems tend to be 
complex, such partnerships are often indispensable. On the contrary, for simpler opera-
tions like water trucking, emergency water storage, and interventions in camps, which are 
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often carried out in the early phase of an emergency, partnerships are less essential be-
cause these operations are less dependent on local expertise; 
.:. They depend on local conditions such as the capacity of the water utility, local political 
background and security conditions; 
.:. They also depend on the type of agency involved, its mission and modus operandi. 
In the end, the study has neither proved nor disproved the hypothesis. Wherever partnerships 
had to take place for the ab~ve mentioned areas, they certainly contributed to improved efficiency 
but wherever water utilities did not participate in the emergency response, agencies also man-
aged outputs benefiting the recipient population. 
This however, only considers the short term, which is the timeframe of emergency operations. If 
effects are considered on the longer term, it is obvious that the level of partnership may influence 
how emergency interventions may be linked to rehabilitation I reconstruction and development. 
'Interventions' in Monrovia and Jaffna have shown that water sector institutions involved in emer-
gency response are often also involved in rehabilitation projects and collaborating in emergency 
response is the initial step towards a closer relationship. 
Therefore, partnerships in emergency response must be sought whenever possible because they 
contribute to prepare and facilitate implementation of rehabilitation. They may also be a first step 
in strengthening the capacity of water sector institutions, giving them more credibility vis-a-vis 
consumers. 
2. Rehabilitation I Reconstruction 
In the case of rehabilitation I reconstruction, the hypothes'is to verify was: 
Partnerships between local water sector institutions and aid agencies contribute to achieve sus-
tainabi/ity. 
,The analysis is based on 'interventions' in Kabul, Jaffna, Monrovia, Bani, Port-au-Prince, and 
Port-de-Paix. 
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2.1 Nature of partnership and the size of urban areas 
As stated in the introduction to the review of the case studies 1, the rehabilitation / reconstruction 
projects that considered in this study took place in urban areas of different sizes: . 
• Kabul, Monrovia and Port-au-Prince are large cities, with populations ranging approxi-
mately from one to three million people; 
• Jaffna, Beni and Port-de-Paix are considered as towns, with populations ranging from 
80.000 to 240.000 people. " 
The choice for such diversity was deliberate and aimed at supporting the validity of the studio 
The 'size factor' is more relevant in the case of rehabilitation/reconstruction than in emergency· 
operations. In the case of the latter, even in cities, target populations tend to live in specific areas 
deprived from water and sanitation services. For instance, emergency water trucking in Grozny 
targeted primarily 20,000 people in Starapromislovsky districtl, an operation similar to what took 
place in Jaffna, a much smaller place. 
Analysing the nature of partnership in relation to the size of the considered urban area reveals 
differences between large cities and towns . 
• Partnerships in large cities 
Projects in large cities are obviously more attractive to donors and a large number of agencies 
may obtain funds to intervene. In Kabul, in addition to the KfW / World Bank project, ICRC / 
Spanish Red Cross, ACF and some others4 were active. Water utilities are therefore exposed 
to a multiplicity of interlocutors with different approaches and agendas. Partnerships may take 
place at utility level or even at ministerial level, such as with the World Bank in Kabul5• Some 
agencies may also choose to work independently from the water utility. It was the case of ACF 
in Kabul and of UNICEF in Monrovia. Coverage is important and all the more relevant given the 
large size of peri-urban areas, fn most cases poorly served by existing services. Coordination 
and collaboration between aid agencies is also crucial. Both issues are detailed in the following 
sections and in the last chapter. 
• Partnerships in towns 
Projects in towns are often carried out by a limited number of agencies. IFls tend to consider 
towns only as part of a larger intervention. For instance, Port-<le-Paix is part of rehabilitation pro-
ject by the Inter-American Development Bank (lOB) targeting four Haitian cities and towns. In any 
1 See page 129. 
2 See page 122. 
3 See page 233. 
4 Care, Oxfam and 'Solidarites; among others, carried out rehabilitation projects which were not reviewed in this·. 
study. 
• See page 149. 
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case, it appears that 'interventions' in towns involve fewer agencies and often only one at a time 
- GTZ in Jaffna, ACF in Port-de-Paix, 'Solidaritas' in Bani. In such conditions, partnerships are 
difficult to avoid by aid agencies and in the cases reviewed, they took place, albeit with mixed re-
sults in terms of institutional strengthening. Each time, the local branch of a water utility -
REGIDESO-Bani and SNEP- Port-de-Paix - or municipal services - JMC in Jaffna - were in-
volved . 
. 2.2 Levels of partnership 
• Evaluation of the levels of partnership 
The evaluation of the level of partnership between local water sector institutions and· aid agen-
cies is based on criteria detailed in Table D.2, page 119. They may be classified into three 
categories: 
1. Leadership recognition; 
2. Resources sharing: personnel and knowledge; and 
3. Resources sharing: funds. 
The tables below summarize the levels of partnership for the following 'interventions': 
- K1: Kabul, RRI-Beller-Kocks -KtW - World Bank I CAWSS; 
- K2: Kabul, ICRC - Spanish Red Cross I CAWSS; 
- K3: Kabul, ACF - CAWSS; 
- J: Jaffna, GTZ I JMC water. services; 
- M1: Monrovia, Geoscience - EDF I LWSC; 
- M2: Monrovia, Hydroplan - EU and Wold Bank I LWSC; 
- M3: Monrovia, Oxfam I LWSC; 
- M4: Monrovia, UNICEF I LWSC; 
- B: Beni, 'Solidarites'-Aquassistance I REGIDESO ; 
- PaP: Port-au-Prince, GRET I CAMEP ; 
- PdP: Port-de-Paix, ACF-Aquassistance I SNEP. 
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Two of these 'interventions': ACF in Kabul, and UNICEF in Monrovia, were chosen as illustra-
tion of cases in which there was little or no collaboration between aid agencies and water utili-
ties. 
LEADERSHIP RECOGNITION 
The first table shows that, in almost all the cases, institutions authorized 'interventions' and, 
, 
in more than half of the cases, supervised infrastructure works. The design of 'interventions' 
in collaboration with institutions was less frequent, with only three cases out of 12. Participa-
tion in management happened mostly in large-scale rehabilitation projects funded by Intema-
tional Financial Institutions (IFI), as in Kabul and Monrovia, as well as in projects carried out 
in Haiti by the NGOs GRET and ACF. This represented half of the cases. 
-RESOURCES SHARING: PERSONNEL AND KNOWLEDGE 
The second table shows that, as in the first one, resources sharing in terms of personnel and 
knowledge was predominant in large-scale rehabilitation projects in Kabul and Monrovia. It 
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also took place in smaller programmes with institutional development ambitions as in Port-
au-Prince, Port-de-Paix and, to a lesser extend, in Jaffna and Semi. 
RESOURCES SHARING: FUNDS 
The third table shows that payment of salaries or 'incentives' by agencies to institutions' staff 
involved in 'interventions' was frequent. It took place in at least eight cases out of 12. Pay-
ment for consumables is normally a short-term measure applied until cost-recovery functions 
effectively. It was only applied in large-scale rehabilitation projects in Kabul and Monrovia. 
The table also shows that cost-recovery measures were frequently supported by agencies . 
• Factors influencing partnerships 
The decision of engaging in a partnership with the water utilities depends primarily on the aid 
agency. In most cases - or at least in each of the reviewed case studies - water utilities 
emerging from an armed conflict situation are eager to receive assistance. 
The review of case studies suggests that this decision and the level of partnership depend on 
the relative importance given by aid agencies to: 
• Infrastructure work; 
• Institutional development; and 
• Community partiCipation. 
All three aspects may contribute to institutional development of the water utilities and, in tum, to 
the technical, institutional, and financial sustainability of the service they provide. This is shown 
in Figure 8-22 page 99. 
The importance given to infrastructure work, institutional development and social work with the 
communities in the different 'interventions' reviewed is illustrated in Table F.2. It shows that the 
primary objective of most 'interventions' was to improve infrastructure. This makes sense in ar-
eas where fighting and lack of maintenance and investments often caused physical damage 
and subsequent service deterioration. It is also consistent with the clear preference given both 
by aid agenCies and donors to 'hardware', as it was highlighted in the review of the literature 1. 
1 See page 100. 
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Table F-2: Relative Importance of infrastructure work, institutional development and work with 
communities In the case-studies reviewed 
Institutional development of the water utility played the most important role in large-scale rehabili-
tation projects as in Kabul and Monrovia. Most of the smaller projects involving NGOs, the Red 
Cross or UNICEF did little or nothing in this respect. The approach supported by GRET's project 
in Port-au-Prince was different. It was large in terms of coverage but infrastructure was not its 
main objective. It managed to balance institutional development and social work. In Jaffna, JMC 
water services played a very important role in implementing the project and indeed a close rela-
tionship with GTZ was established. Nonetheless, this was short-lived and the involvement of GTZ 
in the institutional development of JMC water services was limited and did not seem to be a major 
objective for Jaffna Rehabilitation Project. 
The importance given to working with the community was a characteristic of the 'interventions' 
managed by NGOs and UNICEF in the case of Monrovia. In contrast, commercial consulting 
firms funded by IFls showed little effort in terms of interacting with the communities benefiting 
from their projects. 
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2.3 Results 
. Results were evaluated In tenns of: 
• The efficiency and effectiveness of 'interventions' at improving access to water and sani-
tation; 
• The appropriateness and sustainability of the service provided, which depend on the ca-
pacity of the water utility and, in many instances, of its relationship with the community of 
consumers; 
• The level of coverage achieved by the service and in particular whether it reached those 
most in need. 
The table below summarizes results obtained for the following 'interventions': 
- K1: Kabul, RRI-Beller-Kocks -KfVV - World Bank I CAWSS; 
__ • - K2: Kabul,lCRC - Spanish Red Cross I CAWSS; 
- K3: Kabul, ACF - CAWSS; 
, 
.: J: Jaffna, GTZ I JMC water services; 
- M1: Monrovia, Geoscience - EDF I LWSC; 
- M2: Monrovia, Hydroplan - EU and Wold Bank I LWSC; 
- M3: Monrovia, Oxfam I LWSC; 
- M4: Monrovia, UNICEF I LWSC; 
- B: Beni, 'Solidarites'-Aquassistance I REGIDESO; . 
- PaP: Port-au-Prince, GRET I CAMEP; 
- PdP : Port-de-Paix, ACF-Aquassistance I SNEP. 
For each criterion, the levels reported in the table are based on the conclusions of the individual 
cases appearing in the review. In the case of Monrovia, some of the projects were at their begin-
ning at the time of the visit and levels could not be estimated . 
. 
K1 K2 K3 J M1 M2 M3 M4 B PaP PdP 
Efficiency •• • ... ... • ? ? • .. .... .. 
Effectiveness .. • .. ... • ? ? ... ... ... .. 
Appropriateness ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. 
Sustainability .. .. • .. .. ? ... ... .. ... .. 
Coverage • • ... ... .. • ... ... .. ... .. 
• Efficiency 
The study shows that interventions focusing on infrastructure and implemented on a relatively 
small scale have a quicker impact and are therefore more efficient. In contrast, the benefits of 
large-scale rehabilitations such as in Kabul and Monrovia may take years before they are fell. 
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Efficiency is very important factor to be taken into account when evaluating the outcome of re-
habilitation/reconstruction because both consumers and govemment institutions tend to lose 
trust in projects that do not show Significant results after a few years of implementation, in par-
ticular when experts are deployed at a very high price. The lack of communication with recipient 
communities, which tend to characterize this type of project, helps to maintain this image. 
c' Effectiveness 
Effectiveness depends on the actual results achieved by interventions. The study has shown 
that this tends to depend, on the one hand on the size of the project, and on the other on its 
ambitions in tenns of institutional development. The effects from 'interventions' involving sub-
stantial institutional development were hardly felt at the time of field visits. For instance, in Ka-
bul, it appeared that most of the .improvements observed at the time of the study, resulting from 
the KfW-World Bank funded rehabilitation of the water distribution network were due to the 
'emergency works' carried out between 2002 and early 2003. This phase of the project -
Phase I - actually achieved little in tenns of institutional development. In 2005, no major refonn 
was yet implemented in the management of CAWSS whilst none of the large-scale infrastruc-
ture improvements had started. 
Community-based project such as ACF water and sanitation activities, also in Kabul, may be 
more effective but their outcome is often much localized. Individual systems maintainable by the 
community, such as hand-pumps, can only supply a limited number of consumers; compared to 
the potentially large number of consumers characterized by networks. These systems are de-
signed for rural areas. Their use in the urban environment only compensates for the deficiency 
of centralized services. The study shows that interventions focusing on infrastructure and im-
plemented on a relatively small scale have a quicker impact are therefore more efficient. In con-
trast, the benefits of large-scale rehabilitations such as in Kabul and Monrovia may take years 
before they are felt. In Kabul, most of the improvements observed at the time of the study, re-
sulting from the KfW-World Bank funded rehabilitation of the water distribution network were 
due to the :emergency works'1 carried out between 2002 and early 2003. This phase of the pro-
ject achieved little in terms of institutional development. Community-based project such as ACF 
water and sanitation activities, also in Kabul, may have a quick impact but it is often much local-
ized. Individual systems maintainable by the community, such as hand-pumps, can only supply 
a limited number of consumers; compared to the potentially large number of consumers charac-
terized by networks. These systems are designed for rural areas. Their use in the urban envi-
ronment only compensates for the deficiency of centralized services. 
1 Beginning of Phase I. 
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• Appropriateness. 
In most cases, 'interventions' aimed at repairing or constructing elements of water networks, 
which are considered as appropriate for the densely populated urban environment. ACF's pro-
ject in Kabul, supporting the drilling of boreholes equipped with hand-pumps and the construc-
tion of individual latrines was an exception, but focused on peri-urban areas not served by the 
water supply network. This specific project could only be considered appropriate because, at 
the time of the study, hand-pumps remained the most reliable water system in Kabul since there 
was little hope for an extension of the network towards these areas . 
• Sustainability 
The literature suggests that, whilst time-consuming, institutional development should contribute 
to the sustainability of the project1 by increasing the capacity ofthe water sector utility to run the 
service. This capacity should improve the technical and, up to a certain extent, the institutional 
sustainability of the service. The 'interventions' reviewed did not confirm this hypothesis since 
large-scale rehabilitation projects with predominant institutional development components failed 
to show evidences of their Significant contribution to improving the sustainability of water ser-
vices. Some of these projects were not completed at the time of the study, which makes difficult 
a rigorous estimation of their levels of sustainability. Nonetheless, in the case of Monrovia, a re-
port by Geoscience admitted that the capacity of the water utility had not significantly improved 
, 
as a result of its intervention (Geoscience, 1998). Both in Kabul and Monrovia, services ran 
with huge deficits after two of more years of technical assistance and, in the end, aid agencies 
recommended a partial privatization of water services in order to reach sustainability and im- . 
prove efficiency. Smaller-scale 'interventions' on the water distribution network, such as ICRC-
Spanish Red Cross project in Kabul or ACF project in Port'de-Paix tend not to address institu-
tional development and focus on infrastructure. This leaves other agencies - KfW-World Bank 
in Kabul and IRB in Port'de-Paix - with the task of ensuring that the service is sustainable. 
The quality of equipment and materials used in rehabilitation is another parameter of sustain-
ability. Poor quality may cause problems in the long term. This aspect is important for water dis-
tribution networks, but also in the case of systems maintainable by communities such as hand- . 
pumps. Maintenance is one of the major threats to sustainability of community-based water pro-
jects. Experience from ACF's project in Kabul showed that this primarily depended on the levels 
of motivation of community leaders. 
GRET programme in Port-au-Prince showed how an NGO may play a role of intermediary be-
tween communities and water utilities, thereby achieving a technically, institutionally and finan-
Cially sustainable service. The water utility, CAMEP eventually took over the activity, which is 
1 See page page 98. 
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the best possible result; only threatened by the increase in the level of gang-violence in certain 
areas ofthe Haitian capital. 
Problems related to quality and scarcity of water resources are other aspects to be taken into 
account when evaluating the sustain ability of rehabilitation projects. The case of Jaffna is typical 
and extreme since' access to the water distribution network had to be restricted because of the 
limited quantity of available fresh water. In Kabul, privatization plans may be a threat for water 
resources. Profitability requires sufficient water consumption, which may be difficult to obtain 
with current resources. ' 
• Coverage 
In cities such as Kabul and Monrovia, institutional development was mostly carried out with the 
objective of supporting water supply in areas already covered by water distribution networks. 
High and middle income households tend to live in these areas. In the case of Kabul, it repre-
sented only 40 per cent of the population. 
When projects focus on low-income areas, they may be community-managed and carried out 
independently from water utilities. ACF's project, also in Kabul, is an example. Projects are 
sometimes speCifically designed to cover certain areas, with institutional development as a sec-
ondary objective, as in 'Solidarites' programme in Beni or Oxfam's project in Monrovia. 
GRET's project in Port-au-Prince was also successful in terms of coverage since it targeted ar-
eas not reached by the water distribution network and managed to augment water access. What 
is more, the project contributed to changing the policy of the water-utility CAMEP towards ex-
tending its service to shantytowns, and helped in increasing its capacity to do so. 
2.4 Conclusions 
The tables on 'leadership recognition' and 'resource sharing' show that a certain level of partner-
ship between local water sector institutions and aid agencies always exists in 'interventions' in-
volving works on a water distribution network. However; Table F.2 suggests that, in most cases, 
agencies' primary objectives remained the rehabilitation ofthe infrastructure. 
Achieving sustainability through institutional development of the water utility has proved difficult 
and the study found little evidence of success. Moreover, 'interventions' with a large institutional 
development component tend to target areas already served by a water distribution network and 
neglect a large proportion of the urban population, especially in the low-income areas. On the 
other hand, relying solely on communities for the operation and maintenance of systems may 
,also fail to achieve sustainability, since it often depends on the presence of a few motivated 
community members. 
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It can be concluded that: 
.:. Partnerships between water sector institution and aid agencies are frequent in rehabilita-
tion I reconstruction but most' of the 'interventions' reviewed have shown little evidence of 
these partnerships contributing to sustainability . 
• :. Large-scale rehabilitation projects are .carried out in close collaboration with water utili-
ties and encourage 'policy driven' systems 1. The study suggests that current strategies fail 
to effectively contribute to their institutional development. Aid agencies involved in the 
process prefer instead to encourage privatization to substitute poorly performing utilities. 
Privatization is a long and difficult process and, by 2006, none of the 'interventions' man-
aged to implement it effectively. If successful, Kabul and Monrovia cases suggest that it 
would mostly benefit middle and high income neighbourghoods, already served by a water 
network . 
• :. SmaIlElr-scale, often community-based projects tend, on the contrary, to focus on low-
income areas and to have a limited interaction with water sector institutions. They repro-
duce mechanisms typical of the rural environment or emergency response, thereby setting 
up 'needs driven' systems2• Their outcomes lack sustainability both from a technological or 
an institutional point of view . 
• :. The lack of interaction between large-scale and community based projects is more no-
ticeable in 'interventions' in large cities in which multiple 'projects are taking place simulta-
neously than in towns where often only one project is active at a time . 
• :.. In a situation of water scarcity, sustainability requires that partnerships are envisaged 
taking into consideration the preservation of water resources. 
This relatively negative assessment of partnerships does not imply that they are. never justified~ It 
only shows that achieving sustainability and universal services through partnerships requires a 
paradigm shift. This would involve adopting a different, more balanced strategy, which may be 
inspired from GRETs experience in Port-au-Prince. This strategy would encompass fostering the 
institutional development of the water utility and ensuring the consultation of consumer's commu-
nities. 
1 See page 41. 
2 See footnote 1. 
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3. Validity of the conclusions 
This section evaluates the validity ofthe conclusions by examining: 
• Whether the selected methodology was followed as planned and whether it was appro-
priate; 
• Whether the research question was answered and the hypotheses proved or disproved; 
• What the research has achieved and whether there were shortcomings. 
3.1 In following the methodology 
The methodology was based on determining levels of partnership between water sector institu-
tions and aid agencies and looking at how they influenced the performance of 'interventions'. This 
was done using evaluation criteria recognized as valid for humanitarian projects: efficiency, ap- . 
propriateness, sustainability and coverage .. 
The methodology was followed as planned, conclusions being supported primarily by case stud-
ies for which the largest quantity of information was available i.e. those carried out in Kabul, 
Jaffna, Monrovia and Grozny. Three of these places were visited by the author. Interviews of 
members of the agencies involved in Beni and Port-de-Paix partly compensated the fact that no 
field visit was carried out in these places. 
The method benefited from the fact that most agencies intervened in more than one of the se-
lected locations: 
• ACF: in Kabul, and Port-de-Paix; 
• GTZ: in Jaffna, and Monrovia 
• The ICRC: in Kabul, Monrovia, Port-au-Prince, and Grozny; 
• Solidarites: in Kabul, and Beni 
The same applied to donors such as ECHO. 
This contributed to a certain similarity in approaches, at least on the side of aid agencies, which 
made it easier to compare situations, find similarities, and draw conclusions. 
Reports produced by aid agencies, in particular those for donors, were also structured in terms of 
objectives, relevance and sustainability. This material was therefore well adapted to the use of 
. humanitarian evaluation criteria. 
3.2 In answering the research question and verifying the hypotheses 
In the case of emergency response, the study verified the hypotheSis, albeit with reservations due 
to certain factors influencing partnerships. It also answered the research question, drawing con-
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clusions on the circumstances under which partnerships took place and how they benefited water 
sector institutions and the recipient population. 
In the case of rehabilitation, the 'intervention' by GRET in Port-au-Prince was the only example of 
partnership with evidence of sustainable results. No other case study fully verified the hypothesis. 
The shortcomings observed suggest the need for a different way of envisaging partnerships. The 
study also pointed out the importance of coverage as a performance indicator, in addition to sus-
tainability, since a sustainable service should be accessible by all. The study showed the poten-
tial of partnership for improving the service but, based on the case studies alone, could not an-
swer the research question on the best strategy for implementing partnership. In the next chapter, 
it is suggested how current partnerships strategies could be modified in order to improve the out-
come of 'interventions'. 
3.3 In terms of achievements an~ shortcomings 
This study is one of the very few academic works carried out on analysing the interaction be-
tween aid agencies and water sector institutions in 'unstable' situations i.e. emergency response 
and rehabilitation. In this regard, its value comes on the one hand from its originality and on the 
other from the fact that it compiles a variety of information rarely available. Its conclusions may 
help in improving the way aid is organised in cities affected by armed conflicts. 
In terms of shortcomings, this study has suffered from the unavailability of data, in particular on 
emergency response. The fact that some of the selected 'interventions', in particular in Kabul and 
Monrovia, were still ongoing at the time of the study, was another obstacle since issues such as 
sustainability were analysed, based on interpretations by the author of how the outcome may 
evolve based on the situation at hand. Moreover, the only 'intervention' sustaining the hypothesis, 
i.e. GRET project in Port-au-Prince was only based on literature. A visit would have given more 
insight on how partnerships may be carried out. Finally, most of the information available came 
from aid agencies. Water sector institutions and members of the community could only be con, 
suited during field visits in Kabul, Jaffna and Monrovia. There was limited time in the field, in par-
ticular in Kabul, due to security constraints and the number of interviews of consumers was lim-
ited. 
From a more general point of view, it should be added that cultural and gender dimensions, which 
may have been considered under 'appropriateness', were not specifically analysed in the frame-
work. On of the reasons was that analYSing this aspect would have required more interviews with 
members of the community. This was only possible in some locations - Kabul, Jaffna and Mon-
rovia - and with the limitation stated hereabove. 
Some ofthese shortcomings were foreseen and appear in the 'Methodology' chapter. 
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G. Lessons to be learnt and Recommendations 
This chapter analyses what lessons can be leamt from this study. Beyond what is revealed by the 
case studies, it suggests possible strategies to remedy the following problems observed in part-
nerships: 
• The apparent I,ack of communication between IFI funded large-scale rehabilitation pro-
grammes carried out by commercial consulting firms and smaller-scale, sometimes 
community based, projects often carried out by NGOs; 
• The incapacity to reconcile working on institutional development of water utilities whilst 
establishing a dialogue with communities; and 
• Building confidence in water institutions.· 
These problems are linked and highlight the need for a different approach on how emergency 
response and rehabilitation are funded. This aspect is analysed in the last section. 
1. Combining skills in partnership 
The study suggests that achieving sustainable and universal service in rehabilitation I re-
construction of urban water and sanitation systems requires aid agencies to revise their strategy 
towards genuinely engaging in developing the institutional capacity of water sector institutions 
vis-a~vis consumers' communities. This implies, in addition to infrastructure rehabilitation, working 
simultaneously on institutional development of water utilities and on social issues in neighbour-
hoods. Such a 'pluralistic approach' is further analysed in the following section. 
It is another kind of partnership, which calls for diverse skills and collaboration between different 
types of organisations. Analysing how 'interventions' were carried out suggests that these skills 
do exist among aid agencies: 
• Commercial consulting firms funded by Intemational Financial Institutions usually engage 
in institutional development of the water utility, albeit with unequal success. However, 
they rarely interact with consumer communities'; 
• . On the contrary, agencies involved in smaller-scale projects, in particular NGOs, often 
base their action on community participation. They are therefore more prone to work on 
the social aspects of water projects. However, they tend to reproduce strategies more 
adapted to the rural environment or to emergency response and do not always consult 
water utilities. 
1 Except for surveys. 
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As mentioned ealier, the former base their action on 'policy driven'systems and the latter focus on 
'needs driven' systems. 
Unfortunately, differences exist in the ethical motivations, type of personnel and agendas be-
tween them, which make this kind of partnership particularly difficult. Interviews carried out in the 
field, in particular for case studies in Kabul, Monrovia and Port-de-Paix show that NGOs, some-
times already involved in emergency response, may see consulting firms as 'new-comers', with 
little knowledge of the environment in which they work. Antagonism may also take place in the 
opposite direction as consulting firms may see NGOs, as 'amateurs', lacking experience in urban 
water services and incapable of meeting high quality standards. They often work side by side, but 
with different methods, and rarely exchange ideas. 
Resolving these differences requires understanding and mutual respect. This may be facilitated' 
through the involvement of 'professional associations' such as Aquassistance, collaborating with 
NGOs as 'partner-consultants' in order to ensure that state-of-the-art standards are respected1• 
This kind of agency is rare and a coordinating body is needed to encourage, if not impose, a rap-
prochement between the various skills available. For that, a sufficiently strong leadership is indis-
pensable. 
There is no straightforward answer to how this leadership can be created. Ideally, this should be 
the task of govemments and their public utilities. It is their responsibility to ensure that rehabilita-
tion is carried out in a coordinated fashion. Unfortunately, govemments are often too weak to play 
this prominent role. They may only carry such responsibility if donors encourage this change. This 
would be relatively easy for donors funding both large-scale and community-based water supply 
rehabilitations. It is therefore important to raise awareness among donors in order to ensure that 
rehabilitation programmes are designed to tackle both utility and community levels simultaneously 
and in a coordinated fashion. This alone may reconcile sustainability and universal service. 
2. Reconciling sustainability and universal service 
As it was mentioned in the review of the literature, sustainability of urban services has three com-
ponents: technological, financial and institutional. This means that 'interventions' must also look 
at social aspects including, among others, community consultation and hygiene promotion in ad~ 
dition to rehabilitating the infrastructure and ensuring that water utilities have the capacity to run it 
- or manage a delegated service. This would ensure institutional sustainability, which depends 
on communities relying on the service. Consumers' willingness to pay would in turn guarantee 
financial sustainability. 
In most cases, this study pOinted out a different reality. Institutional sustainability cannot be 
achieved because rehabilitation projects were found to intervene either exclusively at central level 
1 Aquassistance collaborating with 'So/idarites'in Beni and wffh ACF in Port-<le-Paix. 
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through water sector institutions, or in specific neighbourhoods with their respective communities. 
There were limited links between these two levels. 
-
Agencies working at central level usually aim at restoring the situation prevailing 'before' the 
armed conflict, in which the utility distributed water through private connections to a limited num~ 
ber of consumers. Kabul is a significant example: a master plan designed in 1974 was taken as 
the basis for the 2003· rehabilitation of the water distribution network.·Yet, this study has shown 
the considerable changes induced by war. After years of conflict and massive population dis-
placements, cities such as Kabul, Monrovia and many others changed dramatically. The number 
of operational private connections may have dropped, whilst the number of consumers may have 
increased, but these consumers are usually not connected to a water network. Rehabilitation pro-
jects must adapt to the new state of the city, rather than trying to reproduce conditions from the 
past. 
For that, working with communities is essential in order to understand and quantify their needs. 
For instance, in certain neighbourhoods, in general the richest, privatizing water distribution may 
be beneficial. In others, often the poorest, a different model, such as community-management, 
may be the answer. In Monrovia, the situation found at the time of the study suggests that the 
most realistic solution would have been to work on the 'legalization' of the multitude of SSIPs who 
took over most of municipal water supply. It is not an isolated case among cities affected by 
armed conflicts. Aid agencies, which sometimes consider working with SSIPs as 'supporting pri-
vate interests', should acknowledge their role and contribute to their official recognition. 
Agencies working at neighbourhood level with communities may contribute to sustainability if they 
act as intermediaries between the water utility and consumers. In this way, mechanisms of ac-
countability could be established and consumers would have a 'voice' on how water services are 
delivered in their area. An independent regulatory board, with participation of all stakeholders in-
volved, that would ensure that sufficient water of determined quality is delivered at a price afford-
able to all consumers would guarantee that these mechanisms of accountability ·exist. Steps were 
recently taken both in Kabul and Monrovia to create such institutions, but nothing concrete has 
yet emerged. 
256 
G. Lessons to be leamt and Recommendations 
3. Building confidence in institutions 
Water sector institutions are sometimes assigned 'advisors' funded by IFls in order to foster their 
institutional development~ These advisors are usually staff employed by commercial consulting 
firms managing large-scale rehabilitation projects. This study has found considerable mistrust 
between these firms and the staff of the water utility whose capacity they are meant to 
strengthen. 
Confronted with the apparently irresolvable problem· of encouraging reforms in order to restore 
efficiency and profitability to the water utility, these firms tend to recommend privatization, how-
ever Improbable, as the best solution. This policy, supported by the World Bank and other IFls, is 
not different from what was applied In some 'peaceful' developing countries. In certain cities 
where water utilities were inefficient and only survived thanks to subsidies from their govemment, 
the private sector was seen as the best way of improving services. However,. in countries affected 
by armed conflicts, problems are usually more acute at every level: weak state, lack of resources, 
considerable urban poverty, sometimes urban violence etc. Moreover, as mentioned in the review 
of the literature, Private Sector Participation often contributes to higher water tariffs, which may 
de facto exclude the· poor from the service. This concem is all the more relevant in post-conflict 
situations, in which the number of vulnerable consumers may increase considerably. Finally, it 
usually proves hard to find a suitable company within the country, and foreign companies are 
rarely attracted. 
Post-conflict situations, may, on the other hand, have one advantage for aid agencies: recon-
struction money gives them more power and a much better position to influence strategies than in 
development programmes carried out in peaceful situations. What is more, newly established 
govemments tend to be willing to break with the past and undertake reforms. In these conditions, 
recommending privatization may be wasting a crucial opportunity or the demonstration of a lack 
of interest from aid agencies for institutional development of the water utility. Recent changes 
within LWSC in Monrovia, which led to the restoration of water supply in areas where it had been 
interrupted for nearly fifteen years, show that, in certain cases, untapped resources may exist 
within local institutions. Of course, this is largely dependent on the political will of local govern-
ments. 
There are ways of improving management without necessarily 'throwing the baby out with the 
bath water'. Suppressing subsidies cannot be considered as a valid argument for privatization 
either. Subsidies are commonplace in water supply, even in developed countries. In the words of 
. Talbot (2002:20)1: 
1 In 2002, Jean-Fran~ois Talbot was the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of SAUR International, a French 
company among the world leaders in water services. 
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"Water pays for water" is no longer realistic in developing countries: even Europe 
and the US subsidize seN/ces! SeN/ces users canY pay for the level of invest-
ment required, nor for social projects'. 
If this is true for developing countries in general, it is all the more true in countries emerging from 
an armed conflict. 
Private Sector Participation may. however be an appropriate solution ina post-conflict Situation, 
but this should not be considered as a magic bullet used to evade from the need for aid agencies 
to support institutional development of water utilities. It is important to build confidence between 
them and the aid agencies who are supposed to strengthen them. In Kabul, Najibullah Pattan, 
president of CAWSS, said during an interview, in May 2005: 
We would like they work with us instead of working for us'. 
He was referring to the work of aid agencies and their tendency to substitute rather then inte-
grate. 
Building confidence between water utilities and aid agencies is also important when working with 
communities. This may contribute to a change in the nature of social cohesion by ensuring that· 
'Bridging social capital' becomes preponderant over 'Bonding social capital' (Figure B-23, page 
104} In otherwords, aid agencies may help in re-establishing a bond existing between certain 
communities and public services. These communities are usually the most vulnerable and often 
live in the peri-urban areas. Whilst gaining access to municipal services, they also regain the 
status of citizen, from which they were previously excluded. This was a major achievement of 
GRET's project in Port-au-Prince. Water utilities may be changed through this process and adopt 
the 'customer orientation' suggested by the KfW - World Bank programme in Kabul. This cus-
tomer orientation should be understood as a policy aiming to establishing a genuine dialogue with 
existing and potential customers. 
4. Relief and development: rethinking funding patterns 
The adoption of a more holistic strategy for water supply rehabilitation requires a different mindset 
that transcends the traditional divide between emergency and long-term development. In this re-
spect, current conceptions have proved irrelevant. As pOinted out by BraTlovsky and Boisgallais 
(2000:7) in the case of Port-au- Prince, agencies are often confronted with situations in which: 
'needs are urgent needs for the long term and not emergency needs'l. 
This is frequently the case in post-conflict areas, and the strategy of encouragement to 'link' relief 
and development recognizes this fact. Surprisingly enough, funding pattems do not seem to have 
been adapted to this approach and, for donorS, 'emergencies' and 'development' remain totally 
disconnected. This may lead to absurd situations. The European Commission Humanitarian Of-
1 'Les besoins sont des besoins urgents pour le long terme et non des besoins d'urgence'. 
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fice (ECHO), one of the major funding agencies for emergencies, funds operations over six 
months, with possible extensions, but without any mechanism for allowing a continuity - or syn-
ergyl - of funding that would ensure the consolidations of outputs (European CommisSion, 
1996a:Article 13). ECHO may object to initiatives as important as cost-recovery in certain projects 
arguing that this kind of initiative has a 'long-term approach' character and is not required in an 
. . , 
emergency. This happened in Port-de-Paix in relation with the construction of water-kiosks by 
ACF. The same could be said of the ECHO-funded 'Solidarites' emergency operation in Kabul, 
which extended over three years without any impact on cost recovery. Long delays needed to 
obtain development funds - often exceeding one year in the case of EuropeAid - discourage 
agencies, who tend to emphasize the 'emergency' aspects of their intervention in order to obtain 
funds more easily and more quickly. 
Addressing this. problem requires a reform of donorship, which would allow greater flexibility in 
terms of objectives and ensure funding over longer periods. The newly established 'Good Hu-
manitarian Donorship', which aims at improving the way humanitarian assistance is funded, does 
not contemplate such change. It considers on the contrary that 'humanitarian action and transi-
tional assistance should remain distinct' (Harmer et ai, 2004:3). Nevertheless, considering emer-
gency response and rehabilitation as distinct does not mean that there cannot be links in funding 
. between both. Aid agencies may stay for decades implementing 'emergency projects' in certain 
countries. In recent years, this happened in Afghanistan, Angola and Sudan, to cite only a few. 
This contributes to the blur of the limits between relief and development and if a link must be es-
tablished in strategies, this link must be reflected in funding pattems. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Cities and Towns affected by Armed Con-
flict. 1975-2004 
Source: Sources: ·CE-DATDatabase: www.cred.be/cedatl - Universite catholique de Louvain -
Brussels - Belgium~ and "ReliefWeb; www.reliefweb.int". Population figures are estimations at the 
time of the criSiS, when available, based on www.world-oazetteer.com. 
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Appendix 2: Main agencies involved in water and 
sanitation assistance in some armed con-
flicts affecting urban areas 1994 .;.2004 
• Sources "ReliefWeb; www.reliefweb.inr and annual reports. 
• Cities or towns appearing in italic are part of the case studies. Population figures are es-
timations at the time ofthe crisis, when available, based on www.world-gazetleer.com. 
f MONUC : Mission des Nations Unies en Repub/ique Democratique du Congo: United Nations Mission in the" 
Democratic Republic of Congo .. 
2 IRC: Intemational Rescue Committee. 
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1 NCA: Norwegian Church Aid. 
2 WMD: Waterieidingmaatschappij Drenthe: Water Supply Company Drenthe. 
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Appendix 3: Historical background to the case studies 
1) Kabul, Afghanistan 
• Armed struggle in Afghanistan: From the origins to 1979 
Ever since its creation, in the 18th century, the country has been at the centre of a struggle be-
tween great powers. 
From the 16th century, most of what would become Afghanistan was part of the Indian Mogul 
empire, after having been successively conquered by the Persians under Cyrus, the Greeks 
under Alexander the Great, and the Mongols under Genghis Khan - Hazara people are be-
lieved to be descendents from Mongol warriors. In the 18th century, the Persian ruler Ahmed 
Shah established his empire in Afghanistan, with Kandahar as its capital. His son later moved 
the capital to Kabul (Jalalza'i, 1996) ... 
From the 19th century, the recently created kingdom of Afghanistan was the centre of what was 
known as the 'Great Game'. This 'game' was a struggle between the British and the Russian 
empires. The Russians were then relentlessly progressing towards the south and the east, con-
quering the Caucasus, Central Asia and Siberia. The British tried to ensure control of Afghani-
stan in order to halt this progression. This translated into three Anglo-Afghan wars between 
1854 and 1919 (Jalalza'i, 1996); It was a resounding failure for the powerful British Empire, 
which was confronted with what Barry (2004) calls 'Yaghestan', a state in which Afghan tribes 
join forces and take advantage of the mountains to obstinately attack the invader until it is de-
stroyed. 
After the Second World War, the 'Great Game' continued with new players: the United States 
took the role of Britain and the Soviet Union replaced Russia. The Soviets initiated programmes 
of 'cooperation' with the Afghan government, training civil servants and army officers. In 1964, 
they built an asphalt road linking Kabul to the Central Asia Soviet republics. The Americans re-
sponded by building a road between Kabul, Herat and Kandahar. The Afghan government be-
lieved it was taking advantage of the rivalry between the two superpowers, but in reality, these 
links with the external world contributed to the destabilization of Afghan traditional society. An 
influx of cheap manufactured goods ruined local producers and the country was plunged into a 
profound crisis (Barry, 2004). At the same time, the non-recognition by the Afghan government 
of the 'Durand line', that defines the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, created tensions 
between the two countries. The Afghan claimed sovereignty over the Pashto-speaking North-
West Frontier Province - forming, with Afghanistan, what Phastun nationalists call 'Phushtuni-
stan'. The United States paid little attention to the problem and Afghanistan sought support from 
the Soviet Union, with which closer links were created. 
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The 1960s saw a liberalization of the Afghan regime. The last king of Afghanistan, Muhamad 
. Zaher Shah, established a constitutional monarchy and organised general elections in 1965. 
Two communists: Hafizullah Amin and Babraki Karmal, who were bound to play a prominent 
role in Afghan politics, were elected. A period of agitation followed, which saw the creation of a 
number of semi-clandestine political parties, including the left-wing People's Democratic Party 
of Afghanistan (PDPA) as well as Islamic parties (Brigot and Roy, 1988). 
In 1971 and 1972, Afghanistan suffered from severe drought causing a famine apparently ne-
glected by the authorities. Prince Muhamad Daoud, a former prime minister and a cousin of the 
king, took advantage of the resulting social unrest to stage a coup in July 1973, which ended 
the monarchy. He became preSident, supported by a faction of PDPA, the 'Partcham,1 as well 
as the army, and Pashtun nationalists. His first govemment included seven pro-communist min-
isters out of fourteen members. However, his policy was mostly one of secular nationalism. He 
progressively distanced himself from the PDPA and from the Soviet Union, whilst developing 
ties with Iran and improving relations with Pakistan. His estrangement from the PDPA precipi-
tated his fall. Following the assassination of a PDPA leader, in April 1978, the army, strongly 
tied to the party, intervened attacking the preSidential palace and killing President Daoud and 
his entire family. This became known as the 'Saur Revolution' (Brigot and Roy, 1988). 
On the 30th of April 1978, Noor Muhamad Taraki, secretary general of PDPA and leader of the 
'Khalq,2 faction of PDPA, became president. Babraki Karmal, leader of 'Partcham', was named 
vice-president of the Revolutionary Council and Hafizullah Amin deputy prime-minister and min-
ister of Foreign Affairs. The new govemment engaged in a number of Soviet-inspired reforms 
that clashed with traditional society pattems. This caused popular revolt and the insurrection of 
the army. By March 1979, the rebellion became general. Simultaneously, there was a conflict of 
power within the govemment, amid intense political repression. Karmal was dismissed and 
'Khalq' monopolised power, with Taraki as president and Amin as the newly-apPointed prime 
minister. Taraki was eventually eliminated by Amin, who became president in September 1979. 
The 'Yaghestan' mechanism operated again, this time to fight a central power excessively influ-
enced by the Soviet Union. In order to end a civil war at its doors, the Soviet Union invaded the 
country with 85,000 troops on the 27th of December 1979 (Brigot and Roy, 1988; Barry, 2004) . 
• The war against Soviet occupation: 1979 to 1989 
The Soviets, whose initial intention was to withdraw after six months, tried stabilizing the situa-
tion by reinstating Karmal as president and changing PDPA's most unpopular reforms. This, 
however, did not prevent the resistance from getting organised, with backing from Pakistan, the . 
United States, Saudi Arabia and China. The call for insurrection was interpreted by rural Afghan 
1 The Standard. 
2 The People. 
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as a 'Jihad' - a war in defence of Islam - and rebels considered themselves as 'Mujaheddin' 
- 'fighters of the holy war'. Combats took place in many areas of the country, obliging a large 
number of people to become IDPs or refugees - mostly in Pakistan and Iran. The Soviets tried 
to prevent people's support to the 'Mujaheddin' by buming crops, killing livestock and indis-
criminately bombing villages. As a result, almost one million people died. In cities, the secret po-
lice 'Khad', modelled on the Soviet KGB, organised repression. By the mid 1980s, the Soviet . 
Union was fully controlling the Afghan govemment and its institutions (Johnson, 2004). 
The· situation changed from 1986, as increased extemal support made 'Mujaheddin' fighters 
less dependent on local resources. Moreover, 'Stinger' missiles, received from the United 
Statt~s, inflicted severe losses on the Soviet air force. The same year, the decision of withdraw-
ing from Afghanistan was made by the Soviet regime under its new leader: Mikhail Gomachov. 
In 1987, President Karmal was replaced by Dr Najibullah Khan, head of 'Khad', with the mission 
of promoting reconciliation. In 1988, attempts to organise a negotiated transfer of power to the 
Mujaheddin failed. Soviet troops eventually withdrew in February 1989 (Barry, 2004; Johnson, 
2004) . 
• The Battle for Kabul: 1989 to 1996 
Najibullah's govemment was thought unable to survive Soviet withdrawal (Alien-Mills, 1990). 
Yet, it did during three years, but it had almost no influence on rural areas. Meanwhile, the 'Mu-
jaheddin', who lost 'Jihad' against the Soviet troops as a unifying factor became bitterly divided 
in ethnic factions, some of which were supported by Iran or Saudi Arabia. Among the main 
movements were the Tajik-dominated'Jamiat-i-lslami' under Gulbuddin Rabbani and Ahmad 
Shah Massoud , and its rival the Pashtun-dominated 'Hezb-i-Islami', under Gulbuddin Hekmat-
yar. These confrontations made difficult tuming individual victories into a unified one and 
probably delayed the fall of Najibullah's regime (Jalalza'i, 1996; Johnson, 2004). 
In October 1990, Hekmatyar's troops reached the outskirts of Kabul and started attacking the 
city (The Independent, 1990a). Less than two years later, in March 1992, Najibullah announced 
his intention to step down. With the collapse of the regime, the northem commander of govem-
mental forces, the Uzbek general Abdul Rashid Dostum, changed sides and joined the rebels 
(Johnson, 2004), becoming a major actor in the struggle for power. Kabul fell on the 25th of April 
1992. Najibullah was prevented from leaving the city and found refuge in the UN compound. 
Massoud's troops were the first in entering Kabul and organised its control, preventing looting. 
They were confronted with fierce opposition from Hekmatyar's forces, kept at the edge of the 
city (Dinmore, 1992; McGirk, 1992). This almost immediately degenerated into the renewal of 
hostilities between Massoud's allied to Dostum's forces on one side and Hekmatyar's on the 
other (McGirk, 1992). Despite fierce fighting in the streets of Kabul, the Islamic state of Afghani-
stan was proclaimed on the 28th of April 1992 (Jalalza'i, 1996). Rocket attacks intensified in Au-
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gust and continued throughout 1992 and in the early months of 1993. There was an unexpected 
period of lull in May 1993, but combat resumed at the end of the same year and during the first 
months of 1994, with Dostum again changing sides and backing Hekmatyar (The Economist, 
1993a; The Economist, 1993b; MacWilliam, 1994). At the time, more than 700 tanks were pa-
trolling the streets of Kabul and it is conservatively estimated that 20,000 people died and 
500,000 fled, leaving only 800,000 residents in the capital (Whitaker, 1994; Johnson, 2004) . 
• Rise and fall ofthe Taliban: 1994 to 2002 
In order to restore order in a country they wished weak but quiet, Pakistan armed a militia of 
Pashtun theology students: the Taliban (Barry, 2004): They first appeared in 1994, and in a few 
months gained control of the southem half of Afghanistan, sometimes entering cities with little or 
no resistance. During the first months of 1995, they tried taking Kabul, but were pushed back by 
Massoud's forces (Anderson, 1995; The Economist, 1995a; Barry, 2004). A new attempt, in 
September 1996, proved successful and Kabul fell into their grip. One of their first actions was 
to take ex-president Najibullah out of the UN compound iri which he was hiding, and immedi-
ately hang him in one of Kabul's squares (O'Kane, 1996). Peace was however restored in Kabul 
and many IDPs and refugees retumed to their homes, bringing the city's population, close to its 
pre-war level of about 1.2 million people (Bourke, 1996). The Taliban continued their progres-
sion towards the north, while installing their govemment. In 1999, they took Bamyian and later 
Mazar-e-Shariff. By 2000, only the Panshir Valley, held by Massoud, and Rabbani's fief of 
Badakshan - Fayzabad region - remained under control of what had become known as the 
'Northem Alliance'1. Dostum troops were disbanded and the genera,l himself left for exile to Uz-
bekistan. The Taliban imposed peace at the cost of the most fundamentalist Islam. The support 
they received at the beginning from people desperately longing for peace, soon decreased, in 
particular in urban areas. The Taliban regime was only recognised by Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia 
and the Arab Emirates. Its relationship with the West was tense, mostly because of its attitude 
towards women rights, opium production, and its harbouring of Osama Bin Laden, himself a 
former Mujaheddin fighter. On the 9th of September 2001, Massoud was assassinated and 'AI, 
Qaeda' immediately suspected. The attacks on New York and Washington, two days later, trig-
gered a new war, in which the United States and the Northem Alliance fought against the Tali-
ban; It consisted mostly of aerial attacks, with 12,000 bombs being dropped in less than two 
months (Johnson, 2004). 
Kabul suffered from air strikes throughout October 2001 (Traynor, 2001). The city actually fell in 
less than two hours, at the end of November (Davis, 2001). Soon after, Herat, Jalalabad, and 
even the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar were controlled by the new coalition (The Economist, 
2001c). In 2001, a traditional assembly decided the installation of the Afghanistan Transitional 
1 See Map E-2 page 134. 
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Authority (AT A), replaced in the following years by an elected govemment. Security continued 
to largely rely on the United States and on a multinational 'Intemational Security Assistance 
Force' (ISAF), fighting pro-Taliban factions active in several areas of the country, especially in 
the south (Johnson, 2004). 
2) Jaffna, Sri Lanka 
• Colonial times: 1505 to 1948 
From 1505, Portugal was the first European nation to establish significant colonial trading posts 
in what was known as the island of Ceylon. They were later followed by Holland and Britain, the 
latter becoming the preponderant power in the 19th century. From 1815, the British Empire con-
trolled the entire island. It built an economy based on the export of tea, rubber and coconut, for 
which large plantations were created. Its power was based on the establishment of an angli-
cized, educated elite from both Sinhalese and Tamil extraction (Goonasekera, 2001). However, 
Tamils benefited more from the colony in terms of employment and access to higher education'. 
They also took advantage of the imposition of English as the official language because they 
proved more gifted at learning the language than Sinhalese (Stewart, 2002:21). This situation 
created resentment among the Sinhalese against the Tamil minority, which intensified with the 
revival of Buddhist nationalism in the late 19th century (Goonasekera, 2001 :110) . 
• The run-up to civil war: 1948 to 1983 
Ceylon obtained independence in 1948. The Sinhalese govemment which came to power 
sought compensa~ion for the unequal treatment inflicted on the Sinhalese during colonial times 
by reversing the situation in their favour. Educational quotas were imposed, that gave easier 
access to higher education to Sinhalese students, Sinhala2 was declared the sole official lan-
guage, and regional investments gave priority to Sinhalese-populated areas (Stewart, 2002:21). 
The citizenship act of 1948 denied 'Indian Tamils' the right to citizenship 'by descent' and im-
posed upon them to be registered selectively as citizens. Many were 'repatriated' to the Indian 
state of Tamil Nadu. The situation degraded further in 1956 when the 'Sinhala only' act was 
adopted by parliament, following a wave of Sinhalese nationalism. It prevented many Tamils 
from accessing university and pOSitions in the administration. As a result, Tamil youth organised 
riots across the country (Goonasekera, 2001: 11 0). In 1958, the country was bitterly divided and 
many violent attacks against Tamils were perpetrated. Elements of Sinhalese youth, who ex-
pected more from the Sinhalese dominated government, created the Sinhalese nationalist and 
Maoist party: Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), supported by a large proportion of the Bud-
1 Tamils held 40 per cent of the university places in science and engineering, medicine and agriculture and veteri-
nary science. 
2 The language spoken by Sinhalese. 
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dhist clergy. It was the origin of new riots in 1971, for which a state of emergency was declared 
and remained in place until 1977 (Goonasekera, 2001:110). In 1972, the constitution was modi-. 
tied, changing the name of the country into Sri Lanka and reaffirming Sri Lanka as a Sinhalese 
state, Buddhism as the religious majority, and Sinhala as the official language. Tamil leaders 
had liltle success in achieving any improvement in the civil rights for their community. In reac-
tion to the new law, a number of Tamil rebel groups were created. The most radical one: Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (L TIE) appeared in 1976. The movement claimed for an inde-
pendent state: 'Tamil Eelam', in the provinces predominantly populated by Tamils showed in the 
map hereafter. It was banned by the govemment two years lalter. The 1980s saw an even 
sharper divide between the two communities. During local elections, in 1981, a candidate and 
. two policemen were killed in Jaffna. In reprisal, the police burnt the market-place, the local 
headquarters of a Tamil party and the public library with its 95,000 volumes. In July 1983, 13 
soldiers were killed in the blast of a mine laid by Tamil militants in the Northern Province. The 
soldiers received state funerals and, immediately after, mobs attacked Tamil families, initially in 
Colombo and gradually in all areas outside the north and the east of the country. Over 1,000 
people died and 100,000 became refugees abroad or in the north-eastern region. Tamil-owned 
assets were systematically destroyed. The damage was estimated to 300 million USD (Khumar, 
1997). 
Tamil Eelam territory claim 
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• First battle for Jaffna and Indian intervention: 1984 to 1990 
In 1984, the Sri Lankan government decided to go to war against the L TIE, which had become 
the only significant Tamil armed opposition group (Khumar, 1997; Goonasekera, 20(1). It 
launched an increasing number of attacks on the north of the country (Edirisinge, 1984). In 
1985, the president of Sri Lanka declared: 
'Sri Lanka is one land 75 per cent Sinhala and 25 per cent other races, and the 
government will settle Sri Lankans in this proportion throughout the land'. 
As a result, land in 'sensitive areas' of the north-eastern region was given to 200,000 Sinhalese 
settlers. Tamils saw this initiative as a rampant occupation and many new settlements were at-
tacked by the L TIE (Khumar, 1997). 
The country became more and more unstable, to the point of obliging India, whose Tamil Nadu 
state is home to 50 million Tamils (Hawksley, 1986a; Khumar, 1997), to mediate in an attempt 
to restore peace. By mid 1985, a cease-fire was agreed and peace-talks organised, but they did 
not succeed in reducing tensions. In November, the government broke the cease-fire and at-
tacked LTIE positions in the north (Khumar, 1997). In 1986, war was raging in the Jaffna pen-
insula. The L TIE controlled most of it, with the exception of army bases, around which most of 
the fighting was taking place (Hawksley, 1986a; Hawksley, 1986c). In May, Jaffna town was 
bombed by the Sri Lankan air force and shelled from a colonial military fortI, situated on an is-
land near the town centre in which the army had established a base (Hawksley, 1986b). Four 
days later, the army was forced to withdraw and leave free range to the L TIE in Jaffna 
(Hawksley, 1986d). Only the fort was still under government control. The L TIE took over the 
administration of the peninsula, collecting electricity bills, levying taxes and ensuring essential 
public services (Hamlyn, 1987b). The government continued paying civil servants but imposed 
an embargo on fuel (Khumar, 1997). In May 1987, the Sri Lankan army launched a new offen-
sive from the north-eastem corner ofthe peninsula (Brown, 1987a; Hamlyn, 1987c). As a result 
many villages in this area were destroyed and hundreds of families were forced to flee (Hamlyn, 
1987a; The Times, 1987). By mid June, the army was contrOlling about a third of the peninsula 
(Brown, 1987b). 
India supported Tamil militants, airdropping aid and supplying them with funds and weapons. By 
mid 1987. its government declared that it would not let the Sri Lankan government retake 
Jaffna. In July of the same year, a peace accord was concluded, which was to be monitored by 
Indian peace-keeping troops: IPKF. Initially, 32,000 troops were sent to Northern Sri Lanka. A 
year later, their number increased to reach 52,000. However, by the time of the accord, the In-
dian government had changed position and decided to disarm the L TIE by force (Khumar, 
1997). In October 1987,Indian troops were surrounding Jaffna town and started intense fighting 
against militants. The humanitarian situation was critical, with no electricity for several days, wa-
1 Built by the Portuguese and later used by the Dutch. 
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ter and sanitation systems broken down and there were no means of distributing food (Hamlyn, 
1987b). An estimated 375,000 people in the peninsula had to leave their homes and found ref-
uge in Hindu temples, schools and churches outside Jaffna (Swain, 1987). The initial phase of 
IPKF intervention seemed successful (The Guardian, 1987), but IPKF did not manage to sub-
due the insurgents. Confronted by mounting opposition from the Sinhalese community against 
the Indian-mediated peace-accord, the Sri Lankan government lost the elections in 1990 and 
the new administration asked Indian troops to leave the country. This was effective on the 251h 
of March 1990 (Khumar, 1997; Goonasekera, 2001) . 
• The second battle for Jaffna: 1990 to 1995 
In June 1990, the L TIE broke a 14 months ceasefire and resumed fighting in the Jaffna penin-
sula (Pringle, 1990). By then, Jaffna town's population, submitted to daily bombardment, had 
fallen from its pre-war 130,000 inhabitants down to 60,000 (The Independent, 1990b; Whitaker, 
1990). In September, tlie Sri Lankan army abandoned its stronghold in the fort; but kept on 
shelling and bombing of the town (Pringle, 1990). The army continued to lose ground until No-
vember 1993, when it had to withdraw from its last bases on the peninsula whilst remaining in 
control of 'Elephant Pass' (The Economist, 1993c). 
In August 1994, the newly-elected president Chandrika Kumaratunga tried to resume peace-
talks with the L TIE, promising reconstruction, a higher degree of autonomy for Tamil regions 
and to ease the embargo on Jaffna peninsula (The Economist, 1995b; The Economist, 1995d). 
A cease-fire was concluded in January 1995, but the L TIE rejected the governmental plan and 
broke it three months later. The government changed its strategy and decided to recapture 
Jaffna peninsula (Goonasekera, 2001 :112). As a result, fighting resumed in Jaffna in October 
(The Economist, 1995d). Areas of the peninsula were again bombed and shelled, displaCing 
400,000 people. 110,000 of them moved to Jaffna town (Thomas, 1995). By December the Sri 
Lankan army had retaken control of the territory. By then, the L TIE had moved nearly 200,000 
of its inhabitants across the lagoon, in the Vanni region', where they established new headquar-
ters in the town of Kilinochchi (The Economist,1995c) . 
• War in the Vanni,and the fall of Elephant Pass: 1996 to 2001 
From 1996, a substantial number of people started returning to Jaffna (The Economist, 1996). 
The same year, the L TIE dislodged the army from its bases in Mullaitivu, and two years later in 
Kilinochchi (Map E-5). The Vanni became under the full control of the separatist movement. The 
main road to Jaffna was cut, leaving Jaffna peninsula fully dependent on supplies by air and by 
sea (The Economist, 1998a; The Economist, 1998b). The army suffered another defeat in Man-
nar in September 1999 (The Economist, 1999) but the worst was the loss of the Elephant Pass 
f See map hereabove 
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base in April 2000 (Harding, 2000a; The Economist, 2000b). It allowed the L TIE to reach the 
immediate surroundings of the town, a month later. This created yet another major crisis in 
Jaffna, with renewed population displacements (Harding, 2000b). However, the L TIE did not 
, . 
capture back the town and the Sri Lankan army regained some of its positions in September 
(The Economist, 2000a). In 2001 most of the peninsula was again under its control (The 
Economist, 2001 b) . 
• Uncertain peace: 2002 to 2006 
By the early 2000s, the L TIE declared to have conquered 70% of its territorial claims (The 
Economist, 2000c). Government military setbacks lead to the victory of the opposition party in 
December 2001 general elections. Fresh peace-talks, mediated by Norway, were organised. As a 
result, an indefinite ceasefire was agreed in February 2002. The peace-process was approved by 
90 per cent of the Tamils but only by a third of the Sinhalese (Gouvemeur, 2004). One of its main 
effects was to open the road to Jaffna through the Vanni region (Ganguly, 2004). Much needed 
assistance could reach the peninsula, whilst electrical power became more constant (Bedi, 2003). 
This brought hope to its inhabitants. 80,000 buildings were destroyed during fighting, including 
the entire town of Chavakachcheri (Map E-6), the second largest settlement in the peninsula after 
Jaffna town (The Refugee Council, 2002:13). In 2002, the economic cost of the conflict since 
1983 was estimated to be at least twice Sri Lanka's GDP of 1996. In 2001, the country had be-
come the world's leading aid recipient in per capita terms (Arunatilake et aI., 2001) and 726,000 
people, 88 per cent of them Tamils, had become lOPs (The Refugee Council, 2002:16) . 
. 
Since 2003, the situation has changed for the worst, leading to the break of a fragile ceasefire in 
2006 .. The disagreement between the Sri Lanka president - then, Chandrika Kumaratunga -
and her prime minister initially contributed to this deterioration (Bedi, 2003). In 2005 the country's 
minister of foreign affairs was assassinated (The Economist, 2005d) and by 2006, fighting re-
started, first in the east and later in the Jaffna Peninsula (The Economist, 2006). 
3) Monrovia, Liberia 
,; The Americo-Liberian predominance: 1847 to 1979 
The country was founded by 40,000 freed-slaves from the United States 1, who settled in this 
area in 1822, with the suppor! of anti-slave philanthropic societies who financed their journey. 
The independence of the new state - the oldest in Africa - was proclaimed in 1847. The de-
scendants of the early settlers are today known as 'Americo-Liberians' or 'Congos'. Although 
they represent not more than five per cent of the current population (BBC News, 2006b), they 
remained in power for more than a century, from 1878 to 1980. The country's constitution is 
1 Monrovia is named after United States president James Monroe. 
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based on the United States'. The newly-created presidential regime was however a more au-
thoritarian one. The president accumulated most of the power, leaving little authority to parlia-
mentarian assemblies: Indigenous people were granted citizenship only in 1904 and effective 
voting rights in 1985. In contrast, the state allowed the 'Americo-Liberian' ruling-elite to expro-
priate land and benefit from the majority of revenues from the country's abundant natural re-
sources. President William Tubman, in power from 1952, suppressed any intent of opposition 
through a constant surveillance by his secret police and a tight control on the media. His vice-
president, William Tolbert, succeeded him in 1971. He tried, at the beginning of his mandate, to 
introduce more democracy, but this liberalization did not last long and, by 1974, the briefly re-
established press-freedom was suppressed. The 1974 oil crisis led to a drop in the prices of iron 
ore, one of the country's main exports, and plunged the country into a severe economic crisis. 
The government decided to increase the price of a bag of rice from 22 to 26 Liberian dollars in 
order to encourage local production. This measure, de facto prevented the indigenous popula-
tion, whose average monthly income was, at that time, about 70 Liberian dollars, from buying 
. their main food. The outcome was growing discontent that led to a demonstration organised by 
an increasingly strong political opposition on the 14th of April 1979. It ended in a blood bath, with 
100 protestors killed by the police and many more injured. Opposition leaders were arrested 
and later released. In March 1980 a general strike in protest against Tolbert's govemment was 
organised by the opposition, who started establishing links with indigenous members of the 
armed forces, poorly paid and kept in inferior positions by 'Americo-Liberian' high-ranking offi-
cers. Following rumours, according to which the president would have ordered the leader of the 
opposition to be arrested and executed, a junior officer, sergeant-chief Samuel Doe, led a mili-
tary coup on the 13th of April 1980. Tolbert was assassinated the same day, along with 15 of 
his aides and ministers (Sesay, 1982; Sesay, 1996; Outram,1999; Marmoz, 2003) . 
• Samuel Doe's regime: 1980 to 1989 
Doe became the first indigenous president of Liberia. He belonged to the Khran tribe, a rela-
tively small ethnic group present in the east of the country. He was poorly educated and inexpe-
rienced and he did not radically change the policy conducted by his predecessor. One novelty 
however was the clear predominance of Doe's own ethnic group in the govemment and armed 
forces. Violent and corrupt, Doe's regime caused the average Liberian income to fall by three 
quarters in ten years. After his victory in seriously flawed presidential elections organised in 
1985, several attempted coups were organised by opposition groups based in Cote d'lvoire and 
Ghana. One of them, led by Thomas Quiwonka, prompted a ferocious response from the gov-
ernment, which killed him and many of his followers. Quiwonka was a friend of Charles Taylor, 
himself a former Doe's aide dismissed for embezzlement. Taylor created the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL), who launched an attack against the govemment on the 24th of Decem-
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ber 1989 from the Nimba County, an area of the north of Liberia populated by Gio and Mano, 
two ethnic groups hostile to the Khran~dominated regime (Outram, 1999; The Economist, 
2005c) . 
• The first Liberian war: 1990 to 1992 
In August 1990, the Nigeria-dominated Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) sent an interposition force to Liberia: ECOMOG\ who halted NPFL before it 
reached Monrovia but did not prevent President Doe from being abducted, tortured and mur-
dered in September. ECOMOG had up to 19,000 troops and backed the creation of an interim 
govemment. By mid-1992 however, the cease-fire was broken by govemmental forces, which 
attacked NPFL positions in Westem Liberia. In October. of the same year, NPFL forces re-
sponded by launching an offensive on Monrovia known as 'Operation Octopus' (The Economist, 
1992; Outram, 1999; Atkinson and Leader, 2000). As a result, Monrovia was shelled, water 
supply disrupted and the power plant seriously damaged. NPFL warriors, young men in long 
wigs, cartoon masks and wedding dresses committed atrocities, terrorizing a city where a large 
number of lOPs had taken refuge whilst the country was falling into anarchy (Huband, 1992; 
The Economist, 1992) . 
• Warlordism and tentative cease-fires: 1992 to 1997 
During this period, the conflict tumed into sporadic violence involving factions allied to Charles 
Taylor confronting the Khran and Mandingo fighters, supporters of the former government. 
Warlords loyal to both groups held portions of the country, forcedly recruiting the local popula-
tion, and exploiting natural resources - in particular diamonds - in order to sustain fighting. 
Most of the humanitarian aid only reached Monrovia, where an estimated 600,000 people were 
forced to move and were sometimes caught between the different frontlines. Many of the dis-
placed were staying in the damaged buildings of the capital (The Economist, 1994c; Reno, 
1995; Atkinson and Leader, 2000). 
The several peace accords signed between 1993 and 1995 - Cotonou, Accra, Abuja -did not 
prevent fighting from resuming in April 1996. NPFL and its allies launched a new attack on Mon-
rovia, where they were opposed to Khran fighters. Together with ECOMOG forces, they carried 
out a 'very heavy and very systematic' looting of the capital, which included UN premises (Reid 
and Jackson, 1996; Atkinson and Leader, 2000). 
Following the resuming of fighting and gruesome massacres in Monrovia, the international 
community increased its efforts to impose a peace deal. The process, named 'Abuja 11', allowed 
the organisation of presidential elections in July 1997 while disarmament and demobilisation 
procedures were put in place. Taylor won in a landSlide, since he was seen as the only candi-
1 ECOWAS Military Organisation. 
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date sufficiently strong to prevent the resumption of a conflict, which had left 200,000 people 
dead and 2.5. million displaced (Atkinson and Leader, 2000; Marmoz, 2003). 
• Charles Taylor's regime: 1997 to 2003 
As a president, Taylor continued his predatory exploitation of the natural resources of Liberia. 
He also contributed to the stimulation of civil war in neighbouring countries - Sierra Leone, 
Guinea and Cote d'lvoire - through arms and diamonds smuggling (Outram, 1999; Smillie, 
2000; The Economist, 2005c). These practices caused the suspension of EU aid to Liberia 
(Posthumus, 2000). 
From 1999, yet another rebel movement: the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democ-
racy (LURD), supported by Guinea, initiated a new uprising from the border with Sierra Leone. 
Continuous fighting provoked the displacement of at least 375,000 people. By May 2003, the 
LURD and its ally the· Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), supported by Cote 
d'lvoire, controlled two thirds of the country. Despite a ceasefire agreement signed on the 18th 
of June 2003, the two rebel groups undertook the siege of Monrovia in July (The Economist, 
2002; ICRC, 2003; The Economist, 2003b). 
June and July 2003 saw Monrovia in flames, with hundreds of mortar shells fired. Three attacks 
were conducted on the 4th and 25th of June and on the 18th of July - what Monrovians call 
World War One, World War Two and World War Three. War did not spare the diplomatic area 
despite 20,000 people taking refuge in the US embassy. Eventually, Charles Taylor was forced 
to leave for exile in Nigeria and a peace accord was signed in Accra on the 18th of August, 
which brought LURD and MODEL to share power in a transitional govemment (ICG, 2003b; 
ICRG, 2003; The Economist, 2003d; The Economist, 2005c). 
• The transition: 2004 to 2006 
The transitional govemment put in place after the fall of Charles Taylor prepared presidential 
elections, which took place in October and November 2005 and were won by Ellen Johnson-
Sirleaf. Since 2003, 17,000 UN troops forming the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 
ensure the security of the country (The Economist, 2005c). 
4) The Democratic Republic of Congo 
• From slavery to forced labour: 1482 to 1898 
The Portuguese navigator Diodo Cao was the first European to reach Congo's costs in 1482 
and discover river Congo. Many more followed. The Portuguese, soon joined by the British, 
French and Dutch established a flourishing slave trade from the coast of the African Kingdom of 
Kongo, located along the Congo River, in the north of today's Angola. Considerably weakened 
by slavery, the kingdom was eventually conquered and annihilated by the Portuguese in 1665. 
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Its territory was taken over by European colonies by the late 1800s but few Europeans ventured 
inside the continent (Hochschild, 1999). 
Slave trade continued in the coastal area around the mouth of the river Congo until it was abol-
ished in Europe towards the end of the 19th century. In 1877, the famous explorer Henry Morton 
Stanley was the first white man to cross the continent from east to west, following the course of 
river Congo. At that time, the king of Belgium, Leopold 11 was actively looking for a colony for his 
country. Given the apparent lack of interest for Central Equatorial Africa from major colonial 
powers such as Britain and France, the king teamed up with Stanley to get hold of this territory. 
Stanley went on a mission aiming to sign 'treaties' with local chiefs surrendering to Leopold the 
actual control over their land. In this way, Leopold and Stanley managed to seize a territory 
equivalent to modem DRC. Intense lobbying managed the recognition of the new African col-
ony, first by the United States and later by all major Westem powers (Hochschild, 1999). 
In 1885, Leopold became 'King-Sovereign' of 'Congo Free State,1 , not a Belgium colony, but a 
privately-controlled one, that the king acquired with his private fortune. The enterprise was pre-. 
sented as 'humanitarian', aiming to 'free' natives from the Arab slave-trade, still active from the 
African eastem coast. In reality, Leopold - who never set a foot in his new state - was plan-
ning the thorough exploitation of the immense natural resources, he suspected, would be found 
in the Congo. It started with the ivory trade, but from 1890, the creation of the car industry led to 
a huge demand for rubber, that became the main export of the colony. As a result, King Leopold 
became fabulously rich but this came at a very high price for the local population. Forced labour 
was used to carry loads, build infrastructure - in particular the railway and cities such as Leo-
poldville, the capital of Congo and Stanleyville - and, most notoriously, extract rubber from wild 
vines in the forest. Torture, hostage-takihg, and massacres were commonplace and rebellions 
ruthlessly crushed (Hochschild, 1999; Wrong, 2001). It is estimated that during Leopold lI's rul-
ing of the Congo, the population was reduced by half due to the loss of 10 million lives as a re-
sult of murder, starvation, exhaustion, disease and a plummeting birth rate (Hochschild, 1999: 
225-234) . 
• A Belgian colony: 1898 to 1960. 
Confronted with mounting criticism about the crimes committed in the Congo, Leopold 11 was 
forced to hand-over his colony - for a substantial fee - to the Belgian state, in 1898, two years 
before his death (Hochschild, 1999). The change brought some improvements. Infrastructure 
works were carried out and industrial production developed. As a result, Congo's GNP at the in-
dependence in 1960, was the same as South Korea (Reno, 2006:44) and the country had more 
hospital beds than all the others Black African countries combined (Wrong, 2001 :49). Yet, daily 
life resembled South Africa under Apartheid and forced labour was widespread. Belgium did 
1 Etat Independant du Congo. 
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nothing to prepare the country for independence, expected in 1955 to be decades away. In 
1960, only 17 Congolese youths had received highereducation (Wrong, 2001; Reno, 2006) . 
• The independence wars: 1960 to 1965 
Confronted with the reluctance of Belgium to acknowledge trends towards independence that 
could be felt all over Africa, Congolese became increasirigly vocal with their own claims. A ref-
. erendum on independence held in neighbouring French-Congo prompted violent protests in the 
Belgium colony, in order to obtain the same privilege (Reno,2006:46). In the end, talks were 
held in Brussels, which led to independence on the 30th of June 1960. The Belgian administra-
tion retired swiftly, amid mutiny and violence and a new govemment was formed. In this period 
of Cold War, its composition was a concem for the West given that its leaders, President Jo-
seph Kasavubu and more particularly Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba were seen as potentially 
sympathetic to the Soviet Union. A young - 29 years old - and brilliant officer, Joseph Mobutu 
was named army chief of staff. 
The new state seemed bound to break-up from the beginning. Almost immediately after inde-
pendence, two southem provinces rich in mineral resources, Katanga and South-Kasai, de-
clared independence. This move was supported by Belgium, eager to maintain its control over 
some of the territory's mineral wealth (Wrong, 2001). The United Nations responded by sending 
peace-keeping troops but with a limited mandate that disappointed the govemment. Moscow 
was approached for help, and weapons were sent, but too late to avoid a defeat of the Congo-
lese army in South-Kasai. Before withdrawal, it carried out a massacre of civilians. Soviet inter-
vention triggered a dispute between President Kasavubu and Prime-Minister Lumumba, who 
ended up dismissing each other (Wrong, 2001; Englebert, 2003). On the 14th of September 
1960, Mobutu, with the support of the CIA 1, 'neutralized' both Kasavubu and Lumumba, in what 
he called a 'peaceful revolution' (Wrong, 2001 :67). Lumumba was later assassinated in Ka-
tanga2 on the 17th of January 1961. He remained a martyr, whose memory was exploited by 
many, including Mobutu (M'Bokolo, 1997). Following Lumumba's assassination and a growing 
danger of Congo falling apart, the United Nations authorized the use of force by its troops, 
which managed, with the backing of the United States, to defeat Kasai and Katanga secessions, 
respectively in 1962 and 1963. Both of their leaders took part in govemment while Mobutu re-
mained behind the scenes, as head of the army. He took advantage of another governmental 
crisis in 1965 to take power for good (Englebert, 2003) . 
• The Mobutu Era: 1965 to 1996 
Once in power, Mobutu changed the name of the country, its main water way and its currency 
into Zaire. African names replaced Christian ones, inherited from the colony. This applied also 
1 Central Intelligence Agency, United-States secret seNices 
2 South of the country, see Map E-11 page 194 
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to places - Leopoldville became Kinshasa, Stanleyville became Kisangani- and to people. 
Joseph Mobutu gave the example by becoming Mobutu Sese Seko. 
From 1970, a more dramatic change was 'Zairisation'. It consisted of the government seizing all 
foreign-owned assets. Thousands of businesses, totalling one billion USD in value (Wrong, 
2001), changed hands. Most of them ended up owned by the govemmental elite 1. Mobutu him-
self harvested the biggest share. He paid for the loyalty of its followers and likewise 'bought' his 
enemies, . essentially by drawing from the country's huge natural wealth including diamonds, 
gold, copper, cobalt, uranium, timber and cOltan2 (Englebert, 2003:4). A 'kleptocratic' system 
was introduced that would plunge the country into destitution. In 1992, the services of the 
presidency represented 95 per cent of the national budget, as opposed to four per cent for agri-
. culture and zero per cent for social services (Englebert, 2003:12). Growth remained weak and 
life for ordinary Zairians increasingly difficult. The proportion of people employed in the formal 
sector dropped from 40 per cent in 1955 to 5 per cent by the mid 1990s. At the time, the official 
figure for per capita income was an obviously impossible 120 USD per year (Wrong, 2001:148) 
while the extemal debt reached 14.5 billion USD (Wrong, 2001:195). 
Such a level of state predation was tolerated by westem countries - and most notoriously by 
the United States and France - because Mobutu's regime was seen as a barrier against com-
munism. For that reason, Mobutu benefited from foreign assistance - from France - to defeat 
rebels who, in 1977, invaded Katanga - renamed Shaba - from neighbouring Angola (Engle-
bert, 2003: 19). The situation changed after the end of the Cold War. By the early 1990s, Mobutu 
was obliged to abandoned one-party rule and accept general elections in order to please his 
foreign supporters. By then, his grasp on power had weakened and he could neither trust his 
anmy nor his govemment (Reno, 2006:46) . 
• First Congolese war and the fall of Mobutu: 1994 to 1997 
The early 1990s saw C;ivil war spreading across the Great Lakes region, an area including Bu-
rundi, Rwanda and the eastem part of Zaire: the Kivu region (Guichaoua and Vidal, 1997). Dur-
ing this period, the long lasting conflict between two rival ethnic groups: the Hutus and the 
Tutsis, both present in Burundi and Rwanda, increased in intensity. A turning point was the 
death of the presidents of both countries, in a plane crash, in April 1994. In Rwanda, where 
Hutus are in majority, this event triggered the massive killing of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Be-
tween 500,000 and one million people were massacred in three months. An anmy of Tutsi rebels 
eventually manag·ed to take the capital Kigali and overthrow the Hutu government. 
1 Dubbed 'Ies mouvanciers'. 
2 'Coltan is the colloquial African name for 'columbite-tantalite~ a metallic ore comprising Niobium and Tantalum. 
Tantalum is used primarily for the production of capacitors, which are vital components in electronic devices, .. 
ranging widely from mobile phones to laptop computers. The Eastem Democratic Republic of Congo has 80 per 
. cent of the world known reserVes' www.wikipedia.org. 
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In the aftermath, 1.2 million Hutus, including 40,000 members of the militias responsible for the 
genocide, fled to neighbouring countries, the majority settling in Zaire's Kivu region (Wrong, 
2001; Olsson and Fors, 2004). 700,000 refugees were left with no food, clean water or medical 
care in a multitude of camps across the region and in particular around Goma and Bukavu, the 
respective capitals of North and South-Kivu provinces (Map E-11). The response by the intema-
tional community was massive: 200 aid organisations were mobilised to assist refugees 
(Fedarko, 1996; Wrong, 2001). 
These refugees arrived in a region with its own ethnic problems. The Banyamulenge, a group of 
ethnic Tutsis, some of whom had been in the country for more than 200 years, were in a latent 
conflict with the govemment. Their relative prosperity created jealous reactions in a region un-
der considerable population pressure on land. In 1981, a law was passed, stripping Banya-
mUlenge of their nationality. Mounting resentment provoked ethnic violence in 1992 and 1993. 
The influx of Hutus refugees from Rwanda, including militias with deep hatred for the Tutsis,. 
worsened the situation. Hutu extremists launched pogroms against Banyamulenges and raided 
the mines they owned. They also used camps as bases to attack Rwandan villages across the 
border. The Zairian govemment did nothing to prevent their action, some of its armed-forces 
even supported them. 
The situation degenerated until September 1996, when the govemor of South-Kivu gave six 
days to what he called 'foreign Banyamulenge' to leave the country. On the 18th of October, a 
rebellion erupted that seized the town of Uvira in South-Kivu and marched towards Bukavu 
(Fedarko, 1996; Englebert, 2003; Olsson and Fors, 2004). The insurgents were an alliance of 
various rebel groups led by a coalition of Banyamulenge resistance groups: the 'Alliance De-
mocratique des Forces pour la Liberation' (ADFL), led by a Katangan, former Maoist rebel. 
tumed gold trafficker: Laurent Desire Kabila. ADFL's main goal was to take Kinshasa and over-
throw Mobutu (Braeckman, 1997; Leymarie, 1997; Olsson and Fors, 2004) and would be suc-
cessful in this enterprise. Among the factors that contributed to its success were conditions cre-
ated by Mobutu himself to maintain his grip on power: a weak army and poor transport infra~ 
structure 1. The rebellion also benefited from the experience of its own fighters in the Rwandan 
conflict as well as from support from Katangan secessionists. Finally, and most importantly, for-
eign countries supported the movement: Rwanda and Uganda were the main interveners but 
Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe also took part. DUring ADFL progression towards the capital, 
200,000 Hutu refugees were allegedly killed. On the 17th of May 1997, Kinshasa fell and Kabila 
immediately proclaimed himself president. The country was renamed Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Mobutu had already left for exile and died in September of the same year (Braeckman, 
1997; ICG, 1998a; Olsson and Fors, 2004). 
1 Only 30.000 km of paved road remained of the 210,000 km left from colonial times (De Waal, 1996) 
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• Second Congolese war: 1998 to 2003, and current situation 
Soon after accessing power, Kabila decided to reduce his dependence on Rwanda and 
Uganda, which had helped him to succeed. In July 1998, the Rwandan soldiers that had joined 
his troops were dismissed. He also ordered the closure of the border between the ORC and 
Rwanda to the Rwandan Army, which was until then free to move. Both Rwanda and Uganda 
accused the Congolese govemment of supporting rebel movements in their own countries. 
They were also disappointed about the ,share of Congolese mineral resources - in particular 
gold and diamond - from which they benefited in retum from their support. Finally, 'Kabila ex-
cluded the Banyamulenge from power, preferring people from his home province of Katanga. 
All these events led to a new conflict in the North-Kivu from August 1998. It involved, on one 
side troops from Rwanda, Uganda, the Banyamulenge, and other groups hostile to Kabila, and 
on the other the Congolese army, and groups including Rwandan and Ugandan rebels and Hutu 
extremist militias (ICG, 1998b; Bames, 1999; de Villers and Omasombo Tshonda, 2002). An-
gola, Namibia and Zimbabwe supported Kabila's regime but did not take part in the war in the 
North-Kivu. The new war further contributed to the acceleration of the collapse of Kivu's econ-
omy, which was mostly dependent on humanitarian aid, plantations and mines. The main dam-
aging factors were the disappearance of refugee camps and security conditions made difficult' 
for humanitarian intervention 1 (Ooyle, 2004), combined with a 60 per cent reduction in the price 
of coffee due to its poor quality, and the closure of most of the main mineral trade counters in 
Goma and Bukavu (Bames, 1999). 
In July and August 1999, an accord was signed in Zambia's capital, Lusaka by all govemments 
involved in the conflict. A ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign troops was agreed, along 
with the deployment of UN peace-keeping forces (Leymarie, 2001). This accord was never re-
spected, apart from the deployment of UN military observers MONUC2 (Smis and Oyatambwe, 
2002), whose mandate later evolved towards peace-keeping. In the view of most observers, 
Kabila himself, seen as violent and corrupt, was one of the main obstacles to peace. His as-
sassination, by one of his bodyguards, on the 16th of January 2001, and replacement by his 29 
years old son, Joseph, the head of the army, was therefore seen as a reason to hope for a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict (Braeckman, 2001). Under Joseph Kabila, a new peace ac-
cord was signed and, in 2003, all foreign troops claimed to have withdrawn, with th~ exception 
of the 16,000 men-strong MONUC contingent (The Economist, 2003c). Some of the foreign 
troops seemed nonetheless to have remained in the country (Peta, 2003). Fighting between 
Congolese troops and increasingly fragmented rebel groups continued in the Kivu region, which 
remains unstable. A study carried out by the NGO Intemational Rescue Committee in 2004, es-
timated to 3.3 million the total number of deaths due to war in the ORC, with death rates in the' 
1 Trade around immense refugee camps had become an important economic activity for the region. 
2 'Mission de I'ONU en Republique Democratique du Congo': United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. 
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East more than one third higher than in the West (Coghlan et al., 2006). It has become the sin-
gle country having suffered the worst massacres since the Second World War (Peta, 2003) . 
• The war in Ituri: 1999 to 2006 
In recent years, the Itun region has been the theatre for another bloody war in the eastem part 
of the ORC. Its population, aCcording to the aid agencies working there, is 4.5 million 
(OCHAlIRIN, 2002). Two of the main ethnic groups in this region are the Hema and the Lendu. 
They both occupy the fertile highlands of the region. This region is also rich in mineral resources 
- in particular gold, the largest deposit in the world - which made it particularly attractive for 
the Belgian. colonial power. Belgium developed plantations and mines. Whilst most of the infra-
structure was in Lendu territory, the Hemas were given priority in education and employment in 
the local administration. The Lendus worked in plantations and mines. Following decolonization, 
the Hema conserved their predominant position and supported Mobutu's regime. In 1973, a 
land law declared all vacant land as the property of the state. This was a negation of customary 
law and helped the Hemas to further consolidate their advantage. The growing rivalry between 
the two groups was the main topic of political campaigns during the 'democratizati.on' of 
Mobutu's regime in the early 1990s. Ethnicity proved to be a more powerful instrument for nio~ 
bilisation than ideology: Clashes between communities occurred in 1966, 1973, 1990 and 1997, 
but they were resolved through 'mechanisms of local resolution' before they managed to esca-
late. With the fall of the Mobutu regime, these mechanisms disappeared and in June 1999, a 
large-scale conflict between Hema and Lendu erupted while war was raging in the Kivu region 
(ICG, 2003a; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004). Violence spread beyond Hema and Lendu 
homelands and touched all communities. After AOFL uprising, Uganda occupied the territory 
and played an active role in manipulating the numerous rebel movements and their leaders 
(ICG,2003a). 
The first wave of violence, in June 1999, left 7,000 civilians dead and displaced 150,000 people . 
. The total absence of judicial power led to a fear of a Rwanda-like extermination (ICG, 2003a). 
Horrendous massacres took place (Keane, 2003) and provoked to the intervention of French 
troops in July 2003, replaced by MONUC forces three month later (ICG, 2004). There were 
more massive displacements, and by 2002, the number of lOPs was estimated at 500,000. The 
city of Bunia, at the heart of the territory, received 100,000 lOPs (OCHAlIRIN, 2002). By 2006, 
16,000 former fighters had willingly handed over their weapons but instability remained in the 
territory (IRIN, 2006). 
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5) Haiti 
• Doomed from the start: 1804 to 1915 
The country, founded in 1804, was the first independent black nation (Fatt6n, 2006). A former 
French possession, it used to be the richest sugar plantation colony in the world. It gained inde-
pendence following a 12 years. bloody war between black slaves and white colonists. The new 
country was immediately isolated on the international scene by Western powers concerned 
about a possible propagation of its aspiration for freedom (Maguire et aI., 1996). In 1825, 
France required, in exchange for its recognition of Haiti, the payment of an indemnity of 150 mil-
lion francs. This payment compromised economic development and was a cause for popular 
discontent. The United States only recognised Haiti in 1862 (Fatton, 2006). 
Ever since its origins, Haitian society has been profoundly divided according to the colour of the 
skin. A few monthsafter independence, thenew head of state'ordered all French nationals re-
maining on the island to be exterminated (Bloch, 2004). The mulattos replaced them as the po-
litical and economic elite, in a country under the military rule of those who fought for its inde-
pendence. Most of its plantation-based economic structure was maintained and the working 
conditions where not significantly different from what prevailed in colonial times (Fatton, 2006). 
At the independence, 90 per cent of Haitians had been slaves until the abolition of slavery by 
the French constitution in 1794. 95 per cent of them were illiterate. Adding to the misery, the 
country was governed by a succession of despots, many of whom had to flee popular uprisings 
or were assassinated (The Economist, 1994a) . 
• The American occupation and its consequences: 1915 to 1957 
Despite imposing a commercial embargo during the first years of Haiti's independence, the 
United States soon became the country's main trade-partner. Already in 1823, the 'Monroe Doc-
trine', named after President James Monroe, declared the American continent a zone of Ameri-
can interest. This policy obliged the United States to intervene when the political situation wors-
ened in Haiti during the few years before 1915 (The Economist, 1994a). US troops invaded the 
country to restore order and to. keep Germans out of the coutry since, at the time, the First 
World War was raging in Europe (Maguire et aI., 1996). American occupation lasted 19 years. It 
contributed to the disbanding of what remained of the revolutionary army but also to the creation 
of a fust-growing guerrilla resistance: the. 'Ca co' rebellion (Bloch, 2004). The United States 
trained a new Haitian army, built roads and bridges and improved telecommunications in order 
in ensure efficient occupation. They also improved sanitation and health facilities. Members of 
the commercial elite were chosen to govern but the choice did not stand the withdrawal of 
American troops in 1934. A stronger government army, allied to the local mulatto bourgeoisie, 
seized power soon after, and kept it until 1956. 
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.• The Duvalier dictatorship: 1957 to 1986 
A medical doctor: Franc;ois Duvalier1 was elected president in 1957. He was a follower of the 
'Noirisme' movement, who lauded African identity and adopted Voodoo religion as a source of 
inspiration. 'Noirisme' disapproved of the adaptation of the Haitian society to European culture 
and on this basis, Duvalier promised a revolution (Bloch, 2004). What actually happened was 
the transfer of power from the armed forces to a new political elite: the 'Duvalierists' .. The Mu-
latto bourgeoisie was attacked by the govemment using a highly politicized para~military force 
dubbed the 'Tonton Macoute'. Many fled to France, the United States and Canada. The poor 
black majority remained, became poorer, and lived under a regime of terror. The US govem-
ment tolerated this govemment because it was considered as a barrier against communism, a 
consideration all the more important, given the proximity of Cuba. Duvalier took advantage from 
this leverage whilst maintaining links with the Soviet block (Smith, 1993; Maguire et aI., 1996). 
Duvalier proclaimed himself 'preSident for life'. When he died of illness in 1971, his son, Jean-
Claude2 succeeded him with the same title. At 19, he became the youngest head of state in the 
world and was dubbed 'Baby doc'. In the first years of his govemment, Jean-Claude Duvalier 
promised to work at improving the economy and living conditions of his people. Yet, whilst the 
commercial elite retumed home and money from intemational donors started flowing into devel-
opment projects - mostly for Port-au-Prince - the main beneficiaries of these improvements 
remained the 'Duvalierists'. In the early 1980s, one per cent of Haiti's population controlled 55 
per cent of its GNP, whilst 75 per cent lived in absolute povertl. During this period, as the 
economic situation seriously deteriorated, many Haitians tried to flee the country on improvised 
boats. Between January and October 1980, 13,500 reached the coasts of Florida (Maguire et 
aI., 1996). 
At the beginning of 1986, poverty and despair forced thousands of people to demonstrate in 
several cities throughout the country, where they confronted the 'Tonton Macoute'. Jean-Claude 
Duvalier had lost support from the United States and was forced into exile in France, in Febru-
ary (Chamberlain, 1986; Fishlock, 1986; Maguire et aI., 1996) . 
• An aborted transition: 1986 to 1994 
Duvalier's regime was replaced by a 'National Goveming Council' (CNG), whose mission was to 
, 
lead the country to elections. A new constitution was written and approved by popular vote in 
1987. While the mulatto bourgeoisie was looking for a status quo, the black majority wanted 
radical changes. New political parties emerged among sporadic violence, such as the July 1987 
massacre of several hundred of peasants, who were demonstrating to obtain agrarian reform. 
1 Dubbed 'Papa Doe'. 
2 Dubbed 'Baby Doe'. 
3 The situation is almost unchanged today, according to BBC News (BBC News, 2006a). 
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'Lavalas,1, a left-wing movement, became especially popular among the poor. Its leader was a 
former catholic priest: Jean-Bertrand Aristide (Maguire et aI., 1996). 
Aristide's victory in December 1990s presidential elections, the first free elections in the coun-
try's history, was seen as a success for the marginalized black majority (Mangones, 2001). His 
discourse, inspired by the 'Noirisme' that brought Duvalier to power, emphasized Black man's 
dignity and promised to give power to the poor (Bloch, 2004; Fatton, 2006). Aristide was elected 
by two thirds of the voters, but people neglected parliamentary and municipal elections, won by 
candidates supporting Haiti's ruling class. They could hardly tolerate a pro-poor president in 
power and tried to prevent him from taking office by attempting a coup in January 1991 that 
failed (Maguire et aI., 1996). From his inauguration in February 1991, Aristide made use of his 
immense popularity to push ahead reforms, with support from intemational funding institutions. 
His action however lasted less than eight months. On the 29th of September 1991, a new coup 
attempt, staged by the army with the support of the CIA, succeeded in overthrowing the newly-
elected preSident, who sought refuge in the United States (Maguire et aI., 1996; Lemoine, 
2004). Brigadier-General Raoul Cadras was brought to power in the midst of a street battle in 
Port-au-Prince that left 1,500 dead (Adams, 1991; Cockbum, 1993). The military regime estab-
lished a regime of terror in order to prevent any attempt to retum of the former president. In to-
tal, between 3,000 and 5,000 'Lavalas' militants were killed or considered 'disappeared' during 
the coup d'atat. Repression including assassinations, politically motivated rape, and arbitrary ar-
rests, forced an estimated 300,000 people to flee their homes (Gunson, 1996; Mangones, 2001; 
Lemoine, 2004). Intemational sanctions, encouraged by Aristide from exile (Lemoine, 2004), 
made poverty even more dramatic. Between 1991 and 1994, the NGO Care fed 600,000 Hai-
tians- a day. Many tried to escape to the United States on boats. On the 16th of July 1994 alone, 
3,000 of them were picked up by the American coast-guards (O'Kane and Maggie, 1994). Dur-
ing a two-month peak period that year, this number was 21,000 (The Economist,1994a) . 
• American intervention and a new transition: 1994 to 2000 
Given the constant worsening of the situation in Haiti, the United-States, under the presidency 
of a recently-elected Bill Clinton, decided on a new intervention,' which had the support of the 
United Nations Security Council. It was in part the result of intense lobbying from Aristide's sup-
- porters groups, and was intend to stop the flow of boat-people. In September 1994, The opera-
tion 'Uphold Democracy' brought 20,000 US-troops to Haiti (The Economist, 1994a; Maguire et 
al., 1996; Lemoine, 2004; Fatton, 2006). The step-down of the military regime was negotiated, 
amid police violence and fears of reactions from pro-military militias (The Economist, 1994b). 
New presidential elections were organised in December 1995 to which the country's constitution 
did not allow Aristide to be candidate. Rena Preval, his friend and former prime minister, was 
1 'The cleanSing flood: 
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elected. Aristide remained in control, behind the scenes. The former champion of the poor re-
tumed from exile with a different agenda. He had become a promoter of neo-liberalism, and im-
posed on the govemment measures unlikely to improve living conditions for the poor, which had 
considerably worsened during the embargo. Govemmental instability did not help. In June 1997, 
the prime minister resigned and his position remained vacant for several months. Meanwhile, 
Aristide and members of his party were. increasingly prone to clientelism 1 and nepotism (Fatton, 
2006). The former priest of the poor had become extremely rich and owned an immense villa 
built in Port-au-Prince's upperoo<;lass district. He nevertheless retained popular support and won 
presidential elections in November 2000, which were widely considered as fraudulent, (Comu, 
2004; Lemoine, 2004) . 
• Aristide's second presidency: 2000 to 2004 
Under Aristide's autocratic rule, poverty and unemployment reached alarming heights and po-
litical crises continued. The army he dissolved in 1994 was replaced by militias, such as the 
'Chime res' he controlled. Many of their members lived in the slums of Port-au-Prince and other 
cities. Their blind violence was not significantly different from what the country experienced with 
the 'Tontons Macoute.' (Cornu, 2004; Lemoine, 2004). The regime tumed into what Fatton 
(2006:125) calls a 'predatory democracy' i.e.: 
'A system of govemance based on a zero-sum game of power in which factions 
of the political class fight for supremacy: elected officials at the highest level are 
controlled by opaque private forces; elections are held regularly and are usually 
fraudulent; and public administrators claim to save the constitution by continu-
ously violating its spirits and its laws.' 
The regime's popularity among the poor quickly dropped (The Economist, 2003a)~ In December 
2001, an attempted coup was organised, for which the govemment blamed the opposition. Its 
'Chime res' responded by buming the offices and homes of opposition leaders (The Economist, 
2001a). Armed rebel groups were organised from the neighbouring Dominican Republic. They 
included ex-members of Cadras' army and police and were supported by both the United States 
and Dominican govemments (Lemoine, 2004). When one of the 'Chimeres' former leaders in 
the city of Gonaives changed sides and was assassinated in September 2003, it triggered a re-
bellion in which groups coming from the Dominican republic took the lead (Fatton, 2006, Comu 
2004). After Gonaives, the rebels took Haiti's second largest city, Cap-Haitien, and headed to 
Port-au-Prince, which was defended by only 5,000 policemen and troubled by violent demon-
strations (Gubert, 2004; Williams and Loomis, 2004; Warren, 2005). It was taken by rebels in 
February 2004. Aristide was forced to resign and to leave the country, while Canada, France 
and the United States sent peace-keeping troops (Malveaux et al., 2004). They were later re-
1 'A social or administrative system which depends upon relationships of patronage, favouritism, and self-
interested exchange; a political culture which emphasizes or exploits such relationships; the practice of such 
relations' Oxford English Dictionary. 
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placed by the 8,300 troops of a United Nations contingent: MINUSTAH1 • This however did not 
, entirely stop violence, in particular in the slums of Port-au-Prince and most notoriously in the the 
largest one: 'Cite Solei I' (The Economist, 2004a; The Economist, 2004b; The Economist, 
2005a). 
A transitional govemment was put in place and prepared elections staged in February 2006. 
They were won by former-president Rene Preval with 51 per cent of the votes. 
6) Grozny, Chechnya 
) • From colonization to deportation: 1859 to 1957 
Russian incursions into the North Caucasus started in the 17th and 18th centuries when Cos-
saks2 settled in the area, encouraged by Tsar Peter the Great, whose intention was to open a 
trading route to India. Between 1817 and 1864, a guerrilla-war raged In the North Caucasus be-
tween the Russian army and Chechen rebels, lead by Imam Shamil (German, 2003). It is be-
lieved that this war mobilized up to 300,000 Russian troops, of which 50,000 were killed (Nau-
det, 1995). In 1859, Imam Shamil was vanquished and the territory integrated into the Russian 
empire (German, 2003). In 1818, General Alexei Yermolov founded a new fortress in the North 
Caucasus that he called 'Groznaya', meaning 'Terrible' or 'Formidable' (de Waal, 2001 :xiv). It 
was to become the city of Grozny. 
In 1893, oil was discovered near Grozny and thousands of Russian oil workers were sent to the 
area. Chechnya was tumed into a major oil production and refinement centre (German, 2003). 
Under the Soviet Union, Chechnya became an autonomous region3 in 1922. In 1934, it was 
merged with Ingushetia (German, 2003). Moscow was unable to co-opt Chechen leaders into 
joining their cause and most of the local rulers were outsiders. Chechens considered Russians 
as occupiers and this led to a number of uprisings in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1944, Chechens 
and Ingush were the largest ethnic group to be deported to Northem Kazakhstan by Stalin for 
alleged collaboration with the German ocCupant during the Second World War. 500,000 people 
were displaced; one third of whom died in' the process. They remained in Kazakhstan until 
1957, when Stalin's successor, Kruschev, rehabilitated them (Colarusso, 1995; Lapidus, 1998; 
German, 2003) . 
• First Chechnya war: 1989 to 1997, 
The 1957 rehabilitation was inadequate and there were continuous disputes over land among 
retumees. It is believed to be one of the reasons for the war that unfolded 35 years later. 
1 'Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation d'Hai'ti' : United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. 
> Warlike Turl<lsh people now subject to Russia, occupying the parts north of the Black Sea. From them the Poles 
organised a body of light horsemen, in which capacity they fanned an important element of the Russian anny' 
Oxford English Dictionary. 
3 'Oblast' 
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Among other causes of instability were issues such as the constant discrimination against Che-
. chens and Ingush imposed by the Russian-run administration (Colarusso, 1995), along with 
high levels of unemployment, which obliged many Chechens to look for work in other regions of 
the USSR (German, 2003). 
From 1989, the Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev, engaged in a number of reforms of the 
North Caucasus' govemment institutions. For the first time, a native, Doku Zavgayev, was ap-
pointed First Secretary of the Republican Communist Party for Checheno-Ingushetia. There 
was also more freedom for opposition and, a year later, the only Chechen general in the Soviet 
army, Dzhokar Dudayev, emerged as a nationalist leader fiercely opposed to the communist 
rule. Following a declaration of sovereignty in 1990, Chechnya took advantage of the collapse 
of the USSR in 1991 to split from the Russian Federation. Zavgayev, who had become un-
popular due to his inability to undertake reforms, was forced to resign and parliamentary and 
presidential elections were staged in October. They were won by Dudayev (Colarusso, 1995; 
German, 2003) and a declaration of independence followed immediately. It caused the massive 
exodus of most of the 300,000 ethnic-Russians living in the secessionist republic (German, 
2003). In November, Ingushetia, which preferred remaining in the Russian Federation, sepa-
rated from Chechnya (Colarusso, 1995). 
The independence of Chechnya was rejected by the Russian Federation and, despite attempts, 
in 1992, to achieve a negotiated solution to the crisis, no solution was found. In addition to 
threats from Russia, Dudayev, who was an authoritarian and erratic leader, had his own do~ 
mestic problems. Salaries and pensions were no longer paid by Moscow and skilled Russian 
workers, on which the oil industry depended, had left. This led to greater economic hardship. 
The govemment was confronted with mounting opposition, and Dudyaev escaped an assassi-
nation attempt in 1993. The same year he dissolved parliament, amid Constant violation of hu-
man rights. Moscow supported certain opposition groups. In November 1994, one of them at-
tacked Grozny with 1,500 fighters. The attempt failed and the group was captured along with 
their weapons (Colarusso, 1995; German, 2003). 
Following a number of ultimatums ignored by Grozny, Russian troops finally intervened, enter-
ing Chechnya from three directions on the 11th of December 1994. By the 25th of December, 
they were besieging Grozny (Colarusso, 1995). Most of the civilians remaining in the city were 
ethnic Russians, who had nowhere else to go. Estimations of their number varied between 
60,000 (Drysdale et aI., 2000:218) and 150,000, depending on the sources, out of 400,000 in-
habitants (The Economist, 1994d; Higgins, 1995). The assault on Grozny was hurried and iII-
prepared. It relied on heavy bombardment and, at its peak, 4,000 shells and bombs an hour 
were dropped on the city. More than 25,000 civilians died as a result (Colarusso, 1995:334). 
The presidential palace fell on the 19th of January 1995. By then, an estimated 200 buildings 
had been hit, including the parliament and the national bank (Beeston, 1994). It was the effec-
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tive fall of Grozny but not the end of the war, which continued in mountain areas (German, 
2003). Another major assault on Grozny, towards the end of the war, took place on the 6th of 
August 1996 (Beeston, 1996). More than 400,000 civilians were displaced as a result of com-
bats .. The majority of them went to Ingushetia. Russian troops suffered heavy losses, without 
being able to defeat the insurgency, and a cease-fire was signed in Khasavyurt, Daghestan, on 
the 31 st of August 1996, followed by the withdrawal of the Russian army. Dudayev, who had 
been killed in 1994, was replaced by the leader of Chechen fighters, Asian Mashadov, elected 
president in January 1997 (Lapidus, 1998:21-24) . 
• Second Chechnya war: 1999-2006 
In September 1999, four bomb explosions in apartment-blocks of Russia and Daghestan, gave 
a pretext to the Russian govemment of the newly-appointed prime minister Vladimir Putin to re-
sume war in Chechnya (de "Yaal, 2001:xiv). It started a month later, in October, with the bomb-
ing of Grozny's market, which left dozens of ci~mans dead (Gentleman and Bohlen, 1999). On 
the 14th of December, following a week of bombardment that flattened most of what remained of 
the city, the Russian army entered Grozny, with three times as many troops as during the first 
campaign (Quinn-Judge, 1999; Whittell, 1999a; Whittell, 1999b). The bombardments had forced 
185,000 civilians to flee the city but 30 to 50,000 people could not leave (Gentleman and Boh-
len, 1999; Quinn-Judge, 2000). By the end of 1999, the Russian army had retaken 60 per cent 
of the territory of Chechnya (Quinn-Judge, 2000) and imposed its rule. The following years were 
marked by continuous guerrilla operations. A number of terrorist attacks from Chechen groups 
targeted Moscow - most notoriously the hostage-taking at Dubrovka Streefs theatre - as well 
as in the Caucasus - hostage-taking at Beslan's primary school. These two examples both 
ended tragically. Meanwhile the Chechen population suffered constant persecution from the 
Russian occupant, with countless massacres, destruction of property, torture and arbitrary ar-
rests (Nivat, 2003). Westem govemments remained largely indifferent to human rights abuses 
in Chechnya. It contributed to increase the feeling of isolation and injustice present among Che-
chens ever since their deportation (Furman, 2002). 
It is estimated that about 100,000 people have been killed - and many more displaced - dur-
ing the two campaigns (The Economist, 2005b). In 2000, Grozny was in the same state as 
Dresden after the Second World War. A year later there was still no electricity or telephone. 
Only gas supply was partially restored. Russian authorities allegedly earmarked about 500 mil-
lion USD1 for reconstruction, but progress has been desperately slow (Steele, 2001). 
1 350 million United Kingdom Pounds. 
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